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In recent years, oil has become a dominant feature of the Nigerian economy. For almost two decades, 
the Niger Delta region – where the oil is primarily situated – has been engulfed in crisis which 
continues to prove adverse to the socio-economic development of the country. Many have argued that 
the unrest in the region is rooted in the inability of MNCs to act in a socially responsible manner. The 
MNCs argue that the various CSR projects they have initiated and implemented should be enough to 
satisfy host-communities. 
This research seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge in this area. It assesses whether CSR in its 
contemporary form is capable of making a significant contribution to the resolution of the Niger Delta 
crisis. It examines the nature of contemporary CSR in the context of the essentially neoliberal forms 
of corporate governance which have risen to dominance in recent years. In the course of the research, 
the thesis identifies and separates for analytical purposes, a number of interconnected but 
distinguishable barriers that render the CSR practices of MNCs ineffective – ideological, practical and 
political barriers. It suggests that these barriers, rooted mainly in the Anglo-American neoliberal 
shareholder value model of corporate governance and promoted by international organizations 
including the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF, militate against the realization of effective CSR, 
both in Nigeria specifically and, perhaps more generally. 
It argues that given the current dominance of the ‘maximizing shareholder value’ model of corporate 
governance – both in Nigeria and internationally – it will not be advisable to pin too much hope in 
CSR as a solution to the problems in the region. Neither the culture of corporations, nor the pressures 
to which they are currently subjected encourage socially responsible behaviour. The thesis equally 
argues that the problem in Nigeria is exacerbated by the country’s political situation and the close 
links between MNCs and key state officials. 
In view of the arguments developed in the thesis, one of its main conclusions is that the existence and 
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Oil has come to be the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. At present, it is by some distance the 
country’s most important export commodity, accounting for over 80 per cent of her revenue and 95 
per cent of her foreign exchange earnings.
1
 As a result, it plays a crucial role in the country’s economy 
and will continue to do so into the future. The oil industry – situated primarily in the Niger Delta 
region of the country – encompasses both the federal government and subsidiaries of oil multinational 
corporations (MNCs) such as Shell, Chevron, Total and ExxonMobil.
2
  
The centrality of oil mining and the attendant revenue accruable from it to the Nigerian state 
cannot be over-emphasised. This explains why the crisis rocking the oil-producing region continues to 
prove adverse to the socio-economic development of the country. The militant activities of the Niger 
Delta youths have resulted in huge losses of revenue to both the corporations and the federal 
government. In 2008, the country lost over N14 billion (US$86, 184 million) in revenue as a result of 
the unrest in the region.
3
 This increased to over N15 billion (US$92, 340 million) in 2010
4
 and to 
more than N21 billion (US$127,785 million) in 2012.
5
 The inference to be drawn from this is that if 
                                                             
1
 S Pegg and N Zabbey, ‘Oil and Water: The Bodo Spills and the Destruction of Traditional Livelihood Structures 
in the Niger Delta’ (2013) Community Development Journal Vol. 48 (3) 391–405 at 393; See also SF Iwejingi, 
‘Socio-Economic Problems of Oil Exploration and Exploitation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta’ (2013) Journal of Energy 
Technologies and Policy Vol. 3(1) 76 
2
 JC Ebegbulem, D Ekpe and TO Adejumo, ‘Oil Exploration and Poverty in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A 
Critical Analysis’ (2013) International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 4 (3) 280 
3
 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Annual Statistical Bulletin (2008) NNPC Website 
<http://www.nnpcgroup.com/Portals/0/Monthly%20Performance/2008%20ASB%201st%20Edition%20Web.p
df> accessed 19 November 2013 
4 See NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2010) NNPC Website 
<http://www.nnpcgroup.com/Portals/0/Monthly%20Performance/2010%20ASB%201st%20edition.pdf> 
accessed 19 November 2013 
5 See NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2012) NNPC Website 
<http://www.nnpcgroup.com/Portals/0/Monthly%20Performance/2012%20ASB%201st%20edition.pdf> 
accessed 19 November 2013 
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the country is to achieve a significant level of sustainable development in the future, there is a 
pressing need to find a workable solution to the crisis. 
This thesis focuses on the attempts to deploy the idea of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
to control and moderate the activities of the multinational oil corporations (MNCs) operating in the 
Niger Delta area of Nigeria. The backdrop is an Amnesty International report, published in 2009, 
which looks at the operations of these corporations and the consequences of their actions on both 
people and the environment. This report, entitled Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the 
Niger Delta,
6
 gives a detailed account of the degree of human and environmental destruction 
occasioned by the exploration and extraction of oil mineral in this part of Nigeria. 
Considerable damage has been done to the ecosystem by oil spillage, gas flaring, seismic 
surveys, construction of pipelines, dredging which causes environmental damage, inadequate clean up 
and negligent waste disposal, amongst many other things. In recent years, there has also been an 
increasing loss of life and property, occasioned in part by the intensified militant activities of the 
people of the Niger Delta. Many have argued that the unrest in the region is rooted in the inability of 
MNCs to act in a socially responsible manner.
7
 The MNCs argue that the various CSR projects they 
have initiated and implemented should be enough to satisfy host-communities. The host-communities 
disagree and insist that the CSR initiatives of oil corporations are hypocritical and self-serving. The 
consequence of these arguments and counter-arguments is a region enmeshed in armed conflict and a 
country reeling from dwindling oil revenues.  
I had originally intended to focus my research on the behaviour of MNCs in the region and to 
assess the extent to which they have in fact been acting in a socially responsible way. My goal was to 
identify ways that might make them act in a more socially responsible manner. As I began to 
investigate the issues, however, new ones arose. For instance, after looking at the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance, which has become progressively more dominant globally in recent 
decades and which seems to have increasingly shaped the behaviour and culture of these corporations, 
                                                             
6
 See Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta’ (2009) Amnesty 
International Publication <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/017/2009/en/e2415061-da5c-
44f8-a73c-a7a4766ee21d/afr440172009en.pdf>  accessed 19 November 2013 
7
 See chapter Two where this is discussed in details 
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I began to wonder whether it was realistic to expect them to behave responsibly, when their 
governance regimes and the environment in which they operate seem to propel them in a very 
different direction.  
In the course of the research, it became clear to me that corporate managers, in significant 
part because of the market imperatives to which they are subject, are under immense pressure to 
prioritize ‘shareholder value’ above all other goals. This state of affairs is justified by the radically 
shareholder-oriented, Anglo-American theories and models of corporate governance which have 
become increasingly dominant in recent decades.  Within these theories, the rights and interests of 
non-shareholders – so-called stakeholders such as employees, customers, and the community at large 
– are entirely secondary, in the absence of rights protected by law or acquired through contract. In this 
context, CSR is almost inevitably marginal and ameliorative in nature: it seeks only to make sure that 
the maximization of shareholder value is not pursued to such an extent that it totally disregards the 
impact of a corporation’s operations on the larger society. Moreover, contemporary CSR relies almost 
entirely on self-regulation by corporations; it is voluntaristic.
8
 What this means, in essence, is that 
contemporary CSR and respect for the rights of stakeholders depends on voluntary action by 
corporations themselves. It has to come voluntarily from within, rather than being imposed on 
corporations from without.   
In keeping with the neoliberal market-based model of economic and social development, with 
its emphasis on free trade, freedom of movement for capital and limited state intervention in and 
regulation of economic affairs, contemporary CSR promotes not the legal regulation of corporations 
by the state, but self-regulation by corporations themselves. Indeed, its emphasis on voluntarism and 
self-regulation is one of its defining characteristics. From this perspective, contemporary CSR is 
arguably part and parcel of neoliberalism.  
 
 
                                                             
8 Paddy Ireland and Renginee G Pillay ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in a Neoliberal Age’ in P Ytting and J. 





Research Questions, Key Aims and Hypothesis 
 
The recasting of the purpose of the thesis led me to revise my research questions. In the first place, 
given the essentially neoliberal underpinnings of contemporary CSR, to what extent can it be an 
effective solution to the crisis in the Niger Delta? Or to put it in another way; is contemporary 
corporate governance, with its neoliberal focus on maximizing shareholder value, fundamentally 
antithetical to effective CSR practices? Again, are there barriers to effective CSR and are these 
barriers purely ideological? Furthermore, is the seeming failure of MNCs to engage meaningfully in 
effective socially responsible behaviour rooted in the economic pressures they face and in the 
existence of corporate governance mechanisms embedding shareholder value, or is this failure 
attributable to the peculiar situation in Nigeria? Finally, given the questions above, is there any hope 
for the Niger Delta and Nigeria? 
In attempting to answer these questions, I will seek to examine the CSR practices of MNCs 
in the Niger Delta and to briefly assess how effective these practices have been in providing 
solutions to the crisis in the area. I will also examine the tension that exists between neoliberal 
ideology (and by implication, that of shareholder value) and the idea of CSR, in order to ascertain 
whether they are compatible or incompatible. I will then move on to assess what I call the barriers to 
effective CSR. The thesis seeks to show that the barriers to effective CSR are not purely ideological; 
that there are also practical and political obstacles militating against the realization of effective CSR, 
both in Nigeria specifically and, perhaps, more generally. 
In this thesis, I will argue that given the current dominance of the ‘maximizing shareholder 
value’ model of corporate governance – both in Nigeria and internationally – we cannot pin too much 
hope in CSR as a solution to the problems in the Niger Delta. Neither the culture of corporations, nor 
the pressures to which they are currently subjected encourage socially responsible behaviour. 
Moreover, the problem in Nigeria is exacerbated by the country’s political situation and the close 







This thesis seeks to assess whether CSR in its contemporary form is capable of making a significant 
contribution to the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis. To this end, it examines the nature of 
contemporary CSR in the context of the essentially neoliberal forms of corporate governance which 
have risen to dominance. In recent decades, it is argued, the goal of maximizing shareholder value has 
increasingly shaped the character and culture of corporations (including those in the Niger Delta). Is 
the pursuit of shareholder value compatible with meaningful CSR? Or does the pursuit of shareholder 
value overwhelm any attempt to realize effective CSR?
9
 
The thesis is divided into two parts (I and II) and proceeds as follows; 
Part one, made up of two chapters; provides a brief introductory narrative of the Niger Delta conflict 
and the claim by MNCs in the region that CSR can be an important part of a solution. 
Chapter one offers an insight into the Nigerian oil industry (including the Niger Delta 
region) and the legal regulation of the industry. It begins with a critical assessment of the oil industry 
in Nigeria and the various legislations, licences and contracts which regulate the sector. It argues that 
as a result of many factors which are present in the Nigerian socio-political system, the various 
legislations appear ineffective as a regulatory mechanism for the conduct of oil exploitation in the 
country. The chapter also looks at the roles played by the Nigerian government, the oil MNCs and the 
host communities in the conflict in the region. It suggests that the implication of the petroleum 
contracts between the NNPC and the oil corporations is that they afford the latter the freedom to 
operate with little or no regard for the environment. This, it contends, is one of the causes of the crisis 
in the Niger Delta.  
Chapter Two investigates the CSR claims of oil corporations in the area. It begins with a 
review of the existing literature on the CSR practices of MNCs in the Niger Delta and what amounts 
                                                             
9 As a literature-based study, documents emanating from the region will be utilized, as well as documents from 
the wider world. Primary and secondary sources including text books, journal articles, Nigerian government 
gazettes and legislations, corporate websites and reliable internet sources will be consulted. 
6 
 
to sustainable development for the people of the region. It then proceeds to look at the 
internationalization of the Niger Delta conflict and the growing international pressures exerted on oil 
corporations by such groups as the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Green Peace, 
Friends of the Earth, the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) etc. It contends that 
the MNCs eventually resorted to CSR as a reaction to these pressures. The chapter traces the various 
activities which are depicted by the MNCs as evidence of their socially responsible behaviour. 
However, it suggests that a distinction needs to be drawn between philanthropic CSR acts 
such as the building of schools, roads, hospitals etc., and the more demanding CSR duty to refrain 
from harming the ecosystem – sometimes referred to as the duty of care owed by MNCs to the 
environment.
10
 The failure of the MNCs to discharge this duty lies at the heart of the crisis in the area. 
The seeming inability, or refusal, of oil MNCs to care for the environment has clearly created a 
negative perception of corporate activities by host-communities. It is clear, it is suggested, that many 
people in the Niger Delta do not believe in the MNCs’ claims that they are behaving in a socially 
responsible manner; and that they have good reasons for this belief. The question is why?    
Part Two is made up of three chapters and seeks to identify and separate for analytical 
purposes, a number of inter-connected but distinguishable barriers to effective CSR: ideological, 
practical and political. The part equally explores these barriers to effective CSR in the Nigerian 
context and argues that they are also present in the Nigerian situation, rendering it unlikely that CSR in 
its contemporary form will do much to resolve the problems found in Niger Delta. 
Chapter Three is divided into two sections; sections one and two. In section one, the 
ideological barriers to effective CSR – neoliberalism and shareholder value – are analysed. The 
analysis begins by looking at the decline in the 1920s and1930s of the idea that corporations were 
purely private enterprises to be run only in the interests of shareholders – so-called shareholder 
primacy. Moving on, it examines the rise of the idea of the socially responsible corporation and the 
belief that corporations should not be simply seeking to maximize profits for shareholders, but should 
rather, be seeking to balance a range of different interests. However, beginning from the 1970s, there 
was a backlash against the idea of the socially responsible corporation, and the 1980s and 1990s saw 
                                                             
10
 Equally known as negative injunction duties 
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the rise of the idea that corporate managers should be seeking to maximize ‘shareholder value’. The 
ideological re-assertion of shareholder primacy that resulted did not however occur in isolation. It was 
part and parcel of the rise to prominence (and eventual hegemony) of neoliberal theories about 
economic and social development in the international financial architecture.  
The section, therefore, also examines the rise of the neoliberal theories of economic and 
social development which rose to prominence during this period. It suggests that neoliberalism is a 
developmental theory which champions free markets and takes an anti-state stance which is rhetorical. 
In this sense, it encourages precisely the voluntarism and self-regulation which lies at the heart of 
contemporary CSR. For this reason, it is arguable that contemporary CSR is consonant with both 
neoliberal ideas and shareholder value. The section will also explore what makes neoliberalism new,
11
 
and what differentiates it from classical liberalism. Neoliberals, it is suggested, recognize that markets 
are not natural but have to be created and maintained by the state. The rise of neoliberalism can be 
attributed in part to the failure of classical liberal ideas about natural and self-regulating free markets 
in the 1920s-1930s, and to the fear of state regulation and of the threats posed to market-based social 
and economic arrangements by Communism, Fascism and Keynesianism. The section concludes by 
arguing that there is a fundamental  tension between ideas about the desirability of socially 
responsible corporate behaviour (CSR) and the belief that it is to the benefit of society as a whole for 




Section Two of the chapter explores the paradigm shift in Nigeria which began in the late 
1970s, from Keynesianism to neoliberalism, and which led to the eventual domination of neoliberal 
and shareholder value ideologies in the country. The section also examines the impact of this major 
shift in economic thinking on the policies pursued by the Nigerian state, particularly in relation to the 
activities of multinational oil corporations operating in the country. It argues that by adopting and 
implementing neoliberal ideological reforms, including the promotion of the primacy of shareholder 
                                                             
11 That is a brief history of neoliberalism 
12
 See for instance, Milton Friedman’s ‘the Social Responsibility of Corporations is to Profit Maximise’ discussed 
in chapter Three 
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value, any hope that contemporary CSR will be an effective solution to the Niger Delta crisis is 
seriously undermined. 
If the barriers to CSR were only – or largely – ideological, however, there would clearly be 
hope for it: all its supporters would have to do is to persuade corporations and corporate managers that 
they should take account of the wider social interest in their decision-making – either because it is 
worthwhile in itself or because (as many supporters of ‘stake-holding’ have tried to argue) acting in a 
socially responsible manner is in the long-term interests of shareholders.
13
 But there are good reasons 
for believing that the barriers/obstacles standing in the way of CSR are not purely or even 
predominantly ideological.   
Chapter Four explores a second set of barriers to effective CSR and is equally divided into 
two sections. Section one begins by exploring the links between shareholder value and contemporary 
corporate governance. The implication of the belief that corporations should profit maximize, it is 
suggested, finds expression in the claim that corporate governance is a simple agency problem: how 
do you get corporate managers to act in the interests of inactive and often dispersed shareholders?
14
  
In this section, the various mechanisms which have been developed to solve this agency 
problem are examined and evaluated. While some of these mechanisms operate from within 
corporations – things such as performance related pay and the use of Non- Executive Directors to 
monitor managers –; others operate externally, such as the market for corporate control. These 
mechanisms, it is argued, have incentivized corporate managers to seek to maximize shareholder 
value – and, more specifically, to get the share price of the corporations they are managing as high as 
possible. Not only that, they have put intense pressure on managers to do so to avoid the wrath of ‘the 
markets’ and the threat of takeover. The resulting model of CG – which is essentially the Anglo-
American, stock market based model
15
 – has been, and is being, promoted around the world by the 
                                                             
13 An idea captured in the notion of ‘enlightened shareholder value’. 
14
 See for instance; A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 52(2) 741 
15
Susanne Soederberg, The Politics of the New International Financial Architecture: Re-imposing Neoliberal 
Domination in the Global South (London: Zed Books 2004)139-149 
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OECD, the FSB, the World Bank and the IMF, not least in Nigeria. The section concludes with the 
contention that these entrenched mechanisms now constitute major practical barriers to effective CSR. 
Section Two will consider the application of the neoliberal corporate governance mechanisms 
in Nigeria. It aims to show that the practical barriers to effective CSR discussed in section one 
(performance related pay and the use of Non- Executive Directors to monitor managers, the 
operations of the markets for corporate control and the stock markets) are also present in the Nigerian 
situation, rendering it unlikely that CSR in its contemporary form will do much to resolve the 
problems found in the Niger Delta.  
 Chapter Five explores a third set of barriers to effective CSR, referred to here as political. It 
is suggested that these set of barriers are largely attributable to the re-emergence of financial power.
16
 
Again, the chapter is divided into two sections: section one of the chapter explores the resurgence in 
the power of finance and its role in imposing shareholder primacy and entrenching the corporate 
governance mechanisms discussed in chapter Four. In this context, the section looks at the idea of 
globalization and the spread of neoliberalism.
17
 It also investigates the role of international 
organizations
18
 in these processes and looks at the Washington Consensus and Post-Washington 
Consensus policy packages that have been imposed on developing nations. The Post-Washington 
Consensus package, the chapter argues, is the precursor of what has been termed ‘disciplinary 
neoliberalism’19 or the ‘new constitutionalism’.20  
The effect of this new constitutionalism has led some critics to conclude that neoliberalism is 
a class project aimed at protecting and furthering the interests of financial elites. Indeed, it is also 
arguable that corporate executives are now themselves one of these financial interest groups, even if 
their interests seem at times to conflict with those of shareholders. Possibly, this class project explains 
                                                             
16 Or the power of resurgent finance 
17
 However, considering that globalization is a controversial concept which means different things to different 
people, the context in which it is applied in the thesis is in the liberalization of (liquid) capital across territories 
and in the lifting of the ban on capital and its free movement internationally. 
18 Including the Washington institutions and the OECD 
19 Stephen Gill, ‘The Constitution of Global Capitalism’ (2000) 
<http://www.uv.es/~mperezs/intpoleco/Lecturcomp/Geoeconomia%20y%20Globalizacion/Constitution%20of
%20Global%20Capitalism%20S%20Gill.pdf> accessed 20 October, 2013 
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the contrast – which often amounts to a gulf – between neoliberal rhetoric (anti-state – reduce state 
welfare) and neoliberal practice (increased state support for finance).
21
 To these critics, neoliberalism 
in practice is very different from neoliberalism in theory. In this context, the thesis briefly looks at the 
works of commentators such as Stephen Gill, Susan Soerderberg, Ha-Joon Chang, David 
Schneiderman and David Harvey. As these writers make clear, the very idea of a free market is deeply 
problematic: markets are not natural, they are political and legal constructs.  
The section concludes with the argument that the activities of this powerful financial interests 
amount to political barriers to effective CSR.   
In section two of the chapter, the application of disciplinary neoliberalism and the new 
constitutionalism in Nigeria and how this has created a class of financial elites fundamentally opposed 
to the realization of effective CSR will be discussed The section will finally examine the problem of 
institutional corruption in the country and argue that the ‘slick alliance’ between oil corporations and 
the Nigerian government officials is a major political barrier to the realization of effective CSR in the 
Niger Delta and Nigeria. 
Part Two will be followed by a general conclusion which concludes the thesis. 
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Introductory Narrative of the Niger Delta Conflict and the CSR Claims of 










In a study undertaken by a group of Nigerian and international environmental experts in 2006, it was 
reported that the Niger Delta is;  
 
...one of the world’s most severely petroleum-impacted ecosystems [and] the 
damage from oil operations is chronic and cumulative, and has acted 
synergistically with other sources of environmental stress to result in a 
severely impaired coastal ecosystem and compromised the livelihoods and 
health of the region’s impoverished residents.1  
 
 
This type of negative report is one of the reasons why critics have maintained that Nigeria is among 
the countries that possess the proverbial ‘resource curse’ characteristics.2 
The Niger Delta region is arguably the world’s largest wetland, and certainly one of the 10 
generally acknowledged wetland and seashore maritime ecosystems of the world.
3
 It has a population 
of about 35 million people and is endowed with enormous naturally occurring minerals. The Niger 
Delta boasts of a profusion of diverse aquatic life and mineral residues and is the major oil producing 
                                                             
1
Nigerian Conservation Foundation, WWF UK and International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, with Federal Ministry of Environment, ‘Niger Delta 
Natural Resources Damage Assessment and Restoration Project Scoping Report’  2000 contained in United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Niger Delta Human Development Report 2006 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/africa/nigeria/name,3368,en.html> accessed 1 March 2013, 
2 ‘Resource curse’ hypothesis or the ‘paradox of plenty’ refers to the contradiction of a country or region 
blessed with rich mineral resources still suffering from poor economic growth and under-development; For a 
detailed discussion of the term, see F Allen, Implementation of Oil Related Environmental Policies in Nigeria: 
Government Inertia and Conflict in the Niger Delta (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2012) 10 
3O Ibeanu, ‘Oiling the Friction: Environmental Conflict Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’ (2000) 
Environmental Change & Security Project Report Vol. 6 20 
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area in Nigeria, generating over 80 per cent of the country’s national revenue. Mineral oil has been 
mined in the region by MNCs on behalf of the federal government for over 50 years. An estimated 
$600 billion has been generated from it since the 1960s.
4
  
The Niger Delta is made up of a number of States near the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. They 
include the States of Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. It is 
a region of people whose economic activities and life sustenance revolve around the coastal waters. 
The demography of the Niger Delta is made up of individuals who enjoy an analogous cultural 
relationship and comparative convergence of history. The population engages in the economic 
activities of fishing, farming and hunting, though fishing and farming are the dominant occupations.
5
 
The area is a stumpy, level land spanning some five miles north of the equator. It is a vast, 
abundant stretch extending into the Gulf of Guinea and creating the Bight of Biafra in the East and the 
Bight of Benin in the West.
6
 These 36,000 square kilometres (14,000 square miles) of marshland, 
creeks, tributaries and lagoons empty the Niger River into the Atlantic Ocean, at the Bight of Biafra. 
A third of this area, measuring around 12, 000 square kilometres, is a delicate mangrove forest, 
alleged to be the biggest mangrove forest in the world. It contains many plant and animal varieties, 
comprising numerous colourful and distinctive flowers and birds.
7
 
The local population is classified into a number of ‘ethnic groups or nations’ including the 
Ijaw, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Isoko, Efik, Etche, Ibibio, Andoni, Ikwere, Ogoni, Edo and Kwale-Igbo. 
Several of these ‘nations’ are additionally split into ‘clans’ with their own individual languages. The 
bulk of the Niger Delta people live in the three states of Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa. Others are 
scattered in the other six states in different proportions.
8
 
                                                             
4G Wurthmann, ‘‘Ways of Using the African Oil Boom for Sustainable Development’ (March 2006) African 
Development Bank Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 84 
<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/00806226-EN-ERWP-84.PDF> 
accessed 2 March 2013 
5 AO Emmanuel and others, ‘Poverty, Oil exploration and the Niger Delta Crisis: The Response of the Youth’ 
(2009) African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 3 (5) 225 
6Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglass, Where Vultures Feast; Shell, Human Rights and Oil (London: Verso Books 
2003) 1 
7 O Ibeanu (n 3) above 20 
8 Kenneth O Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and 
Political History of Nigeria (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1956) 21 
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A combination of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria and a cluster of other local legislations 
(like the Land Use Act of 1978 and the Petroleum Act of 1969) mean that local communities have no 
legal rights to the oil and gas reserves in their area.
9
 The Federal Government issues ‘permits, licences 
and leases’ to MNCs to survey, explore and mine oil. Following from such assignments, the 
corporations are accorded admittance to the land covered by their licences or permits.
10
  
The involvement of MNCs in the Nigerian economy dates back to the colonial era, before the 
country’s independence. The concession of mineral oil permits to the Shell d’Arcy Petroleum 
Development Company by the colonial government in 1937 marks the starting point of MNCs’ 
activities in Nigeria, although exploration and surveying activities began as early as 1906. Shortly 
after oil was discovered in commercial quantities at Oloibiri, in present day Bayelsa State, other 
multinationals like ExxonMobil, Chevron, Agip, Elf, and Texaco also moved into the country.
11
 
The oil extraction industry is made up of the government of Nigeria, subsidiaries of MNCs, 
and a few Nigerian corporations. Oil extraction is operated through contractual arrangements (joint 
venture agreements, production sharing contracts or service contracts) between the state-owned 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
12
 and one or more oil corporations.
13
 NNPC is the 
‘chief investor’ in all joint ventures, while Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), a 
subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, is the main oil MNC in Nigeria. The SPDC joint venture involves 
                                                             
9
 See S. 44 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 discussed below  
10 See Petroleum Act 1969, amended in 2004 and Oil Pipelines Act 1990; These legislations are discussed in 
details below 
11
See NK Obasi, ‘Nigeria and Oil’ <http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/adv.asp?blurb=493> accessed 2 June 
2011 
12“The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was established on April 1, 1977, under the statutory 
instrument-Decree No. 33 of same year by a merger of Nigerian National Oil Corporation, NNOC, with its 
operational functions and the Federal Ministry of Mines & Power with its regulatory responsibilities. This 
decree established NNPC, a public organization that would, on behalf of Government, adequately manage all 
government interests in the Nigerian Oil industry. In addition to its exploration activities, the Corporation was 
given powers and operational interests in refining, petrochemicals and products transportation as well as 
marketing. Between 1978 and 1989, NNPC constructed refineries in Warri, Kaduna and Port Harcourt and took 
over the 35,000-barrel Shell Refinery established in Port Harcourt in 1965”; See <www.nnpcgroup.com> 
accessed on 28 February 2013 
13 These are discussed below 
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Oil activities constitute a risk to the ecosystem at each phase of the supply chain, be it at the 
exploration, production, transportation, or refining stage. During oil exploration, possible ecological 
injuries include land clearing (which can cause enduring and perpetual loss of vegetation) and drilling 
activities (which cause the liberation of ‘drilling fluids’ into the atmosphere). At the production phase, 
the environment is damaged either as a result of oil pipes breaking and causing leakages, or as a result 
of atmospheric emissions from the flaring of gases, an inevitable consequence of oil production. At 
the transportation phase, tankers discharge oil into seas and rivers in the process of pumping out bilge 
water containing oil residuals, solid-wastes and atmospheric emissions. As well as the environmental 
perils inherent in oil processing, consumer utilization of oil products, just as with fossil fuels, adds to 
the hazards of global warming.
15
  
Oil extraction equally has undesirable consequences on the indigenous peoples of the oil-rich 
regions. In extreme cases, the setting up of oil facilities actually divests host-communities of their 
means of survival. In constructing roads for oil business, rivers may be sidetracked and water 
reservoirs desiccated. Fishing waters are thus destroyed, making it necessary for families to relocate 
from their ancestral homes. Oil operations cause the destruction of private property and agricultural 
land, leading to poverty and deprivation.
16
 
For the communities in the Niger Delta region, environmental sustainability and excellence 
are essential to their general welfare and growth. As the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) recounts, over 60 per cent of the population have sources of livelihoods contingent on the 
natural environment.
17
 For many of the communities, the environmental resource base is exploited for 
agricultural purposes:  fishing, hunting and the gathering of forest fruits. For many, these activities are 
                                                             
14 See <www.shell.com> accessed 28 February 2013 
15
RB Clark (ed.) The Long Term Effects of Oil Pollution on Marine Populations, Communities and Ecosystems 
(London: Royal Society 1982) 7 
16J. G Frynas, ‘The Oil Boom in Equatorial Guinea’ (2004) African Affairs 103 (413) 527-546 
17United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), ‘Niger Delta Human Development Report’ (2006) 




the main or only source of subsistence. Pollution and environmental damage, therefore, pose 
significant risks to their very existence.
18
 
Despite the background of a huge reservoir of natural resources, a significant percentage of 
the inhabitants are poor. The UNDP portrays the territory as tormented by ‘administrative neglect, 
crumbling social infrastructure and services, lack of clean water and adequate health-care facilities, 
high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict’.19 
Notwithstanding the enormous mineral reserve of the Niger Delta, it continues to be one of the 
poorest and least developed regions of Nigeria.
20
  
It is calculated that approximately 70 per cent of the population suffer from deficiencies in 
fundamental facilities including electricity, pipe-borne water, hospitals, proper housing and good 
roads. Incapacitating factors like scarcity and destitution, starvation and sickness are rife in the region. 
According to a World Bank estimate, 84.5% of the region’s inhabitants in 2010 survive on less than 
$2 per day,
21
 while the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) declares that the 
region has some of the worst social indicators in the world.
22
 By juxtaposing the sufferings of the 
people with the huge resources engendered by oil, the area turns out to be one of the world’s severest 
and most alarming instances of the ‘resource curse’.23 
Apart from the destruction of the ecosystem and the connected hazards of contamination and 
disease, periodic eruptions of fires from worn-out and haphazardly laid oil pipes have destroyed 
thousands of lives and properties worth billions of Nigerian naira. Some oil pipelines dissect 
farmlands, streets and homes, rendering them useless. Gas flaring and acid rains negatively affect both 
people and their environment. While gas is usually put to other ‘beneficial’, or at least ‘less harmful’, 
                                                             
18See Amnesty International, Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta (London: Amnesty 
International Publications 2009) <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_19492.pdf> accessed 
1 March 2013 
19UNDP Report (n 17) above 
20
FN Ikome, ‘Conflict in the Niger Delta: Issues and Dynamics’ (2005) Global Insight Vol. 44 5; See also the 
UNDP Report cited in (n 17) above 
21 See World Bank, ‘Report on Nigeria’ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.2DAY5> accessed 10 
February 2011 
22 See UK’s DFID Website <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/nigeria.asp> accessed 10 February 2011 
23Amnesty International (n 18) above; see also (n 2) above 
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uses in the developed world, oil MNCs in less developed countries like Nigeria and the Niger Delta 
have a preference for random and arbitrary gas flaring because it offers a cheaper alternative.
24
 
In the last two decades, the Niger Delta region has been engulfed in crisis, spawned, many 
believe, by alleged neglect by the government and MNCs. The indigenous people of the region accuse 
oil MNCs of systemic environmental degradation and a callous destruction of their sources of 
livelihood. The people also indict the Nigerian state for collaborating with MNCs to perpetuate these 
vices. As evidence of the alliance between the state and oil corporations, the communities point to the 
brutal suppression of non-violent demonstrations and gross human rights abuses by the Nigerian state, 
aimed at promoting and protecting the oil business. For many, this was epitomized by the extra-
judicial killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni eight in 1995.
25
 
The alleged despoliation of the environment by MNCs, coupled with the state’s preferred 
methods of addressing agitation from the communities, led to the formation of various indigenous 
civil society organizations, which helped to broadcast the perceived injustices of oil business beyond 
the shores of Nigeria. This alleged mistreatment created an environment of anger, desperation and 
violence. Youths resorted to kidnapping and hostage taking, destruction of corporate facilities and 




The hanging of Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni eight, together with other state actions, including 
the Odi Massacre in 1999, contributed to the internationalization of the conflict. The international 
community, represented mainly by international non-governmental organizations now became aware 
of the tragedy in the region. These organizations became involved in the conflict indirectly, 
financially supporting indigenous civil society movements like MOSOP and IYC. They condemned 
equally strongly most of the policies and actions of the corporations. MNCs, suddenly under intense 
pressures from NGOs and civil society organizations, reacted by adopting corporate codes of conducts 
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25 N Nwogwugwu, OE Alao and C Egwuonwu, ‘Militancy and Insecurity in the Niger Delta: Impact on the Inflow 
of Foreign Direct investment to Nigeria’ (Sep. 2012) Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and 
Management Review Vol. 2(1) 23 




and by laying claim to CSR practices. To what extent, however, is CSR providing a solution to the 
problems and conflict in the area? And to what extent can it do so in the future? 
This chapter offers an insight into the Nigerian oil industry (including the Niger Delta region) 
and the legal regulation of the industry in the country. It begins with a critical assessment of the oil 
industry in Nigeria and the various legislations, licences and contracts which regulate the sector. It 
argues that as a result of many factors which are present in the Nigerian socio-political system, the 
various legislations appear ineffective as a regulatory mechanism for the conduct of oil exploitation in 
the country. The chapter also looks at the roles played by the Nigerian government, the oil MNCs and 
the host communities in the conflict. It suggests that the implication of the petroleum contracts 
between the NNPC and the oil corporations is that they afford the latter the freedom to operate with 





OVERVIEW/ REGULATION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA 
 
The Nigerian oil industry is broadly divided into two; the upstream sector – exploration, drilling, 
production and transportation of crude oil – and the downstream sector – refining, storage, 
importation, transportation, distribution and marketing of petroleum products. As was stated above, 
the Niger Delta is home to most of the country’s oil reserves. This explains why the region is seen as 
‘one of the most prolific oil-bearing sedimentary basins in the world’.27 Recently, however, oil wells 
have also been discovered in offshore locations outside the Niger Delta – Bight of Bonny, Gulf of 
Guinea and the Bight of Benin – and in the Nigeria-Sao Tome and Principe Development Zone (JDZ). 
The country’s major oil terminals are at Forcados and Bonny (under the management of Shell), 
                                                             
27 See S. Awogbade, S. Sipasi and G. Iroegbunam, ‘Getting the Deal Through-Oil Regulation: Nigeria’ (2008) 
AELEX Legal Practitioners and Arbitrators, 115 <www.gettingthedealthrough.com> accessed 27 May 2011 
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The Oil and Gas Journal reports that in 2007, the country’s oil reserves stood at 36.2 billion 
barrels. In that year, the federal government had plans to increase this capacity to 40 billion barrels by 
2010, and although this target was not met, the country’s oil reserves slightly increased to 37.2 billion 
barrels by 2011.
29
 It is suggested that Nigeria is the largest producer of oil in Africa and the sixth 
largest producer of oil globally.
30
 In 2006, the country’s total export hit a high of 2.45 million barrels 
per day (bpd), which then rose to 2.53 million bpd in 2011.
31
 About 40 per cent of this oil is exported 
to the US alone.
32
 
Despite the high export of crude oil, Nigeria imports petroleum products for domestic 
consumption. Though the country has four major refineries with a combined refining capacity of 438, 
750 bpd (two in Port Harcourt, one in Warri and another in Kaduna), the refineries hardly refine up to 
the capacity of 214, 000 bpd due to lack of maintenance. As a result, Nigeria first exports crude oil 






Ownership of Natural Resources in Nigeria 
 
Under general principles of international law, states have permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources located within their territories (that is on-shore resources, especially those existing in the 
                                                             
28 P.C Nwilo and O.T Badejo, ‘Impacts and Management of Oil Spill Pollution along the Nigerian Coastal 
Areas’(2009) fig publications <www.fig.net/pub/figpub/pub36/chapters/chapter_8.pdf> accessed 15 May 
2013 
29 From The Oil and Gas Journal  (22 December 2010) <www.ogj.com/articles/2010/12/halliburton-
agrees.html> accessed 25 September 2011 
30
 See US Energy Information Administration on Nigeria (16 October 2012) 
<www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Nigeria/nigeria.pdf> accessed 15 May 2013 
31 ibid 
32 See ‘Top 7 Suppliers of Oil to the US’ (30 July 2010) Global Post Publication 
<www.globalpost.com/dispatch/100726/top-7-us-oil-importers> accessed 15 May 2013 





 For instance, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 
14 December 1963 (Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources) declared that ‘the right of the 
peoples and nations to the permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be 
exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well being of the people of the state 
concerned’.35  
In similar vein, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which is a 
follow up to the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, provides that ‘states have, 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.36 The 
permanent ownership of natural resources by states has, therefore, been recognized under 
international law as one of the sovereign rights of the state.  
Even though these international instruments specifically vests ownership of natural resources 
on states (to be utilized for the benefit of the individual citizens within them), at no time did they 
prohibit individual ownership of natural resources. Accordingly, states, under general international 
law, are free to determine whether these natural resources are to be owned by the state or by the 
individual land-owners who reside in the state. In this sense, it is left to the national laws of each state 
to develop and determine its own system of ownership.
37
 However, despite international law not 
prohibiting individual ownership, the reality is that many countries (including Britain, Spain, Norway, 
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 Anita Ronne, ‘Public and Private Rights to Natural Resources and Differences in their Protection?’ in Aileen 
McHarg and others (eds.) Property and the Law in Energy Resources (Oxford: OUP 2010) 64-65 
35UN General Assembly, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ (1962) <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/193/11/PDF/NR019311.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 20 January 2015 
36 Principle 2 of the UN Rio Declaration <www.unesco.org/education/nfsunesco/pdf/RIO_E.PDF> accessed 20 
January 2015 ; for other international instruments vesting ownership of natural resources on states, see the 
UNGA Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources Resolution No 2158 (XXI) (1966)  <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/004/61/IMG/NR000461.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 20 January 2015 
and the UN Resolution on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 
December 1974) < http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3281.htm> accessed 20 January 2015 
37  Anita Ronne (n 34) 65; The same instruments also vest permanent sovereignty on states for off-shore 
natural resources found in and around their continental shelf (up to 200 miles offshore) 
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Denmark and Germany) vest the ownership of natural resources on the state, as against individual 
citizens who reside in them.
38
  
In this context, as early as the sixteenth century, the British Court in The Case of Mines,
39
 
declared that all natural resources (including gold and silver), whether situated on public or private 
land, is vested in the Crown. The court also held that all minerals are the common heritage of the 
people, and the Crown, as custodian of these resources for the benefit of all citizens, may grant, refuse 
or administer mineral rights and charge royalties for their exploitation.
40
  
The vesting of all natural resources in the Crown was part of the general colonial mining 
policy in colonised territories, including Nigeria. As a result, the history of legislations in the oil 
industry in the country began during colonialism, with the Oil and Mineral Laws of 1887, 1907, and 
1914 (amended in 1925, 1950, and 1958 respectively). In this sense, English legal principles underlie 
much of Nigerian legislation in this area. These laws gave the rights of mineral ownership and 
exploration to the colonial government, whose administrators justified this position by arguing that 
minerals were important economic assets to the territories were they are located.
41
 Being the gift of 
nature, the administrators argued, these resources should not be left in the hands of limited groups of 
private individuals (who sometimes may not even be members of the producing community). 
Accordingly, the advantages derivable from these mineral reserves should be shared beneficially to all 
members of the community in general.
42
  
Nigeria, in line with what is commonly obtainable in other former British colonies, inherited 
this policy after independence and continues to vest all naturally occurring minerals in the federal 
government. In this respect, a number of legal instruments and legislations have been enacted by 
successive governments to regulate mineral oil exploitation in the country and simultaneously 
maintain the state’s ownership of natural resources. 
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40 Adrian J. Bradbrook, ‘The Relevance of the Cujus Est Solum Doctrine to the Surface Landowner’s Claims to 
Natural Resources Located Above and Beneath the Surface’ (1998) Adelaide Law Review Vol. 11 462-463 
41 K Omeje, High Stakes and Stakeholders: Oil Conflict and Security in Nigeria (Hampshire and Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishers  2006) 35–36 
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It is imperative at this juncture to suggest that while in theory the Nigerian government 
controls the activities of oil MNCs, in practice however, the latter controls actual production and 
ancillary services. As a result, they have significant influence over costs which the Nigerian 
government practically has no ability to supervise. Despite the fact that government receives a greater 
percentage of oil proceeds, the argument is that the Nigerian state ‘cannot say exactly how much oil is 
lifted from the country’ and depends almost exclusively on whatever oil corporations tell them.43  
 
 
The 1999 Constitution 
 
The 1999 Constitution reiterates the Nigerian state’s absolute ownership and control of oil (and other 
natural resources) by conferring ownership of all mineral resources on the federal government. 
According to section 44 (3) of the Constitution; 
  
...the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural 
gas in under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial 
waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the 
Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may 
be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
 
In Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia State and 35 others,
44
 the Nigerian 
Supreme Court affirmed the position of section 44 (3) and held that only the federal government has 
control and revenue rights over mineral resources produced in the country, even though the federal 
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An analysis of the provisions of section 44 (3) has led to the suggestion that the right of oil-
producing regions to participate in the oil industry, particularly as it concerns their ‘well-being’, is not 
recognized in the Constitution.
46
 This is because by vesting all ownership rights in the federal 
government, the Constitution failed to consider the rights and interests of the oil-host communities. 
However, it should be noted that section 162 (2) of the same Constitution provides for the payment of 
not less than 13 per cent of the revenue accruing from such resources to the federating State in which 
the minerals are found.
47
 This provision has been criticised on two grounds. In the first place, it is 
argued that 13 per cent is not an adequate compensation to the oil bearing communities and secondly, 
that it did not take into account the interests of other stakeholders – including the local governments 




Regarding the rights of Nigerian citizens to have access to justice against the government in 
issues concerning the protection of the environment, the 1999 Constitution neither recognizes nor 
protects such rights. For instance, the Constitution in section 20 provides that the government should 
‘protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wildlife of 
Nigeria’.49 This section is contained in Chapter II of the Constitution entitled ‘Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy’. However, by virtue of the provisions of section 6 
(6) (c) of the same Constitution, the provisions of Chapter II are not enforceable against the 
government. Section 6 (6) (c) provides that; 
 
                                                             
45Though the principal issue before the Court was to determine how to calculate the amount of revenue 
accruing to the central government from resources derived from a particular State, the Supreme Court used 
the opportunity to affirm the position of section 44 (3) of the 1999 Constitution 
46 R.T. Ako and A.A. Adedeji, ‘Public Participation: An Imperative to the Sustainable Development of the 
Nigerian Oil Industry’ (2009) < www.bhu.ac.in/...09/.../5_RT%20AKO_public_participation_1_[1].doc> accessed 
20 January 2015 
47See section 162(2) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution   
48 R.T. Ako and A.A. Adedeji (n 46) 
49 Section 20; See also, Olanrewaju Fagbohun, ‘Re-appraising the Nigerian Constitution for Environmental 
Management’ (2002) AAU Law Journal Vol.1 No. 1 (2002) 24-47. 
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The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of 
this section – shall not, except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, 
extend to any issue or question as to whether any act or omission by any 
authority or person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is in 
conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and  Directive Principles of 
State Policy set out in Chapter II of this Constitution. 
 
 
The implication of section 6 (6) (c), therefore, is that no question as to whether any obligation under 
Chapter II (including environmental issues) is being complied with or given effect to can be raised 
before any court of law in Nigeria, not to talk of nullifying any legislation or policy made by the 
government on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter II.
50
 
In this context, it appears that the state’s absolute ownership of naturally occurring minerals 
and the inability of the Niger Delta people to bring actions against the Nigerian government itself is 
one of the major reasons for the conflict in the region. The host-communities have been agitating for 
‘resource control’ and argue that the state’s absolute ownership of mineral resources has significantly 
contributed to the under-development of their communities. Yet, they cannot seek for justice in the 
courts against the Nigerian government directly. They, therefore, advocate for a repeal of section 44 
(3) of the Nigerian Constitution.
51
   
In the light of the provisions of sections 43 (3) and 6 (6) (c) of the 1999 Constitution, it has 
been suggested that it is advisable for the Nigerian government to fashion out political arrangements 
that will tackle the challenges created by natural minerals ownership, instead of sticking to a strict 
legal interpretation of the Constitution as the Supreme Court did. This, it is argued, is because the 
doctrine of national ownership by the state is not the only option towards the proper control and 
utilization of resources. For instance, countries such as the United States of America and Canada, who 
                                                             
50 Akinola E. Akintayo, ‘A Good Thing from Nazareth? Stemming the Tide of Neoliberalism against Socio-
Economic Rights’ (2014) ESR Review Vol. 15 (2) 5-9 at 6  
51 M. O. Ameh, ‘Ownership and Control of Mineral Resources: Can the Brazilian Model be used to Douse 
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recognize both national and individual ownership of resources (oil), are still able to achieve this 









In addition to the 1999 Constitution above, the Land Use Act of 1978 is another legislation which 
regulates ownership of natural resources in Nigeria. Section 1 of the Act vests all land within the 
territory of each federating State in the Governor of that State, to be held on trust for all Nigerians, 
and the Governor is empowered under the Act to issue certificates of occupancy to applicants for the 
use and occupation of land. However, this provision only vests surface rights on the State Governor, 
meaning that ownership rights do not extend to resources below the surface of the earth. Where 




Section 28 (3) (b) of the Act contains provisions for compensation where land is compulsorily 
acquired for mining purposes or construction of oil pipelines or for any purpose connected 
therewith.
55
 Equally, section 29 (2) (b) provides that the original occupier of land acquired for mining 
purposes is entitled to compensation as provided under the Petroleum Act
56
 or any other applicable 
legislation. Nevertheless, section 47(2) of the Act ousts the jurisdiction of the courts to investigate or 
entertain any question relating to the amount or adequacy of compensation offered in pursuance of 
any acquisition made under it. The sub-section provides that: 
 
No court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into any question concerning or 
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53 Now Cap L5, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria [LFN] 2004 
54
 Section 1, Land Use Act  
55 Section 28 (3) (b) Land Use Act 
56Section 36 of the Petroleum Act discussed below 





Since the compensation rates are usually decided by the acquiring authority (the federal  or state 
government) without the input of the host-communities, ‘pre-determined’ government approved rates 
are thereby used to guide the calculation and payment of compensation to ‘victims’ of oil mineral 
exploitation. The argument is that in many cases, the compensation rate is fixed without due 
consideration of the total or actual loss that has been suffered by the aggrieved person(s). This leads to 
an arbitrary and flawed payment system which gives little or no consideration to the prevailing market 
rates or the yielding potential and life span of crops that may be destroyed as a result of the 
acquisition.
58
 The implication of section 47 (2), therefore, is that any person who is aggrieved with the 
amount of compensation offered by the government cannot seek and get justice in the courts. 
The 1978 Act is also criticised on the basis that since it vests all lands in the State Governor, 
it alienates people from their lands and affords them mere proprietary rights to land, which is 
possessory in nature. Moreover, since 1978 when it was promulgated, critics argue that the Act has 
never been revised or modified to reflect the country’s changing economic realities .59 
 
 




The Petroleum Act 1969 is Nigeria’s principal petroleum legislation and forms the basis of the 
framework for the regulation of the oil Industry in Nigeria.
61
 Section 1 of the Act vests all petroleum 
resources in the Nigerian state. It states that: 
 
                                                             
58 Sampson Akanimo, ‘Ecologist Blames FG for Oil Pipelines Vandalization’ (2003) Daily Independent 
Newspaper cited in R.T. Ako and A.A. Adedeji (n 46) above  
59 O. Iwere, What Effect does the Ownership of Resources by the Government have on its People: A Case Study 
of Nigeria? (2011) University of Dundee < www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/files.php?file=CAR-
11_37...pdf> accessed 20 January 2015 
60 Cap P10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria [LFN], 2004 
61 Yinka Omorogbe, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (Lagos: Malthouse Press 2001) 17 
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The entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any 
lands to which this section applies shall be vested in the [Nigerian] state; this 
section applies to all lands (including land covered by water) which is in 




In Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) v Attorney General of Abia State (No. 2),
62
 a case 
dealing with the legal implication of the federal government’s ownership of petroleum resources in 
Nigeria, the Nigerian Supreme Court again confirmed the vesting of ownership of petroleum 
resources in the federal government and further held that the federal government alone, and not the 
littoral States (Niger Delta States) can lawfully exercise legislative, exclusive and judicial powers 
over the maritime belt or territorial waters as well as sovereign rights over the exclusive economic 
zones of the country, in accordance with universally recognized rights. 
The Act generally empowers the Minister in charge of petroleum affairs to supervise the oil 
industry and requires that oil corporations should operate in accordance with good oil field practice.
63
 
It contains provisions for the prevention of the pollution of watercourses and the atmosphere during 
petroleum operations
64
 and for fair and adequate compensation to be paid where the surface rights or 




It has been suggested that the Act failed to adequately provide for the protection of the 
environment. This is because the ‘imprecise’ obligation on oil corporations to ‘prevent the pollution 
of water courses and the atmosphere’ is not strong enough to compel oil MNCs to adequately cater for 
the environment.
66
 Nevertheless, the Act empowers the Minister of Petroleum Resources to make 
subsidiary regulations prescribing anything to be done (including environmental regulations) for the 
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 (2002) 6 N.W.L.R, Part 764, 542 
63 Sections 2 and 9 
64 Section 9 (1)  (b) (iii) 
65 Section 36 of the First Schedule to the Petroleum Act 1969 
66O. Iwere (n 59); see below, on the implications of the petroleum contracts in Nigeria for further discussions 
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purposes of the Act.
67
 Pursuant to this provision, a number of subsidiary legislations have been made 
for the regulation of the oil industry. Some of these are:  
Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations:
68
 This Regulation makes provision for the 






 This Regulation seeks to protect the environment from 
pollution arising from refining operations by placing certain obligations on managers of refineries.
71
 
Other Acts which have been made in pursuance of the provisions of the Petroleum Act 
include:  
 Oil Pipelines Act
72
: This Act provides for the grant of license to construct oil pipelines and 
also creates civil liability on such licenses in the event of breakage or leakage of such pipelines.
73
 
Oil in Navigable Waters Act
74
: This Act deals with the discharge of oil from ships. It prohibits 
the discharge of oil from a Nigerian ship into territorial waters or shorelines
75
. 
Associated Gas Re-Injection Act
76
: This Act deals with the gas flaring activities of oil and gas 
corporations in Nigeria and prohibits, without lawful permission, any oil and gas corporation from 
flaring gas in Nigeria
77
. 
Niger Delta Development Commission Act
78
: This Act is concerned with using allocated funds 
to tackle ecological problems arising from the exploration of oil minerals in the Delta
79
. 
Exclusive Economic Zone Act
80
: This Act makes it illegal to explore or exploit natural 
resources within the exclusive zone without lawful authority.
81
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70 Petroleum Refining Regulations 1974 
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This is the principal legislation guiding the taxation of the operations of oil corporations in Nigeria. 
The legislation was initially enacted in 1959 and has gone through several amendments. Some 
features of the Petroleum Profit Tax Act to be noted are; 
(i) The profits of the corporation in any accounting period on which tax would be based is the 
aggregate of the proceeds of sale of all chargeable oil sold by the corporation in that period, the value 
of all chargeable oil delivered by the corporation to a refinery without a formal sale or to an adjacent 
storage tank for refining by the corporation during the period, the value of all chargeable natural gas 
during the period as determined in accordance with the Fourth Schedule
83
 to the PPTA and all 
incidental incomes to the corporation which are traceable to any of its petroleum operations during the 
period; 
(ii) The tax rate on the profits of a corporation engaged in petroleum operations is 85 per cent 
as the PPTA prescribes that the assessable tax for any accounting period of a corporation is an amount 
equal to 85 per cent of the chargeable profits for the period; 
(iii) The chargeable profit of the corporation, subject to taxation, is determined by the amount 
of its assessable tax for any accounting period less the deductible expenditure items or outgoings. The 
deductible expenses includes amongst others; all non-productive rents, the liability for which was 
incurred by the corporation during the period. These are annual rents paid in respect of oil prospecting 
licences (OPLs) or oil mining leases (OMLs);
84
 all royalties, the liabilities of which were incurred by 
the corporation in respect of locally disposable or chargeable oil for that accounting period; all 
royalties, the liabilities of which were incurred by the company during that period in respect of crude 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
80 Cap C 11,LFN 2004 
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 See the long title to the Act 
82 Cap P13 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria [LFN] 2004 
83 Schedule Four of the PTA was introduced into the Principal Act by Act No. 95 of 1979. It was enacted as a 
means of converting chargeable natural gas into bands of chargeable oil equivalent to determine the value of 
the gas component in the profits calculation on which PPT is based. 
84 See below for a discussion of these terms 
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oil or casing-head petroleum spirit won in Nigeria; sums incurred by way of interest payable on 
capital employed in carrying out petroleum operations; any expense incurred for repair of premises, 
plant, machinery or fixtures employed in petroleum operations or for renewal, repair of implements, 
articles and utensils so employed; contributions to a pension, provident or other society, scheme or 
fund; all sums, the liability of which was incurred by the corporation during that period to the federal 
government or any other state or local government council in Nigeria by way of duty, customs and 
excise duties, education tax (other than tax imposed as petroleum profits by the PPTA) or any other 
tax, fee or other like charges.
85
 
In Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria v Federal Board of Inland Revenue,
86
 
the court was called upon to determine the computation of adjusted profits for purposes of payment of 
petroleum profit tax and to pronounce on the legal authority of the Federal Board of Inland Revenue 
(FBIR) to sue for and recover petroleum profits on behalf of the federal government of Nigeria. The 
Supreme Court held that by virtue of section 8 of the Petroleum Profits Tax Act, 1959, any 
corporation engaged in petroleum operations is liable to pay profits tax. On the meaning of petroleum 
operations for the purpose of payment of petroleum profits tax, the court held that ‘petroleum 
operations’ include not only winning or obtaining and transportation of petroleum oil by drilling, 
mining, etc, but also all activities incidental to such operations, excluding refining at a refinery. 
 
 




This Act was enacted to ensure due process and transparency in the payments made to the federal 
government by corporations operating in the Nigerian extractive industry, and to ensure accountability 
                                                             
85 Humphrey Onyeukwu, ‘The Incentives in the Fiscal Framework of the Nigerian MOUs with the International 
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in the revenue receipts of the federation from corporations in the extractive industry.
88
 It also seeks to 
ensure conformity with the principles of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and to 
eliminate all forms of corrupt practices in the determination, payments, receipts and posting of 
revenue accruing to the federal government from extractive industry corporations.
89
  
The Initiative has the function of developing a framework for transparency and accountability 
in the reporting and disclosure by all oil corporations of revenue due or paid to the Nigerian federal 
government and evaluate without prejudice to any existing contractual obligation or sovereign 
obligations, the practices of both the oil corporations and the government regarding oil mining 
operations.
90
 Section 6 (2) of the Act establishes a National Stakeholders Working Group, with a 
governing body made up of an inclusive network of stakeholders 
 
 
The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 2012 
 
The PIB was conceived as a result of the need to bring the regulatory framework of Nigeria’s oil and 
gas industry to the level of international standards. It seeks to consolidate all existing legislations 
under the Petroleum Act and the Petroleum Profit Tax Act.
91
 The Bill was first presented to the 
National Assembly (NA) in 2008, but had to be withdrawn as a result of objections and reservations 
raised by oil corporations, who threatened to stop operations in Nigeria if the NA went ahead to pass 
the Bill into law. They complained that the implementation of the Bill will rob-off adversely on 
them.
92
 For instance, the Chairman of Shell Nigeria complained that; 
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91 See Petroleum Industry Draft Bill (2012) <www.nnpcgroup.com/Portals/0/pdf/PIBDrapftBill2008.pdf> 
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The PIB proposes multiple increased royalties and fiscal terms that will slow 
down new investments in deep water considerably. It will also exclude a 
number of legitimate costs from being recovered. Uncertainties around these 
issues are already stalling development of major discovered resources and 
discouraging companies from undertaking the aggressive exploration 




As a result of these objections, the 2008 Bill was withdrawn and re-presented in 2012, after some 
modifications were made to address the complaints of the MNCs. The 2012 version has now gone 
through its second reading in both Houses of the National Assembly. 
As contained in section 1 (Part 1) of the Bill, the key objectives of the PIB are: to create a 
favourable commercial environment for petroleum operations in Nigeria; to enhance exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum resources in Nigeria for the benefit of the Nigerian people – this objective 
states that the exploitation of  petroleum minerals for the Nigerian people
94
 should be a cardinal 
principle because they have not enjoyed any significant benefit from oil operations since commercial 
exploitation began in the 1950s; to optimize domestic gas supplies, particularly for power generation 
and industrial development; to establish a progressive fiscal framework that encourages further 
investment in the petroleum industry while optimizing revenues accruing to the government; to 
establish commercially-oriented and profit-driven oil and gas agencies; to deregulate and liberalize 
the downstream sector; to create efficient and effective regulatory agencies; to promote transparency 
and openness in the administration of the petroleum resources of Nigeria; to promote the development 
of Nigerian content in the petroleum industry; to protect health, safety and environment in the course 
of petroleum operations and; to attain such other objectives to promote a viable and sustainable 
petroleum industry in Nigeria.
95
 
Section 2 of the Act re-states the position that ownership of minerals in the country vests in 
the Nigerian state. According to the section; 
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The entire property and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands 
within Nigeria, its territorial waters, or which forms part of its continental 
shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone, is vested in the federal government. 
 
 
Section 3 states that the management and allocation of petroleum products in the country shall be 
conducted strictly in accordance with the principles of good governance, transparency and sustainable 
development. Section 6 gives the Minister supervisory powers over the affairs and operations of the 
petroleum industry, while section 7 gives the Minister the right of pre-emption. In section 8, the PIB 
outlines the conditions required for the minister to make subsidiary regulations, and the processes 
through which stakeholders in the oil industry (including host-communities) can participate in the 
management and operations of the petroleum industry. In this context, the Minister shall, prior to 
making any regulation, conduct an extensive inquiry and discuss a proposed regulation with host-
communities.
96
 However, section 8 (6) also gives the Minister the power to make regulations (as a 
matter of exigency) without conducting an inquiry. This power has been criticised as creating an 
avenue for official abuse and political interference.
97
 
The PIB 2012 proposes to restructure the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
and break it up into three separate corporations: the National Petroleum Assets Management 
Corporation (NPAMC), which would become the holding and management corporation for the 
investments of the Nigerian government in the upstream industry;
98
 the National Oil Company, which 
will be vested with certain assets of the NNPC;
99
 and the National Gas Corporation which will deal 
with the exploitation and production of gas.
100
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Section 116 of the Bill proposes to establish a Petroleum Host Communities Fund (PHCF), 
for the development of the socio-economic infrastructures of the Niger Delta communities.
101
 Each 
upstream oil corporation is required to remit 10 per cent of its net profit (derived from onshore and 
shallow areas) to the PHCF on a monthly basis. For profits derived from deep-water areas, the same 




 It has been suggested that the PHCF will potentially improve the peace and stability of the 
Niger Delta region, since the communities will profit directly from the exploitation of oil. An increase 
in oil production will result in an increase in the funds remitted to the PHCF, which will in turn 
increase the amount to be delivered to the communities. This will then create a symbiotic relationship 
between the host-communities and the oil MNCs, eliminate production disruptions and costs and 
eventually lead to a significant increase in revenues for all the parties concerned.
103
  
Another view, however, sees the proposal to establish the PHCF as needless and insists that 
its creation will serve no meaningful purpose. This is because the pre-existing 13 per cent Petroleum 
Derivation Fund given to the oil producing States has not been applied effectively to the benefit of the 
host-communities. As a result, what the PIB should be looking to correct is the in-effective and 
unproductive application of already existing funds (through such agencies as the Niger Delta 
Development Commission
104









The first enactment that had the statutory responsibility of protecting the environment in Nigeria was 
the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act of 1988.
107
 The Act was established by 
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Decree 55 of 30 December 1988 and up till then, was the most comprehensive and far-reaching 
legislation that dealt specifically with the environment in Nigeria.
108
  
The FEPA Act was subsequently repealed by the National Environmental Standards and 
Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act of 2007.
109
 The 2007 Act is a consolidation of 
previous legislations and regulations dealing with the protection and sustainable development of the 
Nigerian environment and its natural resources. Under the 2007 Act, the NESREA is mandated to 
protect, develop and manage the Nigerian environment. It has the authority to ensure compliance with 
environmental laws, both local and international on environmental sanitation, pollution prevention 
and control through monitory and regulatory measures.
110
 The Act empowers the agency to make and 




 control of harmful substances 
and other forms of environmental pollution and sanitation.
113
 The Act equally requires industries to 




Section 27 of the Act prohibits the discharge of hazardous substances into the environment, 
without lawful authority. The section prescribes the punishment of a fine not exceeding N1, 000,000 
(One Million Naira) and an imprisonment of five years. In the case of a corporation, there is an 
additional N50, 000 (Fifty Thousand Naira) for every day the offence persists. Under the section, 
where an offence is committed by a body corporate, every person who at the time the offence was 
committed was in charge of the body corporate shall be deemed to be guilty of such offence and shall 
be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly, provided that nothing shall render any 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
107 Cap F10 LFN, 2004 
108
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person liable to any punishment, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge 









An environmental impact assessment is an appraisal or evaluation of the likely effects, either positive 
or negative, of a proposed project on the natural environment. The E.I.A Act, as it is generally called, 
deals with the considerations of the impact of public and private projects on the environment. 
Accordingly, the EIA Act requires and assessment of public or private projects likely to have a 
significant negative impact on the environment before they are commenced.
117
 
  The Act requires that an application in writing should be made to the EIA Agency by any 
interested party for their environmental assessment, before embarking on such projects.
118
 Section 13 
of the 2004 Act establishes the various projects where an environmental impact assessment will be 
required, and these include projects for the exploration and exploitation of mineral oils. There is a 









CAMA 1990 is the principal legislation regulating the formation and operations of corporations in 
Nigeria. It repealed the 1968 Companies Decree promulgated by the military government to regulate 
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Nigerian Legislations and the Effective Regulation of the Oil Industry 
 
Before looking at how effective the Nigerian legislations are in regulating the conduct of oil MNCs in 
the country, it is necessary to point out that the obligations which are imposed on the oil MNCs by 
these regulatory statutes (that is by law) are treated differently from the obligations imposed on 
corporations under corporate social responsibility. The focus of this thesis is not on the obligations 
imposed by Nigerian legislations, but on the voluntary obligations assumed by corporations under 
contemporary CSR, as defined and analysed in chapters two and three. However, it is also true that in 
some instances, the same obligations which are imposed by statute (like cleaning up oil spills and 
preventing pollutions) may also be part of the corporate social responsibility obligations of 
corporations. Moreover, the effective legal regulation of the activities in the oil sector by the Nigerian 
government will equally act as an effective support for corporate social responsibility practices by 
MNCs.
122
As a result of this and for purposes of comprehensiveness, it is considered necessary to 
evaluate how effective the Nigerian legislations are in regulating the oil industry.  
In this context, after an examination of the various legislations stated above, it appears 
reasonable to suggest that a comprehensive system of environmental regulations are in place presently 
in Nigeria. Yet, issues of environmental pollution and degradation continue to persist under these 
legislations. A number of reasons can be identified as working against the effective regulation of the 
oil industry by the Nigerian government. In the first instance, the recent legislations in the country 
which deal with the environment (for instance the NESREA Act 2007 and the EIA Act 2004) only 
address current and future issues. The fact is that commercial oil exploitation has been going on in the 
country since 1956, and the Niger Delta environment has suffered extensive pollution and 
degradation, the impacts of which are still felt today. Introducing legislations and regulations that only 
mandate oil MNCs to undertake present and future corrective measures will, therefore, not be 
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adequate. Effective legislations, it is suggested, will need to address the present consequences of the 
past environmental abuses in the area.
123
  
Again, in spite of the fact that some of these legislations provide for penalties and 
punishments in cases of breach by corporations and their managers, they ‘neither provide a substantial 
deterrent effect against oil spills, nor create any substantial incentives to clean up spills once they 
occur’.124 For instance, the punishments (in form of fines) provided under various sections of the 
NESREA Act amount to meagre amounts, when compared to the adverse consequences of a breach 
(for instance oil spill).
125
 In this situation, corporate managers may decide to pay the daily fine and 
post-pone cleaning up the environment to a later date, instead of providing money for the immediate 
clean up of the spills, if doing this will affect short-term profits. Furthermore, these punishment 
provisions permit corporate managers to avoid punishment, if they are able to establish that the act in 
question was done without their knowledge, or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the 
commission of the offence.
126
 According to Eaton, this ‘defence provides a loophole for managers 
claiming ignorance of the offense, even if that ignorance was negligent, reckless, or even feigned’.127 
 In similar vein, even though there have been many instances of oil spills and other instances 
of pollution in the region, there is no recorded instance of enforcement of the applicable sanctions by 
the government, against oil MNCs. The lack of enforcement is predicated partly on the incompetence 
of those entrusted to supervise the process, as well as on institutional structures which militate against 
the effective execution of sanctions. Some of these institutional structures are created by the Acts 
themselves. For instance, they entrust the enforcement of the sanctions to government officials, who 
in most cases are likely, when taking decisions, to protect government interests over the interests of 
pollution victims. As a result of government’s over-reliance on proceeds from oil, the Nigerian 
government finds it difficult to use its officers to move against the oil corporations. Since more than 
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80 per cent of the country’s revenue is derived from oil, enforcement of environmental regulations 
may affect the production of oil, which in turn will have an impact on the amount of money accruable 
to the government. In this sense, the Nigerian government has ‘direct economic incentives to ensure 
that environmental regulations are not enforced against the oil corporation’.128 
Finally, corruption is another principal reason for the ineffectiveness of the legislations 
regulating the oil industry in Nigeria (the issue of corruption in Nigeria and how this decreases the 
ability of the Nigerian government to adequately regulate the activities of oil MNCs is discussed 




PETROLEUM CONTRACTS IN NIGERIA 
 
Petroleum contracts establish the rights and responsibilities of both the corporations and the 
government, and stipulate the formula for computing the amount of the revenues allocated to each 
party in the contract. These contracts are broadly categorized into leases and licenses. 
 
 
Lease and Licence Types 
 
 The Petroleum Act 1969 introduced three types of contractual grants for the exploitation of oil in 
Nigeria. These are; the oil exploration licence (OEL); the oil prospecting licence (OPL) and; the Oil 
mining lease (OML).
129
 A lease or license may be granted to any corporation registered in Nigeria 
under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA1990)
130
 or any corresponding law.
131
 Leases 
and licences are granted on the payment of an application fee and the applicant meeting the criteria for 
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award. The lessee or licensee then pays another fee called the ‘Signature Bonus’, after which the 
government signs the lease or licence. Annual lease or licence fees are paid either as OEL, OPL or 





Oil Exploration Licence (OEL) 
 
An oil exploration licence is granted by the Minister of Petroleum under the powers conferred by 
Section 2(l) (a) of the Petroleum Act 1969. It is usually granted for those areas that have not been 
explored before. It confers on the licencee, the non-exclusive right to carry out geological and geo-
physical mineral exploration within the area covered by the agreement. The granting of an oil 
exploration licence does not preclude the granting of another OEL or another OPL or OML over the 
same area or part thereof.
133
 Again, the grant of an OEL does not confer any right to the grant of an 
OPL or OML.
134
 The duration of an OEL is for one year only, with a possible extension for another 
year.
135
 Any discovery of hydrocarbon or other minerals by the licencee must be reported to the Head 
of the Petroleum Inspectorate of NNPC and this may be accompanied by an application for either an 
oil prospecting licence or oil mining lease in respect of the same area or areas. 
 
 
Oil Prospecting Licence (OPL) 
 
This licence, much like the OEL, is granted by the Minister of Petroleum on application by an oil 
corporation. It conveys an exclusive right to explore and prospect for petroleum within the area of the 
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 The holder of an OPL may carry away and dispose any petroleum won during prospecting 
operations, subject to fulfilment of the obligations imposed on him by the Act or by the Petroleum 
Profits Tax Act or any other law imposing taxation in respect of petroleum.
137
 The duration of an OPL 
is at the discretion of the Minister, but it does not usually extend beyond a five year period for inland 





Oil Mining Lease (OML) 
 
Generally, an oil mining lease is an agreement which gives rise to the relationship of landlord and 
tenant or ‘lessor and lessee’ in respect of real or personal property respectively. In this sense, when 
compared with a licence, a lease is a more formal contract which confers greater and more enduring 
rights to the tenant. In Nigeria, an oil mining lease is granted for the purposes of searching for, 
wining, working, carrying away and disposing of petroleum
139
 and may only be granted to a person 
who is already in possession of an oil prospecting licence.
140
 
A lease granted under the Petroleum Act 1969 has similar characteristics to that of a general 
lease. Nevertheless, unlike the normal lease agreement, an oil lease under the Petroleum Act does not 
convey a leasehold estate to the tenant. This is because it is merely in the nature of a mineral lease 
which allows the lessee to exploit the land for oil and to dispose any petroleum mineral discovered 
within the area covered by the lease for a definite duration, upon the payment of royalties to the 
Nigerian government. The maximum duration of an OML is 20 years, which is renewable upon 
approval by the Minister.
141
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Contractual Performance of a Lease or Licence 
 
The leases and licences for oil exploitation in Nigeria are performed through (i) Joint Venture 
Contracts (JV) (ii) Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) (iii) Service Contracts (SC).  
 
 
Joint Venture Contracts 
 
These refer to a set of policies affecting the way and manner in which holders and operators of 
production licences manage the licensed blocks, without the active participation of government.
143
 JV 
contracts usually look like standard partnership agreements. They function as a form of ‘joint venture 
partnership’ between the corporations amongst themselves and the Nigerian federal government. In 
the agreement, the duties, responsibilities and interest of all partners are clearly stated. The agreement 
will equally stipulate in very clear terms, the particular partner that will function as the operator of the 
JV. The NNPC represents the interest of the government, whereas the respective MNCs operate the 
different ventures with varying participatory interests.
144
 
The beginning of every fiscal year requires the operators to submit an operational financial 
statement to the joint venture partners for approval, and this estimate is based on the forecast of what 
the agreement will likely require for its operation in that year. Where the estimate is approved, the 
operators will prepare a ‘monthly cash call statement’, which requires all partners to provide their 
own share of the capital required to operate the JV in that particular month, paid half in Nigerian 
Naira and half in US Dollars. Where there is insufficiency of cash in a particular month – as a result 
of a partner defaulting in payment – an operator is also authorized to borrow money on behalf of the 
JV and charge the debt on the defaulting partner with interest. In the event that money cannot be 
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borrowed, the operator will reduce the scope of the venture, to bring it in line with available funds. 
This has led to arguments against the JV contracts, as critics argue that the possibility of default by a 




 As soon as money is realized from the venture, it is shared amongst partners according to the 
amount of equity contributed for the operation, though each partner bears the tax obligations and 




In summary, the main features of a JV include: one partner is designated the operator; the 
NNPC reserves the right to become an operator; all parties are to share in the cost of operations; each 
partner can lift and separately dispose its interest share of production subject to the payment of 
Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) and Royalty; the operator is the one to prepare proposals for programmes 
of work and budget of expenditure annually, which shall be shared on share-holding basis; each party 
can opt for and carry on sole risk operations; technical matters are discussed and policy decisions 





Production Sharing Contract (PSC) 
 
Under a PSC, the government has no equity in the venture, but shares in the volume of oil or gas 
produced by the licence holder. The government's share of production volume after deduction of 
exploration and production cost – expressed in terms of the value of oil volume – rises as production 
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According to a United Nations Development Programme/World Bank (UNDP/WB) Report, 
ownership of the hydrocarbons stays with the federal government at all times. The oil corporations 
operate independently and engage in oil mining and production according to the terms of the PSC 
arrangement. The service provider is usually compensated by allocating a share of the production to it, 
in accordance with an agreed formula, which allows for prior recovery of costs at a pre-established 
rate.
149
 Onyeukwu explains the PSC thus;  
 
The contractor bears the risks and costs of exploration which it loses if there 
is no discovery. If there is a discovery it recoups its costs from an agreed 
percentage of the production. The balance of the production is shared 
between the contractor and the NOC in accordance with agreed percentages 
that normally give a greater portion to the company when production is low 
and higher volumes of production give corresponding larger shares to the 
NOC. Nigerian PSCs have the elements of Cost Oil, Royalty Oil, Tax Oil, 
and Profit Oil. The crude oil is allocated between the NOC and the 
contractor in the following order: Royalty Oil, Cost Oil, Tax Oil and Profit 
Oil. Profit oil is shared subsequent to the deduction of royalty, provisions for 
cost recovery and tax payments. Cost recovery is usually capped and limited 






The location and water depth of a particular field are usually applied as the basis for calculating the 
royalty rates payable to the government, while the sum spent on production determines how the profits 
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Service Contracts (SC) 
 
These are new partnership arrangements introduced in 2000 as a third form of oil mining contracts, 
between the Nigerian government and oil MNCs. The difference between the SC and other petroleum 
contract types is that while a JV is operated solely by a particular multinational corporation, the SC 
involves the NNPC (using its subsidiary, E&P co.) as a joint operator with another MNC. It also 
differs from the PSC in the sense that while the investment requirements in the SC are shared between 
the joint operators according to the terms of the contract, in the PSC, investment risks are borne solely 





Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
 
The Memorandum of Understanding is a contractual agreement between the Nigerian state and 
specific oil prospecting corporations with JV agreements. The reason for the MoU is to list out the 
different inducements that Nigeria has accepted to honour in favour of particular corporations, with 
the objective of ensuring that their operations are profitable in different circumstances. 
In the stipulations contained in a model MoU between each oil corporation and the Nigerian 
government, the operating corporation collects a fixed amount per barrel of oil, on the condition that 
the cost per barrel stays within evident boundaries. The ‘risk and benefit’ of oil price changes, as a 
result, ensue mainly to the government. For instance, provided the cost of oil stays between US 
$35.50 and US $50 a barrel, the Shell Joint Venture pays US $5 per barrel to the reserved 
shareholders according to their shareholding. Then, to cater for prospective speculations, US $3 goes 
to theoretical operational expenses and the balance is paid to the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
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According to Onyeukwu;  
 
The advent of the...Memorandum of Understanding fiscal regime in Nigeria 
is traced to the period of the oil price recession of the 1970’s, the 
IOCs[International Oil Companies] complained that the combined royalty 
and petroleum profits tax rates were reducing profit margins to such a level 
as to discourage further investment. The government then began the practice 
of granting fiscal incentives... to encourage a favourable climate for 
investment by the IOCs in the sector. The first MoU entered between the 
Nigerian government and the IOCs were in 1986. There were subsequent 




The MoUs purposes are; to create financial encouragements to oil MNCs, in other to motivate them in 
the quest to ensure that NNPC’s holdings in crude oil is properly distributed in the international 






The Nature of Petroleum Contracts in Nigeria 
 
An evaluation of the nature and role of petroleum contracts in the development of the oil industry in 
Nigeria is considered relevant in this part of the thesis. This is because the contents, terms and 
provisions of these contracts, to a large extent, determine how the parties conduct themselves in the 
execution of the oil mining operations. They set out the duties and obligations which the corporations 




Unfortunately, not many studies have been carried out in this area and very little information 
exists outside the knowledge of the parties to the contracts (that is the Nigerian federal government 
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and the oil corporations). Nevertheless, notwithstanding this dearth of existing literature, it is 
considered apposite to examine how these contracts contribute (if at all) towards the 
(under)development of both the oil industry and the host-communities in Nigeria. 
As was stated above, leases and licenses for the exploitation of petroleum minerals are 
granted by the Nigerian government through its state-owned oil corporation – the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). However, the Nigerian government may also transfer these 
contractual rights to private Nigerian oil corporations, who will then execute the necessary contracts 
with foreign oil corporations. The contracts recognize the rights of two primary stakeholders; the 
Nigerian government (usually represented by the NNPC) and that of the oil MNCs. Since the Nigerian 
state is vested with exclusive rights over the land where the petroleum resources are founded, it 
assumes the responsibility of negotiating the contracts with the corporations.
156
 
 The following is an analysis of the provisions of four of such petroleum contracts between 
the Nigerian government and some oil MNCs. These contracts are; the 1988 Operating Agreement 
between the NNPC and Texaco; the Participation Agreement of 12 January 2005 for Oil Mining 
Lease No. 113 between the NNPC (represented by Yinka Folawiyo Petroleum Company Limited) and 
Syntroleum Limited, Lindin Petroleum BV and Palace Exploration Company; the Participation 
Agreement between the NNPC and Elf Nigeria Limited in 1985 and; the Production Sharing Contract 
between the NNPC and Ashland oil in 1986.
157
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There are certain contractual stipulations which are found in two or more of the contracts. 
These terms (though worded differently in the contracts) include;  
Acquisition and Transfer of Petroleum Rights: The Participation Agreements (e.g. the NNPC/ 
Elf Participation Agreement and the Participation Agreement of 12 January 2005 between the NNPC 
and Syntroleum Limited, Lindin Petroleum BV and Palace Exploration Company) contain provisions 
which transfer oil mining rights from the Nigerian state to the oil corporations. The agreements state 
that the corporations undertaking actual mining operations will be entitled to an agreed amount of 
revenue as a result of their acquisition of the mining rights.
158
 
Control and Management of Operations: The contracts provide for the party that will be in 
actual control and management of exploration and mining. In the Participation Contracts, the control 
and management of operations are usually entrusted to the oil MNCs. For example, the control and 
management of the petroleum contracts between the NNPC and Texaco and that between the NNPC 
and Elf stipulate that the operators of the leases (Texaco and Elf) shall have and be responsible for the 
control and management of the operations contemplated in the agreement, as well as its execution.
159
 
In this context, the contracts clearly spell out the duties, rights and responsibilities of each contracting 
party. As Gidado submits, these contracts ‘explain the legitimacy of these rights, obligations and 
responsibilities within the context of petroleum exploration and exploitation, by stating that all the 
parties to the contracts have undertaken obligations to successfully carry out the exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum’.160 
Recovery of Operating Cost: All the contracts have provisions for the recovery of costs and 
expenses incurred by the operator appointed by the parties. For example, Article 10.1.1 of the 1988 
Operating Agreement between the NNPC and Texaco provides that all costs and expenses suffered by 
the operator (in this case the MNC) shall be assumed by the parties to the agreement according to 
their individual and particular participating interests. In similar vein, Clause 4 of the 1986 Production 
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Sharing Contract between the NNPC and Ashland Oil made provisions for the costs and expenses of 
the contract and how they are to be recovered.  
Reimbursement of Expenses: The petroleum mining contracts all provided for the parties to be 
reimbursed according to their ‘cost bearing participations’, so that they will be compensated for their 
operational expenses.  As a result, the NNPC/ Elf Participation Agreement of January 2005 provided 
that the parties will be entitled to a proportionate reimbursement which will be sufficient to cover 
their operational costs.
161
 So did the 1986 PSC between NNPC and Ashland and the Operating 
Agreement between the NNPC and Texaco. 
For Ejims, these reimbursement clauses seem ‘to be attractive to oil companies because it 
enables them to obtain a quick recovery of expenses of exploration, development, and other operating 
costs they have incurred’.162 
Arbitration Agreements; Most of the petroleum contracts contain provisions for the settlement 
of disputes between the Nigerian government and the MNCs. Accordingly, article 12.2 of the 2005 
Participation Agreement states that: 
 
Any and all claims, demands, causes of action, disputes, controversies and 
other matters in question arising out of or relating to the Agreement, 
including any question regarding its breach, existence, validity or 
termination, which the parties do not resolve amicably within a period of 




Similarly, the 1988 Operating Agreement between the NNPC and Texaco, in article 21 provides that;  
 
In case any dispute shall at any time arise between two or more of the parties 
with respect to interpretation application or effect of any provision of this 
agreement and if the parties hereto fail to settle such dispute by amicable 
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In this context, the arbitration clauses in these contracts stipulate that parties failing to settle any 





The Implications of the Petroleum Contracts 
 
Before looking at the implications of the petroleum contracts, it is again necessary to point out that the 
obligations which these petroleum contracts confer on the parties (in this case the oil MNCs) are 
treated differently from the obligations undertaken under corporate social responsibility. While the 
focus of the thesis is on the ‘voluntary’ social responsibility practices of oil MNCs in the Niger Delta, 
the duty to act according to the provisions of the contracts is dictated by the terms of the contract, and 
not voluntarily. However, as was observed in the section dealing with the effectiveness of Nigerian 
legislations in regulating the oil industry, there may sometimes be an over-lap between the contractual 
obligations and the voluntary CSR obligations. As a result and for the purpose of comprehensiveness, 
it is considered relevant to evaluate the implications of these petroleum contracts in the development 
of the Nigerian oil industry and the Niger Delta environment. 
In looking at the implications of the petroleum contracts, especially on how they deal with the 
host-communities and their environment, two inferences can be drawn from their contents. The first is 
that despite the fact that they contain specific provisions on the nature of rights and obligations 
assumed by the contractual parties, they neither make provisions for the inclusion of members of the 
host-communities nor acknowledge their interests in the process of petroleum exploitations.
166
 This 
exclusion of host-communities, according to Ejims, are  ‘indicative of the fact that the contracts are 
based on commercial needs and merely include predictable rules that allow for effective satisfaction 
of the interests of the parties to the contracts’.167 
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Secondly, it is also argued that the contracts treat environmental issues casually and 
indifferently. They failed to provide for the operational mechanisms necessary for implementing the 
‘precautionary approach’ to oil mining. The precautionary approach emphasizes that the impact of 
mining operations on communities and the environment should be determined first, before operations 
are commenced. This will help to prevent from the source any possibility of environmental 
degradation and prepare operators for possible consequences of environmental breaches. According to 
Ejims, the inability of the petroleum contracts to incorporate comprehensive environmental provisions 
may in part be responsible for the environmental problems faced by Niger Delta communities.
168
 
In this context, the 1985 contract between NNPC and Shell makes no mention of the 
environment at all. The same can be said of the 1986 PSC between the NNPC and Ashland Oil. 
Though the 1988 Operating Agreement between the NNPC and Texaco contains a brief statement in 
article 6.1.2 that ‘the operator shall conduct all Joint Operations with utmost good faith in a good and 
workmanlike manner in accordance with good industry practice’, it equally did not expressly mention 
the environment.
169
 As Ejims argues; 
 
The fact that the Operating Agreement only provides for good petroleum 
practice in terms of environmental protection means that substantive 
measures of environmental risk assessment are not required. Thus, this 





Again, the 2005 Participation Agreement between the NNPC (represented by Yinka Folawiyo 
Petroleum Company Limited) and Syntroleum Limited, Lindin Petroleum BV and Palace Exploration 
Company neither contains an express provision for the protection of the environment nor mandates 
MNCs to consider the  social and ecological impacts of their activities on the communities. Instead, 
the contract in the only section where the environment is mentioned states that; 
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No orders, notices or directives have been issued by the Government and no 
claims have been threatened or made by the Government or any other person 
or entity in respect of environmental matters (including, without limitations, 
allegations of environmental contamination, noncompliance with 
abandonment and reclamation obligations or noncompliance with any 
applicable laws or regulations pertaining to health, safety and the 





Essentially, the fact that the government issued no orders, notices or directives in connection with the 
lease should have been a reason to expressly include the environmental objectives or obligations 
which the participating MNCs are expected to comply with in the contract. Surprisingly, this is not the 
case and the contract makes no further provisions for the protection of the environment.
172
  
The failure of these agreements to contain adequate provisions for the protection of the 
environment is contrary to recent developments in international investment contracts where national 
governments are beginning to take environmental issues seriously and are now making adequate 
provisions in investment contracts for the protection of the environment. For instance, Article 11 of 
the investment agreement between Canada and Peru states that; 
 
Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing 
domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a party 
should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise 
derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an 
investor. If a party considers that the other party has offered such an 
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other party and the two 
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Again, article 12 of the investment treaty between the United States and Uruguay are equally worded 
in similar fashion.
174
 In the same vein, the Canadian and United States model investment agreements 
contain  provisions stating that ‘the non-discriminatory measures of a party that are designed and 
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment 
shall not constitute indirect expropriation’.175 
In analyzing the implications of the petroleum contracts governing the relationship between 
the Nigerian government and oil MNCs, it has been suggested that the government has a significant 
portion of the blame for the environmental challenges in the Niger Delta region.
176
 As was noted 
above, most of the contracts seldom make adequate provisions for the protection of the environment 
and the ones that mentioned the environment at all treated it casually and in passing. In this situation, 
despite the wide-spread environmental issues in the Niger Delta, no claim has ever been made by the 
government against the oil MNCs.
177
  
In fact, the argument is that the Nigerian government appears to be so indifferent to the 
activities of oil MNCs (apart from receiving rents and royalties accruable to it) that it has failed to 
take any pro-active steps to include the protection and preservation of the environment in the 
petroleum contracts it has entered into with the MNCs. This apparent failure to be pro-active (due 
mainly to the reasons enumerated in the section on Nigerian legislations and the effective regulation 
of the oil industry discussed above) means that the MNCs themselves have not instituted any arbitral 
claim against any measure from the government protecting the environment, unlike what is obtainable 
in other jurisdictions and countries where MNCs operate.
178
  
In these other jurisdictions, arbitration cases have been instituted by foreign investors against 
national governments who introduce measures for the protection of the environment, alleging that 
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such measures adversely affect their commercial interests.
179
 Many of these arbitration cases have 
been brought because the national governments have been pro-active enough to invoke the obligation 
to defend the environment as a reason for adopting positive measures. This has not been the case with 
Nigeria, as successive governments appear to have failed to rise to the challenge of taking active and 
effective steps towards protecting and preserving the environment from the activities of MNCs. 
In Methanex Corporation v United States,
180
 the state of California introduced a legislation 
which banned methanol from the State. Methanex brought a claim against California, alleging that its 
rights under an investment agreement have been expropriated. The arbitral tribunal held that in the 
interpretation of any expropriating provision, the approach adopted should not be one that encumbers 
the right of governments to impose environmental measures for the safety and good health of its 
citizens. The tribunal, therefore, held that the prohibition on methanol which was taken to preserve the 
quality of water was a legitimate legislation for the protection of the environment and did not amount 
to an expropriation. The Tribunal also ordered Methanex to pay the United States' legal fees and 
arbitral expenses in the amount of approximately US$ 4 million.  
Again, in Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America,
181
 the California government 
introduced laws for the protection of the environment and cultural rights of the indigenous people of 
the State. Glamis argued that the law was a breach of the expropriation provision in the contract it had 
entered with the State of California. The arbitral tribunal disagreed, holding that the steps taken by the 
Californian government in this respect did not expropriate the rights of the MNC. 
In Biwater v Tanzania,
182
 similar issues arose. The MNC contracted with the Tanzanian 
government to supply water to its capital city, Dares Salaam. When the corporation could not meet its 
obligations, the government in order to improve the quality of water provided for the city, terminated 
the contract. Biwater took the dispute to arbitration. Though the tribunal found in favor of the 
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corporation (after an examination of all the relevant documents and all surrounding circumstances), 
the fact is that Tanzania took a pro-active step to remedy a wrong which it felt was suffered by its 
citizens.  
In Metalclad Corporation v Mexico,
183
 the government of Mexico introduced a decree which 
was aimed at protecting the environment and people’s health. Metalclad felt that the effect of this 
decree was to indirectly expropriate its right under an investment agreement. Though the arbitral 
tribunal agreed with the MNC and held that the decree was an indirect expropriation, the point is that 
the Municipal government, at least, was able to introduce a pro-active legislation aimed at protecting 
the environment and the people. 
In similar vein, in Suez, Sociedad General and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic,
184
 the 
government of Argentina also took measures to protect its people and the environment and this 
resulted in an arbitration dispute. In many other instances in different jurisdictions, parties have 
resorted to arbitration to settle international investment disputes. In a majority of these cases, foreign 
investors allege that their rights under contractual agreements have been expropriated by national 
governments, who from all intents and purposes were positive enough to invoke pro-active measures 
for the protection of their environment.
185
  
 Juxtaposing the above situation with what is obtainable in Nigeria, it will be seen that 
successive Nigerian governments have failed to institute any arbitration claim against oil MNCs for 
environmental breaches, despite wide-spread acceptance by the corporations themselves that their 
activities have, in many instances, impacted adversely on the Nigerian environment. There are also no 
recorded instances of the corporations instituting claims against the Nigerian government for taking 
positive measures to protect the environment. The inference to be drawn from this, therefore, is that 
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the Nigerian government has not been positive enough to combat the excesses of corporate activities, 
especially those that impact negatively on the environment.  
Therefore, it appears reasonable to think that from an environmental perspective, these 
petroleum contracts contain little or no provisions for the protection of the Nigerian (Niger Delta) 
environment.  In the final analysis, because of the weak environmental provisions of these contracts 
and the reluctance of the Nigerian government to introduce pro-active terms in these contracts, oil 
corporations have no compelling obligation to tackle environmental challenges with the seriousness 
they deserve. In this context, Sornarajah contends ‘that the strong investment protection in the 





THE ROLE OF THE NIGERIAN STATE IN THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS 
 
As was discussed earlier, international instruments vesting ownership of natural resources on the state 
usually provide that the resources should be used for the welfare of its citizens. In Nigeria, all mineral 
oil in the country is vested in the federal government, which is expected to utilize the natural resource 
for the benefit of all Nigerians, especially those on whose lands the resource is situated. The federal 
government receives payments from the oil corporations and decides how this is distributed between 
the three tiers of government. 
It is clear that the allocation of oil revenue is one of the major reasons for the struggles in the 
Niger Delta. The amount of oil revenues credited to the oil host-communities in the region has varied 
over time and as was pointed out earlier, the current derivation formula for them is 13 per cent. 
Nevertheless, many of the inhabitants feel that the current revenue allocation formula is neither 
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adequate nor commensurate with the sustainable development needs of the people.
187
 In this situation, 
it appears that most parties involved are more focused on the percentage accruable to each party, 
instead of concentrating on how to utilize the available resources effectively.
188
  
In this state of affairs, the fact that the 13 per cent derivation allocated to the Niger Delta 
states if applied effectively can help to alleviate the plight of the people in the region is obscured. As 
Nigeria’s political economy continues to be dominated by a federal system seen fundamentally as a 
means for the re-distribution of centrally amassed oil wealth, issues of public governance have 
become avenues through which money is distributed to political allies and clients.
189
 
As Hyden contends, in a system that operates in this mode of governance, the provision of 
public employment and the distribution of goods are seen and applied first and foremost as resources 
belonging to particular individuals or groups and not for the benefit of the general public. In this 
sense, those who control political offices are pressurized into rewarding their clients and supporters 
and in doing this, creates a governance regime propelled and directed by patronage and 
‘patrimonialism’, rather than effective and efficient policy directive. The consequence, as a result, is 
civil strife and violence, much like what is happening in the Niger Delta
190
  
Patronage system has greatly undermined the ability of the Nigerian government to equitably 
distribute the wealth generated from oil and to amicably settle conflicts arising from the interactions 
between individuals and groups within its territory. Indeed, the argument is that the patronage driven 
governance of the Nigerian state is a major reason for the government’s inability to effectively 
regulate the interaction between oil corporations and oil host-communities in the past. The 
consequence of this failure, it is argued, is that the negative externalities from oil production are and 
have not been adequately addressed. It also prevents the government from moving against the 
intensification of high levels of rent-seeking and corruption and leads to the establishment of an 
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Furthermore, there is very little transparency and accountability in the governance regime of 
the Nigerian state, especially as they concern how public expenditures are prosecuted. A major 
challenge that has always confronted successive governments in Nigeria is how to utilize the 
resources of the country in a transparent and efficient way, for the sustainable development of the 
Niger Delta specifically and the country in general.
192
 
In this context, therefore, it is strongly argued that the government of Nigeria has played a 
major role in the escalation of violence in the Niger Delta through its inability to properly allocate and 
manage the natural resources in its territory. Equally, it appears reasonable to think that the role of the 
Nigerian state is central to creating peace between the host-communities and the oil MNCs. Through 
the inability to perform its expected role in ensuring the optimal utilization of the country’s natural 
resources for the benefit of its citizens, the Nigerian state appears to have abandoned its 
responsibilities and has become unable to create an environment conducive for the continued mining 





The Role of Oil MNCs 
 
Multinational corporations rule the international financial system. More than half of the world’s 
biggest markets ‘by turn over’ are made up of corporations, as opposed to states.194 Multinational 
corporations possess an ever-increasing amount of influence and power in international economics 
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and also undertake the provision of a wide-range of products and services, catering for an ‘emerging’ 
international market.
195
 The growing power of MNCs is evidenced in the fact that out of the 100 
largest economies in the world, 51 of them are corporations. By way of example, it has been pointed 
out that the economy of Toyota is bigger than that of Norway, while the assets of General Motors are 
more than that of Denmark.
196
 Commenting on their influence in international economics, Utting 
submits that the joint assets of five corporate entities in 2006 were more than double that of the 
aggregate Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the world’s one hundred poorest nations.197 
According to Ikelegbe, oil MNCs contribute positively to economic development, through 
their activities as the principal agents of foreign direct investment (FDI) and capital flow. Their 
involvements in national economies increase ‘the flow of technology, economic production, 
efficiency and productivity, expertise, manpower development, managerial skills, employment 
opportunities, incomes and philanthropy’.198 In similar vein, by paying taxes and royalties, rents and 
fees, they also impact positively of the economies where they operate.
199
 
By reason of the enormous wealth, coupled with the economic and political power possessed 
by corporations in modern times, it is impracticable to view their ‘decision-making’ capacities and 
powers of persuasion as that of mere private individuals.
200
 Their character is discernible from the 
level of impacts they have, not only in the progress of national economies, but also in their ability to 
enmesh themselves (either directly or indirectly, through their commercial partners and subsidiaries) 
in wide-spread environmental and social struggles. The argument is that the huge resources at their 
disposal are often used to influence national governments in areas where they have interests.
201
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In Nigeria, oil MNCs and other private corporations are expected to contribute positively 
towards the sustainable development of the host-communities. Apart from performing their 
obligations under national legislations and according to the provisions of the contracts governing their 
commercial activities, they are also expected to act in a socially responsible manner. Social 
responsibility, in this sense, amounts to the moral minimum (different from law or contract) which 
they are expected to comply with, and extends beyond mere corporate philanthropy to an obligation 
which offers a social license to operate.
202
 
In pursuing this role of contributing to the sustainable development of the Niger Delta, oil 
MNCs claim to have undertaken numerous obligations as evidence of their social responsibility 
practices.
203
 Nevertheless, the corporations are also alleged to have contributed to the dynamics of the 
conflict in the region. Generally speaking, the MNCs are accused of degrading the environment 
through their oil operations and situating oil installations without any regard for international safety 




Furthermore, the oil corporations are accused of manipulating successive Nigerian 
governments into making policies favourable to them. As Okonta argues, the MNCs (especially Shell) 
have constantly displayed their informed ‘self-interest’ by pointing to the close and cosy affiliation 
they enjoy with an ‘alliance of military rulers, top echelons of the civic bureaucracy and the business 
sector’.205 Again, he accuses them of being deeply enmeshed in the country’s ‘political and economic’ 




The MNCs are also alleged to have encouraged and contributed to the growing inter-
community dimension of the conflict, supplying funds to some militant groups, in some cases to 
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‘pacify’ them, and in other instances as part of a divide and rule strategy aimed at pitching 
communities against one another. Finally, the CSR activities of MNCs often themselves engender 
bitterness and anger between communities. These occur when corporations make donations to one 
community and do not extend same to neighbouring communities. The inability of one community to 
benefit from such ‘largesse’ creates animosity and hostility between the benefitting community and 





The Role of the Host-Communities 
 
For many inhabitants of the Niger Delta, the continued exploitation of oil mineral in the area, with its 
attendant environmental problems has rendered the people powerless and incapable of determining 
and charting the course of their existence. In this context, a significant proportion of these inhabitants 
believe that they have not legitimately benefitted from oil resources located in their land. Yet, they are 
made to bear the brunt of most of the negative consequences of oil exploitation, including pollution 
from oil spills, gas flares, forest fires, acid rains etc. To these people, environmental degradation lies 
at the heart of community discontent and has frequently pitched Niger Delta communities against the 
federal government and oil corporations. The decay and corrosion of the environment is one of the 
most observable forms of the negative impact of oil mining and sets the Niger Delta apart from other 
regions in the country. It is this state of frustration that has necessitated aggression, evidenced in the 
militant activities of the Niger Delta people.
208
 
Nevertheless, while Niger Delta citizens have legitimate grievances, it is also suggested that 
some strategic groups have taken advantage of the sometimes chaotic situation in the area to 
perpetrate criminal and violent activities, thereby worsening an already volatile situation. In this 
context, the argument is that even though the pollution and degradation of the environment may be a 
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justifiable cause of the host-communities’ grievances, it also appears reasonable to think that some 
elements of the Niger Delta region are not primarily concerned with protecting and preserving the 
environment. These groups appear to have forgotten their original goal of promoting social justice and 
self-empowerment through environmental preservation and have focused instead on enriching 
themselves through criminal activities.
209
 For these groups, the overriding principle is greed and 
selfishness, leading to the desire to extort as much money as possible from both the government and 
the oil corporations. In this situation, these individuals and groups are sometimes not genuinely 
provoked before they start attacking corporate personnel and facilities and in many instances, even 
their own people. They are ready to foment trouble and escalate the crisis if and when they feel that 
their ‘right’ to the enjoyment of oil proceeds is threatened. During times like this, they selfishly and 
arbitrarily unleash acts of violence which have led to the destruction of life and property.
210
   
Violence emanating from the greed of this group of community members has also had a 
damaging effect on the levels of trust and the quantity of social capital in the region. Customary 
positions (like village chiefs) have been employed to win control over compensation payments from 
oil corporations, which in turn have led to many inhabitants regarding their traditional chiefs with 
suspicion. This, it is argued, has significantly contributed to the decline of the authority and 
legitimacy of community chiefs. When it is considered that these community chiefs are the custodians 
of customary law usually applied as a dispute settlement mechanism between members of the 
community, the destructive influence of the greed of some members of oil-host communities in the 
Niger Delta and how it acts as a damaging weight on existing social realities is brought to the fore.
211
 
The activities of this group is further evidenced in; the theft of petroleum products on a 
gigantic scale; the kidnapping of oil workers; the stage management of gangs and application of 
violence in political and electoral crusades; the enjoyment of profits accumulated from protection of 
oil corporations and their facilities; and a flourishing derived market for the sale and purchase of 
weapons. These four factors, when combined, make the control of the method of violence extremely 
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lucrative and have led to a well-established ethos of spontaneous militarism with its own inescapable 
dynamic of crisis intensification and explosion.
212
 
Furthermore, the draining-off and transporting of bunkered petroleum products is perpetrated 
by ‘criminal’ gangs and associations made up principally of militant youths, supported and protected 
by powerful community chiefs and politicians, military officers and local businessmen. As Watts 
contends, ‘the selfish tendencies of these powerful local actors, coupled with the acknowledgment that 
the bunkering venture offers a source of revenue to restless and jobless youths have encouraged the 
involvement of Nigerian law enforcement authorities and others’.213 According to him, from the 
community level, this has afforded many radical and combative bands and petty criminals with the 
capital to acquire significant supplies of sophisticated weapons, easily available for purchase in many 
of the Delta states.
214
  





This chapter has offered a brief narrative of the Nigeria oil industry (including the Niger Delta 
region). It began with a critical assessment of the oil industry in Nigeria and the various legislations, 
licences and contracts which regulate the sector. While stating that there is a difference between the 
obligations conferred on oil MNCs by both statute and the petroleum contracts on the one hand and 
the voluntary obligations assumed by corporations under CSR on the other hand, the chapter argues 
that as a result of many factors which are present in the Nigerian socio-political system, the various 
legislations appear ineffective as a regulatory mechanism for the conduct of oil exploitation in the 
country. The chapter also suggested that, by implication, the petroleum contracts which govern the 
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conduct and operations of oil MNCs in the country affords them the freedom to operate without due 
regard to the host-communities and their environment. To this end, the Nigerian government has a lot 
of the blame for its inability to provide for the protection of the environment through appropriate 
implementation of existing legislations and the inclusion of pro-active provisions for the protection of 
the environment in the petroleum contracts it has entered into with oil MNCs. The chapter also looked 
at the roles of the Nigerian government, the oil MNCs and the host communities in the Niger Delta 













Multinational corporations control key sectors of the Nigerian economy, including those of 
manufacturing, construction, petrochemicals and telecommunications. However, they are most 
influential in the oil sector.
1
 The foremost MNCs entered Nigeria during colonialism and as a former 
British Colony; the country‘s legal and administrative systems mirror in many ways those of Britain. 
This means that corporate regulation in Nigeria
2




Oil exploration activities started in Nigerian around the beginning of the twentieth century, 
when the British Royal Navy began its transformation from coal power to fuel energy.
4
 In pursuit of 
the objective of locating oil within the Commonwealth, in 1907, the colonial government in Southern 
Nigeria gave J.S. Bergheim
5
 permission to explore for oil, and he subsequently acquired monopoly 
rights to all drilling activities in the area. In September 1912, Bergheim died in a car crash and oil 
exploration was halted, thereby, ending the first phase of the search for oil in the country. The second 
phase began in 1937, when an Anglo-Dutch consortium, Shell D'Arcy came to Nigeria and was 
granted the whole country as one concession.
6
 Between 1953 and 1955, Shell drilled 13 additional 
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wells and eventually struck its first commercial well in 1956 at Oloibiri in present-day Bayelsa State.
7
 
Towards the later part of 1956, more oil was discovered at Afam in present day Rivers State. 
Thereafter, oil pipelines were constructed from Oloibiri to Port-Harcourt in order to ease movement 
and aid export. The first cargo of crude oil was exported from Port-Harcourt on 17 February 1958.
8
 
The success of Shell led to an influx of other foreign corporations into the country. According 
to Obasi, the achievements recorded by Shell persuaded other MNCs to participate in oil exploration 
and by 1968 oil had become a very important source of energy. By this time (i.e. 1960), the quantity 
of oil produced in the country had more than tripled from what it used to be in 1958.
9
 As a result, 
other oil MNCs including ExxonMobil, Tenneco, Texaco, Gulf (now Chevron), Safrap (now Elf), 
Agip, Philip and Esso equally started operations in Nigeria and by the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
these already established MNCs were joined by others including Japan Petroleum, Occidental, 
Deminex, Union Oil, Niger Petroleum and Niger Oil Resources. At the peak of the period, the 
Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) – the forerunner to the NNPC – was formed. At this time 




According to the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC), there are over 30 
MNCs currently in the country, with 18 of them operating in the oil sector. These corporations are 
mainly from Europe, the US, Japan and China.
11
 Other sectors with considerable amounts of 
multinational presence include; the construction sector – Julius Berger, Arab Contractors, Reynolds 
Construction (RCC) and Siemens (amongst others) – and the telecommunication sector – MTN, 
Globacom, Etisalat and Zain.
12
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This chapter reviews existing literature on the CSR practices of MNCs in the Niger Delta and 
what amounts to sustainable development for the people of the region. The chapter then proceeds to 
look at the internationalization of the Niger Delta conflict and the growing international pressures 
exerted on oil corporations by such groups as the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the 
Green Peace, Friends of the Earth, the United Nations‘ Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) etc. It 
contends that the MNCs eventually resorted to CSR as a reaction to these pressures.  
It goes on to investigate the various CSR claims of the four major oil MNCs in the region and 
how these claims are viewed by the host-communities. It then suggests a distinction between the 
performance of positive obligations or philanthropy such as the building of schools, roads, hospitals 
etc. and the more demanding CSR duty to refrain from harming the ecosystem – duty to care for the 
environment. The chapter contends that the failure by oil MNCs to perform the latter duty is at the 
heart of the crisis in the region. In this context, it suggests that the seeming inability of oil 
corporations to care for host communities‘ environment has led to a negative perception of corporate 
activities by host-communities. Based on existing realities in the Niger Delta, the chapter argues that 




REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE  
 
Review of General CSR Literature 
 
Generally, current literatures on CSR have deliberated on the changing relationship between 
corporations and society in general. Even though corporations began to engage in social responsibility 
tasks from the nineteenth century, it was only in the 1990s that the concept of CSR in its 
contemporary form developed. The recent expansion of the concept is evidenced in the increasing 
number of Corporate Codes of Conduct, CSR Reports and in-house organizational arrangements 
67 
 
dealing with issues of CSR. As well as becoming more institutionalized, the recent revival of the 
concept is characterized by its international recognition and convergence. According to Muhle, the 
international nature of contemporary CSR is additionally reflected in the growing acknowledgement 
of its global relevance and endorsement by international organizations like the United Nations (UN).
13
 




The social pressures exerted on corporations by local and international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)
15
 greatly influenced the processes whereby the former began to adopt social 
responsibility codes in the 1990s. For Swanson, external pressures from civil society organizations, 
coupled with the tactical business decisions of managers, led to the emergence of modern CSR. The 
prevailing understanding of the concept appears to be premised on the argument that as business 
activities inevitably impinge on community interests, it is imperative that businesses are accountable 
to those who are affected by their operations. The multifaceted interactions between corporations and 
society trigger responsibilities for firms in situations where their activities cause social problems.
16
  
As McWilliams and Siegel opine, however, contemporary CSR deals not with legal 
regulations but the voluntary responsibilities assumed by corporations towards the communities where 
they operate. According to them, although CSR is presented as something which is in the interests of 
society at large, it is also argued that CSR practices are equally in the interests of the corporations 
themselves.
17
 This is in line with the enlightened self interest notion of CSR, in which CSR is thought 
to bring benefits to the corporations themselves: reputational gains, better employee recruitment and 
retention, increase in sales, the avoidance of risks and so on.
18
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Notwithstanding the increasing prominence of CSR in modern corporate governance, 
however, there is no agreement on its precise definition. The term CSR means different things to 
different people and has become a broad and all-encompassing concept which embraces everything 
from corporate philanthropy to corporate citizenship to corporate social performance.
19
 As Carroll 
submits; 
 ...to some it conveys the idea of legal responsibility or liability; to others, it 
means socially responsible behaviour in an ethical sense; to still others, the 
meaning transmitted is that of ‗responsible for‘,  in a causal mode; many 
simply equate it with a charitable contribution; some take it to mean socially 
conscious; many of those who embrace it most fervently see it as a mere 
synonym for ‗legitimacy‘, in the context of ‗belonging‘ or being proper or 
valid; a few see it as a sort of fiduciary duty imposing higher standards of 





For Smith, corporate social responsibility is seen as an economic arrangement that facilitates the 
production and distribution of wealth, through the execution and incorporation of ethical practices and 
sustainable management habits.
21
 As good a definition as any is probably that adopted by the 
European Commission, which has defined CSR as ‗the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts 
on society‘.22 It is a notion, the Commission argues, which enjoins corporations to ‗have in place, a 
process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their 
business operations and core strategy in collaboration with their stakeholders‘.23 
Does CSR inevitably involve de-prioritising the interests of shareholders? Here the debates 
surrounding CSR cross into those surrounding corporate governance. In general terms, in recent years 
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two broad approaches to corporate governance have been jostling for dominance: one asserts 
shareholder primacy, the other a so-called ‗stakeholder‘ approach.  
For supporters of shareholder primacy, the responsibility of business is to maximize returns 
for shareholders
24
and the sole responsibility of managers is to seek to maximize shareholders‘ profits 
and to advance their interests.
25
 From this perspective, any diminution of pursuit of the interests of 
shareholders by managers represents a kind of fraud. They must not let vague talk about CSR distract 
them from actualizing the main objective, which is profit maximization. For the shareholder theorists, 
only democratically elected governments are legitimately empowered to tackle social problems. Any 
attempt by corporations to ‗pursue social ends‘ is seen ‗as theft of funds belonging to its 
shareholders‘.26 
The shareholder value theory argues that tackling social responsibility matters comes at a cost 
to corporations. In the event that corporations are forced to internalize the costs of socially responsible 
practices, they hurt their competitive position relative to other businesses. The injurious nature of CSR 
to corporate profits is made more compelling as a result of the global competitive environment in 
which modern corporations operate. In this sense, where a business in a particular country expends 
corporate profits in tackling social and environmental issues, it will incur losses if a similar business in 
another country does not act in like manner.
27
 
The implication of the belief that corporations should profit maximize, according to its 
advocates, is exemplified in the claim that corporate governance is a simple agency problem; how do 
you get corporate managers to act in the interests of inactive and often dispersed shareholders? In this 
context, the agency theory acknowledges that the corporation is made up of a principal who assigns 
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work to another person referred to as the agent. Accordingly, the corporation is identified as ‗a nexus 
of contracts between principals and agents, with shareholders being the principals and managers being 
their agents. The corporation must be run by the manager agents in the sole interests of the principal 
shareholders.  
Finding solutions to the agency problem has resulted in the development of various corporate 
governance mechanisms, aimed at monitoring the activities of corporate managers and aligning their 
interest with that of their principals. While some of the mechanisms operate from within corporations 
– things such as performance related pay and the use of Non-Executive Directors to monitor managers 
–; others operate externally, such as the markets for corporate control. These mechanisms incentivize 




As Mallin explains; 
   
In the context of corporations and issues of corporate control, agency theory 
views corporate governance mechanisms, especially the board of directors as 
being an essential monitoring device to try to ensure that any problems that 





However, the argument that corporations should profit maximize has to be linked to the rise to 
prominence of the wider neoliberal theories of development which came into prominence in the 
1970s. The neoliberal, market-based model of economic and social development, with its emphasis on 
free trade, freedom of movement for capital and limited state intervention in and regulation of 
economic affairs, encourages precisely the pursuit of shareholder value and the de-prioritization of 
other interests. To this end, the shareholder value theory is part and parcel of the wider neoliberal 
theories of economic and social development.
30
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 Again, it is also argued that the shareholder theory is supported by a powerful interest group 
whom Ireland refers to as the ‗power of resurgent finance‘ or the ‗re-asserted power of finance‘.31 The 
reach and power of these financial interests took on frightening dimensions with the rise to 
prominence of the neoliberal theories of social and economic development. The activities of the power 
of resurgent finance have led to the intensification of what Gill and Schneiderman have labelled 
disciplinary neoliberalism and the new constitutionalism respectively.
32
 According to Ireland and 
Pillay, this ‗power of resurgent finance‘, - with a strong bias for capital accumulation, – champions 




Supporters of stake-holding, on the other hand, presume that corporations should generate 
value for all of those with interests affected by corporate activities. In this sense, therefore, the 
interests of employees, customers, communities and governments should be considered when 
corporate decisions are made. Agents of stake-holding argue that in contemporary societies, the effects 
of neoliberal restructurings have led to the decreasing power of the nation-state, and by implication 
that of national governments. The diminishing powers of national governments mean that they appear 
to be incapable of effectively addressing the problems of extra-territorial commercial activities 
promoted by neoliberalism. In this situation, MNCs are expected to be the purveyors of responsible 
behaviour and solution providers to the social and economic challenges facing humanity. Since 
transnational corporations have huge resources and advanced technologies at their disposal, they are 
expected to devote a significant part of these resources towards addressing these challenges.
34
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The supporters of the stakeholder theory hold that the purpose of the corporation is not merely 
to maximize profits for shareholders, because the primary function of corporations at their inception 
was to provide social services, which small businesses (sole traders and partnerships) could not easily 
provide. Accordingly, the wealth that is created by the corporation should be distributed to every 
interest that is affected in the course of the operations of the business. When this is done, society in 
general benefits. In this sense, when wealth is distributed to employees in the form of wages, or 
materials are acquired from suppliers, or taxes are paid to the government, or corporations engage in 
environmentally friendly activities, they are merely fulfilling their obligations to the society.
35
  
Most stakeholders do not deny that corporations have economic responsibilities which have to 
be satisfied, including responsibilities towards shareholders. They argue, however, that corporate 
managers should be bound to take into account the interests of other stakeholders. The supporters of 
stake-holding see the corporation as at least in part a social institution – as part of society – with the 
wider obligations which logically flow from this. As a result, equity demands that those affected, 




For Carroll and Bucholtz, corporate stakeholders may be broadly classified into two; primary 
and secondary stakeholders. A corporation‘s primary stakeholders are those individuals and groups 
that have some direct stake in the activities of the enterprise (including shareholders, employees, 
communities, customers etc). On the other hand, secondary stakeholders are ‗public or special interest 
groups that do not have a direct stake in the organization, but are still affected by its operations (for 
example local and federal governments, regulatory bodies, civic institutions etc)‘.37 
There is, however, another emerging theory, which attempts to reconcile the shareholder and 
stakeholder theories. This is what we might call the ‗business case‘ theory. This encourages 
corporations and their managers to integrate CSR concerns into core strategic decision making 
processes on the grounds that it is in the best long-term financial interests of shareholders. Integrating 
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these sorts of issues into decision-making, it is argued, will prevent long-term financial and 
reputational risks and also allow corporations to acquire an enduring ‗set of rules by pre-empting 
change in turbulent environments‘.38 
 
 
Review of Existing CSR Literature in the Niger Delta 
 
Analytical research into CSR in the Niger Delta is only just beginning to emerge. As yet, there have 
been relatively few studies scrutinizing community expectations of CSR in the Niger Delta, using the 
perspective of cultural, political and administrative frameworks.
39
 Most of the earlier studies 
concentrated on describing issues surrounding the struggles, corporate-community interactions, and 
environmental accountability.
40
 As a result, much of the existing literature in the area is largely 
descriptive in nature. Moreover, a considerable number of the studies of CSR in the region have been 




CSR projects in the Niger Delta started in the 1960s and 1970s, when the first MNCs began 
oil exploration and production. Corporations began by making philanthropic gestures - cash payments, 
award of scholarships, construction of classroom blocks, roads, hospitals, and the supply of 
agricultural equipment. The first wave of such projects seems to have been motivated largely by 
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business considerations and sought to do little more than satisfy ‗the most-minimal‘ moral obligations. 
Since then, these corporations have adopted various approaches towards CSR. These include 
community assistance and development projects (philanthropy) and, more recently, partnership 
approaches. The dominant partnership approaches include government-business partnerships, 





The Two Opposing Views on the Nature of CSR in the Niger Delta 
 
There are two divergent views on the nature and effectiveness of the oil MNCs‘ social responsibility 
practices in the Niger Delta. According to Aaron, the debate on CSR in the Niger Delta has polarised 
around two very different positions. The first states that CSR operates as a medium for providing 
‗sustainable community development‘ to deprived oil host-communities in the region. The second 
holds that CSR has failed, and is failing, to provide meaningful development.
43
 
For those who believe CSR is making a significant difference, MNCs have been seriously 
committed to the execution of meaningful CSR obligations and have implemented successful policies 
for all stakeholders. Unsurprisingly, this is the view of MNCs themselves.
44
 Corroborating the 
commitment of MNCs in this regard, Eweje maintains that MNCs have adopted developmental 
schemes principally to prove that they are socially responsible. According to him, they have done this 
through the provision of scholarships, classrooms and teachers for local communities.
45
 Similarly, for 
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Idemudia, from the moment concerns about community development and poverty reduction shifted 
from the fringes of business thoughts to the centre, MNCs reacted progressively by embracing 
‗partnership strategies‘ geared towards poverty alleviation.46 Contributing further, Ite maintains that it 
is not in doubt that MNCs in the region
47
 have consistently acknowledged their social obligations to 
host-communities. Accordingly, they have continued to adopt CSR projects for the development of 
these communities.
48
 Aaron blames commentators for peddling the misconception that MNCs are not 
socially responsible. For him, most of the current literature on CSR initiatives in the area does not 
highlight the fact that some oil MNCs did initiate projects which have fostered relative peace in the 
area. These commentators, he argues, obscure the fact that some of the schemes introduced by the 
corporations are functioning successfully and for the benefit of host- communities.
49
  





 – disclose a number of flaws intrinsic to the CSR projects of 
MNCs in the Niger Delta.
52
 In the first instance, by relying on the restricted goal of providing just the 
moral minimum, MNCs precluded themselves from inventing practical measures for the execution of 
effective CSR projects. Underpinning this flawed strategy is the presumption that the commercial 
objectives of corporations are irreconcilable with the developmental needs of host-communities. As a 
result, the practices of MNCs rarely differed from the stipulations of law and in supplying the ‗moral 
minimum‘.53 This is the reason why many view the millions of dollars MNCs spent on CSR projects 
as cosmetic attempts to preserve corporate reputation. Moreover, the CSR programmes executed by 
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the MNCs were not intended to tackle pressing economic, environmental and social problems. 
Evidencing this point is the fact that the construction of school blocks and health clinics by MNCs 
were made as ‗one time offers instead of as sustainable projects‘.54  
Again, it is contended that MNCs‘ early approaches to sustainable development in the Niger 
Delta failed to appreciate the relationship between business and society. Corporations failed to 
understand that business is not all about accumulating profits whatever the cost and then handing 
down a fraction of it to society. It has to do with how a corporation makes its money, how it operates 
and how it relates with society.
55
 Idemudia and Ite submit that no amount of class room, road or 
hospital construction will adequately compensate for the health injuries caused by oil pollution, acid 




At the centre of the CSR debate in the Niger Delta is the contention that positive affirmative 
duties
57
and the duty to care for the environment
58
operate reciprocally. By fulfilling the duty of care 
not to damage the environment, value is created. The value thus created is further advanced and 
consolidated through the performance of affirmative duties. As a result, the crisis in the Niger Delta is 
attributed to the failure of current sustainable development efforts to fulfil the negative injunction 
duties not to damage the environment.
59
 Thus, Ukpongson and Onu argue that it is incumbent on 
MNCs to understand that CSR is not only about creating new sources of livelihood through social 
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investments, but also about embracing the duty to ensure that existing sources of survival are not 
ruined or wasted as a result of corporate actions.
60
 
Furthermore, the incorporation of ‗community development and self-help projects‘ into  the 
CSR agenda of MNCs only occurred in the mid-1990s, and available evidence suggests initial efforts 
at community-help schemes and infrastructure development were kneejerk and unconsidered. The lack 
of an extensive emergency response strategy for tackling issues of pollution in the region exemplifies 
this point. Oil MNCs‘ reactions when environmental calamities like oil spills occur,61 hardly ever go 
further than the communities within the MNCs‘ immediate locality. Those communities 
‗downstream‘, whose farms and rivers may have been polluted as well, were forgotten.62  
Besides, the inability of MNCs to design ‗a coordinated strategic approach‘ to the execution 
of CSR programmes has generated lopsided outcomes and had insignificant effects on Niger Delta 
people.
63
 For Evuleocha, the millions of dollars expended on scholarships, schools and agricultural 
extension projects have not had any significant impact on poverty alleviation or the socio-economic 
development of the region. MNCs have also not been able to expand their projects to reach ‗the 
poorest and most ecologically devastated communities in the region‘.64  
For Amaeshi and others, most MNCs in the Niger Delta neither appreciate nor acknowledge 
home-communities peculiarities and local interpretations of CSR, but instead concentrate either on 
CSR directives from their home-countries or on CSR actions that are primarily aimed at the goal of 
profit maximization.
65
 To other commentators, the informal execution of CSR undertakings and the 
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inability of the Nigerian state to react to the needs of the people have ‗left the burden of dealing with 
the negative consequences of oil extraction on the communities‘.66 Oil MNCs included CSR in their 






‘Effective CSR’ and Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta 
 
Effective CSR (for the purposes of this thesis) is seen as the social responsibility practices of 
corporations that function as a core part of public governance and sets the parameters of how expenses 
and rewards are expended. It is the corporate action which clearly defines the various actors in the 
economic process and the respective roles they are expected to play in the production and distribution 
of wealth. As a result, effective CSR will stipulate the duties and responsibilities of the MNCs, as well 
as the rights and obligations of corporate stakeholders, including its employees, host-communities, the 
environment and the state that is expected to regulate their activities.
68
  
In this context, effective CSR is the social responsibility obligation that contributes to 
sustainable development. What then is sustainable development? Many scholars, institutions and 
practitioners have tried to articulate and promote their own alternative definitions of sustainable 
development; yet a clear, fixed, and immutable meaning remains elusive. According to Kates and 
others ‗the concrete challenges of (defining) sustainable development are at least as heterogeneous and 
complex as the diversity of human societies and natural ecosystems around the world‘.69  
However, since the concept of development itself is seen as the ‗multidimensional changes 
involving progress or improvements in structures, institutions, the general aspects of life of a given 
people and entails the acceleration of economic growth, decline of poverty, and the reduction of 
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inequality‘, sustainable development (for the purposes of this thesis) may be taken to mean the ability 
of society to maintain these improvements in structures and institutions, without destroying the 
balance between business and the environment.
70
 
As good a definition of sustainable development is that of the Brundtland Report, produced by 
the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)
71
 which defines the concept as the 
development that ‗meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs‘.72  
Furthermore, the Report states that; 
 
The environment does not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, 
ambitions and needs, and attempts to defend it in isolation from human 
concerns have given the very word ―environment‖ a connotation of naivety 
in some political circles. The word ―development‖ has also been narrowed 
by some into a very limited focus, along the lines of ―what poor nations 
should do to become richer,‖ and this again is automatically dismissed by 
many in the international arena as being a concern of specialists, of those 
involved in questions of ―development assistance.‖ But the ―environment‖ is 
where we live; and ―development‖ is what we all do in attempting to 





Sustainable development requires people to see the world as a system in which both space and time 
are connected. For the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), seeing the world as 
a system extending across a given space makes it easier for actors to understand that pollution in one 
part of the world, for instance, may affect the quality of air in another part. The institute further argues 
that seeing development as a system over time leads to the realization that the decisions of people who 
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lived a hundred years ago may affect the lives of those who are living in the world today and that the 
actions of people today may affect the lives of the next generation.
74
  
Sustainable development is the development which ‗not only generates economic growth, but 
distributes its benefits equitably; regenerates the environment instead of destroying it; empowers 
people rather than marginalizing them; gives priority to the poor, enlarging their choices and 
opportunities, and provides for their participation in decisions affecting them‘.75  
According to the Brundtland Report, it is necessary for the world to work harmoniously 
towards creating a new path to development that will sustain human progress in the years to come, 
while simultaneously allowing economic actors to pursue their commercial interests. Accordingly; 
 
The concept of sustainable development does imply limits—not absolute 
limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social 
organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere 





In 1992, the United Nations organized a world conference on the environment in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil.
77
 The Conference was held to mark the 20 years of an earlier Conference on the Environment, 
held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972. The 1992 Conference issued the Rio Declaration, which tried to 
reconcile global economic development with protection of the environment. The Declaration 
acknowledged that the only way the global community could enjoy long-term social and economic 
progress will be to connect economic progress with environmental protection and to establish even-
handed international partnerships between governments and major players in the civil society and 
business sector, including international investors and multinational corporations. 
                                                             
74 International Institute for Sustainable Development, ‘Sustainable Development: Environmental, Economic 
and Social Well-Being for Today and Tomorrow’ (2007) <www.iisd.org/sd/> accessed 25 January 2015 
75
ibid 
76 WCED (n 72) 8 
77
 The United Nations organised the World Conference on the Environment and Development Otherwise 
known as the Earth Summit 
81 
 
The Declaration equally advocated for the implementation of the ‗polluter pays principle‘, 
through which any actor who pollutes an environment will have to bear the costs of pollution. It also 
advocated for the extensive use of the ‗precautionary principle‘, which enjoins economic actors 
(especially multinational corporations) to undertake environmental assessments to identify adverse 
impacts of proposed actions and eliminate any potential harm from a project before such a project is 
commenced. The Declaration insisted that current developmental initiatives should not undermine the 
resource base of future generations and encouraged developed countries to accept the special 
responsibility of making this happen. According to it, developed countries should be saddled with this 
responsibility because of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and the 
technologies and financial resources at their disposal. Even though strong environmental policies are 
necessary, the Declaration warned that it should not be used as an excuse for restricting international 
trade and cutting-off trade between the developed and developing nations. Nevertheless, it urged 




The argument is that for effective CSR to lead to sustainable development, all stakeholders‘ 
interests (investors, lenders, employees, consumers, non-governmental organizations, debtors, 
suppliers and government) must be considered before any corporate decision is made. This is because 
these decisions generally have a direct impact on many or all of the other stakeholders. As such, the 
corporation needs to appreciate the importance of these other constituencies and take their interests 
into account when implementing commercial decisions that directly affect them.
79
 
The pursuit of only shareholder profits by corporations (for instance, by terminating 
employees contracts unilaterally) may enhance shareholders profits, but will in the long run impact 
negatively on the economy and lead to unsustainable development. The same consequence follows 
when a corporation operates without due regard to the environmental needs of the communities where 
it functions. The host-community, frustrated by such careless assignment, may react negatively 
towards the corporation. The reaction, which may be in the form of aggressive and violent conduct (as 
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witnessed in the Niger Delta), could lead to the cessation of corporate operations which in turn will 
affect the economy adversely.
80
 
In this sense, when corporate executives see the maximization of profits as the primary 
business of the corporation, they usually make short-term decisions which harm and deplete the 
environment. For sustainable development to be realized, therefore, economic actors must operate 
within the environmental limits of the locality where they operate. This is taken to mean that 
corporations will strive to meet the diverse needs of people in existing and future communities, 
promote their personal wellbeing, create equal opportunities and foster social cohesion and inclusion 
between and among them. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the interplay between the environment and the 
economy remains at the heart of sustainable development. Poverty is seen as one of the major 
determinants of how a particular society engages in sustainable development, mainly because it is seen 
as the propellant of unsustainable development. As a result, the 2002 UN World Summit on 
sustainable development, held in Johannesburg, urged states not only to take immediate steps to make 
progress in the formulation and elaboration of national strategies for sustainable development, but also 
to push for poverty eradication, as it is crucial to the attainment of environmental sustainability.
81
  
What then amounts to sustainable development in the Niger Delta region? Sustainable 
development in the region is the present ability of the Nigerian government, the oil MNCs and the 
host-communities to efficiently exploit natural resources in the area for the benefit of all parties, 
without jeopardizing the future chances of the communities. It is seen as the preservation of the 
‗carrying capacity‘ of the delicate Niger Delta ecosystem and the ‗progressive elimination of objective 
conditions that limit the capacity of the region‘s environment, as well as the reduction of fears and 
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anxieties about the ability of the environment to cater for the people who rely on it for their 
sustenance‘.82 
 It is the realization that an unsustainable exploitation of crude oil, with its devastation of 
farmland and fishing waters, threatens the livelihood of both the individuals and the communities in 
the region. The concept advocates that MNCs in the region should embark on major oil exploration 
activities only after conducting Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) to understand the effects of 
their operations on the Niger Delta communities and environment. In this context, sustainable 
development in the area is the protection of all parties concerned from poverty, exploitation, disease, 
bio-chemical contamination, injustice and human rights abuses. Essentially, the ‗exploitation‘ of 
mineral oil and the attendant destruction of farmland and fishing waters jeopardizes the movement of 




From the foregoing, it is clear that all the parties involved in the crisis have various roles to 
play in realizing sustainable development in the region. In the first instance, government will have to 
provide an effective and conducive framework for the mining of oil in the area. It will have to support 
the activities of the corporations, while co-operating with the communities through quality leadership 
to enhance their social and economic well-being.
84
  
Secondly, the oil MNCs will have to conduct their activities in accordance with the laws of 
the country. They will endeavour to use environmentally friendly equipment and processes in the 
conduct of their operations and immediately clean-up spills where and when they occur. They will 
also need to apply precautionary measures to make sure that their activities do not destroy the natural 
ecosystem of the host-communities and pay adequate compensation in cases where there activities 
injure the people and their communities.
85
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Finally, the host-communities will have to co-operate with both the government and the oil 
corporations to actualize the interests of all parties. They should see the corporations as partners in 
development and not as opportunities for extortions and unjust enrichment. They will have to apply 
compensation funds to development projects and not use them to enrich their private pockets. It is on 
this premise of all the parties working together in harmony that sustainable development will be 





Nigeria: A Privatised State?  
 
One of the roles of the government is to mediate between conflicting interests of members in its 
territory and, as far as possible to reconcile them.
87
 The relevant question in this context is; what role 
has the Nigerian government played in the Niger Delta conflict, considering that the crisis in the 
region is predicated on the conflicting interests between the host-communities and the oil MNCs? The 
suggestion is that instead of mediating between the two conflicting groups (and their conflicting 
interests); the government has sided with the MNCs – in significant part because it is dependent on 
them for its revenues. 
Ibeanu contends that in contemporary societies, different groups interact with and oppose each 
other, as they struggle to satisfy their interests. The argument is that the principal function of the 
government is to reconcile conflicting interests and to confine them within the limits of 
acceptability.
88
 In order to achieve this task, such government has to try to stand above different 
interest groups and strive to be an ‗impartial arbiter‘, seeking to build consensus. In that situation, it 
becomes feasible for government to curtail the use of force in its supervision of the various 
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interactions. Thus, the management of opposing and contradicting social interactions throw up ‗the 
problematic‘ of state autonomy.89 
On the part of oil host-communities in Nigeria, their interest is seen as the preservation of the 
regenerative ability of the delicate Niger Delta ecosystem. From their perspective, the misuse of oil 
mining opportunities is indefensible, because the resultant devastation to farmlands and fishing 
waters‘ endanger the movement of resources and jeopardizes the survival of the people and their 
communities in general. Scarcity, caused by oil mining activities, is a major source of worry for oil 
producing communities who feel that their source of livelihood is being endangered.
90
  
To the oil corporations, on the other hand, their interest is characterized by a continuous, 
ceaseless and unbroken production of crude oil at cut-throat prices. Encouraged by a pro-growth 
philosophy, they are interested only in the exploitation of oil to enhance and advance corporate profits, 




The argument is that the Nigerian government has been unable to carry out its functions in the 
Niger Delta region. Rather than acting and being seen as representing ‗the general interests of the 
people‘, it is suggested that the Nigerian government has in effect, been ‗privatized‘ and ‗parcelled 
out‘ for the benefit of a special group, the oil MNCs. Many see this as an important contributory factor 
in the ‗social struggles‘ witnessed in the Niger Delta and in the inability of the Nigerian state to 
reconcile the opposing forces in the crisis.
92
 
It is suggested that the Nigerian government has metamorphosed into a tool at the disposal of 
the multinationals in their social struggles against the host-communities. Crucial here, of course, is the 
financial dependence of the state on the revenues delivered by the MNCs. The belligerence of the 
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host-communities poses a threat to state security. The argument is that what sometimes appears as 
intra-group conflict is, in fact, conflict between the state and the host-communities. Stated in another 
way, it is state aggression against a targeted group, and not the aggression of one group against 
another, that is to be found in the Niger Delta. Hence the belief held by many, that government 
involvement in the struggle, instead of helping to mediate and resolve the conflicts has in reality 
promoted and worsened the crisis.
93
 
Ezirim asserts that the federal government has over the years supported the oil corporations. 
To him, this is not surprising, considering that the government collects rents from them. It has already 
been stated that through the combination of a set of local legislations, government expropriated both 
lands and mineral deposits located within the territory of Nigeria. The implication of this is that 
decisions concerning oil and gas exploitation are made directly by the government and the 
multinationals, to the exclusion of the host-communities. This has bred a growing feeling of alienation 
and neglect. The ‗hobnobbing‘ between the government and multinationals has given the latter the 
opportunity of getting things done their way. The oil multinationals have fed the Nigerian state in an 
unequal partnership which has been formalized through joint agreements in the oil sector.
94
 
Clearly, the strategic position of oil corporations in the country‘s economy has allowed them 
to form a lobby group capable not only of influencing but of shaping government policies, actions and 
decisions concerning the activities and development of host-communities. In short, the government 
appears to be more interested in the rents that are remitted to it by the corporations, than in fashioning 
out policies that check the excesses of the oil conglomerates and genuinely seek to reconcile the 
conflicting interests of the MNCs and the host-communities.
95
   
Indeed, according to political commentators, the Nigerian government sees the conflicts in the 
Niger Delta as ‗acts of insubordination‘ which challenge the sovereignty of the nation. For the 
government, this insubordination has to be curbed through the deployment of control measures, 
                                                             
93 ibid 
94
 GE Ezirim, ‘Resource Governance and Conflict in the Niger Delta: Implications for the Gulf of Guinea Region’ 
(2011) African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 5(2) 64 
95
 FC Anyim and others, ‘Conflict and Environmental Challenges Facing the Oil Companies in Nigeria, Niger-
Delta Region’ (2012) International Journal of Business and Management Tomorrow Vol. 2(3) 4  
87 
 
including force and coercion, threats and intimidations, arrests and detentions, and outright invasion 
and destruction of lives and villages. The application of extreme force is utilized against community 
uprisings so as ‗to force the aggrieved people into quiescence‘.96 
This has led to the indictment of the federal government as the principal reason for the under-
development of the Niger Delta. Oil reserves are allowed to be extracted using ‗expropriating laws 
and decrees‘, dispossessing host-communities of their rights to receive royalties. The federal 
government continues to stipulate not only how much is remitted by the multinational corporations but 
also how these payments are accumulated and disbursed. Moreover, the ‗expropriating laws and 
decrees‘ deal only with ‗operational issues‘ which serve the interests of the government and the 
multinationals, with little or no consideration for the interest of the local communities. This has led to 
the description of the Nigerian government as ‗an unconscionable usurper and landlord‘ and the 
multinationals as ‗exploitative illegal tenants‘.97 
Since the government relies heavily on oil for its public revenues, the argument is that it has 
‗deliberately‘ refused to enforce existing environmental legislations that would make the corporations 
behave more responsibly.  The allegation is that government has failed to enforce these legislations 
because it hopes to draw more investors into the oil industry, while obtaining ‗personal, political and 
economic‘ rewards from the multinationals.98 Noticing the weakness on the part of government, 
MNCs have taken advantage of the ambiguity in Nigeria‘s legal framework to ‗wreck havoc‘ on the 
natural environment, using and continuing to use weak national enforcement mechanisms to free 
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THE TURN TO CSR IN THE NIGER DELTA
100
   
 
There is evidence that there was a kind of ‗cooperative relationship‘ between MNCs and host-
communities prior to the rise of violent struggles in the region. The case of Nzekwu & another v 
AG East Central State & another (1972),
101
 is illustrative of the processes whereby relations between 
the two sides deteriorated. In the case, after agreeing to a particular sum as compensation for acquired 
land, the plaintiff family cooperated with Shell and Total when the MNCs acquired their family land 
for oil related activities. Problems arose when the government of the then East Central State of Nigeria 
acquired a bigger portion of the same family‘s land and offered compensation which the family 
considered to be inadequate, when compared to what the oil corporations had paid earlier. The family 
refused the government‘s ‗small‘ compensation and went to court. This marked the beginning of a 
series of disagreements over natural resources between the people and the government. Indeed, it is 




The introduction by the Nigerian government of the enforced land and minerals expropriating 
legislations, and of a minimal or no compensation policy (discussed above) undoubtedly contributed 
to the distrust of both the government and oil corporations by host-communities. This distrust 
eventually led to the formation of indigenous, strong and radical civil society movements, like the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1990 and the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) 
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in 1997-1998. The formation of these civil society organizations eventually led to the transformation 
of non-violent protests to violent conflicts.
103
 
However, another significant factor that may have acted as a catalyst in the escalation of the 
Niger Delta crisis and the subsequent formation of social movements was the effects of neoliberal 
restructuring in Nigeria. The introduction of neoliberal principles and policies led to the occurrence of 
two different phenomena, which both stoked the fire of conflict in the region. Firstly, beginning from 
the late 1970s, neoliberal reorganization led corporations to pursue profit maximizing policies with 
greater ferocity. Corporations and corporate managers were placed under immense pressures to cut 
costs, not only by down-sizing, but also by leaving many facilities unmaintained. This naturally and 
inevitably led to increased oil spills and pollutions, gas flaring, forest and community fires, 
environmental degradations, unemployment and eventual deaths. As the search for profits was 




Notwithstanding the fact that all sections of the country‘s civil society were subjected to the 
damaging effects of the neoliberal structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the oil host-
communities in the Niger Delta suffered particularly badly. Considering the unfavourable nature of 
the Niger Delta ecology – the communities inhabit a suffocating and hostile territory made up of dense 
mangrove forests and swamps – and the effects of the increased exploitation of oil at the time of the 




Secondly, there can be little doubt that neoliberal restructuring contributed to the formation, 
explosion and reinforcement of ‗social movements‘ in the same way that it strengthened ‗the culture 
of mobilization‘ amongst civil society organizations in the country. The sustained contracting of ‗the 
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economic and political spaces‘ that came with neoliberal restructuring promoted the establishment of a 
‗coalition of active civil society organizations‘ opposed to the implementation of the SAPs. The 
disappointments of the neoliberal SAPs, introduced in Nigeria in 1986, together with disenchantment 
with long-lasting (un)democratic disasters, according to Ukeje, propelled many into forming ‗largely 
informal, private, sectarian and ethnic groupings‘.106 
These groups and civil society organizations later became the focal point of the host-
communities‘ resistance to oil activities in the area. Widespread and unchecked human rights 
violations by the government pushed many people deeper into poverty and deprivation, fuelled 
conflict, and led to a pervasive sense of powerlessness and frustration. Indeed, borrowing from the 
frustration-aggression theory,
107
 it could be argued that much of the trouble in the Niger Delta is 
predicated on frustration. According to the theory, aggression usually has its foundation in the 
disappointment that actors experience when goals are not achieved. Disagreements and disputes occur 
as a consequence of the inability of one or more actor(s) to fulfil the aspirations and goals of an 
individual or group. This leads to a state of frustration, generating aggression.
108
  
What is witnessed in the area becomes what Rosenau referred to as a ‗pervasive authority 
crisis‘.109 This is a product of a gradual decline of belief in the ‗existing social, political and economic‘ 
institutions. In these circumstances, he argues, people often transfer allegiance and power ‗to ethnic 
minorities, local governments, single-issue organizations, religious and linguistic groups and political 
factions‘.110This sub-grouping connotes the profound empathy individuals acquire ‗for the 
associations, organizations and sub-cultures with which they have been historically, professionally, 
economically, socially or politically linked‘ and which gives them value (ibid).111  
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As was stated above, the establishment of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP) and the subsequent production of the Ogoni Bill of Rights in August, 1991 contributed 
significantly to the internationalization of the Niger Delta struggle, the subsequent involvement of 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the eventual adoption of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) codes by multinationals in the region.  
An appendix to the Ogoni Bill of Rights had mandated MOSOP to ‗internationalize‘ the 
Ogoni resistance, while approving the Movement‘s non-violent techniques and modus operandi. In 
pursuit of non-violent resistance, the movement presented its case to the Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organization (UNPO) at The Hague in 1992. At this conference, Ken Saro-Wiwa was able to 
draw compassion and approval from international bodies and was able to make contacts with 
international non-governmental organizations concerned with environmental and human rights issues. 
Images depicting the level of environmental degradation of Niger Delta communities at the 




International exposures of this sort, accompanied by the growing access to information and 
communication technologies were instrumental in propelling the resistance beyond local politics and 
into the international arena. The accessibility of phones, fax machines and the internet, together with 
the launching of substantive offices in the US and Europe offered MOSOP the opportunity to express 
its mandate and underscore the dilemma of the Niger Delta communities in the presence of global 
spectators. The IYC utilized comparable tactics to those of MOSOP by launching secretariats in 
Europe. The Council also applied information and communication technologies to make contact with 
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The Involvement and Role of International NGOs 
 
Through the activism of local civil society movements, numerous international human and 
environmental rights‘ non-governmental organizations became aware of the Niger Delta struggle. 
These international organizations offered significant financial support to the indigenous civil 
movements. For instance, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) benefitted from 
foreign grants which made it possible for the Movement to strengthen its resistance and to increase the 
pressure being placed on both the Nigerian government and the multinational corporations, 
particularly Shell Petroleum. The Ijaw Youth Council, in collaboration with other civil society groups, 
worked in partnership with international non-governmental organizations for the provision of 




Since the civil society movements represented the persona of ‗persecuted tribal minorities‘ 
internationally, the ‗globalization‘ of the Niger Delta conflict made it possible for associations such as 
the Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and many 
other international associations
115
 to align strongly with and acknowledge the efforts of the resistance 
movements. Some of these international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) specialise in 
different areas of ‗environmental politics‘. A succession of ‗fact-finding missions‘ sent to the region 
as part of the global ‗environmental rights advocacy‘ of the organizations concerned indicted the 
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Some of the non-governmental organizations, in addition to supporting and encouraging 
indigenous civil society organizations also took it upon themselves to report the activities of the 
multinational corporations in the Niger Delta. They sent out personnel to the troubled region to verify 
some of the alleged abuses. By sending out fact-finding missions, they were able to witness first-hand 
what was going on, enabling them to draw conclusions devoid of bias. This helped to give credence to 
the stories of the civil society movements. Some of the international movements petitioned the home-
countries of the multinational corporations against inhuman corporate acts and assisted in 
broadcasting the plight of the communities to the whole world. Amnesty International and Friends of 
the Earth, for instance, submitted a written complaint to the UK and Dutch National Contact Point of 
the OECD in 2011, stating that Shell in the Niger Delta of Nigeria was in breach of many provisions 
of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
117
 They were also able to report isolated cases 
as they occurred and warned the global community of the dangers occasioned by the violence.
118 The 
organization helped to broadcast some of the abuses taking place in the area and how the multinational 





Reactions to International Opinion: The Nigerian State 
 
The globalization of the Niger Delta struggle highlighted the failure of the Nigerian government to 
reconcile the rival interests in the Delta region. Indeed, it became clear that the government‘s stance in 
the conflict had served to stimulate and animate the resolve of the resistant movements in their quest 
for self-determination. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the wide condemnation of its policies, by both 
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NGOs and civil society organizations, the Nigerian government continues to attribute the root causes 
of underdevelopment in the area to the region‘s difficult terrain and people. It claims that as a result of 
the brittle nature of the delta environment, oil extraction has the capacity of upsetting the ‗delicate 
balance between land, water and life‘. 120 
The internationalization of the Niger Delta crisis generated various reactions from both the oil 
corporations and the government. By getting the international community involved, the indigenous 
civil movements stimulated the anger and rage of the multinationals, which in turn indicted the 
Nigerian government for incompetence in managing and restraining the actions of the local 
movements. The government reacted to this indictment in two ways; firstly it intensified its attempted 
suppression of the host-communities (this simply served to confirm and underline the influence of the 
corporations and their power to manage the affairs of the Nigerian state) and secondly, when force did 
not work, it then attempted to address some of the agitations of the civil movements.
121
  
As a result, succeeding governments have initiated processes towards tackling some of the 
concerns raised by the civil movements. In the first instance, the government claims to have adjusted 
the allocation of revenues in the country in ways which favour states in the region. In the second 
instance, it appears reasonable to think that the resulting changes to government policy, through the 
creation of development agencies, represent the legacy of the opposition movements and the 
internationalization of the Niger Delta struggle.
122
 
In this context, successive governments have established various bodies and government 
agencies to cater for the needs of the communities, including the Niger Delta Basin Development 
Authority (NDBDA),
 123
  established in August 1976; the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development 
Commission (OMPADEC), established in 1992 by Ibrahim Babangida; and the Niger Delta 
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 established in 2000 by the civilian administration of Olusegun 
Obasanjo. These agencies were established to alleviate poverty in the region and to help foster peace 
between the communities, the government and the oil corporations. OMPADEC and NDDC were 
created in direct response to growing international pressures arising out of the escalation of conflict in 
the area. The NDDC is the current federal government agency ‗helping to alleviate‘ poverty in the 
area at the time of this study.
125
 
These boards and agencies have neither succeeded in alleviating poverty, nor brought peace 
and stability to the region. The reasons for their failures are not difficult to identify. In the first 
instance, they were mostly established with political motives. Those created by the military were 
established as ‗public relations gestures to calm the brewing‘ conflict in the area.126 Those created by 
civilian administrations became avenues for the ‗settlement‘ of political cronies and loyalists. Most of 
the agencies lacked clearly defined plans of action and clearly defined objectives. As a result, they 
ended up engaging in ‗white elephant projects‘ created to lure people into a false sense of 
contentment. The creation of hundreds of uncompleted projects, with little or no direct relevance to 
people‘s everyday lives is the legacy of these boards (particularly OMPADEC). And yet, huge 
amounts of money were expended in the projects.
127
 
Secondly, the inefficiency and corruption of board members made it virtually impossible for 
them to succeed and eventually contributed to their failure. The agencies became avenues for officials 
to make quick money, with many colluding with multinational corporations to pillage and milk the 
region. In 1998 for instance, Eric Opia, the sole administrator of OMPADEC was sacked for his 
inability to account for N6.7 billion, then worth about US$80 million.
128
 Critics have argued that the 
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fact that Opia was not prosecuted, despite wide-spread allegations of corruption and collusion with 
Shell to dominate oil host-communities, is a major example of how corruption thrives in the county.
129
 
Thirdly, the communities themselves were not consulted when the boards were constituted 
and were not involved in mapping out their objectives. People from non-oil producing areas of the 
country were drafted-in as board members while people from the oil-bearing communities themselves 
were under-represented. Host-communities continued to be starved of projects, meaning that while 
local people got poorer, non-indigenes got richer through board membership. Finally, the boards were 
dogged by extreme and sometimes unwarranted political interventions, erratic financial support, 
bureaucratic ambiguity and unaccountability, as well as by excessive operating costs.
130
 
The current agency, the NDDC is also proving largely ineffective. There has been some 
progress – the board has completed some projects including the provision of basic social amenities, 
such as electricity, pipe-borne water, and building of roads, to various communities in the area – but 
the structure of the organization continues to limit its effectiveness. As a result of its status being 
advisory, it lacks the powers needed to implement its policies. Again, lack of funds poses real 
problems, making it impossible for the Board to complete some of its projects. The operation of 





Reactions to International Opinion: MNCs and Resort to CSR 
 
The internationalization of the Niger Delta struggle contributed to the ‗perceived‘ change in the 
‗social investment approach‘ of multinationals towards community development. They adopted social 
responsibility codes as part of their business engagements and expanded their corporate-community 
arrangements, from the provision of social amenities alone to that of community empowerment. 
According to Pegg, in 1997 Shell became the first of the oil multinationals to declare publicly its 
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support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the corporation has addressed this issue in 
subsequent years in its reports on the corporation‘s financial, social and environmental duties.132 The 
internationalization of the conflict has also led to the introduction and implementation of the Global 
Memorandum of Understandings (GMoUs)
133
 between oil multinationals and host-communities in 
recent years.
134
 According to Ojakorotu; 
 
In this way, the internationalisation of the Niger Delta crisis has forced the 
major key players in the crisis – the Nigerian state and the MNOCs – to review 
their attitudes towards the region‘s plight. However, their response has been 
two-fold: both hard and soft. On the soft side, there have been some efforts on 
the part of the state to address the developmental needs of the people through 
agencies like the NDDC while some of the oil companies (such as Shell) have 






The presumption is usually that the emergence of CSR is connected to the phenomenon of 
globalization and an attendant anticipation that corporations will invariably plug the holes caused by 
global governance failures. The agitation for corporate social responsibility intensified as soon as it 
became possible for civil society groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to uncover and 
publicize destructive and damaging corporate behaviour even in remote parts of the world. As a result, 
corporations have been subjected to growing public pressure, prompting them to respond more 
positively to calls for greater social engagement.
136
 
It is clear that corporations engage in CSR for various reasons, including obtaining 
competitive advantage, maintaining a stable working environment, managing external perceptions, 
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and keeping employees happy.
137
 Doane extends the reasons further by asserting that the key drivers 
compelling corporations to engage in CSR include managing risks and reputations, protecting human 
capital assets, responding to consumer demands and avoiding regulation.
138
 
Before the embrace of social responsibility codes, MNCs in Nigeria claimed to be devoted to 
balancing economic performance with social responsibility and environmental protection. Ite reports 
that the corporations claimed that since they performed their commercial activities honestly, 
professionally, competently, and in accordance with local legislations, they could not be expected to 
do more. These commercial activities, they insisted, produces wealth for the Nigerian state, generating 
‗royalties and taxes,‘ as well as direct and indirect employment.139 
As a result, oil corporations argued that it was not their responsibility to cater for the people‘s 
welfare. They pointed accusing fingers at the government and directed host-communities to hold their 
leaders accountable for the under-development of their communities.
140
 As the pressure being exerted 
by international organizations grew, however, this uncompromising attitude gradually changed. The 
corporations began to embrace social responsibility codes and practices. In pursuance of the social 
responsibility principles, oil corporations have now adopted General Business Principles or Codes of 
Conduct which govern their behaviour and affairs.
141
  
The history of corporate principles and codes is traced to the International Labour 
Organization‘s (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
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Social Policy, adopted by the ILO Governing Body in 1977. The declaration was drafted with the 
significant participation of the business sector. It affirms, amongst other things that: 
 
All Parties concerned by this Declaration should respect the sovereign rights of 
states, obey the national laws and regulations, give due consideration to local 
practices and respect relevant international standards. They should respect the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding International 
Covenants adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as 
the Constitution of the International Labour Organization and its principles 
according to which freedom of expression and association are essential to 
sustained progress. They should also honour commitments which they have 






Other international principles and codes formulated for the adoption and use of MNCs include: the 
Wolfsberg Principles dealing with anti-money laundering guidelines to direct states and 
multinationals
143
; the Voluntary Principles for Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) initiated by the 
US State Department and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom in December 
2000
144
; the Caux Round Table Principles for Responsible Business
145
; the OECD Guidelines on 
Multinational Corporations (2000, updated 2011); the OECD Bribery Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Officials in Conducting International Business
146
 and the very recent Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
147
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Codes of conduct have become ‗common artefacts‘ in the modern business world. Their 





 the business principles perspective
151
 and the stakeholder 
perspective.
152
 They are described as representing ‗a heuristic tool through which companies enter into 
a discourse about themselves‘.153 They are the ‗voluntary written declarations of companies‘ 
commitments to address the social and environmental conditions of their activities‘.154 They reveal a 
corporation‘s behavioural attitude towards society and the environment. The corporations not only 
create these principles but also assume responsibility for their implementation. They are not legally 
binding and, as such, allegedly introduce issues of ethics and morality into corporate management.
155
  
The non-binding nature of principles and codes was confirmed by R.M Wiseman, the General 
Counsel and Company Secretary of Shell UK Limited, who wrote that after consulting ‗widely‘ on the 
nature of general business principles of Shell, and the intentions of those who drafted the statement, 




It was intended to lay down a code of behaviour by which we think we should 
be judged by the public at large and in this respect perhaps define higher 
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The underlying reason for corporate codes, as already stated, seem to lie in pressures from civil 
society and the desire to avoid external regulation. The effectiveness of codes in regulating the 
conduct of multinationals is, however, much disputed. This is because, as a result of their voluntary 
nature, codes are ineffective unless supported by corporate managers and executives with a strong 
level of commitment towards ethical issues – and by managers and executives who are willing to 
listen to pressures from non-governmental organizations and civil society groups. For a code to be 
effective, therefore, there is the need for all interest-holders to participate in its formulation. It is only 
on this premise of general participation, that the promise of codes can be realised significantly.
158
  
Through these principles and codes, MNCs in the Niger Delta affirm their responsibilities to 
the communities and to the environment. Even though it is within the purview of government to 
provide social amenities and infrastructures for the people, it is also possible to make ‗an ethical‘ case 
that the corporations too should embark on developmental activities in the areas where they operate. 
This is because oil corporations arguably require ‗social licenses‘ to operate, especially in a conflict-
prone zone such as the Niger Delta. MNCs have accordingly, increased their corporate responsibility 







OIL MNCs’ CSR CLAIMS IN THE NIGER DELTA 
 
Niger Delta oil fields increased from a mere 78 in the 1980s to more than 606 in the 1990s. This 
increase led to a high influx of MNCs into the region, which in turn led to a significant increase in the 
volume of interactions between host-communities and MNCs.
160
 Idemudia and Ite suggest that the 
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intensification of oil activities caused a considerable amount of environmental and socio-economic 
upheaval for the people living in the region.
161
 
As was suggested above, the internationalization of the Niger Delta conflict led NGOs and 
civil society organizations to exert pressures on oil MNCs in the region and led oil MNCs‘ to 
‗embrace‘ CSR as a direct response to the growing pressures. The NGOs and civil society movements 
argued that it was necessary for corporations to harmonize the ‗intricate‘ relationship between 
alleviating socially damaging corporate actions and encouraging sustainable development in host-
communities.
162
 In this context, Frynas argued that by laying claim to CSR, oil MNCs declared their 




The following sub-sections will now investigate the various CSR claims of the big four in the 
Niger Delta – Shell Petroleum, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Total oil. 
 
 
Shell Petroleum and CSR in the Niger Delta 
 
Shell Petroleum controls almost 50% of all oil explorations in Nigeria, thus, making it the biggest oil 
MNC in the country. For more than 60 years, the corporation has been at the forefront of oil 
production in Nigeria, with its operation expanding every year.
164
 In 2011, it grossed nearly US$29 
billion in profit, and over US$24 billion of this sum came from upstream activities.
165
 The corporation 
continues to double the production of oil and natural gas liquids (NGL) in Nigeria. In 2010, it 
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produced 302,000 barrel per day (b/d) of crude oil and 587 million standard cubic feet (SCF) of 
natural gas. Oil production has reached some 500,000 b/d and is expected to increase to about 700,000 
b/d. This is the reason why critics argue that Shell played (and continues to play) a vital role in the 
country‘s economic advancement.166 
The corporation declares that in accordance with legal requirements, it donates a percentage 
of its annual earnings to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). In 2010, for instance, it 
claims to have donated over $59.80 million to the development agency as part of its obligations to the 
Nigerian government. This sum excludes the $22.85 million which it expended on specific CSR 
projects in the region.
167
 
In terms of specific CSR projects in the region, the corporation states that it has made 
significant contributions to education through annual scholarships to more than 4,000 Nigerian 
undergraduates to study in Nigerian Universities and 10 annual scholarships to Nigerian students for 
post-graduate studies in three UK Universities; Imperial College London, University College London 
and the University of Leeds.
168
  
On health-care, it claims to have contributed immensely towards the provision of adequate 
health-care to Niger Delta inhabitants. It states that it has more than 27 health facilities in the area, 
with over 880 community health-staff workers.
169
 On youth empowerment, Shell states that it 
introduced a comprehensive youth empowerment scheme targeted at youths in Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, 
Imo, Abia, Akwa Ibom and Edo states.
170
 In 2009, the corporation expended over $710,000 to train 
306 young people in a variety of tasks ‗including welding, pipefitting and carpentry, enterprise and 
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leadership development, and conflict management‘.171 Shell also claims to have introduced a micro-
finance credit scheme to help those interested in business and the scheme has helped over 30,000 
people to launch or develop their own businesses. In 2009, 27 new micro-credit opportunities were 
offered to 2,700 women and youths to set-up their own small-scale businesses.
172
 
On environmental pollution and degradation, the corporations states that the bulk of oil spills 
in the area are caused by criminal activities and that it is committed to cleaning up oil spills when and 
wherever they occur , in line with very strict government regulations and Shell standards, which are 





 some Niger Delta inhabitants believe that Shell has been socially responsible. 
In an interview conducted by Tuodolo in a small number of communities, some of the inhabitants 
praised the corporation for its benevolence to them.
175
 In similar vein, Ite asserts that an investigation 
in Ughoton community confirms that a group of elderly men and women see Shell as the main 
provider of basic amenities to Niger Delta villages, thus, reflecting the corporation‘s contributions to 





ExxonMobil and CSR in the Niger Delta 
 
ExxonMobil is one of the world's major oil MNCs with subsidiaries in almost 200 countries.
177
 
Through a definitive agreement signed in 1998,
178
 two formerly distinct oil corporations, Exxon and 
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Mobil merged to form ExxonMobil. The merger was completed on 30 November, 1999 and the new 
corporation arguably became the largest oil MNC in the world.
179
  
In 2002, ExxonMobil officially replaced the earlier community assistance CSR approach 
(corporate philanthropy) with the local capacity building and economic empowerment strategy 
(LCBEES).
180
 This modification became necessary because it became clear to the corporation that for 
a community to enjoy a strong and sustainable development, it has to create wealth through self-help 
and not through corporate ‗redistribution of income, assets or gifts‘.181 This is in agreement with the 
argument that genuine social development is best realized through individual efforts and not through 
charity and corporate philanthropy.
182
 
In line with the LCBEES strategy, ExxonMobil in April 2002 launched the Integrated 
Community Development Project (ICDP) in conjunction with the Akwa Ibom State government. The 
ICDP focuses on capacity building primarily through the provision of micro-credit schemes for 
individuals and corporate bodies. The operation of the ICDP is based on a support agreement and 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by the various partners.
183
 The MoU specifies the 
obligations of each collaborator. ExxonMobil supplies the requisite capital and participates in 
selecting the communities that will benefit from the project.
184
 Furthermore, the corporation awards 10 
overseas post-graduate scholarships annually to Nigerian students worth US$60,000 each for one year 
and US$80,000 for a two-year course.
185
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ExxonMobil states that for almost a decade, it has been in the vanguard of the war against 
malaria in Nigeria. It says that it has used its local associate, MPN, to expend over $15 million dollars 
in the fight against malaria. Through the activities of the Family Health Care Association – a partner 
of ExxonMobil in Nigeria – it was able to distribute 85,000 mosquito nets and organize malaria 
control workshops for more than 3000 health workers and 120,000 community members. It also 
‗treated 1,670 pregnant women and used the rapid diagnostic test to examine and treat 27,310 people 
in rural communities‘.186 
 
 
ChevronTexaco and CSR in the Niger Delta 
 
ChevronTexaco Nigeria Ltd is a product of the merger between two US oil corporations, Chevron and 
Texaco.
187
 Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) was incorporated in the country in 1961. Two years later, 
it discovered the nation‘s first successful offshore oil field near Warri in Delta State.188 As at 2006, the 
corporation‘s total daily production from 30 fields averaged 387,000 barrels of crude oil, 72 million 
cubic feet of natural gas and 5,000 barrels of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
189
  
ChevronTexaco is the third-largest oil producer in Nigeria and one of its largest investors. The 
corporation states that it spends over US$3 billion every year in the country.
190
 It maintains that it has 
always acted in a ‗mature and socially responsible‘ manner towards host-communities and argues that 
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the significant US$56 billion it has expended in
 
community investments since 1991 proves its social 
responsibility claims. This amount, expended in the building and refurbishing of schools, execution of 
health programmes, implementation of scholarship schemes and execution of progressive 
environmental initiatives, represents a high level of corporate concern for community welfare.
191
 In 
2005, the corporation adopted the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) approach to 
community development in the Niger Delta, which in contrast to the earlier corporate-community 
relationship (CCR) structure, is participatory as communities are allowed to take greater 
responsibilities for their development.
192
 
The GMOUs have led to the execution of 200 projects in 425 communities, villages and 
chiefdoms. The scheme has also delivered loans to more than 2,000 persons in the Niger Delta. 
Chevron maintains that through its RDC scheme, it has overseen the commissioning of 29 projects, in 
various locations in the Niger Delta.
193
  
On environmental conservation, the corporation insists that it has made ‗the responsible 
management of environmental issues‘ an essential aspect of its main business. It limits the 
consequences of oil mining on the environment through the utilization of ‗superior technology in its 
drilling and seismic‘ operations. It continues to take important steps towards the restoration and 





TOTAL and CSR in the Niger Delta 
 
Consecutive mergers between Total and Petrofina in 1999 and between Totalfina and Elf in 2001 
resulted in the fourth largest oil MNC in Nigeria.  The name Total was adopted after the merger was 
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formalized in May 2003 and Total Nigeria PLC is the Nigerian subsidiary of Total Corporation.
195
 
Prior to the merger, TOTAL and Elf traded separately in Nigeria.
196
 Currently, there are three 
subsidiaries of TOTAL in Nigeria; Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited (EPNL), TOTAL Upstream Nigeria 
Limited and TOTAL Liquefied Natural Gas Nigeria Limited. Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited controls 
both offshore and onshore oil extraction and production in Akwa Ibom and River states.
197
  
In its website, the corporation pledges its support for CSR and declares its desire to help 
Nigeria and its communities actualize sustainable development in the long term. It further expresses 
its commitment towards advancing the quality of life of the average Nigerian, by contributing to the 
long term sustainable development of host-communities.
198
  
In 2002, the corporation – much like other MNCs in the region – modified its traditional 
method of community assistance and introduced a new corporate-community-relationship approach to 
CSR, in partnership with NGOs and host-communities. This change became necessary because 
community assistance and corporate philanthropy had failed to deliver meaningful development to 
host-communities.
199
 In line with this new approach, the corporation asserts that between 2009 and 
2012, it used its social responsibility scheme to train about 1,200 youths from Akwa Ibom, Delta and 
Rivers States in businesses, implemented a joint venture sponsored Community Free Health 
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DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN POSITIVE AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE 
INJUNCTION CSR DUTIES 
 
From the evidence above, it is apparent that oil corporations in the Niger Delta have embarked on 
various projects – especially in the last decade – as proof of their socially responsible behaviour. They 
have initiated and executed development schemes for the benefit of host-communities. Nevertheless, it 
has also been suggested that oil activities have caused much harm to the Niger Delta environment. For 
the inhabitants of the region, therefore, in reality the harmful consequences of oil mining far-outweigh 
the positive CSR projects of oil corporations.
201
  
 In looking at the adverse consequences of oil mining, as opposed to the CSR projects of oil 
MNCs, commentators have suggested an important distinction between two different CSR obligations 
which oil MNCs are expected to comply with.
202
 The first is the positive obligation or ‗affirmative 
duty‘ and the second is the duty to care for the environment or ‗negative injunction duty‘. The 
affirmative duties are those obligations which corporations perform in aid of host-communities, 
including the building of roads, hospitals, schools, initiating and executing electrification projects and 
the commissioning of water boreholes, etc. On the other hand, negative injunction duties involve 
preventing and rectifying social injuries that may arise in the process of realizing business objectives – 
including oil spills, water and air pollutions, gas flaring, acid rains, forest fires etc. Meeting these 
negative injunction duties are fundamental aspects of CSR, because they make up the ‗moral 
minimum‘ which every corporation is expected to observe.203  
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At the centre of the CSR debate in the Niger Delta is the contention that positive affirmative 
duties and the duty to care for the environment operate reciprocally. By fulfilling the duty of care not 
to damage the environment, value is created. The value thus created is further enhanced through the 
performance of affirmative duties.
204
 The CSR practices of oil multinationals, it is suggested, are 
principally affirmative in nature. The crisis in the region is therefore, predicated mainly on the failure 
of MNCs to fulfil the negative injunction duties. As Ojo asserts, they seem to have over-concentrated 
on the affirmative obligations, to the detriment of the negative injunction duties.
205
  
According to Duruigbo and others, host-communities continue to suffer from the adverse and 
obnoxious effects of oil activities, which may be social, economic or environmental.
206
 These critics 
report that between 2000 and 2004, there were approximately 5,400 recorded occurrences of oil spills 
in the Niger Delta.
207
 The fact that this number was recorded by the MNCs themselves mean that there 




For Idemudia and Ite, the failure to fulfil the negative injunction duties lies at the heart of the 
crisis in the region. They contend that no amount of road construction or classroom renovation can 
offset the consequences of oil pollution and no amount of electrification project or award of 
scholarship can balance the effect of gas flaring on the host-communities.
209
 What is the use of a 
classroom block built by an oil corporation, if a community‘s river is destroyed by the same 
corporation? According to Ukpongson and Onu, this is why it is necessary for the MNCs to 
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understand that CSR extends beyond investing in the creation of new sources of livelihood. It also 
includes the duty to protect and preserve existing sources of subsistence for the host-communities.
210
 
In the final analysis, no amount of positive affirmative duties will replace the duty of 
adherence to the moral minimum – care for the environment. 
 
 
Effects of Non-Performance of the Duty to the Environment: Oil Spills 
 
The major consequence of corporate failure to fulfil the duty of care to the environment is oil spills. 
There are many recorded oil spills in the region leading to various litigations, both concluded and 
pending, between host-communities and oil corporations. The fact is that majority of the people in the 
region live on rural subsistence, which makes rivers, creeks, swamps and farmlands important aspects 
of their economy. Unfortunately, these same rivers, creeks, swamps and farmlands are consistently 
polluted by oil spills, killing life in the sea and polluting drinking waters.
211
   
In 2010, John Vidal, the Environmental Editor of The Observer, a UK based newspaper 
undertook an investigative journey into the hinterlands of the Niger Delta, in order to obtain first-hand 
information of the situation in the region. These are excerpts from his report; 
 
We could smell the oil long before we saw it – the stench of garage 
forecourts and rotting vegetation hanging thickly in the air. The farther we 
travelled, the more nauseous it became. Soon we were swimming in pools of 
light Nigerian crude, the best-quality oil in the world. One of the many 
hundreds of 40-year-old pipelines that crisscross the Niger Delta had 
corroded and spewed oil for several months. Forests and farmlands were now 
covered in sheen of greasy oil. Drinking wells were polluted and people were 
distraught. No one knew how much oil had leaked... oil companies have 
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Continuing, the report states that in May 2010, a broken ExxonMobil pipe in Ibeno, Akwa Ibom State 
led to the leak of over a million barrels of oil into the Delta Rivers. The leak lasted for more than 
seven days before it was shut-off. The inhabitants of the area, who protested against the leak, were 
allegedly attacked by security guards.
213
  
For Ite and Ibok, in the last three decades, approximately 260,000 barrels of oil are spilled 
every year.
214
 In a report by the Nigerian National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NNOSDRA), it is estimated that over 2,400 oils spills occurred between 2006 and 2010 alone.
215
 
Between January and September 2013, Amnesty International reports that the Niger Delta has 
witnessed more than 600 oil spills and more than 2,500 between 2008 and 2012.
216
 
On 5 August 2011, a report on the contamination of Ogoni land by the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP), indicted Shell for gross environmental pollution and concluded 
that it will take up to 30 years before the consequences of oil spills are eliminated from the area. The 
report stated that complete restoration of the Ogoni environment would entail the world's ‗most wide-
ranging and long-term oil clean-up‘ and will cost over US$1 billion. The report suggested that Ogoni 
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Effects of Non-Performance of the Duty to Care for the Environment: Gas 
Flaring 
 
The MNCs in the Niger Delta are also accused of failing to end gas flaring in the Niger Delta. Gas 
flaring is the process of smouldering-off natural gases which are derivatives of oil production. During 
extraction, crude oil is usually extracted with a mixture of naturally occurring gases known as 
Associated Gas (AG). The main constituent gas of AG is methane.  In order to produce good quality 
oil for export purposes, the natural gas needs to be separated from the oil. When the separation 
process is completed, the gas is usually re-inserted into a container or ‗underground formations‘ 
where it is ‗collected and processed‘, before being emitted (flared) into the air. This is the process 
known as gas flaring. Flaring or venting Associated Gas is the cheapest means of disposing-off this 
‗unwelcome step-child‘ of oil.218 
Globally, Nigeria is the second largest gas flaring country, after Russia. The NNPC estimates 
that 40 per cent of gas produced in Nigeria is flared and that this accounts for about 12.5 per cent of 
annual global flaring.
219
 However, these estimates are regarded as conservative by environmentalists, 
who believe that more realistic estimates should put gas flared in Nigeria at about 23bcm annually, 
representing about 60 per cent of production.
220
 
Gas flares are not only dangerous, but are capable and in the Nigerian case, have indeed 
produced millions of tons of both Methane and Carbon Monoxide.
221
 Gas flaring in predominantly 
farming communities cause acid rains which damages and prevents the pollination and growth of 
crops. Since there are no proper machinery for the extraction and processing of natural gas in Nigeria, 
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75 per cent of this gas is simply burned off.
222
 Despite arguments against the process, oil corporations 
have continued to flare in the Niger Delta. The thinking is that they have continued to do this because 
it is more economical for them than to invest in the technology required to end it.
223
 Again, they have 
persisted with gas flaring because the Nigerian government, because of its full dependency on oil 
revenue, lacks the coercive machinery to end the process. This inability is due in the main, to the 
government‘s corruption and the powers which oil MNCs wield over the Nigerian state and not 
necessarily because of the technical difficulties and costs associated with enforcing the regulations.
224
  
Environmental degradation has meant that many residents of the Delta region can no longer 
live through subsistence means and this has caused more people to migrate to urban areas, instead of 






HOST COMMUNITIES’ PERCEPTION OF MNCs’ CSR CLAIMS 
 
A survey conducted by Idemudia in 2007 shows that over 80 per cent of Niger Delta inhabitants 
believe that oil corporations are curses to them.
226
 Oil host-communities do not believe in the efficacy 
of MNCs‘ CSR practices and in its ability to prevent the vicious and incessant destruction of the Niger 
Delta environment – and by implication the people‘s source of livelihood.227 
Various reasons have been adduced for this negative perception of the CSR claims of oil 
MNCs. The first is that host-communities‘ prospects, aspirations and hopes have been left mostly 
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unrealized. However, this disappointment is not entirely the fault of the corporations. The Nigerian 
government has a large chunk of the blame for the tragedy in the Niger Delta. Nevertheless, the reality 
is that MNCs operate inside the host-communities while in many cases, the government is usually 
outside and has no defined presence in the communities. The corporations then become ‗de facto‘ 
governments, which means that most of the host-communities‘ frustrations are directed at them. It is 
also suggested that the earlier refusal of corporations to take issues of CSR seriously led to pessimism 
on the part of host-communities.
228
 
The second reason is that host-communities believe that oil conglomerates are not effectively 
tackling their ‗negative injunction‘ duties. Negative injunction duties, as discussed above, relate to the 
duty on corporations to prevent injury to both people and their environment. The communities allege 
that there is a ‗geometric‘ rise in the number of oil spills recorded in the area every year. Yet, MNCs 
neither admit liability, nor pay compensation for the spills. The continued denial of responsibility for 
oil spills has giving rise to the saga of the ‗mystery spills‘.229 For the communities, the first and most 
effective CSR is to care for the ecosystem and avoid damage to same. 
The third reason is that host-communities allege that they are not usually consulted before the 
few ‗corporate philanthropic‘ gestures initiated by the corporations are implemented. This creates the 
feeling of exclusion on the part of host-communities in the decision-making processes of these CSR 
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projects, thus, engendering a state of alienation, which is worsened by the weak and inadequate status 
of the ‗corporate-community-relationships‘ existing between the corporations and the communities.230 
As a Youth leader in one of the communities stated;  
 
We do not have any say on how and when oil is explored from our land, and 
even the oil MNCs have neglected us and do not consult us for anything. 
Look at ExxonMobil, here in our community; we do not have any 





The fourth reason is that host-communities see the MNCs as corrupt and insincere. Observers working 
in the Niger Delta allege that a major cause of disagreements – between corporations and host-




Apart from accusations of systematic segregation and intentional disregard of developmental 
responsibilities in host-communities, oil corporations are accused of using this strategy to pitch 
community groups against each other. They also use the strategy to collude with favoured and 
sympathetic community elders and elites against those perceived as unsympathetic to corporate 




In Ugborodo community, a villager states that; 
 
The reason why Chevron prefers [to do this] is clear. They (the favoured 
ones) are the ones who fight the people. They are the ones who take the 
compensation money and know how to give a few ones among us so that 
there can be no common ground with which to fight Chevron for destroying 
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the socio-economic basis of the people in the last few decades. Chevron likes 
this, it does not want the people of Ugborodo to co-operate with one another 
because it fears that we'll demand for our rights. It's doing everything to 





The ‗divide and rule‘ strategy may be in the form of reverence to elders, financial disbursements to 
community executives and youths, sitting and ghost workers‘ allowances, Christmas and New Year 
gifts, rent/compensation for landlords, employments and award of contracts, etc. Dissenters are denied 
these dividends, thereby pitching them against beneficiaries. It has been suggested that this strategy is 
a deliberate ploy by MNCs to trigger division and generate doubt, suspicion and enmity amongst 
members of local communities.
235
 
For one indigene of the Niger Delta; 
 
These oil multinationals have thrust a knife in our midst and we have fallen 
apart. The love for money and our political selfishness have set us against 
each other and we no longer see ourselves as brothers, fathers, chiefs, sisters. 
We disregard ourselves for temporary and temporal things, which have led 






For many critics, the divide and rule strategy is the major reason why host-communities view the CSR 
practices of MNCs as hypocritical. The argument is that corporations are regularly disinclined to 
connect with real issues in the conflict, while corporate pledges to encourage development in host-
communities amount to mere window-dressing. Corporate approaches towards sustainable community 
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development are insincere and corporations are only motivated by the need to dig up oil, amass profits 
and spend very little in the process.
237
 
The fifth reason is anchored on the issue of setbacks and ‗broken promises‘ on the part of oil 
corporations. According to the host-communities, in the last three decades, most of the projects 
promised by the MNCs were never executed or completed. This has led to a situation of mistrust and 
suspicion of corporate promises on the part of host-communities.
238
 
As Myda declared; 
 
I do not trust ExxonMobil because they do not keep their promise. They 
promised to renovate and build new structures for the Qua Iboe church in 





The sixth reason for the negative perception of MNCs‘ CSR claims in the Niger Delta is hinged on the 
inherently weak and inadequate corporate communications system. Communication streams between 
the corporations and the communities are very limited and in many instances, non-existent. This 
generates considerable amounts of ‗misinterpretation and misinformation‘ which consistently 
contribute to an already strained corporate-community-relationship.
240
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In the final analysis, the suggestion is that many of the advantages enjoyed under the CSR 
schemes of the corporations are usually at huge costs to home-communities. In the case of Shell, 
either as a result of oversight or careless assignment, its overall corporate activities impacts negatively 
on the communities.
241
 Numerous oil spills from well heads, flow stations and pipelines, release of 




The women of Ugborodo community, frustrated by the destruction of their environment 
through corporate activities, declared; 
 
We want Chevron to leave our land. We cannot farm. We cannot kill fishes 
and crayfish from the river again. Everywhere [is] polluted. Our farms are all 
gone. We used to farm cassava, okra, pepper, any food. Now the places 





This feeling, it is suggested, is replicated in majority of the Niger Delta communities, leading to the 





This chapter began with a review of the existing literature on the CSR practices of MNCs in the Niger 
Delta and what amounts to sustainable development for the people of the region. It then proceeded to 
look at the internationalization of the Niger Delta conflict and the growing international pressures 
exerted on oil corporations by such groups as the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the 
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Green Peace, Friends of the Earth, the United Nations‘ Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) etc. It 
went on to suggest that as a direct response to pressures from these civil society movements and 
international non-governmental organizations, MNCs began to adopt self-enacted codes to regulate 
corporate activities. The chapter further argued that corporations embarked on CSR initiatives in order 
to protect corporate reputation, avoid external regulation, silence opposition from civil society and 
non-governmental organizations and reduce militancy from youths of host-communities.  
It then went ahead to investigate the various CSR claims of the big four corporations in the 
region. It proceeded to draw a distinction between philanthropic CSR acts such as the building of 
schools, roads, hospitals etc., and the more demanding CSR duty to refrain from harming the 
ecosystem – sometimes referred to as the duty of care owed by MNCs to the environment. The chapter 
suggested that the host-communities‘ negative perception of the CSR claims of the MNCs stems from 
an alleged over-concentration on corporate philanthropy, as against fulfilling the duty of care to the 
environment. In this context, the chapter contended that in spite of the various CSR projects initiated 
and executed by MNCs, the unrest in the region continues unabated. Viewed from this perspective, the 
CSR practices of oil corporations and the huge investment layouts they claim to make (CSR in theory) 
do not support what is on ground (CSR in practice). Put in another way, there are good reasons for 
thinking that the CSR practices of MNCs in the Niger Delta region are ineffective. 
Why is this so? In Part  two, beginning from the next chapter, this thesis will identify and 
categorize for analytical purposes, the main reason why the CSR practices of MNCs in the Niger Delta 
































From the findings in chapter Two, it appears logical to conclude that the experiences of the people of 
the Niger Delta suggests that CSR has not been effective, despite the claims of the oil MNCs in the 
area. A rational question which follows from this is: why is it so? A number of different, but related 
barriers that make the realization of effective CSR difficult can be identified and separated for 
analytical purposes. The first (and perhaps most obvious) of these barriers is ideological. 
As a result, the purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyze the main ideological barriers 
to effective CSR – neoliberalism and shareholder value, especially in its contemporary form. It argues 
that there is a fundamental tension between ideas about the desirability of socially responsible 
corporate behaviour (CSR) and the belief that it is to the benefit of society as a whole for corporations 




In the past 30 years, the ideology of shareholder value (SV) has become a well-established 
code of corporate governance in many parts of the world. This governance ‗rhetoric‘ has become the 
prevalent corporate philosophy in both the US and UK. Even in Japan and Germany, the emphasis on 
shareholder value seems to have triumphed and the principle is supported by many international 
organizations including the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank.
2
 
This was not the situation before the 1980s. The absolute concentration on SV became 
‗notorious‘ during the ‗economic revolutions‘ of Reagan and Thatcher in the US and UK respectively. 
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When they emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, corporations provided services with 
public dimensions, which small businesses
3
 could not easily undertake – thus necessitating the need 
for them to obtain royal charters and state authorization before commencing operations. However, 
with the introduction of limited liability and free incorporation in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, corporations came to be seen as purely private enterprises. The criticisms against this private 
form of business in the 1920s and 1930s – the conglomerates thus formed, had become large and 
powerful, with dispersed shareowners – led to the idea of the ‗soulful‘ corporations which dominated 
the 1950s and 1960s. A backlash against the socially responsible corporations, in turn, led to the rise 
of the idea that corporate managers should be seeking to maximize ‗shareholder value‘ and to the re-
emergence of shareholder value.  
How and why did this happen? What possibly transformed the idea of the socially responsible 
corporation in the 1950 and 1960s, to the currently dominant shareholder value ideology after the 
1970s? How compatible is this idea with effective CSR? 
The chapter focuses on the transformation of corporate purposes – from quasi-social 
institutions at inception to private enterprises after the introduction of free registration and then to 
quasi-social institutions again in the 1950s and 1960s and finally back to the private and highly 
financialized corporations, beginning from the 1970s. It suggests that the re-assertion of SV after the 
1970s arose out of the progressive but radical transformation of the purpose of corporations, from one 
of production to that of high financialization. This cultural change is attributed to the power of 
resurgent finance, made possible by the liberation and protection of the interests of rentier investors – 
i.e. neoliberalism. It argues that the apparent domination of these ideas amount to ideological barriers 
to effective CSR. 
The chapter begins by looking briefly at the history of early corporations – middle of the 19th 
century to about the 1900s.
4
 It goes ahead to explore the culture of corporations from the 1900s to the 
1940s, which incidentally was labelled the era of ‗finance capitalism‘ – when corporations operated 
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within the realm of private enterprises. Then it proceeds to evaluate the culture of corporations from 
the 1950s to 1970. This was the era of ‗managerial capitalism‘ – when corporations came to be seen 
as socially responsible corporations. However, a backlash against the socially responsible corporation 
in the 1970s led to the re-privatization of corporations and the apparent domination of the shareholder 
value ideology in corporate governance. The chapter suggests that this domination has given rise to 
the concept of ‗investor capitalism‘ or new finance capitalism.  
Nevertheless, the re-assertion of SV did not occur in isolation. It was part and parcel of the 
rise to prominence of the neoliberal theory of economic development in the international financial 
architecture, beginning from the 1970s. Therefore, the second part of the section will explore the 
neoliberal theory of social and economic development, its historical roots and the difference between 
it and classical liberalism, its intellectual foundations and the rationalist assumptions that helped to 
entrench it in the global financial system.  
In the concluding part of section one, the chapter argues that neoliberalism is a developmental 
theory which champions free markets and takes an anti-state stance which is rhetorical. In this 
context, it encourages precisely the voluntarism and self-regulation which lies at the heart of 
contemporary CSR. For this reason, it is arguable that contemporary CSR is in consonant with the 
ideas of neoliberalism and shareholder value. In light of this supposition, the section argues that 
neoliberalism and shareholder value, by advocating for voluntary CSR, arguably amount to major 
ideological barriers to effective CSR. 
Furthermore, the chapter in section two explores the reception of neoliberal and shareholder 
value ideas in the Nigerian socio-political economy. It offers a brief historical narrative of 
neoliberalism in Nigeria and analyses the post-neoliberal attitude of the Nigerian state to MNCs. By 
adopting and implementing neoliberal ideological reforms, including the application of the Anglo-
American shareholder value model of corporate governance, the chapter suggests that Nigeria has 
introduced an ideological tension between these ideologies and that of effective CSR. In this context, 
with the continued application of the neoliberal free market ideas in the policy directives of the 
Nigerian state – especially as they relate to MNCs – any hope that the social responsibility practices 





ROAD TO SHAREHOLDER VALUE: Early Years of Corporations 
 
Before the advent of Joint Stock Corporations (JSCs) – the precursor of today‘s large modern 
corporations – businesses were organized around small enterprises, managed either by a single owner 
(sole traders) or by a few partners (partnerships). In fact, even after the industrial revolution, 
partnerships continued to be the main form of business in most places. As Ireland recounts, a major 
characteristic of early business forms was that ‗the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries were predominantly carried out by ―ordinary‖ partnerships, not because of the 
impediments to the formation of JSCs but because of the relatively modest capital requirements in 
most industries‘.5 The formation of JSCs was only legitimized by the turn of the seventeenth century, 
mainly because of the developments in rail transportation. 
In the UK, before the introduction of free registration, the state strictly controlled the 
formation of corporations. It has been suggested that the state began to dominate corporate forms 
during the era of ‗state-chartered companies in the Middle Ages‘.6 The domination of the state over 
JSCs was exemplified in the rule that before a business could publicly list its shares; it first had to 
obtain permission from the state.
7
 Notwithstanding the overriding powers of the state over 
corporations, business actors often devised dubious means of circumventing the need to comply with 
rules and regulations.
8
 This led to the passing of the Bubble Act 1719, which deemed illegal any act 
or attempt to act as a corporate body without legal authority.
9
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The Bubble Act was repealed by the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, which established 
free incorporation subject only to registration. The Act did not, however, grant limited liability. It was 
only in 1855 that limited liability was recognized in English corporate law.
10
 The free incorporation 
Act in England encouraged other European countries like France and Germany to introduce free 
registration in 1867 and 1870 respectively.
11
  
One major characteristic of early JSCs was that permission to operate was only granted to 
enable them carry out beneficial services to the public. As a result, before any business could be 
granted permission to incorporate, it first had to prove that the service for which incorporation was 
needed will be for the public good. This, it has been suggested, accounts for why early JSCs were 
seen as quasi-social institutions.
12
 The introduction of general incorporation by registration and 




In spite of well founded objections to the promulgation of the law on the limited liability of 
corporations,
14
 by 1856, it had become entrenched in the legal systems of both the UK and the US. 
Having removed the risk attached to investing in stocks through legislation, there was no further 
impediment to the ‗popular‘ general participation in the buying and selling of stocks and for those 
who are willing to make investments to ‗diversify‘ their interests.15 
By the beginning of the 1890s, there was an intensified reformation of the laws regulating the 
conduct of corporations. In the US, for instance, states such as Delaware and New Jersey reformed 
their corporate laws to attract valuable incorporation businesses. They abolished the rules that 
mandated corporations to register only for very limited purposes or to operate for a particular time-
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limit or within a particular locality. They loosened the rules on mergers and acquisitions and repealed 
legislations that one corporation cannot buy and own shares in another corporation. With the 
successes recorded in Delaware and New Jersey, other US states followed and dramatically loosened 
restrictions on incorporated businesses. These reforms ‗prompted a flurry of incorporations as 
businesses sought the new freedoms and powers incorporation would grant them‘.16   
The repealed restrictions on mergers and acquisitions meant that smaller and medium-sized 
corporations could be taken over by bigger ones and many merged to form very large corporations. As 
Perrow recounts;  
 
...in a few decades, the basic laws governing large organisations were 
remade. The national political leaders and then the lawyers in the legislatures 
and judges paved the way for untrammelled organisational growth and the 
accompanying centralization of wealth and power. Political values were 






This, it is suggested, was how JSCs, established originally to provide essential social services beyond 




Criticisms of Early Corporations 
 
The transformation of corporations from quasi-social institutions to private enterprises created fear in 
the minds of many, both in the US and the UK. The anti-corporate group saw it as a route through 
which dubious business men could escape unscathed from the failures of their actions. To these 
critics, the corporation amounted to a structure erected to undermine the basic moral foundation of 
society. They therefore argued that the resultant social problems of corporate actions would 
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eventually outweigh the benefits society derive from them.
18
 To these commentators, corporate 
actions threatened the very foundations of the ‗social order‘.19  
Khurana writes that; 
 
...the gigantic corporations that emerged.... towards the end of the nineteenth 
century not only altered the economic landscape but, along with other 
phenomena of the second industrial revolution, helped to transform a taken 
for granted way of life. This way of life was profoundly affected by the era‘s 
tremendous technological innovations and by socio-economic 
transformations, such as urbanization, immigration, and increased upward 





The scope of corporate operations had become virtually untrammelled, as they could now undertake 
any activity and operate in any sector. This caused Lippmann to declare that, ‗all the frictions of life 
are readily ascribed to a deliberate evil intelligence and men like Morgan and Rockefeller take on 
attributes of omnipotence‘.21  
Indeed, for critics of the corporate form, ‗the nexus of social institutions within which‘ people 
‗lived had been radically transformed‘, and according to them, words such as ‗virtue, benevolence and 
duty‘ meant nothing to corporations.22 Big Businesses were so detached from society that they acted 
like machines and ‗symbolised a body of strange customs and new traditions, where familiarity and 
trust were replaced by impersonality and guile‘.23 They were seen as ‗soulless leviathans- uncaring, 
impersonal and amoral‘, enabling people ‗to embark in trade with a limited chance of loss, but with an 
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unlimited chance of gain‘, which in turn encourages a ‗system of vicious and improvident 
speculation‘.24 
Faced with widespread backlash, corporate owners in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, attempted to stem the tide of negativity towards them. Since many of these firms had become 
quite large, corporate actors came to appreciate that the only way to forestall external regulation was 
to engage in more acceptable conducts. The then President of General Electric, a leading corporation 
in the US, stated that ‗organised industry should take the lead, recognising its responsibility to its 
employees, to the public, and to its shareholders, rather than that democratic society should act 
through its government‘.25 The legitimization of corporate activities, thus, became a priority.   
Pursuing this objective of institutional change, leaders of corporations embarked on projects 
to give formal sanction to corporate activities. This led to the initiation of public relations stunts and 
the creation of PR departments, tasked with ‗laundering‘ corporate images before the public. 
Concurrently, they initiated and began to implement socially responsible tasks in specific areas. In 
1908 for instance, AT&T, the parent company of Bell Systems, introduced an advertising campaign to 
convince people to embrace the ‗goodness‘ of the corporation. General Motors used words such as 
‗family‘ to run advertisements aimed at personalizing the corporate institution. Many US 
corporations, including General Electric, Eastman Kodak, National Cash Register, Standard Oil etc, 
all embraced the process of attaining ‗an aura of institutionality‘.26 Several industrialists donated 
liberally to charities and philanthropic societies. Andrew Carnegie donated over US$300,000,000 
(three hundred million) of his personal income to charitable organisations.
27
 
Even at this early stage – similar to the later 1950s and 1960s when corporations were seen as 
soulful – corporations tried to improve corporate performance by setting up welfare schemes for 
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employees‘ needs. Some owners declared they no longer ran their institutions merely as ‗businesses‘, 
but also as ‗social institutions‘.28 This attitude of corporate image laundering, in the shape of 
philanthropy with a semblance of social responsibility, supposedly became corporate form‘s own way 




Despite these PR overtures, however, many still queried corporate intentions and actions. 
Critics alleged that even though the philanthropy of corporations were motivated by the desire to ‗do 
good‘, they were also motivated by enlightened self-interest. Corporate philanthropy, in the end was 
seen as a mechanism for obtaining submissive, enslaved employees that could be programmed into 





The Era of Finance Capitalism: 1910s-1940s 
 
Between the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the development and progression of 
‗the corporation‘ in the US had diverged significantly from that of the UK. Whereas corporations in 
the UK still operated as privately-owned family businesses until the 1930s,
31
 the US corporations, 
equally dominated at inception by family businesses,
32
  had witnessed the process of dispersed 
ownership by the turn of the 1900s.
33
 It was only in the 1930s, following a ‗succession of merger 
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waves‘, that ‗dispersed ownership‘ began to prevail in Britain.34 As a result, securities markets in the 
UK were considerable but frequently under exploited ‗for much of the early period‘ of corporate 
transformation and the London capital market only developed appreciably ‗in both depth and 
liquidity‘ from the middle of the twentieth century.35  
The establishment of markets for corporate stocks led to the financialization of corporate 
interests and to the era of finance capitalism. Generally, this was possible because the growth of the 
corporate mode of commerce in the nineteenth century transformed ‗capitalist property from personal 
property‘ to corporate assets. Title to capital shifted from that of ‗direct ownership of enterprises to 
ownership‘ of financial assets. In this context, the corporation became a form of ‗indirect ownership 
of businesses‘.36 
The process of financialization radically presented rentier investors with the openings to 
evade the dominant crisis usually associated with capital accumulation, made more intense by the 
innovation of advanced technologies and new products. The argument is that wealth, ingrained in the 
shape of a genuine ‗productive enterprise‘, will always suffer from the risk of corrosion, caused not 
only by ‗competition from new products‘, but also by the invention of new methods. To remain 
relevant as a wealth accumulator, rentier investors need to continually find avenues through which the 
hazards of ‗innovation‘ could be avoided.37  
For Kotz therefore; 
 
There are various ways to gain some protection against such threats, 
including the pursuit of monopoly power or protection by the state. 
However, shifting ownership of capital from real capital to financial capital 
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With the increase in the number of corporations and the multiplication of the quantities of intangible 
financial properties made possible by incorporation, the corporate form (particularly in the US) 
became overshadowed by a ‗small number of financiers and industrialists‘.39  
 
Using a wide variety of devices – preference and non-voting shares, 
debentures, voting trusts and holding companies – these financiers were able 
to organise the financialized ownership structures of the new corporate 
behemoths in such a way that they were able to exercise disproportionate 





It has been argued that when corporations became legitimate forms of business, they were established 
mainly for the production of goods and execution of specific services. However, with the 
establishment of a largely dispersed ownership class and the creation of markets for corporate shares, 
trade in intangible corporate properties took over and dominated the earlier purpose of production. 
This transformation in the purpose of corporations also led to a change in the culture and conduct of 
corporate activities. Share prices in capital markets became the priority for corporate managers. This 
major shift led to a raft of shady deals and dubious contracts as corporations competed to out-bid, out-
price and out-profit each other.
41
  
As Ireland asserts;  
 
It was widely believed that the financiers and investment banks that 
controlled many of the leading American corporations were not only 
engaging in self-seeking financial manipulations, such as stock watering and 
insider dealing, but appropriating a disproportionate share of the profits of 
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Decline of Finance Capitalism 
 
Financialization of the corporate form was possible because the introduction of free incorporation by 
registration placed corporations within the exclusive realm of private enterprises. By the 1930s and 
1940s, however, the sheer size and economic powers wielded by these conglomerates and the 
dispersal of the shareholders – making them ordinary rentiers – coupled with the rise of the 
professional managers, led to wide-spread condemnation of the rentier nature of the corporation and 
the ‗financialized‘ culture of the 1910-1940s. Many critics began to advocate for a return to the pre-
free registration era, when corporations were seen as quasi-social institutions. Those who criticised 
‗finance capitalism‘ in the US included, Louis Brandeis, William Ripley, Thorstein Veblen, Adolf 
Berle and Gardener Means.  
For Berle,
43
 in the wake of the increased, absolute and ‗often finance-dominated managerial 
power‘ inherent in finance capitalism, the ordinary shareholder in a corporation had become 
susceptible to the whims and caprices of the directors of corporations, who ‗were not only feathering 
their own nests‘, but were also directing the profits of the corporations to ‗controlling minority 
shareholders against the interest‘ of smaller stockowners. Directors‘ powers had become so ‗absolute‘ 
that they were able to decide the ‗very content of the property rights‘ possessed by stockholders. In 
this regard, he argues, there was a need for more state regulation of corporations, especially since it 
had become apparent that judicial or self-regulation was failing to contain their excesses.
44
 
In similar vein, Veblen
45
 argued that the ‗efficient production of useful goods and services‘, 
had fallen into the hands of corporations, whose sole aim was to make profits and not to produce 
goods. This leads to a decline in the efficient production of goods, as corporate owners become only 
interested in securing ‗pecuniary‘ profits. The consequence of this is a shift from what he called a 
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‗money economy‘, in which products are dominant, to a ‗credit economy‘ where capital markets 
dominate.
46
 This, to him, was not good for the economy. 
Though the highly financialized corporation was introduced much later in the UK, it was also 
criticised by some ‗labour party intellectuals‘, including R. H. Tawney and Harold Laski.47 Tawney 
argued that corporations were ‗promoting inherently pernicious and parasitic forms of intangible 
financial property‘ such as shares.48 To him, the arguments for private property rights should not be 
extended to property forms like shares, particularly when they tended to separate profits from labour 
and ‗reward from work‘.49 In his words; 
 
Unlike rights to tangible personal possessions, which could be defended on 
functional grounds, as indispensible to a life of decency and comfort and as 
encouraging industry and initiative, these new intangible, passive property 
forms – the rights to revenue which had proliferated in recent decades – were 
‗functionless‘. Indeed, in directing productive activity towards ‗acquisition‘ 
rather than ‗service to society‘, they were positively dysfunctional, 






Laski agreed with Tawney and asserted that the rationalization and ethical foundation for property 
rights rested in their capacity to execute socially beneficial functions. The rise of the corporations 
negated the very foundation of property rights, as property in this case became ‗functionless‘.51 With 
the rise of JSCs, there emerged a distinct class of investors who were not concerned with the 
management of corporations, but were rather ‗freed from the legal obligation to labour‘ and continued 
to be ‗maintained in parasitic idleness‘.52 Despite the idle nature of this class, they had come to 
control societal institutions and were able to transform ‗functionless property, whose objective was 
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―simply the maximum profit‖‘, into becoming ‗the controlling factor in industrial production‘.53 This 
was not beneficial to society. 
For many of these critics, the sheer size and functions of corporations had separated them 
from their owners and most of them had come under the full authority of managers, as opposed to 
shareholders. Considering their extended range and enormous powers, it was no longer appropriate to 
see them as exclusively under the domain of private enterprises. Corporate activities, they argued, 
impacted heavily on the public, such that it had become reasonable to liken them to social or public 
institutions. For Dodd, it was legitimately justifiable to take ‗separate corporate personality more 
seriously‘ and treat the corporation and the owners as truly independent units. In this situation, he 
argued, it will be justified to hold that ‗corporate directors owed duties not only to shareholders but to 
employees, consumers, creditors and society as a whole‘.54According to Berle; 
 
The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a giant 
corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a multitude of 
individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of trade, bring ruin to 
one community and prosperity to another. The organizations which they 
control have passed far beyond the realm of private enterprise - they have 





Ireland argues that, ‗implicit in these ideas56 of course, was [not only] a rejection of the principle of 
shareholder primacy and of the view that corporate governance was a simple matter of shareholder 
protection‘, but, equally inherent ‗in them was a much more ―socialized‖ conception of corporations 
and a rejection of the view that they were purely private enterprises‘.57 According to him, not a few 
commentators believed at the time that the ‗socialization‘ of the corporation will eventually result in a 
corporate revolution. One of such commentators was John Maynard Keynes, who had written as early 
as the 1920s that there was a tendency for ‗Joint Stock Institutions, when they [had] reached a certain 
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age and size, to approximate to the status of public corporations, rather than that of individualistic 
private enterprise‘.58 This situation occurs when owners of corporations have become so ‗dissociated 
from the management‘, that it will not be justifiable to still think of them as sole owners, whose 
interests alone matter. At this stage, ‗the direct personal interest of the (shareholder) in making of 
profit becomes quite secondary. Managers are then more concerned about the stability and reputation 
of the institution, where upon shareholders had to satisfy themselves with conventionally adequate 
dividends‘.59 
Corporate managers, already locked in a struggle with shareowners regarding who controls 
the corporations, supported the view that managers are trustees for all stakeholders and saw the so 
called ‗socialization‘ as an avenue to actualize their ambitions. Beginning from the 1950s, therefore, 
the idea of corporations as public institutions had risen to prominence and corporate managers began 
to exercise considerable amounts of control over them. 
 
 
 The Era of Managerialism: 1950s -1970s 
 
By the end of the Second World War in 1945, calls were made for a critical re-appraisal of the role of 
corporations and the functions of corporate managers. Corporations had contributed immensely to the 
war struggles, necessitating the call by many for them to play more central roles in the protection and 
development of society.
60
 According to these commentators, allowing managers to run corporations as 
public institutions will be in the overall interest of society.
61
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Apart from their role in the war, it was equally contended that any business with conventional 
wisdom will always ensure that its managers balance conflicting varieties of interests. Instead of 
pushing solely for the accumulation of more profits for its shareholders, every conscientious 
organization takes into cognisance the interest of its employees, suppliers, dealers, local communities 
and the society in which it operates. Where a corporation is unable to take these varied interests into 
consideration, it will be adjudged to have failed in its commitments as a ‗good corporate citizen‘.62 
Corporations, much like states, were seen as one of the long lasting features of the societal 
landscape and were looked at as financial territories, thrust directly into the care and control of a 
managerial cadre, whose current elevation downgraded shareholders to the status of mere providers of 
needed resources.
63
 To some critics, corporations with superior managerial cadre will eventually come 
to rival states as the ‗dominant institution of the modern world‘.64  
The vindication of the post-second world war corporation meant the vindication of corporate 
executives, who managed them. Khurana maintains that not a few began to link the survival of liberty 
and democracy to the ability of a country to manage, regulate and exploit the prospects of large 
corporations.
65
 This predisposition towards managerial supremacy in the 1950s, made the then 
President of Harvard University to declare that;  
 
As never before, business needs men who appreciate the responsibilities of 
business to itself and to that unique society of free men which has been 
developed on this continent. Such men must understand not only the 
practical workings of business organisations, but also the economic and 
social climate in which business operates; they must be as well trained as our 
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The prominent position ascribed to managers replicated the important function that was eventually 
credited to them. As a result, it was not surprising that after the war, far-reaching powers were 
assigned to corporate managers and they were expected to use this power for the greater good of 
society, as opposed to that of only shareholders.  
It is also imperative to note that in the 1950s, capitalism was ‗at war‘ with communism. 
Economic analysts believed that ‗a new and more rational conception‘ of managers and their 
functions in a corporation was required, if capitalism was to win the war against communism. This 
rational conception meant that managers came to be identified as ‗systems designers‘, ‗information 
processors‘ and ‗programmers‘, saddled with the responsibility of ‗regulating the interface between 
the organization and its environment.
67
  
Kaysen states that specialized corporate executives subsequently metamorphosed into a class 
of compassionate leaders, whose priority was one of putting the interests of society first, before every 
other interest.  
 
No longer the agent of the proprietorship seeking to maximize return on 
investment, management sees itself as responsible to stockholders, employees, 
customers, the general public and, perhaps most important, the firm itself as an 
institution...[Moreover, its] responsibilities to the general public are wide 
spread: leadership in local charitable enterprises, concern with factory 
architecture and landscaping, provision of support for higher education, and 





This was the era of managerialism or managerial capitalism, when corporations came to be seen as 
being more responsive to the needs of society. The idea that shareholders were still corporate owners 
in the traditional sense of the word had taken a back-seat. On this development, Ireland and Pillay, 
quoting Edward Mason in a collection of essays he published in 1959,
69
 stated that;  
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...the traditional justification for private property ownership had gone 
forever. The old argument that private property ownership was essential to 
the full development of personality [and] to the maintenance of individual 
freedom might still be valid in relation to individual possessory holdings but 






In his own contribution supporting managerial supremacy, Wedderburn  asserted that corporate law 
should no longer treat the shareholder as a ‗proprietor‘ entitled to control of the corporation. Rather, 
the shareholder‘s position should be seen in the same way as the position of a well secured creditor.71 
The managerial theorists argued that since shareholders had become rentiers in the corporate 
process, managers are consequentially freed from the shackles and the pressures of the cut-throat, 
monopolistic market competitions which formerly restricted their activities. Freed from the shadows 
of shareholders, the overriding purpose of a corporation was no longer to maximize profit but to 
balance the divergent and sometimes conflicting interests of the different groups affected by corporate 
activities. This led to the creation of socially responsible corporations. According to Ireland; 
 
By 1950s and 60s, non-sectional managerialist ideas had become common 
place, underpinning claims that corporations were becoming more ‗socially 
responsible‘ and ‗soulful‘. In 1955, for example, L.C.B. Gower, doyen of 
post war British company law, suggested that the emphasis that some still 
placed on ‗the profit making element in corporate activity‘ now had ‗a 
slightly old fashioned ring‘.72 
 
 
The concept of the socially responsible corporation in the 1950s and 60s found outlets in different 
forms; corporations engaged more in philanthropic gestures; they also created multi-constituency 
boards to run corporations (particularly in the US); employees were given more attention and their 
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welfare was taken into consideration when making corporate decisions and; in some organizations, 
attempts were made to create industrial democracies.
 73
  
According to Davies, in the US many economists began to assert that the country was no 
longer a capitalist economy in the strict sense of the word. To these ‗optimists‘, the country had 
become a variant of an industrial economy in which those in control of business where guided by 
organizational imperatives, devoid of excessive profit-making mentality.
74
 They pointed to the various 
mechanisms through which corporations had become central instruments in the realization of public 
policy objectives. These included environmental protection objectives, through the passage of the 
Environmental Protection Act of 1970; work place safety with the enactment of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970; product safety with the passing of the Consumer Product Safety Act of 
1972 and equitable employment practices, through the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
75
  
In the 1968 revised edition of The Modern Corporation,
76
Berle stated that corporate managers 
had become ‗administrators of a community system‘, and held that corporations are no longer 
‗business devices‘, but should rather be seen as ‗social institutions‘.77 In the same vein, Young and 
Scott argue that during the period, managers seemed to value the life and enduring success of the 
enterprise and saw this as the fundamental end. Satisfactory shareholder returns resulted from 
pursuing this prime goal.
78
 
The culture of most corporations in the 1950s and 1960s can be summarised, therefore, as one 
in which business organizations were socially responsible. They were seen as ‗soulful‘ enterprises, 
managed in the interest of the public.
79
 They engaged in varied degrees of philanthropic gestures and 
attached importance to the welfare of their employees. Corporations also took into consideration, the 
interest of communities where they operated and concerned themselves with ensuring that the 
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environment was not adversely affected by corporate activities. They became outlets through which 
certain ‗civic‘ legislations were passed and enforced. 
It is imperative to point out, however, that even during this period, the concept of profit-
making was still an integral part of corporations and businesses were still set up for that purpose. The 
fact that corporations had become socially responsible did not dispense-with the purpose of profit-
making. As Ireland submits; 
 
It is important not to overstate the extent to which corporate managers 
abandoned the shareholder interest and to which corporations really acted in a 
‗socially responsible‘ manner during this period. Finance was by no means 
stripped of power and, despite the dampening of competition associated with 
the rising levels of industrial concentration, the adoption of multi-divisional 
management structures by many large corporations saw the emergence within 
them of decentralised ‗profit centres‘ which competed for capital.80 
 
 
The point is that during the managerial era, pursuit of profit for the benefit of shareholders, though 
still an integral aspect of corporate capitalism, was not pursued ruthlessly and in total disregard of 
other stake-holders in society. 
In Nigeria, commercial oil extraction and exportation started in the 1950s and by the 1960s, 
MNCs such as Shell, Chevron, AGIP and Exxon Mobil were already operating in the country. It is 
arguable that the idea of the socially responsible corporations also influenced the decisions and 
operations of these entities in Nigeria. Between 1958 and 1970 for instance, there were practically no 
recorded oil spills in Nigeria. The first batch of news on oil spills began to filter-in from the 1970s. At 
this time, the culture of corporations had transformed and the idea of the socially responsible 
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Crisis of Managerialism: Markets for Corporate Control (MCCs) and the Rise of 
the Agency Theory  
 
The position in the 1950s and 1960s, by which corporations were approximated to social institutions, 
was heavily criticized by a ‗new liberal‘ group,82 backed by powerful rentier investors. This group 
argued that the inclination towards the socially responsible corporation led to inefficiencies which 
work against the interest of society. The backlash against the ‗soulful corporation‘ resulted in the re-
privatisation of corporations beginning from the 1970s and was achieved mainly through the 




Bakan observes that from the late 1960s to early 1970s, the world witnessed an intense 
economic meltdown. A perfect storm of external economic shocks, made the worse by a decline in 
productivity and growth, cost of living adjustment and an economy tilting towards the use of services 
more than the production of goods, dealt a big blow to the global economy.
84
 As he recounts; 
 
In 1973, [national economies] were shaken by a surge in oil prices due to the 
formation of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), which operated in cartel-like fashion to control the world‘s oil 
supply. High unemployment, runaway inflation, and deep recession soon 
followed. Prevailing economic policies, which, true to their New Deal 
lineage, had favoured regulation and other modes of government 






Furthermore, an excess of funds for business was unleashed on an international scale after the failure 
of ‗the Bretton Woods agreements‘ in the early 1970s. According to Sennett, capital that hitherto had 
been restricted to indigenous or national purposes or which were deposited in ‗national banks‘, were 
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released from the vaults and became easily transferrable internationally. Significantly, he continues, 
there was an increased desire to invest by both the ‗oil rich countries‘ of the Gulf region and 
American investors. Japanese and German Banks, and even an assortment of Chinese business men in 
the Pacific got in on the act. Exploring offshore prospects increased drastically and this deluge of 
capitalist funds, seeking for investment opportunities, led to ‗perfection‘ in the art of hostile 
takeovers. The consequence was a craving for ‗short term rather than long term results, which 
symbolized the age of the ‗impatient capital‘.86  
By the time Margaret Thatcher became the British Prime Minister in 1979 and Ronald 
Reagan, the President of the US in 1980, there was a clear signal that the ‗economic era‘ which was 
the motivation behind the New Deal of President Roosevelt and his allied colleagues had come to its 
conclusive end. According to Bergin, this was the 1980s, when Michael Douglas declared that ‗greed‘ 
was good in the film ‗The Wall Street’.87 It was the period when Margaret Thatcher was pushing back 
the ability of the state to regulate economic activities and ‗shareholder value‘ became the overriding 
management viewpoint.
88
 In this context, Bakan explains that ‗over the next two decades, 
governments pursued neoliberalism‘s core policies of deregulation, privatization, spending cuts and 
inflation reduction with increasing vigour‘.89 Neoliberalism had thus become the economic orthodoxy 
by the early 1990s. 
However, even before the 1970s and Margaret Thatcher, some free market exponents had 
begun to write extensively against the socially responsible corporation. In 1965, Henry Manne had 
written that those who acknowledged the principle of managerial supremacy were too hasty in their 
judgement. According to him, when the existence of markets for corporate control is considered,
90
 
there was ‗a limit to how far corporate managers could abuse their investors‘ in the guise of social 
responsibility. The notion of the ‗market for corporate control‘ inferred that management of public 
corporations ‗was always for sale in principle‘, thereby fixing the threshold of the extent to which 
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corporate administrators ‗could ignore‘ the market price of shares. Since the market actually exists, 





The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient 
management, the more attractive the take-over becomes to those who believe 
that they can manage the company more efficiently. And the potential return 






Manne contended vigorously that ‗managerial capitalism‘ was not efficient and beneficial to society, 
as Berle and Means had earlier written. Shrewd and prudent shareholders, being wiser than Berle and 
Means had portrayed, could not be expected to transfer their resources to a group of unaccountable 
corporate managers who neither listens to them, nor pursues their interests.
93
 For as long as options 
exist, investors will not be deceived into following the ‗destructive‘ path of transferring their 
resources to these group of irresponsible and selfish officers. Moreover, corporations that fail to draw 
financiers will not endure for long, because once the value of the corporation‘s stocks fall to a certain 
level, external interests like corporate competitors will use that as an opportunity to take-over the 
corporation and manage it more efficiently. This will result in a kind of Darwinian selection method, 
with a preference for shareholder-oriented corporations. Managerial capitalism, therefore, could not 
be the answer, but was rather the cause of most corporate problems.
94
  
Manne‘s writings greatly influenced the subsequent works of the agency theorists, including 
Michael Jensen, William Meckling and Eugene Fama,
95
 who implicated managers as the major 
protagonists in the economic problems encountered by corporate capitalism. Corporate managers – 
who would not ‗voluntarily change‘ their ways – they argued, acted as obstacles to the efficient 
operation of competitive markets. Furthermore, corporate managers, who serve as agents of 
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shareholders by managing corporations on their behalf, have ‗self interest motives‘ which are quite 
different from that of the shareholders. It will be difficult to monitor the conduct and behaviour of 
these managers, considering that the conditions upon which stock ownership is managed are both 
wide and complex. Accordingly, ‗because managers‘ work is not easily observable, they will fail to 
pursue actions that maximize the value of the firm. The challenge, they argued therefore, is to create 




The agency theorists embarked on a far-reaching evaluation of relationship capitalism and 
argued that the solution to the economic crisis of the 1970s lay in restructuring how corporations are 
managed.
97
 Jensen and Meckling argued strongly that the overriding objective of corporations should 
be the ‗theoretical justification for takeovers and the maximization of corporate value which is 
measured by share price‘.98 Accordingly, the absence or lack of an active market for corporate control 
was one of the factors responsible for the corporate indiscipline and unaccountability of corporate 
managers. Markets should be relied upon ‗for the regulation of the overall economy and that of 
corporate governance‘.99   
The agency theorists argued that it was necessary to clearly re-define the purpose of 
corporations and transform its essence and principles.
100
 Ontologically, they argued, the view that 
corporations are social institutions is rendered ‗delusional‘ by the fact that the fundamental nature of 
corporations consists of formal associations. Corporations are mere legal inventions which function as 
‗a nexus‘ for a series of ‗contracting relationships‘ between persons. In this situation, there is no 
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justification for the attempt to differentiate between ‗those things that are ―inside‖ the firm (or any 
organisation)‘ and ‗those things that are ―outside‖ of it‘.101 
 
There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e. 
contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labour, material 





In pursuance of the objective of transforming the purpose of corporations, agency theorists, over time, 
formulated a variety of mechanisms aimed at solving the agency problem. The mechanisms include; 
(i) monitoring managerial performances; (ii) providing comprehensive economic incentives which 
will involve ‗remunerating managers‘ with company stock and options; (iii) introducing the concept 
of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs); (iv) promoting an active market for corporate control (MCCs).
103
  
Khurana states that after the Second World War – when Keynesianism was the economic 
orthodoxy – this type of market logic was considered extremist in nature. Gradually, however, more 
and more people ‗sided with the free market or neoliberal economists in the belief that institutional 
investors and other shareholders were more trust-worthy than managers as custodians of the 
corporation‘.104 
Corporate raiders began to portray corporate executives as people only interested in satisfying 
their personal and selfish interests. T. B. Pickens, a well known corporate raider, wrote that; 
 
US executives aren‘t looking at takeovers as a means of enhancing 
shareholder value. They only look to takeovers as a threat to their salaries 
and perks. And the reasons they perceive it this way is that they generally 
own very little stock in their own companies. They don‘t relate to 
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In many articles and journals, written after the 1970s, as a prelude to the re-emergence of shareholder 
value, most business media readily blamed corporate managers for the prevailing economic crisis. 
Managers were depicted as ‗unaccountable plutocrats‘, squandering the assets of corporations and 
using them for purposes not beneficial to shareholders. As more and more attacks were directed at 
corporate managers, ‗the social and political context which had favoured managerialism since the 
progressive era, and was institutionalised in a variety of regulatory policies and normative practices 




Re-Assertion of Shareholder Value and the Re-Privatization of Corporations 
 
With the high level of deregulation witnessed after the 1970s, in line with the wishes of anti-
managerialists, active markets for corporate control were created. The creation of these markets led 
arguably to the de-legitimization of the conglomerate forms of corporations. The balance in the 
control of corporations subsequently tilted in favour of financial actors, as opposed to corporate 
executives. As a result, many corporations were broken up, forced to voluntarily shed unrelated 
businesses or made to borrow funds to engage in stock buybacks, in order to enhance their share value 
and repel the claws of the aggressive corporate raiders.
107
 Executive attention shifted from the 
business to the share price and by the end of the 1990s, ‗spurring the share price to the highest level 
possible had become an end in itself for many, many executives, who would go to any lengths to 
achieve it‘.108 
According to Khurana;  
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...with the creation of the shareholder value position as the key criterion for 
business success and the only way to maintain independence from corporate 
raiders, companies not only divested unrelated business but sought to lower 
costs by cutting out layers of management, improving processes and 
outsourcing non-core functions. Corporations downsized, dramatically 
reducing the middle management ranks that had been one of the defining 





The New York Times declared that ‗the new corporate order, eschews loyalty to workers, products, 
corporate structures, businesses, factories, communities, even the nation‘ and that ‗all such allegiances 
are viewed as expendable under the new rules‘, meaning that ‗with survival at stake, only market 
leadership, strong profits and a high stock price can be allowed to matter‘.110 Instead of the financial 
sector rotating around big business, big business (large corporations) began to spin around financial 
markets and the ‗signals they generated‘.111 According to Davies, this ‗Copernican Revolution‘ 
became ‗the functionalist theory of corporate governance‘.112 
It has been suggested that the idea of shareholder primacy freed managers and corporate 
executives from responsibility to any other objective, other than the actualization of desired financial 
results. Corporations were now looked at as a combination of financial assets, arranged according to 
their value in the market.
113
 In this new corporate economy, the argument that the corporation could 
be subordinate to any social arrangement, outside shareholder value, was derided as lacking normative 
value. With neoliberalism as a foundation for the new orthodoxy, the idea that ‗the relationship among 
managers, boards of directors, and equities markets should be mediated and evaluated primarily 
through the lens of the firm‘s share price became institutionalized throughout the corporate and 
financial worlds‘.114 Corporations ceased to be seen as part of a connection of corresponding 
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institutions in society, but instead, became raised as ‗the most important institution in society‘.115 The 
manager‘s function in the corporation was, in the final analysis, ‗framed as serving shareholders and 
shareholders alone.‘116 
It has been equally argued that the culture inherent in this ideology makes corporate managers 
indifferent to moral issues. They dissociate themselves from the values of society, even though the 
rhetoric of shareholder primacy states that maximizing shareholder profit is beneficial to society. The 
image of corporate managers are transformed from ‗one of a steady reliable caretaker of the 
corporation and its constituents to that of a swash-buckling, iconoclastic champion of shareholder 
value‘.117In other words, they became reduced to no more than hired hands.118  
The growing complexity of ‗financial instruments like the leveraged buyout‘, supposes that 





Due to the emergence of sophisticated shareholder power, corporate generals at 
the top of the chain of command were not the generals they once were; a new 
source of lateral power had emerged at the top, often literally foreign, often 
otherwise indifferent, to the culture that long term associations and alliances had 





This pressure on corporate managers to maximize profits and satisfy shareholders means that 
everything is legitimate in the pursuit of profits – be it the use of child labour or sweat shops, sacking 
15,000 employees or subjecting communities to colossal misery to exploit profits.
121
  
The ascendancy of ‗shareholder value primacy‘ and its apparent domination has led to the 
eventual demise of managerial capitalism. In its place, what is witnessed is the re-privatisation of the 
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corporate form and the birth of ‗investor capitalism‘, or what Ireland terms ‗resurgent finance‘.122 
According to him, re-privatised corporations are extremely susceptible to the evaluation of ‗financial 
market participants‘ and to the indicators emanating from the markets themselves. Since ‗financial 
markets‘ are subject to an ever increasing role, ‗corporate strategies‘ in turn are progressively ‗tied to 
a narrowly financial view‘ of the way corporations should be managed, ‗one in which maximizing 
stock price trumps all other goals‘.123 The culture of corporations thus, has become radically 
financialized. 
As all these were happening, technological innovations in communication and transportation 
also meant that the mobility and portability of corporations had become possible. Fast and large jet 
planes and new container shipping equipment (which allowed for sea-shipping to be smoothly 
integrated with rail and truck networks) drove down costs and increased the speed and efficiency of 
transportation. Communications were similarly enhanced with improvements in ‗long distance phone 
networks, telex and fax technology, and more recently, the creation of the internet‘.124 Corporations, 
no longer bound to operate in their places of incorporation, could comb all parts of the globe in search 
of areas to produce goods and services at considerably lesser costs. It thus became possible to 
purchase cheap labour in poor countries with poor environmental and work standards,
125
 while selling 
the finished products in wealthy countries, where ‗people had disposable income and were prepared to 
pay decent prices for them‘.126 
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SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND NEOLIBERALISM 
 
As was suggested earlier, the re-assertion of shareholder primacy did not occur in isolation. It is part 
and parcel of the rise to prominence of the neoliberal theory of development, beginning from the 
1970s. In order to better understand shareholder value with its predilection towards voluntary and 
self-regulatory CSR, an analysis of the wider neoliberal theories of economic and social development 
is considered necessary. This part of the section is, therefore, dedicated to an analysis of the wider 
neoliberal theory, its historical roots, the differences between it and classical liberalism and the 
rationalist assumptions for its ‗normalizing‘ role in the global economy.  
 
 
Meaning of Neoliberalism 
 
Neoliberalism is an economic theory that advocates for the liberalization of trade and the 
intensification of market processes. It is a doctrine ‗which champions precisely, the kind of market 
mechanisms through which modern finance exercises its coercive power‘.127 Harvey gives a detailed 
description of the term, with its different connotations. According to him, it is; 
 
A theory of political economic practise that proposes that human well-being 
can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create 
and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices... 
Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, 
health care, social security or environmental pollution) then they must be 
created by state action, if necessary. But beyond these tasks, the state should 
not venture. State intervention in markets (once created) must be kept to the 
barest minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly 
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possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and 
because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state 





Neoliberalism is an ideology based on the idea that free markets operate to maximize aggregate 
wealth and welfare and that the best policies to be implemented by governments (especially the 
developing ones) are liberalized market policies. This means that economies are managed better when 
governments transform as many public institutions as possible, into private institutions. When this is 
done, social institutions become ‗items‘ or commodities capable of being ‗transacted with‘ in markets 
(the commodification of public goods). Systems that are governed by heavy privatization encourage 
‗investments and savings‘ by diminishing ‗the cost of capital to business‘, thereby motivating ‗the 
development of capital markets and promoting the efficient allocation of resources‘.129 The process of 
commoditizing social institutions, on its own, cannot be possible unless there is a complementary 
process of deregulation. The deregulation process will prevent intervention or unwarranted regulation 




According to neoliberal economists, the best economic policy is one where there is perfect 
market competition. The reason for this, they claim, is that there is a rationality which exists only in a 
free market. To this end, ‗private contractual and economic ordering of the ―unregulated‖ forces of 
supply and demand serves to maximize not only individual freedom but efficiency, growth, wealth 
and welfare‘.131  
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It sees the state as interfering with the rationality of markets and as an unproductive, greedy 
assembly of self-seeking policy-makers, commonly used by special interest groups to advance their 
peculiar and pecuniary interests. The officials, who manage the affairs of state, are always under 
intense and constant pressure from these varied interest groups, making it impossible to make the 
right decisions. In this condition of imperfection, the state ends up in ‗governmental failures‘ which 
include (but is not limited to) regulatory capture, rent seeking and corruption.
132
 
This strong dislike for state interventions in economic policies – at least rhetorically – is 
extended to a universal dislike for the state as an institution. The dislike of the state as an institution 
has on its own, become so wide spread that in today‘s globalized world, ‗many now see the states as 
at best an anachronism and at worst as an obstacle‘ to societal advancement. Politics, which is a 
natural consequence of ‗state-ship‘, opens the door to sectional interests which distort the rationality 
of market systems. The solution to this aberration is to ‗depoliticise the economy‘.133  
On a global scale, neoliberalism involves the process of ensuring that goods and services 
move freely across borders without interference from government. This, it is argued, will ensure that 
cheaper resources are utilized to maximize profits and efficiency. The free movement of goods and 
services across territories, borders and boundaries can only be achieved when certain interventionist 
policies of government are removed. These include tariffs, standards, laws, legislation and regulatory 
controls, restrictions on capital flows and investment.
134
 
In pursuit of this ostensibly free and perfect market, neoliberals treat other aspects of law as 
merely reflecting the economic rationality of markets. As Ireland observes, ‗this tendency has found 
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its most vivid expression in the work of the law-and-economics movement... much of which is 
underlain by a belief in the trans-historical, purely economic, efficiency maximising rationality of the 
‗deregulated‘ market and in a ‗classical evolutionary paradigm‘ of legal development‘.135 This has led 
to the neoliberal claim of ‗legal convergence‘ and the need to import and imitate rules, particularly in 
the areas relating to trade. This process of legal transplant (where rules, which are seen as efficient are 
transferred to trade related areas) amounts to an ‗economically determinist Darwinian paradigm of 
development‘.136    
According to the French writer, Bourdieu, ‗neoliberalism is a programme for destroying 
collective structures which may impede the pure market logic‘.137 He sees the theory as a system 
which ‗tends on the whole to favour severing the economy from social realities, thereby constructing 
in actuality, an economic system conforming to its description in pure theory, that is a sort of logical 
machine that presents itself  as a chain of constrains regulating economic agents‘.138  
However, it has also been submitted that the anti-state stance of neoliberalism is merely 
rhetorical. This is because in reality and with the rise of neoliberalism, state activity has not 
diminished.
139
 Rather, it has taken on a different pattern with less welfare, but more financial 





Ideological Evolution: From Classical Liberalism to Neoliberalism 
 
The development of neoliberalism can be traced to the theories of natural liberty and natural rights 
which emerged around the sixteenth century and replaced the divine right of the church and monarchs 
                                                             
135
Paddy Ireland (n 129) 
136ibid; this is because in the world of free markets, allocation of resources is carried out based on how 
efficient a particular participant is and in this way, it becomes a situation of survival of the fittest. 
137Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Essence of Neoliberalism’, (1998) Le Monde Diplomatic (English edition) 
<http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu> accessed 16 February 2011 
138
 ibid 
139 Early neoliberals learnt from ‘the mistakes’ of the classical liberals and recognised that markets require 
state maintenance in order to function properly 
140
 This point is discussed more in Chapter Five, dealing with the political barrier to effective CSR 
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by the end of the seventeenth century.
141
 From Locke to Hume, Paley and Rousseau, these political 
philosophers emphasized the importance of the individual in the realization of the ‗general will‘. The 
notion of ‗rights in the individual‘ was logically presumed and provided intellectual foundations for 
the emergence of ‗rights in property‘ and to the liberty of the individual who is in possession, to do 
what he likes with the property he possesses.
142
  
The philosophers, however, argued that the elevation of ‗the individual‘ alone, might be at the 
expense of the progress of society. As a result, the ‗individual will‘ had to be modified in a manner 
that will simultaneously suit the goals of the wider society. The result was the creation of an 
alignment between the individual and the society. Paley and Bentham had to borrow from the earlier 
works of Hume on ‗utilitarian hedonism‘, to propound the philosophical doctrine of social utility. 
Rousseau took the ‗social contract‘ from Locke and modified it to become the ‗general will‘.143 The 
problem inherent in individualism was side-tracked by applying the concept of equality. Equality of 
men leads to equality in ownership of property, which in turn, leads to general security for all.
144
 
The salient point discernible from the writings of these philosophers is the assumption that by 
the workings of ‗natural laws‘, individuals engaged in the pursuit of their own personal interests ‗with 
enlightenment‘ (in a free and unrestrained world), will always promote the general interest of society 
at the same time.
145
 Since every free man strives for his own good, every man strives for the good of 
society at the same time. In this way, ―I‖ becomes the same as ―all‖ and society benefits in the end. 
                                                             
141 There is the argument, however, that theories of the individual and natural rights had taken root even 
before the sixteenth century, in the writings of Stoic philosophers like Marcus Aurelius and Zeno; See WD 
Grampp, ‘The Stoic Origins of Liberalism: Economic Liberalism, Vol.1’ (New York: Random House 1965) 1-2  
142
 John Maynard Keynes, ‘The End of Laissez-Faire’ (1926) Multimania Publication 
<http://membres.multimania.fr/yannickperez/site/Keynes%20la%20fin%20du%20laissez%20Faire.PDF> 
accessed 13 November 2011; Keynes suggests that the reason for the promotion of the ‘individual right’ was to 
depose the authority of both the monarch and that of the church. It was felt that their rule over men had 
become autocratic, despotic and arbitrary. Every individual should, in consequence, be allowed to enjoy rights 





 This, links to the idea of free markets as ‘natural’ and not requiring state constitution and maintenance. 
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Classical liberal theory is predicated on the principal pillars of ‗comparative advantage‘, a 
notion attributed to David Ricardo, and the ‗invisible hand,‘ ascribed to Adam Smith. According to 
Smith, in the area of economics, human beings are enthused by the need to make profit. The essential 
premise is one of self-interest. People will accidentally advance their society if existing circumstances 
allow them to pursue their personal needs and desires. The old mercantilist arguments for restrictive 
and protective trade were no longer tenable because ‗economic events‘ are greatly hindered by over-
protectionism.
147
 The values of free trade, competition and choice have the capacity to stimulate 
economic development and reduce poverty. This is only possible where the ‗invisible hand‘ (of the 
market) is set free from its ‗mercantilist‘ chains.148 This economic paradigm of freedom for the 
individual is what is known as the Laissez-Faire theory or Classical Liberalism. 
The phrase ‗Laissez-Faire‘ is a French word which literally means ‗leave it alone‘ or ‗leave us 
alone‘. Keynes states that the Marquis d‘ Argenson was the first writer to use the phrase in clear 
association with the doctrine of individual freedom, in about 1751.
149
 The Marquis believed that there 
were many economic advantages derivable from a system in which the government left trade alone.
150
 
Accordingly, the Marquis declared that, ‗to govern better, one must govern less‘.151 On the other hand, 
Handman writes that the phrase was first recorded by Franklin as a spoken word, in his work; 
                                                             
146 See I Adams, Political Ideology Today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001) 20; Freedom 
becomes the single most important condition for the progress and development of society. Every man is 
encouraged, as a result, to ensure that the conditions for freedom are attained. Interference from any angle, 
be it from the government or non-governmental groups, is not acceptable. The natural effort of every 
individual to better his own condition becomes the prop upon which the public good rests. 
147
A Skinner (Ed.), ‘Introduction’ to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, first published 1776 (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books 1970) 44 
148
B Polling-Vocke, ‘What is Economic Liberalism?’ Briefing Paper Series 
<www.hockeyarenas.com/berntpv/briefingpaper/papers/13.htm> accessed 2 April 2013 
149 This ‘written attribution’ could only be ascribed to the Marquis after his work was published in his own 
name in 1858; See D Saussy, ‘Round Table: Keynes, The Laissez-Faire and Sedimentation, Part 1 by Reynaldo 
Miranda’ (December, 2012) Symposium: Great Books Institute Publications <http://symposiumsa.com/keynes-
the-laissez-faire-and-sedimentation-part-1-by-reynaldo-miranda/> accessed 3 April 2013 
150 Again, this is part of the underlying reasons why classical liberals insisted that trade and the markets do not 
need state support 
151
 John M. Keynes (n 142)  
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Principles of Trade published in 1774, where he recounted the 'colloquy‘ between Colbert and 
Legendre towards the end of the sixteenth century.
152
  
It is in the works of Bentham that the rules of Laissez-Faire were properly stated and argued 
in English literature. Bentham exhibited his predisposition to the doctrine of individual freedom in his 
writing on utilitarian philosophy entitled, A Manual of Political Economy.
153
 In this seminal work, he 
writes that:  
 
With the view of causing an increase to take place in the mass of national 
wealth, or with a view to increase of the means either of subsistence or 
enjoyment, without some special reason, the general rule is that nothing 
ought to be done or attempted by government. The motto, or watchword of 
government, on these occasions, ought to be—be quiet.154 
 
 
Government involvement in the daily activities of men, he continues, amounts to an unwarranted 
interference which restricts and inhibits the maximum optimization of human capacity.  
 
The request which agriculture, manufacturers and commerce present to 
governments is as modest and reasonable as that which Diogenes made to 





With the appealing nature of this argument to capitalist actors, it was not surprising that free trade 
campaigners readily adopted the slogan of Laissez-Faire. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
doctrine had permeated and practically dominated the academic system. The church was even co-
                                                             
152 M Handman, ‘Economic History-The Decline of Laissez-Faire’ (March, 1931) The American Economic Review 
Vol. 21(1) Supplement Papers and Proceedings of the Forty Third Annual meeting of the American Economic 
Association <www.jstor.org> accessed  01 November 2011; According to Handman, Colbert had asked 
Legendre (who perhaps was encountering difficulties in his business) how the government might be of help to 
him. Legendre simply replied that the government should “let me be”. It is logical to conclude however, that 
the meaning Legendre attributed to the phrase at the time must be without some of the implications ascribed 
to it today. 
153 Jeremy Bentham, ‘A Manual of Political Economy’ (1843) The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol. 3 The Online 
Library of Liberty 
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1922&chapter=114388&layout
=html&Itemid=27> accessed 2 April 2013 
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opted into disseminating the ‗faith‘ of Laissez-Faire ideology. In the Easy Lessons for the Use of 
Young People,
156
 Archbishop Whately wrote that ‗more harm than good is likely to be done by almost 
any interference of government with men‘s money transactions, whether letting or leasing, or buying 
or selling of any kind‘.157  Real freedom and liberty is realized only when an individual is given the 
freedom ‗to dispose of his own property, his own time and strength, and skill, in whatever way he 
himself may think fit, provided he does no wrong to his neighbours‘.158 As Keynes observes, ‗the 
political philosophy which the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had forged in order to throw 
down kings and prelates, had been made milk for babes, and had literally entered the nursery‘.159 
Classical liberalism believes that an unregulated market is an expression of ‗moral truth‘ 
which is beneficial to all. It teaches that regulation creates a bunch of lazy citizens who believe that 
the government will always protect and provide for them. They become less and less efficient and 
eventually sink into a condition of perpetual dependency. Samuel Smiles, a great apostle of classical 
liberalism, is quoted by Evans as saying that ‗whatever is done for men or class, to a certain extent 
takes away the stimulus and necessity of doing for themselves; and where men are subjected to over-
guidance and over-government, the inevitable tendency is to render them comparatively helpless‘.160  
In a classical liberal economy, the ‗ideal‘ distribution of productive resources is made 
possible when individuals work independently, using the method of trial and error. By utilizing the 
‗capitalist constant‘ of competition, those individuals who move in the right direction will triumph 
over those who move in the wrong direction. There is no mercy or compassion for those who invest in 
the wrong ventures. This process of ‗economic rationality‘ will eventually lead to the emergence of 
the ‗most successful profit makers‘ at the top, through a ‗ruthless struggle for survival which selects 
                                                             
156 R Whately, Easy Lessons on Money Matters: For the Use of Young People (London: J.W. Parker, 1845); this 




159John M Keynes (n 142)  
160
 E Evans, ‘Laissez-Faire and The Victorians’ (2006) BBC History 
<www.bbc.co.uk/history/trail/victorian_britain> accessed  01 November 2011 
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the most efficient by the bankruptcy of the less efficient‘.161 The cost of the struggle is immaterial. 
What matters is the final result which is always constant.
 162
 
To operate in a state of unhindered natural selection leads not only to progress and 
effectiveness, but also to the creation of inevitable opportunities ‗for unlimited private money 
making‘ as an inducement for utmost endeavours. The individual, who either by his own expertise or 
luck is able to make his investment at the right place and at the right time, makes profit. This system 
allows the ‗skilful‘ or lucky investor to make as much profits as possible, by acting as an incentive 
and a motivation for people who, with their investments, strive to be in the right place and at the right 
time. In this way, one of the most powerful human motives – the love of money – will be employed 
‗to the task of distributing economic resources in the way best calculated to increase wealth‘.163  
 
 
Differences between Classical Liberalism and Neoliberalism 
 
Classical liberalism was concerned with the freedom of the market and the individual. It encouraged 
competition as the best means through which efficiency could be attained. Neoliberalism also believes 
in a radically free market and in the importance of competition.
164
 Nevertheless, there are still 
differences between classical liberalism and the ‗new‘ or ‗neo‘ liberal philosophy. 
The classical liberalists believed in the freedom of markets; i.e. the non-interference of 
political institutions in the affairs of markets. To them, however, markets are naturally occurring 
                                                             
161 John M Keynes (n 142) 
162
ibid; According to Keynes, “corresponding to this method of attaining the ideal distribution of the 
instruments of production between different purposes, there is a similar assumption as to how to attain the 
ideal distribution of what is available for consumption. In the first place, each individual will discover what 
amongst the possible objects of consumption he wants most by the method of trial and error at the margin and 
in this way not only will each consumer come to distribute his consumption most advantageously, but each 
object of consumption will find its way into the mouth of the consumer whose relish for it is greatest compared 
with that of others, because that consumer will outbid the rest”.  
163
ibid; from this proposition, there is a correlation between the philosophy of classical economists and 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection and survival of the fittest. 
164
 A Barry, T Osborne and R Nikolas, (Eds.) Foucault and Political Reason-Liberalism, Neoliberalism and the 
Rationalities of Government (London: University College London Press 1996) 
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phenomena which needs no interference from the state. For the neoliberals on the other hand, the state 
can and should intervene in the market process, but only for its protection and preservation. Even in 
sectors where markets do not exist, states should create them for the sake of efficient allocation of 
resources.  According to Mirowski;  
 
The starting point of neoliberalism is the admission, contrary to classical 
liberal doctrine, that their vision of the good society will triumph only if it 
becomes reconciled to the fact that the conditions for its existence must be 
constructed and will not come about ―naturally‖ in the absence of concerted 





In the same vein, Foucault – with foreknowledge, it appears – submits that; 
 
Neoliberalism should not be confused with the slogan ―laissez-faire‖, but on 






In neoliberalism, therefore, there is a constitutional role ascribed to the state to provide the ‗judicio-
legal‘ rules that will regulate the framework within which business transactions are carried out.167  
 
Neoliberals replaced the ‗naturalism‘ of classical liberalism with a kind of 
‗constructivism... it differs from earlier forms of liberalism in that they do not 
regard the market as an existing quasi-natural reality situated in a kind of 
economic nature reserve space marked off, secured and supervised by the State. 
Rather, the market exists, and can only exist, under certain political, legal and 





Thus viewed, it becomes clear that neoliberals do not believe in the classical liberals‘ view of markets 
or rational economic behaviour as pure, naturally occurring phenomena. To them, the market is a 
                                                             
165 P Mirowski, ‘Post Face’ in P Mirowski and D Plehwe (eds.) The Road From Mont Pelerin: The Making of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press  2009) 434 
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 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics – Lectures 1978-9 (Paris: Gallimard 2004)137  
167 M Peters, ‘Neoliberalism: Hayek and the Austrian School’ (1999) University of Auckland’s Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy of Education <www.ffst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/doku.php> accessed on 01 November 2011 
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 A Barry, T Osborne and R Nikolas (n 164)  
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contrived artefact that needs the support and protection of the state. Unlike the classical liberals who 
insisted that the government should ‗leave the market alone‘, the neoliberals argue that even though 
the state should leave the market alone, nevertheless, it should intervene when it is necessary to 
support and maintain the market. In this context, markets and rational economic tendencies are 
constructed where and when it is necessary. Both are organised and managed by legal and political 
institutions and require political intervention and involvement, if and when the need arises. The 
economy, unlike what the classical liberals believed, must be directed, supervised, supported and 
protected by the law and policy of states.
169
 
Lemke argues that for neoliberals;  
 
...the market does not amount to a natural economic reality, with intrinsic 
laws that the art of government must bear in mind and respect; instead, the 
market can be constructed and kept alive only by dint of political 
interventions...competition, too is not a natural fact...this fundamental 
economic mechanism can function only if support is forthcoming to bolster a 
series of conditions, and adherence to the latter must consistently be 





Again, the old liberals, by focusing on the economy argued for the freedom of markets and nothing 
more. On the other hand, neoliberals extended the freedom of markets further. Neoliberalism is not 
only concerned with economic policies, the facilitation of free trade and the maximization of 
corporate profits. It carries within its principles, a ‗social analytical‘ basis which, when installed as a 
variety of ‗governmentality‘, stretches from the soul of the citizen-subject to other state policies, 
especially education policies. As Wendy Brown suggests, ‗neoliberal rationality, while foregrounding 
the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; rather it involves extending and 
disseminating market values to all institutions and social actions, even as the market itself remains a 
distinctive player‘.171 
                                                             
169 Wendy Brown, ‘Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’ (2007) Theory and Event 7 
<www.muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.1brown.html> accessed on 10 November, 2011 
170 T Lemke, ‘The Birth of Bio-Politics: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the College de France on Neoliberal 
Governmentality’ (2001) Economy and Society Vol. 30(2) 193 
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For Neoliberals, the existence and provision of legal arrangements for the support and 
protection of markets by the state, does not mean that the former is controlled by the latter. Rather, it 
is the state that is controlled by the market. The market is ‗the organising and regulative principle‘ of 
both state and society. The state freely and openly, reacts to the requirements of the market possibly 
through fiscal and monetary policies, immigration, or the organization of public education. 
Neoliberalism ‗indexes the state itself with success‘ which is dependent on the state‘s ability to 
maintain and promote markets. The legitimacy accorded to a state must be predicated on this 
success.
172
 As Lemke put it,
173
 economic liberty for neoliberals, ‗produces the legitimacy for a form of 
sovereignty limited to guaranteeing economic activity... a state that was no longer defined in terms of 
an historical mission but legitimated itself with reference to economic growth‘.174  
These significant differences between classical liberalism and neoliberalism have led some to 
argue that neoliberalism‘s anti-state rhetoric is a political project to restore the power and wealth of 





Crisis of Classical Liberalism  
 
Classical liberalism, according to Gailbrath, led to an inordinate ambition to get rich quick, which in 
turn led to the stock market crash of 1929.
176
 At the same time also, there was the crisis of over 
production, which resulted in the ‗big problem‘ of disequilibrium in many national economies. For 
                                                             
172 ibid 
173
 In a lecture in which he was interpreting Foucault’s writing on Ordo-liberalism 
174 T Lemke (n 170) above 
175 This line of argument is the subject-matter of Chapter Five below. See also David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism (London: Oxford University Press) 79 
176 John K Gailbrath, The Great Crash 1929: The Classical Account of Financial Disaster (London: Penguin Books, 
2009) 32; To a large extent, the number of manufacturing industries had increased from what it used to be in 
the late 1800s. In most ‘urban and country club districts’ in New York and London, beautiful English houses 
were sprouting up. The stock markets boomed and more and more profits were made, devoid of the 
meddlesome intervention of governments. 
162 
 
Hannah, mass protests against ‗over-production‘ or ‗under consumption‘177 became common as the 
‗nuisance‘ of over-capacity affected one industry after another. In this context, competition was no 
longer widely accepted as essentially benign, but was increasingly referred to as ―cut throat‖, 
―wasteful‖, ―unfair‖, ―destructive‖, or ―ruinous‘‖.178 
As a result, the justification for an unregulated competitive market system on the basis that 
‗the great complexity of effort necessary to maintain the world‘s material life‘ cannot be brought 




Urwick, writing in 1931, declared that;  
 
Our control over natural resources is enlarged almost beyond the wildest 
dreams, even of each preceding decade. The world‘s capacity for production 
has been developed to a far greater degree than any corresponding increase 
in population, especially in the industrialised nations. Yet the peoples of 
those nations, by millions, are eye to eye with uncertainty, with want, with 
moral degradation and with despair. We meet under the shadow of the 
gravest economic crisis which has threatened the material well being of 





The suggestion here is that the crisis led many to believe that the idea of the self- regulated market, 





                                                             
177Depending on the angle from which it is viewed  
178
 Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (2
nd
 edition, London: Methuen & Co 1983)  31 
179ibid; it, thus, became clear that the market, on its own, was incapable of organising commercial activities. By 
allowing the market to operate unchecked, the world was rewarded with an ‘unproductive competitive 
system’ with too many products and very little demand. Coupled with the speculative bubble which burst in 
1929, national economies were brought to their feet and signalled the end of the liberal, laissez-faire economic 
theory.  
180 L Urwick, ‘The International Position’, in R.J Mackay (ed.) Business and Science: Being Collected Papers Read 
to the Department of Industrial Co-operation at the Centenary Meeting of the British Association for the 




The Rise of the Rationalization Movement 
 
The Great Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression which followed meant that economic recession 
became an integral part of the years between the First World War and the Second World War. For the 
workers, it meant ‗misery‘ and ‗sufferings‘, while for the employers, it meant ‗over-production‘.181 
Both the employer and the employee were forced to re-examine the political, social and economic 
foundations upon which their institutions were built. Instead of the hitherto infallible automatic 
equilibration of the markets, it was suggested that ‗men should substitute a consciously and 
deliberately fashioned rational system‘ of corporate and economic regulation. Many began to 
advocate for an increase in the scale of amalgamations in the private sector of the economy and 
believed that centralized planning – either by the state or large corporations – was superior. To this 
end, they argued that resources should be allocated by the state and not left to the vagaries of the 
markets.
182
 This led to the ‗rationalization‘ era and acted as a precursor to the post-war Keynesian 
economic orthodoxy. 
The rationalization movement advocated for a more ‗rational‘ control of national economies, 
through the application of scientific methods. This could be done either by the state or where possible, 
the industries themselves. However, since it had already become clear that markets lacked the 
requisite capacity to regulate its own, an outside agency was advocated as the best planner, organiser 
and regulator of business activities. It was widely acknowledged that the state was the external agency 
needed to achieve this objective, in the knowledge that only its regulatory oversight could make 
industries compliant with the ideas and values of modern society.
183
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 Leslie Hannah (n 178) 
182 ibid 
183ibid, 32-33; It should be remembered that this was also happening at a time when socialism (or 
communism) was on the rise and in serious conflict with capitalism. The capitalist business class were not only 
aware but also weary of the threats socialism posed to capitalist accumulation. They were in agreement that if 
capitalism was to remain relevant as an economic ideology, it was necessary to find an alternative to state-
sponsored socialism. A system was needed which, while incorporating certain ideas that champion collectivism 
as opposed to outright individualism, will not embrace all the tenets of socialism. Capitalist actors knew that it 
was their class that was imperilled by the depression and it was their responsibility to revalidate capitalism by 
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The argument, in essence, was that there was the need for collective action by all actors 
involved in the economic sector. Both states and manufacturers came together to help each other and 
the economy at the same time, and apparently, competition became relegated to the background. 
According to Caillard, all tools used for competition, including ‗patents, secret processes, special 
methods, and goodwill‘, were all sacrificed for the common good.184  
 
 
Keynesianism and the Establishment of Neoliberalism 
 
Keynesianism is a form of economic orthodoxy largely attributed to the writings of the British 
economist, John Maynard Keynes. Keynes had argued that in order to encourage growth and 
development, there was the need for a compromise between capital and labour such that a balance will 
be created.
185
 Keynesianism as an economic theory believes that the level of economic activity is 
determined by the level of aggregate demand.
186
 As a result, periodically, capitalist economies 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
eliminating some the unwanted elements of the market system which were causing market failures. The state 
was needed to lead the way in this re-organisation, planning and co-ordination of national economies. 
Considering that advancements in science and technology had made it possible for humans to control the 
environment better, there was the need to utilise these developments for the development of human beings. 
In the thinking of the rationalists’ movement, competition was antithetical to progress. The solution to the 
over-productivity occasioned by cut-throat and wasteful competition was mergers and amalgamations. These 
ideas will be used to strengthen industries and provide more employment which will lead to the general 
progress of society 
184
 Vincent Caillard, ‘Industry and Production’ contained in A Wright (ed.) The New Phase in Industry (London: 
Financial Review of Reviews Vol. 22, 1929) 43 
185
 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) cited in Paddy 
Ireland, ‘Financialization of Corporate Governance’ (n 40) above, 14.  It was an arrangement which depicted 
the web that was created around market processes, entrepreneurial and corporate activities by the state. This 
form of ‘social re-ordering’ protected the environment through restraints on economic activities on one hand 
and the promotion of economic and industrial strategies on the other hand. States were therefore encouraged 
and did actually intervene in business and industrial policies, through the promulgation and establishment of 
bench marks for labour wages. They actively participated in the provision of social infrastructures by 
supporting and subsidizing education, engaging in social welfare and providing health care facilities. 
186
 Aggregate demand in this case is the total level of demand for goods and services in a particular economy. 
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undergo a limitation in the aggregate demand process which manifests in unemployment. This flaw 
can only be remedied by the state through the use of both fiscal and monetary policies.
187
 
The theory holds that the principal remedy for the failures of both capitalism and communism 
is to create a right balance between states, markets and democratic institutions. This will act as a 
catalyst in guaranteeing peace, inclusion, well-being and stability internationally.
188
 In order to 
achieve this balance, a ‗new world order‘ was needed to stabilize international relations. The fixed 
exchange rate, based on the US dollars was introduced to aid the convertibility of gold at a fixed 
price. This introduced Keynesianism or the era of the ‗New Deal‘, and was championed by President 
Roosevelt of the US and his victorious allied colleagues. This form of politico-economic organization 
also came to be known as embedded liberalism.
189
 
It is suggested that the alleged threat to the ‗free markets‘ by the introduction of 
Keynesianism, with its emphasis on central planning, led neoliberals to revise the idea of classical 
liberalism and eventually led to the establishment of neoliberalism. In this context, by the beginning 
of the 1970s, the ‗Keynesian impulse‘ had gone on the reverse. Many factors led to this reversal, one 
of which was the academic division that occurred in the intellectual arm of the movement. Again, in 
the US especially, there was a deep-rooted opposition to the policy by conservatives and industrialists. 
These capitalists, with the requisite financial power, had discovered that globalization was the most 
effective means through which their profit aggregation tendencies could be maintained. Keynesianism 
permitted a considerable amount of protectionism, which amounts to a constraint on capitalists‘ 
accumulation ambitions. They therefore expended so much energy and resources to reverse the 
application of the economic theory and replace it with one which champions free trade.
190
 
On the economic front, the financial prosperity recorded at the early stages of the Keynesian 
orthodoxy led to a significant increase in the number of economically opulent citizens. This ‗social 
contract between business and labour‘ created an engendered belief that the ‗core economic problems 
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of income distribution and mass unemployment‘ was finally over. So many things came to be taken 
for granted and, as Paley argues, this proved to be a costly assumption. The problem of 




In summation, the economic system which mandated governments to organize and regulate 
economic activities meant that a small number of people were disadvantaged. These few but 
influential investors and conglomerates – angered by the profit-neutralizing consequences of 
embedded liberalism – spent huge resources campaigning against its continued application. They set 
in motion, mechanisms to lobby and influence governments into separating economic activities from 
political decisions and allowing the market to run itself. With the division in the intellectual arm of 
Keynesianism having weakened the economic theory, capitalists with huge resources at their disposal 
funded and sponsored academics and intellectuals to proffer arguments discrediting the Keynesian 
regime. This led to the re-invigoration of economic liberalism and explains the expression ‗neo-
liberalism‘.192 
 The snag however, was that this latest variety was not only constrained to nations, but 
became rather relevant to global finances. It was equally not restricted to only economic activities but 





The Intellectual Foundations/Different Schools of Neoliberalism 
 
It has already been stated that the eventual acceptance of neoliberal policies by politicians and policy 
makers was made possible by a group of economists, intellectuals and philosophers. These academics 
were able to create, develop and argue the neoliberal ideals and why they are better than 
Keynesianism. Just as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, James Stuart Mill and other philosophers helped 
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in the formulation and consolidation of libertarian philosophies in the 1770s, later day thinkers 
equally acted as catalysts in the formulation and proliferation of neoliberal ideas in the contemporary 
world. 
Though it is generally accepted that Neoliberalism, as an economic movement, was created in 
reaction to the perceived unfavourable consequences of Keynesian policies, there are still different 
schools of neoliberalism with minor variations in their principles. Thus, it is possible to identify three 
dominant strands of the neoliberal movement; the Austrian school, the Chicago school and the 
German Ordo-Liberal school.  
Before looking at the various schools however, it is pertinent to first look at the formation of a 
network of organized neoliberal advocates, which came to be known as the Mont Pelerin Society. 
This is considered necessary because the network, which includes members from the different 
schools, constitutes the most pronounced
194attempt to promote ‗organized individualism‘ during the 





The Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) 
 
The MPS traces its roots to the meeting of a group of intellectuals under the aegis of the Walter 
Lippmann Colloquy in 1937. The group met at the instance of the French Philosopher, Louis Rougier 
to discuss Walter Lippmann‘s book, The Good Society.196 It is claimed that it was in this Colloquy 
that the name neoliberalism was coined.
197
 In all, 26 intellectuals participated in this inaugural 
meeting, with the responsibility of formulating a framework for the development and modernization 
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 It was formed in order to proclaim the emergence of a ‗new orientation towards the 
previous liberal tradition‘ and propose a different attitude to state power. It replaced the ‗naturalism‘ 
of classical liberal economists with a type of ‗constructivism‘. The classical liberalists believed that 
the market is an existing ‗quasi natural reality‘ situated in an economically reserved space. Members 
of the Colloquy disagreed and held that markets can only function under particular ‗legal, political 
and institutional‘ circumstances constructed by the state.199 
For this group of intellectuals, it was necessary to overcome the experiences of the old liberal 
traditions and dismantle the mixed ‗state/economy‘ viewpoint which had overshadowed the classical 
liberalists‘ thinking before the Second World War. These men, who formed the nucleus of the 
resurgent neoliberal movement, included Raymond Aaron, Wilhelm Ropke, Louis Baudin, Michael 




On 10 April 1947, an Austrian Professor, Fredrich August Von Hayek invited a group of 
scholars, made up of intellectuals from the three strands or schools of neoliberalism, to a meeting at 
Mont Pelerin, in Switzerland to discuss the state of the world economy.  
 
After World War II, in 1947, when many of the values of Western 
civilization were imperilled, 36 scholars, mostly economists, with some 
historians and philosophers, were invited by Professor Friedrich von Hayek 
to meet at Mont Pelerin, near Montreux, Switzerland, to discuss the state and 






The organization was initially named the Acton-Tocqueville Society but was later renamed Mont 
Pelerin Society (MPS). It grew and expanded its base and began to influence other fully funded 
organizations like the Institute of Economic Affairs in London, and the Heritage Foundation in 
Washington. The movement, with the help of people like Hayek and Friedman, spilled into 
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Universities – most especially the University of Chicago – from where a group known as the ‗Chicago 
Boys‘ perfected the art of neoliberal theory. From some of these Universities, neoliberalism was sold 
to politicians and it began to wield considerable influence over government policies and 
pronouncements. It was from the University of Chicago, for instance, that the ideology was exported 
to Chile, where it was first put into practise, as a fully fledged governmental policy by Pinochet, after 





The Austrian School of Neoliberalism 
 
This is the neoliberal school attributed to Von Hayek. However, it is necessary to point out that Hayek 
equally had a hand in the formation of the Chicago School and at a time, was a lecturer in the 
University of Freiburg where the German Ordo-Liberalism was formed. The Austrian school‘s liberal 
philosophy sprang up primarily from the theoretical exposés of Carl Menger, Leon Walras, Eugen 
Boehm-Bawerk and Ludvig Von Mises, in the first decade of the early twentieth century. The 
Austrian school differed from the classical economists in that they believed in the subjective theory of 
value as opposed to the classical liberal‘s belief in the objective theory of value. Leon Walras, for 
instance, saw economics as ‗the calculus of pleasure and pain of the rational individual‘ while Carl 
Menger queried the idea of ‗perfect information that was taken to underlie homo-economicus by both 
classical and neo-classical economists‘.203 Menger insisted that there was no perfect information as 
postulated by the old liberals. Von Mises agreed in principle with the imperfect information theory of 
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Ordo-Liberalism originates from Germany. It is also known as the Freiburg School and was founded 
in the 1930s at the University of Freiburg in Germany by an economist, Walter Eucken and two 
lawyers, Franz Bohm and Hans Grobmann-Doerth. These fathers of Ordo-liberalism were in 
agreement that ‗the question of the constitutional foundations of a free economy and society‘ was one 
that needed investigating. In a joint publication by the three in 1937 (Ordnung der Wirtschaft), they 
insisted that they were in ‗opposition to the, then still influential, heritage of Gustav Von Schmoller‘s 
Historical School‘ and the corrupt relativism, which this historical school had foisted upon German 
Jurisprudence and Political Economy. They declared that the ‗treatment of all practical politico-legal 
and politico-economic questions must be keyed to the idea of the economic constitution‘.205 
 For the Ordo-liberals, the market order, which does not discriminate in matters of 
competition, should be united with a ‗system of minimal income guarantees for those people who 
provisionally or for the long run, are not able to make a living by selling or dealing in services‘ 
through the free markets.  Such a ‗social insurance‘ must not discriminate, must be endowed with a 
‗privilege-free nature‘ and must be distributed in ways that do not damage the underlying moral 
assumption of the market order, i.e. its ‗privilege free nature.‘206 
The Ordo-liberals begin from the very premise that the market order is a constitutional order. 
It is characterized by an institutional framework which is subject to constitutional choice. ‗It assumes 
that the working properties of the market processes depend on the nature of the legal-institutional 
frameworks within which they take place, and that the issue of which rules are and which are not 
desirable elements of such frameworks ought to be judged as a constitutional issue, i.e. in terms of the 
relative desirability of relevant constitutional alternatives‘.207  
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The Chicago School 
 
The Chicago school of neoliberalism was founded at the University of Chicago around 1946.
208
 This 
was in consequence of a lecture delivered by Hayek at the Economic Club in Detroit Michigan on 23 
April, 1945. In the lecture, Hayek proclaimed that Keynesianism consists of ‗inflationary measures 
which in the short run may keep employment high but in the long run make the situation much more 
difficult than it was before‘.209 Such a theory, according to him, was to be avoided. 
After the lecture, Hayek was commissioned by an industrialist, Harold Luhnow
210
  to conduct 
a neoliberal project and mandated to provide a befitting work on the dangers of government 
interference in business. Hayek co-opted his ‗great friend‘, Henry Simons to help in actualising this 
project. Simons, on his own, was able to draft-in both his former and current colleagues at the 
Economics and Law Faculties respectively, to work together in the execution of the project, with the 
backing of the Faculties‘ boards. The work was entitled; The American Road to Serfdom. 211 
The Chicago school believed that the free market is the most systemic, rational and efficient 
organizer of economic activity. They were the innovators of the idea that ‗much of politics could be 
understood as if it were a market process and therefore amenable to be formalized through 
neoclassical theory‘.212 Politicians were only trying to ‗maximise their own utility‘, in the same way 
as the electorate. Since this is so, the state is only one sub-standard medium through which outcomes, 
more efficiently accomplished by the markets, could be realized. This leads to a cynical evaluation of 
the ‗virtues and benefits‘ of democracy. They used the doctrine to make unappealing evaluations of 
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the intellectual abilities of people and argued that social amenities such as education are not ‗the price 
to be paid in order to build a competent democratic citizenry‘, but are plain commodities which ought 
to go to the highest bidder.
213
 
One of the greatest exponents of the school was Milton Friedman. He was an American 
Economist, Statistician and a Professor at the University. A recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Sciences in 1976, Milton Friedman wrote on such issues as consumption analysis, 
monetary history and theory. He is equally credited with having demonstrated the complexity of 
stabilization policy. Friedman was an Economic Advisor to Ronald Reagan and was instrumental in 
creating most of the neoliberal policies undertaken by the Reagan administration in the US.
214
 
He was originally a supporter of Keynesianism but later recanted his position. In 1953, his 
interpretation of the Keynesian consumption function was a challenge to the existing Keynesian 
Model. In 1960, he wrote a book which promoted monetarism and in this way, put him in staunch 
opposition to the Keynesian model. He consistently argued that the only way the US could end 
stagflation was through the introduction of neoliberal fiscal policies and the promotion of monetarism. 





The ‘Rationalist Assumptions’ that ‘Normalized’ Neoliberalism as an Economic 
Paradigm 
 
In looking at the triumph of neoliberalism over Keynesianism, Hay presents a set of ‗rationalist 
assumptions‘ which contributed in embedding and normalizing the neoliberal ideology 
                                                             
213
 ibid, 39-40; For the Chicago School, corporations are simply inactive reactors to external forces. They wield 
no power on their own. The only actor which constantly misuses its power, as far as the market process is 
concerned, is the trade union. They are, as a consequence, illegitimate interest holders that must not be 
permitted to operate. However, other market powers such as monopoly and oligopoly are both harmless and 
temporary. Even when or where they are harmful, they must be the creation of the state. 
214
 See  Special Report, ‘Milton Friedman; a Heavy Weight Champ at Five Foot Two: The Legacy of Milton 
Freedman, a Giant Among Economists’ (November 23, 2006) The Economist, 





internationally. According to him, relying on the work of Thomas Kuhn,
216
 systematic succession can 
be understood in terms of the appearance and institutionalization of a sequence of ‗more or less 
enduring paradigms‘.217 The progressions of these paradigms are interspersed by episodic 
‗revolutions‘, through which the existing postulation is challenged and over-thrown. There is a period 
of ‗normal science‘ and a period of ‗exceptional science‘. During the period of ‗normal science‘, a 
particular paradigm dominates and is not challenged by any other paradigm. This dominating 
paradigm supplies the basic structure which defines and delimits a range of issues. Gradually and over 
time, however, the generally accepted ‗dominant norm‘ is challenged as a result of an accumulation of 
anomalies within this presently dominating norm. This is the period of ‗exceptional science‘, when a 
group of practitioners break away from the old paradigm (norm) to find an alternative. This emerging 
paradigm (norm) implicates the old one as the cause of existing problems and attempts to postulate 
solutions to the problems. When this happens, the ‗exceptional science‘ eventually becomes 
acceptable as the norm, ‗thereby opening a renewed phase of normal science under the dominance of 
the new paradigm‘.218 
At the time the ‗exceptional science‘ becomes the ‗normal science‘, dominant rationalizations 
are used to show its ‗normative‘ character. The normative character of the ‗normal science‘ is used to 
justify its overthrow of the hitherto existing ‗normal science‘ and the ascendancy of the ‗exceptional 
science‘ to the status of the dominant paradigm. The new paradigm is used to explain the problems of 
the old paradigm and becomes a solution to the problems created by the old paradigm. In the case of 
neoliberalism, the paradigm is rationalized as the answer to the stagflation of the 1970s, occasioned 
by the failures of Keynesianism. At that level, it has a normative character which acts as a better 
option, compared to that which it overthrew.
219
 
From the rationalist‘s assumption of neoliberalism as a ‗normative phenomenon‘, there is a 
progression to the level of neoliberalism as a ‗normalizing phenomenon‘. Here, the ‗normal science‘ 
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is now advocated as the only option to which no alternative exists. At this stage, the paradigm is 
cloaked with a ‗normative‘, as well as a ‗normalizing‘ character. This is the stage of the ‗normal 
science‘ where the paradigm is justified, not necessarily on its own terms, but ‗as the only possible 
solution to the problem in a world of rational expectations‘ and ‗in this way, rationalist assumptions 
normalize and institutionalize neoliberal policy such that no alternative is conceivable‘.220 
The application of the rationalist assumptions explain how a group of intellectuals, funded 
‗prodigiously‘ by capitalist and rentier investors, broke away from the then ‗normal science‘ of 
Keynesianism and established their own ‗exceptional science‘ of neoliberalism, as an answer to the 
problems encountered by Keynesianism. Over time, these groups of intellectuals and business men,
221
 
through organized but sometimes very expensive lobbying, got political support from state and 
government officials. They successfully attacked and overthrew the Keynesian hegemony, thus, 
enthroning the ‗normative science‘ of neoliberalism. Presently, for the neoliberal advocates, there is 
no other alternative to neoliberalism, thereby transforming and cloaking it with a ‗normative‘ as well 
as a ‗normalizing‘ character. 
According to Harvey; 
 
In the US in particular, a powerful group of wealthy individuals and 
corporate leaders who were viscerally opposed to all forms of state 
intervention and regulation ... sought to organise opposition to what they saw 
as an emerging consensus for pursuing a mixed economy. Fearful of how the 
alliance with the Soviet Union and the command economy constructed 
within the US during the Second World War might play out politically in a 
post war setting, they were ready to embrace anything from McCarthyism to 





In October 1979, Paul Volcker, the then Chairman of the Federal Reserve constructed a 
draconian shift in US monetary policy which was instrumental to the final demise of Keynesianism 
and eventual ‗death‘ of the welfare state.223  
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In the UK, from 1979 when Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister, the ascendancy of 
‗neoliberalism as a new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy at the state level‘, was 
realized.
224
 Her government abhorred the meddlesomeness of governments in the functions of 
‗instinctively produced market stability‘ – for the purposes of re-distribution – and strongly argued 
that this leads to disorder, volatility and repression. When politicians and public officials are granted 
the ‗power to manage and re-direct public resources‘, they end up endorsing and elevating ‗the rent-
seeking activities‘ of special interests, instead of the ‗entrepreneurial spirit‘ of society.225 In order to 
prevent this from happening, Thatcher‘s government embarked on a governmental reform, aimed at 
diminishing the state and freeing society from its grip. It had to replace the ‗welfare culture‘ linked 
with ‗democratic socialism‘ with a novel ‗enterprise culture‘ established on neoliberal values of the 
‗free market and individual choice‘.226 
This policy choice led, in essence, to a consistent attack on trade unions and the dismantling 
of most welfare packages associated with the state. It adopted liberal policies which emphasised the 
encouragement of competition, lowering of taxes and the support of entrepreneurial development. For 
Thatcher, ‗there was no such thing as society, only individuals, men and women‘.227 All aspects of 
social solidarity were dismantled while individualism and private property was given prominence. As 
Yergin submits, the conceptual onslaught of the welfare state that emanated from Thatcher‘s oratory 
was ‗uncompromising‘.228 
It was from the two cities of Washington and London that neoliberal economic practices were 
marketed internationally and imposed on weaker nations. These two governments co-opted the help of 
the Bretton Woods institutions created after the 2
nd
 World War – the IMF and the World Bank – to 
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disseminate the doctrine to all countries of the world. In this way, the neoliberal ideology took on a 
normative, as well as a normalizing role. 
Susan George captures the reason behind the success of the neoliberal movement in these 
words;  
 
They have built this highly efficient ideological cadre because they understand 
what the Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci was talking about when he 
developed the concept of cultural hegemony. If you can occupy peoples‘ heads, 
their hearts and their hands, will follow. I do not have time to give you details 
here, but believe me; the ideological and promotional work of the right has been 
absolutely brilliant... So, from a small, unpopular sect with virtually no 
influence, neo-liberalism has become the major world religion with its dogmatic 
doctrine, its priesthood, its law-giving institutions and perhaps most important 







NEOLIBERAL SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND CONTEMPORARY CSR 
 
This third and final part of section one attempts to locate contemporary CSR in the neoliberal 
ideology (and by implication that of shareholder value), identify the tensions that exist between the 
two ideas and how the ideologies of neoliberalism and shareholder value, seemingly act as barriers to 
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Locating CSR in the Neoliberal/ Shareholder Value Ideologies 
 
It has already been suggested that shareholder value is part and parcel of the wider neoliberal 
economic theory of development.
230
 Neoliberalism, in itself, is the 21
st
 century form of capitalism. 
The culture of profit maximization and the tension that exists between shareholder value and 
transformative CSR become clearer when the nature of the capitalist system is rationally de-
constructed. One essential characteristic of capitalism is competition and this concept is so 
fundamental to a capitalist system that it operates without recourse to the individual position of 
capitalist actors.
231
 This is because the ‗social conditions‘ in every capitalist market decide how price 
competition operates and this is outside the command of any particular actor.
232
 
The suggestion that capitalist
233
 profits rely on a complimentary ‗cost/price‘ relationship, 
means that the best approach to accumulate more profit is to reduce personal costs. This leads to the 
persistent compulsion to cut labour costs and to continually develop labour efficiency. The imperative 
to cut costs, in turn, necessitates the need to discover ‗the organizational and technical means‘ of 
obtaining a great deal of excess from both labour and the environment in a given time frame, ‗at the 
lowest possible cost‘.234 
Again, in order to continuously accumulate profits, it is necessary for the capitalist to re-
invest the excess profits already realized. Put in another way, investment demands steady and 
relentless wealth aggregation, thereby making it essential for profit to be exploited. According to 
Woods, exploitation of profit is best achieved through the process known as ‗the re-investment of 
surpluses‘.235 This obligation is forced on entrepreneurs, not withstanding their personal desires or 
wishes. Even the most self-effacing, unassuming and ‗socially responsible capitalist‘ has to bow to 
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Continuous flow in the distribution and movement of capital is very essential and cannot be 
broken-up without sustaining losses. Any pause in the process imminently leads to the ‗loss or 
devaluation‘ of the capital invested. In a situation where an investor fails to expand and a competitor 
does, it is almost a given that the former will likely be driven out of business. He has to defend and 
increase his market share in order to forestall this from happening. Thus, the effects of ‗the coercive 
laws of competition‘ are seen in action.237  
The necessity to re-invest, in order to remain in business, drives the investor to expand and, in 
turn, creates a perpetual need to explore new areas where ‗surplus capital‘ can be re-invested. This 
leads to the ‗capital surplus absorption‘ question – what new areas can we invest in, so as to continue 
with the process of profit accumulation? Those factors that inhibit the re-investment of capital amount 
to obstacles that must be destroyed or circumvented, in order to prevent the crisis of over-
accumulation. Otherwise, the crisis will result in the devaluation or destruction of capital. Since this is 




As Ellen Woods argue, the requirement to embrace exploitative tactics is a fundamental and 
indispensable characteristic of the logic of capitalism. It is not merely the outcome of recklessness or 
gluttony or materialism. It appears logical to suppose that ‗a system based on market principles will 
inevitably place a premium on wealth and encourage a culture of greed‘.239  
With this underlying philosophy, acts which ordinarily are supposed to be moral obligations – 
like CSR – are viewed as immoral acts. As Friedman boldly asserted, ‗a corporation is the property of 
the stockholders. Its interests are the interests of its stock holders. Now, beyond that, should it spend 
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the stockholders‘ money for purposes which it regards as socially responsible but which it cannot 
connect to the bottom line? The answer I would say is no‘.240 
Friedman insists that though circumstances may exist where corporations are allowed to 
consider other interests, this is only permissible when such circumstances contribute to the 
accumulation of more profits. Thus, corporations may be permitted to engage in moral activities when 
the activity is ‗insincere‘. The executive who treats social and environmental issues as a means of 
maximizing shareholder wealth (and not as an end on its own) commits no wrong.
241
 He likens such 
‗deception‘ to a seller of automobile, putting ‗a good-looking girl‘ before an automobile he wants to 
sell, so as to attract customers. To him, ‗that is not to promote pulchritude. That is in order to sale 
cars‘.242 
This is a strategic view of CSR which ‗reduces lofty ideals to hypocritical window dressing‘. 
This hypocrisy is, however, acceptable or in Friedman‘s words ‗virtuous‘, since it serves the bottom 
line. Moral virtue is not acceptable and becomes immoral, if it adds not to the bottom line.
243
  
Looking at the culture of contemporary corporations, it appears reasonable to think that the 
notion of CSR is not taken too seriously, except when it enhances shareholder value. This is because 
shareholder primacy advocates that CSR is best applied as a public relations apparatus or marketing 
tool to enhance business profits. Corporate managers should not be motivated by social responsibility 
practices, except they are exploited as a ‗cloak‘ for legitimate business resolutions.244 
Bakan suggests that this is why BP drills ‗on the coastal plain if that is the most beneficial 
(i.e., profitable) long term course for the company, when all factors are considered‘.245 As he further 
explains, ‗concerns about destroying a Caribou Herd, the Arctic environment, or an entire aboriginal 
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people have no place – at least not as ends in themselves – in the corporation‘s decision making 
lexicon. The cost to the company not drilling could be huge‘.246  
 It is also argued that this underlying philosophy is what motivates a corporation like Pfizer to 
open a company-sponsored school in a host-community. It is not because it cares for the well- being 
of the community, but because building the school is connected to the success of the corporation. As 
their CEO, Hank McKinnell stated in 2002, ‗...unless we have a large pool of candidates who are 
trained in our business and the sciences and mathematics, we won‘t succeed in our business‘.247 This 
culture, it is argued, explains why Shell and ExxonMobil will build roads in the Niger Delta of 
Nigeria. It is not because they care for the host communities‘, but because the roads will make 
employee transportation to and from work sites easier. The motives for socially responsible conducts 
thus viewed, are insincere and hypocritical.
248
 
This culture equally explains the continued spilling of oil in the Niger Delta by oil 
corporations in the area. For these corporations, social and environmental goals, when and if they 
engage in them, must be to promote the interest of their share-owners and not as ends on their own. 
As Danny Schechter points out, there is logic to business which influences corporations. 
Implementing this logic means that some values will be given more emphasis over and above others 




Anita Roddick, a onetime CEO of the Body Shop UK, reflecting on the culture of 
contemporary corporations, opines that it prevents people (the managers and their employers) from 
‗having a sense of empathy with the human‘ situation. For her, ‗the language of business is not the 
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language of humanity. It is a language of indifference; it is a language of separation, of secrecy, of 
hierarchy‘.250 
For Cour and Kromann, in the world and culture of contemporary corporations, being socially 
responsible ‗holds out promises of help, reassures people‘ but disappoints them in its effectiveness. 
Greed and moral indifference have become the ‗moral code‘ and a corporation can do good only to 
help itself do well. As pressures mount on corporate managers to maximize profits, corporations 
become desperate and are willing to engage in all sorts of activities to achieve their goals.
251
  
While engaging in reckless and fraudulent acts capable of destroying generations, they 
simultaneously adopt social responsibility codes and proclaim their beliefs in the principles of good 
governance. Corporate, moral or organizational hypocrisy becomes a common occurrence.
252
 
According to Wagner and others, corporate hypocrisy occurs when a corporation claims to be what it 
knows it is not, and attempts to make people believe this fake version.
253
 It is suggested that corporate 





 Voluntary and Ameliorative CSR: The De-Radicalisation of Contemporary 
CSR? 
 
The fundamental nature of neoliberalism and shareholder value – freedom from regulation – means 
that the regulation of contemporary CSR and respect for the rights of stakeholders are internal to the 
corporation and not external to it. Except where such rights and social obligations are specifically 
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protected by state legislation or by mutual agreements in the form of contracts, the corporation is not 
under obligation to respect them.
255
  
Contemporary CSR, therefore, is anti-state and focuses on the voluntary action of 
corporations. In this way, the notion of contemporary CSR becomes aligned with Friedman‘s view 
that there is nothing like CSR, outside that of making profits for shareholders. To him;  
  
The doctrine of "social responsibility" taken seriously would extend the 
scope of the political mechanism to every human activity. It does not differ 
in philosophy from the most explicitly collectivist doctrine. It differs only by 
professing to believe that collectivist ends can be attained without 
collectivist means. That is why, in my book Capitalism and Freedom, I have 
called it a "fundamentally subversive doctrine" in a free society, and have 
said that in such a society, there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business–to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 





Friedman‘s contestation, which is at the root of shareholder value, is influenced by the dictates of 
neoliberalism. As was suggested above, neoliberalism insists that there should be no limits to the 
functioning of the market process because, ‗if the natural and beneficent rationality of the market is to 
function without distortion, market actors (such as corporations) need as far as possible to operate 
(contract) without constraint‘.257 External imposition of CSR is a constraint on the freedom of actors 




In keeping with the neoliberal market-based model of economic and social 
development, with its emphasis on free trade, freedom of movement for capital 
and limited state intervention in and regulation of economic affairs, 
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contemporary CSR promotes not the legal regulation of corporations by the 
state but self-regulation by corporations themselves. Indeed, its emphasis on 





As a result, any intervention by the state (whether legal or political) is outside its scope, because 
contemporary CSR is only concerned with the activities of corporations.
260
 The definite and most 
distinguishing ‗denominator‘ of all ‗corporate-oriented, corporate-inspired‘ ideas of the responsible 
corporation is ‗the voluntary, non-enforceability and self-regulatory‘ connotation of the expression.261 
By advocating support for ‗voluntary self regulation‘, the proponents of contemporary CSR 
base their assertion on ‗soft law or quasi or non-legal instruments‘ which do not have the force of law 
at all or whose binding nature is weaker than that usually ascribed to ‗hard law‘. This is acceptable to 
corporations, who in ‗prioritizing shareholder interest above and beyond every other interest, see CSR 
only as a source of legitimacy to their actions.
262
 
As Ireland and Pillay suggest; 
 
Contemporary CSR operates very much within the prevailing neoliberal 
consensus, leaving unchallenged the shareholder-oriented model of the 
corporation. As such, it is in many ways most accurately regarded as a mere 
adjunct to the emergence of the shareholder value model of the corporation. 
Contemporary CSR is not, and does not purport to be transformative in nature. 
It is, and purports to be only ameliorative. It makes little effort to displace the 
view that the goal of business is the pursuit of shareholder interest and 





This has led many critics to assume that contemporary CSR is a mere appendage to essentially 
neoliberal ideas about corporations, the state and development. Indeed, this assumption has led many 
to argue that there is a fundamental tension between neoliberal ideas on enhancing shareholder value, 
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and the idea that CSR codes, voluntarily applied, are effective in achieving efficiency and welfare for 
society. According to them, it is simply a smoke screen for PR purposes.
264
  
This view is further strengthened by the suggestion that contemporary CSR, instead of 
curbing corporate excesses, has been ‗colonised‘ and ‗converted‘ to a secondary use by corporations, 
as an ‗efficiency enhancing devise‘ for the accumulation of more profits.265 From this point of view, 
contemporary CSR embodies what Boltansk and Chiapello labelled the ‗new spirit of 
capitalism‘.266According to them, capitalism has developed within the last 100 years, not necessarily 
because of reactions to forces from within it – like efficiency, competition and industrial 
improvements – but rather, by assimilating significant aspects of the criticisms it has been subjected 
to, and transforming them into a ‗motivating spirit.‘267  
Over time, the argument continues, criticisms of the capitalist hegemony, intended to depose 
‗the capitalist economic system‘ is reconstructed as the rationalization for a ‗new form of 
capitalism‘.268  
 
Capitalism has always relied on critiques of the status quo to alert it to any 
untrammelled development of its current forms and to discover the antidotes 






Faced with a legitimacy crisis,
270
 modern corporations have devised ways of responding to societal 
pressures and neutralizing such pressures. Fundamentally, it is argued that effective CSR is a notion 
which apparently encourages the performance of acts for the ‗greater good‘ of society, as opposed to 
that of ‗the individual‘, thus making it antithetical to the idea of maximizing share profits. Since it 
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 Arising from mounting pressures and attacks from communities and civil societies 
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potentially reduces dividends in its true form, effective CSR, it is suggested, is incompatible with the 
shareholder value ideology – in the short term at least.271 
Yet, modern corporations claim to engage in CSR. The argument is that they do this because 
the concept is based on voluntary codes, as against hard laws. Neoliberalism (as was argued above) 
abhors any form of social regulation of activities of the free market, including the activities of MNCs. 
In line with belligerent corporate efforts towards preventing any form of legal control, corporations 
transformed themselves into ‗active players‘ in the CSR field. This process of corporate 
transformation or infiltration is what Shamir labels the ‗de-radicalization‘ of CSR.272 According to 
him, corporations have aggressively joined the ‗social responsibility bandwagon,‘ slowly but surely 
influencing the very concept of social responsibility in ways agreeable to corporate interests.
273
 
While agreeing with this school of thought, Bollier submits that the primary business policy 
of modern corporations is not to evade accountability or to refute the social commitments of 
corporations.
274
 For him, in contrast to ‗traditional bourgeois philanthropy‘ which was firmly divorced 
from the conglomerate, contemporary CSR converses in ‗the language of instrumental-rationality‘ 
which connects doing ‗good‘ to profits.275 As a result of neoliberal imperatives, corporations engage 
in CSR practices as part of an ‗impact management scheme‘ calculated to upgrade ‗their image and 
enhance their market competitiveness‘.276 
In this context, therefore, the significance of contemporary CSR – including that practiced in 
the Niger Delta – is to make sure that the maximization of shareholder value is not pursued to such an 
extent that it will disregard totally, the impact of a corporation‘s operation on the larger society. 
Viewed from this perspective, contemporary CSR sees no irreconcilable difference between the 
interest of the shareholders and that of the stakeholders. Corporate responsibility should be practiced 
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by corporations as this will aid in actualizing the ‗bottom line‘ principle of maximizing shareholder 
profits. In line with this notion, there is a scope for partnership between corporate shareholders and 
stakeholders.
277
 This partnership, however, is only directed towards the maximization of the 
shareholders‘ profits. When this is done, society in general benefits as well.  
Unfortunately, experiences of people in the Niger Delta specifically and, perhaps generally at 
the international level, show a different outcome from that ascribed to contemporary CSR. This is 
because, as was analysed above, the fundamental nature of neoliberalism and shareholder value places 
strict restrictions on the effectiveness of contemporary CSR. This has led to the suggestion that 
contemporary CSR lacks the ‗radical and transformative spirit‘ with which CSR was identified in the 





Neoliberalism and Shareholder Value as Ideological Barriers to Effective 




In section one, the paradigm shift which began in the late 1970s, from Keynesianism to neoliberalism 
and which led to the eventual domination of shareholder value primacy in corporate governance was 
explored. This section will examine the impact of this major shift in economic thinking on the policies 
pursued by the Nigerian state, and in relation to the activities of multi-national oil corporations 
operating in the Niger Delta region.  
As was discussed in section one above, as a result of the Great Depression witnessed in the 
post-First World War period, Keynesian economics came to occupy an elevated position, not only in 
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academic thinking, but also in the policy making circles of most countries. This tendency predisposed 
third-world academics, policy-makers and advisers in these (often newly independent) countries, to 
the adoption and implementation of Keynesian, ―welfarist‖ policies in their respective states. These 
academics and advisors were encouraged by the introduction of ―structuralist economics‖ as 
contained in the New Deal and by the emergence of activist, welfare states in many parts of Europe.
278
 
Keynesian ideas were reflected in the work of development theorists, most of who came to 
believe that markets and indeed the world economy were imperfect, but that with state intervention in 
appropriate circumstances, these imperfections could be overcome. They, therefore, proposed and 
sought to implement models of development in which the state was assigned a prominent role in 
economic processes. Many third world countries, including Nigeria, adopted these developmental 
models which they believed will lead them quickly to the industrial age. 
 Before independence was granted to Nigeria in 1960, the colonial administration broadly 
speaking, embraced this developmental theory and the idea that it was not only within the authority of 
the state to provide for its citizens, but that it was its duty to try to do so. Such infrastructures as 
hospitals, roads, shelter, and electricity were all provided for by the state, and the provision of 
employment was seen as one of the major priorities of government. When the country became 
independent in 1960, the indigenous government continued with the developmental state model and 
the implementation of ―welfarist‖ policies. This, according to Amuwo, was the ‗golden era‘ in the 
country‘s history of development. He holds this belief because the country met the conditions which 
qualifies a developmental state, including; an investment environment fairly complimentary for 
prolonged development; the measured ‗empowerment‘ of the population to enable them contribute in 
the developmental process; a sustained agreement between ‗the government, emerging private sector, 
and labour‘ that development was a condition sine qua non; the existence of mutual ‗trust between the 
                                                             
278
 J Rapley, Understanding Development and Practice in the Developing World, (3
rd
 Ed. New York: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers 2007)  3 
188 
 
state and non-state actors‘ and organizations; a considerable degree of ‗political stability‘ and a 
consistent investment in human development.
279
 
During this period, the model of the developmental state seemed to deliver important benefits. 
With the post-war world economy booming, demand for third-world products rose. This provided 
third-world governments with the capital they needed for industrial and infrastructural development. 
As Chang writes;  
 
The truth is that developing countries did not do badly at all during the ‗bad 
old days‘ of protectionism and state intervention in the 1960s...  In fact, their 
economic growth performance during the period was far superior to that 





This was certainly true of Nigeria. 
By the late 1970s however, Keynesian economic ideas and the idea of the developmental state 
both began to fall out of favour. There were intellectual squabbles and disagreements‘ amongst the 
exponents of the economic orthodoxy. In the late 1970s, the neoliberal revolution began. The origins 
of this revolution are controversial. As will be suggested in chapter Five, some argue that it was a 
class project
281
 while as was discussed in section one above, others said that it was a revolution in 
ideas. Its impact, however, is undeniable.  In this sense, neoliberal theorists, whose ideas had only a 
few years earlier struggled for serious attention, suddenly emerged as purveyors of a new economic 
orthodoxy. With the cracks in the intellectual walls of Keynesianism and the cultural and economic 
forces militating against its continued existence,
282
 the Keynesian economic paradigm collapsed. It 
was rapidly replaced by the hitherto ―extreme views‖ of the neoliberal theorist.283 
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The ascendancy of neoliberal theories affected the economic policies of developing 
economies, not least because they were embraced by key international agencies such as the IMF, the 
World Bank and the OECD. The worsening economic conditions during the late stages of 
Keynesianism in the late 1960s meant that governments of developing economies, anxious for 
solutions to the worsening economic situation in their countries, were compelled to look not only for 
new ideas but for help and assistance from these agencies. The result was a sustained attack on the 
state and other institutions, such as unions, that were thought to be hindering the operation of the ‗free 
market‘. Donor agencies, including the IMF and the World Bank began pressuring third-world 
governments to make changes in their policies. A large number of these third-world governments 
accepted reluctantly, but the debt crisis had weakened their bargaining power with their creditors and 
their choices were limited. Others rolled back the state more eagerly because local constituencies had 
already started pushing for reform. Less state, more market: this was the essential thrust of the 
strategy known as structural adjustment.
284
  




History of Neoliberalism in Nigeria 
 
According to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NNBS) – based on projections from the 2006 
census that put the nation‘s population at 140 million – Nigeria‘s population in 2013 is estimated at 
166.2 million.
285
 Having been a colony of the old British Empire, Nigeria finally gained its 
independence from the British Government on October 1 1960. The post-independence Nigerian 
economy is usually described as a disarticulated export-enclave economy. This means that the modern 
and traditional sectors of the economy were separate from each other. In disarticulated export-enclave 
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economies, national economic attention is concentrated solely on making money through the export of 
goods. These goods are usually in the form of raw materials.
286
   
Thus, Kalu writes that at this time ‗existing strategies of economic development reflect[ed] 
the colonial model of central planning and emphasis on export over consumption products‘.287 In a 
disarticulated economy, the traditional sector of the economy is made up of the peasants, identified as 
semi-proletariats, who make their living either through ‗subsistence living‘ or by earning wages. In 
Nigeria, at the time of independence, quite a large number of the indigenous population existed 
outside the modern formal sector of the economy. This was because subsistence agriculture was 
practised in many parts of the country. In the Niger Delta area, where there are creeks and rivers, the 
people earned their livelihood mainly through fishing.
288
 
In effect, Nigeria relied a lot on the export of goods for its revenue. Before the late 1960s, the 
country traded mainly agricultural products as its export commodity. During this time, crops such as 
cotton, cocoa, groundnuts and palm oil were the main export commodities. Kalu states that the 
country‘s emphasis on cash crops – which can be traced to the pre-independence colonial government 
– was so widespread and common that it cannot be over-emphasised.289 This however changed with 
the location of oil in Oloibiri in 1956.
290
 
The years after 1960, particularly beginning with the 1970s, became known in Nigeria as the 
years of the oil boom. By this time, the country had become a major exporter of oil globally and oil 
began to dominate its export trade. This domination was largely responsible for the drastic decline 
recorded in the agricultural sector of the economy. Subsistence farming by the former semi-
proletariats was subsequently destroyed as a result of over-reliance on oil. This accounts for the very 
high levels of migration from rural to urban areas. The population of Lagos State – the former capital 
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of the country – for  example, sky-rocketed from 300,000 in 1950 to over 14 million in 2006.291 Many 
other cities in the country – including Port Harcourt, Ibadan, Kano and Enugu – all witnessed 
population explosions similar to that of Lagos. 
In broad terms, this was the state of the Nigerian economy when it began to embrace 
neoliberalism and neoliberal policies in the 1980s. 
By the 1980s, oil accounted for over 80 per cent of the total export earnings of the country.
292
 
According to Salami and Ayoola, ‗since the production of oil in 1958, when it accounted for only one 
percent of national revenue, until the present, oil has contributed several billions of dollars to 
Nigeria‘s foreign exchange earnings‘.293 Mukwaya, while agreeing with this statement, posits that the 
US Time Magazine estimates the amount the country earned between 1974 and 1999 to about $300 
billion. Accordingly, ‗...today, oil and gas resources from the Niger Delta account for over 85 per cent 
of the nations GDP, over 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, over 90 percent of national budget 
and 80 per cent of the nation‘s wealth‘.294 Generally, Nigeria produces about 25 per cent of all African 
crude oil and three per cent of the world total. In 2006, Nigeria‘s crude oil production was averaging 
2.45 million barrels per day and in January, 2007; Revenue Watch Institute 2010 estimated that 
Nigeria‘s oil reserve was 36.2 million barrels.295 Nigeria is ranked as the sixth biggest crude oil 
producer in the world.
296
 
Although the oil boom witnessed between 1958 and 1978 brought benefits to the country, it 
also brought problems, not least as Kass points out, during the 1970s when the boom gave Nigeria a 
false sense of achievement. During this period, the revenue earned from oil came to be seen as the 
                                                             
291Amanda Kass, Neoliberal Nigeria, The United States, and Oil: Linking Production and Consumption (A Senior 
Honours Thesis, The Ohio State University 2008) 12 
292
 Michael Watts, ‘Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta’ (2004) Geopolitics, vol. 
9 (1) 50-80 at 51 
293
 O Salami and A Ayoola, ‘The “War” of Appropriate Pricing of Petroleum Products: The Discourse of Nigeria’s 
Reform Agenda’ (2010) Linguistic On Line  42 <www.linguistik-online.de/42_10/salamiAyoola.html> accessed 
19 May 2011 
294 A Mukwaya, ‘Truth without Reconciliation: The Niger Delta and the Continuing Challenge of National 
Reconciliation’ in Fawole, Alade and Ukeje (eds.) The Crisis of the State and Regionalism in West Africa. 
Identity, Citizenship and Conflict (Butherworths: Dakar 2005)  112-135 
295 O Salami and A Ayoola (n 293)  
296




indicator of Nigeria‘s development, both nationally and internationally.297 Unfortunately, this 
situation did not last for long. The fact is that from the moment oil became the main export and 
government‘s main revenue source, the country was left at the mercy of the vagaries of price 
fluctuations in the trade of petroleum products. Crucially, by the beginning of the 1980s, there was an 
oil glut in the international market and this led to the virtual collapse of the Nigerian economy. As 
Adesina posits, the country‘s balance of payment difficulties had more to do with short term 




The government, even during the boom era, had resorted to heavy borrowing to finance most 
of the white elephant projects it had engaged in. With the onset of the glut, it became difficult and 
near impossible to pay back these loans. In spite of this fact, the government had to borrow more to 
run the state. By 1985, the Nigerian government had borrowed US$ 19.1 Billion in its efforts to 
implement a ‗flawed‘ national development plan.299 By 1986, the country‘s economy was on the verge 
of collapse and it became difficult to borrow more from international financial institutions.
300
 A 
change was needed in the economic front and this led to the signing of the structural adjustments 
programme (SAP) agreement with the IMF in July, 1986. 
In this context, it should be noted that earlier in 1982, the civilian government of Shehu 
Shagari
301
 had taken on board the neoliberal Economic Stabilisation Act (ESA) which principally, was 
concerned with stabilising the economy and arresting inflation. However, despite the pressures that 
the adoption of these policies placed on state welfare provision, the government at all times remained 
‗nominally committed‘ to the provision of social amenities and welfare programmes for the people. 
Even when the military took over in December 1983, the military regime of General Buhari resisted 
the idea of devaluing the Nigerian currency and the cancellation of government-provided subsidies in 
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both the oil sector and in the price of oil. The regime also refused to engage in the heavy privatization 
of state-owned corporations, against the advice of international financial institutions. Indeed, this 
refusal generated a crisis between the institutions and the military regime. However, the resistance 
could not last for long and the regime eventually succumbed to pressures and agreed to placate the 
institutions by accepting many aspects of the proposed IMF scheme. They, for instance, accepted a 
reduction in public expenditure, the retrenchment of workers and wage containment, which was 
implemented using the ‗unilateral determination of industrial wages by local governments‘.302 This 
led to the mass retrenchment and retirement of workers in 1984. 
The SAPs
303
 adopted by the Babangida military junta in July 1986 accepted all the 
recommendations of the IMF ‗in the name of national economic emergency‘ and in order to avert an 
alleged economic disaster for the country. In compliance with these recommendations, the 
government quickly devalued the Nigerian currency – the Naira. There was a large scale privatization 
of state-owned enterprises by the regime and the government drastically reduced the subsidy that had 






Post-Neoliberal Attitude of the Nigerian State to Oil MNCs and CSR 
 
According to Ferguson, ‗today‘s forms of capital investment in African mineral extraction have been 
noteworthy for their ability to by-pass the nation-state framework altogether‘.305 In doing this, the 
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state‘s institutional capacity to govern, already diminished by ‗the neoliberal economic policies of the 
1980s and 1990s‘ is further weakened. By ‗outsourcing‘ its duties and responsibilities to the private 
sector, the state is made completely incapable of controlling the operations of multinationals, not to 
talk of embarking on ‗positive development projects for its citizens‘.306  
Before the onset of neoliberalism in the country, the Nigerian government participated 
actively in the operations of the oil industry. For instance, government owned 33 per cent equity 
shares in Nigerian Agip Oil Corporation and 35 per cent interest in Shell Petroleum. In fact, by the 
middle of the 1970s, the Nigerian state owned 60 per cent equity interest in Gulf Oil (Nigeria), Mobil 
Producing (Nigeria), ELF (Nigeria), Texaco (Nigeria) and Pan Africa (Nigeria) Ltd.
307
 This 
interventionist and developmental state approach (evidenced principally in the partial nationalization 
of most MNCs in the country), increased state participation in the industry and led to a higher degree 
of control of the oil corporations. This contrasts with the situation after the implementation of 
neoliberal policies and the subsequent sale of state-owned equity interests in these corporations, 
beginning from the 1980s.
308
 
As was discussed in section one, the basic idea of neoliberalism is that free market economies 
will operate smoothly and lead to the steady production and efficient allocation of aggregate wealth 
and welfare for the society at large. Accordingly, the role of the state is limited to protecting private 
property rights, upholding contractual obligations, defending the national territory and overseeing the 
supply of money. Essentially, the theory sees the reality of public corporations‘ and government 
involvement in the economy as a principal obstacle to economic development.
309
 As Brodie submits, 
therefore, in a neoliberal economy the market is required to repeal itself by ‗constructing and 
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disciplining self-governing and self-sufficient individuals‘, who along with other institutions are 
further rewarded for enacting the ‗market values‘ and social action visions of neoliberal policies.310  
In Nigeria, with the eventual domination of the neoliberal theories of social and economic 
development, the relationship between the state and other economic actors has been re-configured. 
One implication of this re-configuration is that it is no longer the Nigerian state that controls these 
economic actors; rather it is the market that monitors and regulates all interactions in the economy, 
including that of the state. In this sense, the Nigerian state itself has become subservient to the 
controlling forces of the markets. This is in line with the neoliberal theories of economic and social 
development, which mandates that states should be subject to the disciplinary power of the market 
and that the market should serve as the ‗organizational principle‘ for all activities within the state and 
society.
311
 Accordingly, succeeding Nigerian governments have continued to promote the neoliberal 
principles of ‗personal responsibility‘ and ‗self-care‘, not only for individuals, but also for 
corporations and other economic actors within its jurisdiction. This means that the Nigerian state has 
gone beyond the traditional forms of governance and has come to symbolize the construction of the 
contrived modes of governance, centred on the market and its private agencies.
312
 
In keeping with the neoliberal market-based model of economic and social development, with 
its emphasis on free trade, freedom of movement for capital and limited state intervention in and 
regulation of economic affairs (including the activities of MNCs), Nigerian governments now 
promote not the legal regulation of corporations, but self-regulation by these corporations themselves. 
Any legal or political intervention by the state, to get MNCs to address the interests of other 
stakeholders outside that of shareholders, is not encouraged since it falls outside the neoliberal 
agenda. In pressing the case for voluntary self-regulation by corporations, the Nigerian state merely 
relies on ‗soft law‘ or non-legal instruments (like corporate codes of conduct) which either lack 
binding force or whose binding force is noticeably weaker than ‗hard law‘. This differs directly with 
the government‘s attitude towards the ambitions of corporations, where the state is ready to produce 
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and implement ‗harder‘ legal and quasi-legal instruments for the protection of corporate and 
institutional investors (evidenced for instance in the various bilateral/multilateral trade and investment 
treaties entered into by the country
313




The increased operation of these legal instruments, institutionalised corporate governance 
standards and domestic constitutional changes of the traditional sort, has led to the emergence of a 
complex national legal framework which promotes and protects corporate investors (especially the 
foreign ones). According to Dean, these instruments, standards and constitutional changes have 
become tools used by neoliberal governments (like Nigeria) to target certain parts of the population 
and actualize some entrenched special interests – in this case that of corporate shareholders.315 
In this context, the neoliberal transformation that occurred in the country, beginning from the 
1980s, has resulted in significant shifts in the socio-legal relations existing between the Nigerian state 
and oil MNCs. By making them a major centre in the allocation of societal resources, neoliberalism 
has coerced the Nigeria government into bestowing on the MNCs, the ability to undertake 
fundamental transformations which increase their corporate profits and drive the socio-economic 
structures of the country. Put in another way; oil MNCs in Nigeria use the openings created by 
neoliberalism to construct opportunities for economic gains, and in the process further strengthen their 
powers and enrich the profits of shareholders.
316
 
Going further, the argument is that the Nigerian state‘s capacity to regulate the MNCs is 
weakened by its accession to and subsequent membership of international organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and by the ratification of bilateral and multilateral trade and 
investment treaties with developed countries.
317
 This is because in the competitive process associated 
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with the attraction of foreign direct investments, made possible by economic globalization,
318
 the 
Nigerian state (as an extractive country) joins other countries to draw investment funds to stimulate its 
domestic economy. Through the operations of these bilateral/multilateral trade and investment 
agreements, the Nigerian state has become increasingly locked into a rule of investment law which 
renders foreign investors (including MNCs) immune from legislative and administrative actions that 
would ordinarily affect their investment interests. In this context, the ideologies of neoliberalism and 
shareholder value become the supreme ideological orthodoxy.
319
 
 This aligns with Ireland‘s contestations that while the neoliberal shareholder value ideology 
is protected by the rule of law, the wider social interests with which CSR (for instance) is concerned 
continues to rely on voluntary codes. In this situation, ‗when ―soft‖ law meets ―hard‖ law, the latter is 
likely to prevail‘.320 In consequence, therefore, the domination of the neoliberal ideology in the 
country has skewed the distribution of wealth towards the very wealthy, while issues like CSR are 
relegated to the background. 
 
 
Protecting the Supremacy of Shareholder Value through ‘Hard Laws’ in Nigeria 
 
As was stated above, the Nigerian state‘s attitude towards the ambitions of corporate shareholders has 
led to the production and implementation of ‗harder‘ legal and quasi-legal instruments for the 
protection of corporate and institutional investors. One of such legal instrument is the Nigerian 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA 1990). An interpretation of some of the sections of 
CAMA suggests that the shareholder value ideology has become the dominant economic ideology in 
the Nigerian legal jurisprudence. 
For instance, section 41 (1) of CAMA provides that: 
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Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles, when 
registered, shall have the effect of a contract under seal between the 
company and its members and officers and between the members and 
officers themselves whereby they agree to observe and perform the 
provisions of the memorandum and articles, as altered from time to time in 
so far as they relate to the company, members, or officers as such. 
 
From the provisions of this section, the constitution of the corporation (the memorandum and articles 
of association) is a contract involving the corporation, its shareholders and management on the one 
hand, and between the shareholders and its officers on the other hand. Accordingly, a corporation has 
no legal obligation – contractually at least – to other stakeholders. As Amaeshi and others have 
argued, this position means that the interests of other stakeholders who may be affected by the 
operations of corporations are not protected. For instance, a corporation can easily terminate the 
employment of its employees at will and for no reason, after giving due notice which is one month by 
statute and usually three months by contract.
321
 
Again, section 279 (3) of the Act states that; 
 
A director shall act at all times in what he believes to be the best interests of 
the company as a whole so as to preserve its assets, further its business, and 
promote the purposes for which it was formed, and in such manner as a 
faithful, diligent, careful and ordinarily skilful director would act in the 
circumstances 
 
Furthermore, the provisions of section 79 of CAMA stipulate that only shareholders are members of 
the corporation and their interests alone matter. When these two sections of CAMA are read together, 
the implication is that shareholders, in principle, are the owners of the corporation and it is their 
primary responsibility to maximize the value of their investments. These shareholders delegate their 
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authority to corporate directors who they have appointed to act on their behalf, and who are mandated 
to pursue the actualization of shareholder profits with utmost vigour. 
Through the contemporary decisions and attitude of the Nigerian courts, it appears reasonable 
to conclude that the protection of shareholder value with hard laws in Nigeria is now absolute. With 
the entire business of the country seemingly revolving around the imperatives of market forces, 
rolling back of the welfare states, shrinking the public sector through the retrenchment of workers, 
intensified cost recovery on social services and heightened privatization of many social enterprises, 
the country‘s judiciary has also become an important agent in favour of the protection of shareholder 
value, and has continuously championed the hegemony of this neoliberal ideology.
322
  
In this context, a number of cases have affirmed the supremacy of shareholder value in the 
country. In Yalaju-Amaye v AREC Ltd,
323
 the plaintiff/appellant (who was a shareholder, as well as a 
Director and Managing Director of the defendant corporation) was removed by other directors of the 
corporation on the ground that he had resigned from his appointment as the Managing Director. They 
also held that since he orally resigned as the MD, he simultaneously lost his position as a shareholder 
of the corporation. The plaintiff MD then brought the instant case, asking the court to determine 
whether he was validly removed as the Managing Director of the corporation and whether as a result 
of his purported removal as the MD, he had surrendered his share interests in the corporation. He also 
asked the Court to determine whether he can institute this action in respect of the wrongs done to him 
in his capacity as a shareholder.  
The Nigerian Supreme Court used the opportunity of the case to recap the general position of 
contemporary Nigerian law in the area of shareholding, and the relationship between the shareholders 
of the corporation and other interests. The Court held (amongst other things) that the Memorandum 
and Articles of Association of a corporation binds the corporation and its directors and constitutes a 
contract between them alone.  In this context, there is the relationship of master and servant between 
the Managing Director and the shareholders in a general meeting (that is the corporation) and since 
the plaintiff becomes an employee by virtue of his becoming a Managing Director, there is a contract 
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of service between him and the corporation. Accordingly, the shareholders have the power to alter the 
corporation‘s articles of association to remove him, even if this results in a breach of contract with the 
director.  
However, the contract of service does not extend to him in his capacity as a shareholder. As 
an owner of shares, he is a member of the corporation and his interests trump other interests, apart 
from that of other shareholders. His interests as a shareholder are different from his interests as a 
Managing Director, and it is irrelevant that he became a shareowner as a result of shares he acquired 
in his capacity as a Managing Director. In this sense, he can bring actions that are either personal to 
him or on wrongs which affect the corporation itself. Moreover, since shareholders are the only ones 
permitted by law to bring actions in respect of acts done to the corporation, the plaintiff can, through a 
derivative action sue for wrongs done to the corporation.
324
  
In Kotoye v Saraki,
325
 the court was called upon to adjudicate in a commercial dispute relating 
to the legal and equitable ownership of shares of a corporation. The Supreme Court, in one of its 
determinations, held that shareholders are the owners of the corporation, and corporate managers and 
executives have the responsibility to realize their interests. The court further held that the right to sell, 
the right to pledge and to vote, the right to mortgage and the right to alienate in any other way, in as 
much as they are constituent parts of ownership, belong to corporate shareholders. In carrying out 
their duties as agents of the shareholders, therefore, corporate managers and executives should as a 
matter of necessity, prioritize the interests of the legal owners of corporate shares. 
In Ansambe v Bon,
326
 a corporate employee filed a claim against the respondent corporation, 
alleging unlawful dismissal. The Nigerian court of Appeal, while dismissing the case of the employee 
amongst other things, re-stated the position that the shareholder is the owner of the corporation and in 
the performance of corporate activities; his interest is supreme and must be giving priority. 
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Neoliberal Shareholder Value as a Barrier to Effective CSR in Nigeria 
 
MNCs in developing countries, including Nigeria, are constantly accused of operating in an 
environment completely separated from the communities where they function. They create uneven 
and divided social arrangements ‗that evade both the social problems that surround them and the state 
that attempts to regulate them‘.327 What then is the role of CSR in this system where the neoliberal 
shareholder value ideology is dominant? Many have suggested that the post-neoliberal attitude of both 





 called this collaboration the ‗slick alliance‘.330  
In principle, the effective use of oil rent is another means through which the Nigerian 
government can facilitate corporate social development in the Niger Delta specifically, and in Nigeria 
in general. Christensen and Murphy have argued that in appropriate circumstances, effective CSR can 
contribute to sustainable development. In this context, sustainable development encompasses poverty 
reduction and equitable resource distribution, respect for ecosystem limits and capacity building for 
the long-term. If applied effectively, they argue, CSR is capable of lifting communities beyond 
poverty. They agree, however, that in the absence of state regulation, contemporary CSR – in its 
voluntary form – is incapable of transforming political and economic structures which promote the 
existence of inequalities and injustices.
331
 
For Idemudia, where CSR is effective, it operates as a core part of public governance and sets 
the parameters of how expenses and rewards are expended. In this context, public governance defines 
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the various aspects of CSR and the respective roles of each stakeholder in the economic process. As a 
result, effective CSR will depend on the MNCs performing socially responsible tasks, as well as other 
stakeholders, especially the state, regulating their activities at the same time.
332
  
His suggestion, therefore, is that it is necessary to make use of other participants in the 
economic environment – stakeholders – as a means of understanding better, the relationship between 
CSR and development. The reason for this, he argues, is that the developmental outcome of CSR 
initiatives (i.e. corporate social development) is not simply a function of business action or inaction. 
Rather, it is best understood as a function of stakeholder relationships, because the action or inaction 
of other stakeholders directly or indirectly affects the impact of CSR on development.
333
  
Unfortunately, as was argued in chapter Two, contemporary CSR appears not to have 
contributed effectively to the sustainable development of both the Niger Delta specifically and Nigeria 
in general. It was stated in section one of this chapter that the ideology of shareholder value – which 
directs the activities of oil MNCs in Nigeria –  insists that the responsibility of business is to 
maximize returns for shareholders, and that the sole responsibility of managers is to seek to maximize 
shareholders‘ profits and to advance their interests. The suggestion was that the idea of shareholder 
primacy freed managers and corporate executives from responsibility to any other interest, other than 
the actualization of desired financial results. Issues of effective CSR, which impinge on corporate 
profits, negate the very foundations of shareholder value. Essentially, any activity which has the 
capacity to reduce shareholder profits has to be downgraded. As a result, CSR in Nigeria appears to be 




In this situation, the MNCs not only pick and choose the CSR duties to respect and the ones to 
ignore, they also decide on what projects to complete and the ones to abandon.  For Watts, therefore, 
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what the corporations project to be developmental initiatives are nothing more than public relations 
stunts.  According to him; 
 
Corporate social responsibility on the ground typically appears as a raft of 
unfinished community projects, all of which have contributed to festering 
resentments among the youth. Environmental impact assessments are rarely 
made public, and the record on spills and compensation is deplorable. The 
companies have always thrived on a policy of divide and rule. They are only 
too happy to invoke national sovereignty when pressures are placed on them 
to improve their human rights or social responsibility records; and yet only 
too happy to operate- in Nigeria for the better part of two or three decades- 




To the extent that the neoliberal shareholder value ideology has become the defining determinant of 
how Nigeria relates with these MNCs, it is strongly contended that the Nigerian government has been 
unable to translate its regulatory authority into effective support for corporate social development.
 336
  
This state of affairs is worsened by corruption. Corruption on the part of the Nigerian state 
means that it is indifferent to the activities of oil MNCs in the Niger Delta. The state neither controls 
nor cautions oil corporations against corporate excesses and has no input on how the corporations 
initiate and implement their social responsibility promises. It is argued that the predomination of ‗neo-
patrimonalism-induced‘ corruption and rentier-mentality myopia has prevented the pursuit of this 
option.
337
The institutionalization of corruption at all levels of government and in most agencies in 
Nigeria successfully undermines the state‘s capacity to promote or support effective CSR, as revenue 
that could be directed towards poverty reduction is usually misappropriated.
338
 For Bassey therefore, 
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despite the significant advantages of ‗disaster capitalism‘ that ‗accrue‘ to oil corporations, host-







This chapter, in section one, traced the evolution of the corporate form and the apparent domination of 
the neoliberal shareholder value maximization on the international financial architecture. It discussed 
the rise of finance capitalism and the criticisms of same. It suggested that the separation of ownership 
from management and the birth of professional non-owner managers led to questions about the 
justification of shareholder value. It was at this time also that the idea of the socially responsible 
corporation began to emerge.
340
 The contention was that since corporations had become quite large 
and immensely powerful, they ought to be run in the interest of the wider society.
341
This was the 
‗transformative era‘ of CSR and led to the rise of the ‗socially responsible‘ or ‗soulful‘ corporation 
and entailed ‗a radical re-conceptualization of the nature of the corporation and an explicit rejection of 
the principle of shareholder primacy‘.342Things, however, changed with the ascendancy of 
neoliberalism on the international financial stage after the 1970s. The ascendancy of this theory led to 
the re-emergence of SV, which is apparently antithetical to the dictates of effective CSR. This tension 
between the ideologies of SV and neoliberalism acts as a barrier to effective CSR and renders any 
attempt by corporations to be socially responsible ineffective. 
Furthermore, the chapter in section two explored the reception of neoliberal ideas in the 
Nigerian socio-political economy. It offered a brief history of neoliberalism in Nigeria and analysed 
the post-neoliberal attitude of the Nigerian state to MNCs. The chapter contended that effective CSR 
appears unlikely in a system dominated by the neoliberal ideology. By adopting and implementing 
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neoliberal ideological reforms, including promoting the primacy of shareholder value, the suggestion 
is that Nigeria has introduced an ideological tension between the ideologies of neoliberalism (and by 
implication that of shareholder value) and effective CSR.  
In this context, with the continued application of the neoliberal free market ideology in the 
policy directives of the Nigerian state – especially as they relate to MNCs – any hope that the social 







Practical Barriers to Effective CSR: Corporate Governance 





Having identified the main ideological barriers to effective CSR in chapter Three – neoliberalism and 
shareholder value – this chapter will argue that there would clearly be hope for effective CSR, if 
ideological barriers were the only – or main – obstacles to its realization. It holds that there are good 
reasons for thinking that the barriers/obstacles standing in the way of CSR are not purely or even 
predominantly ideological; that they are much more tangible and formidable. In this context, the 
chapter will identify and explore a second set of barriers, categorized as practical barriers to effective 
CSR. 
As was discussed in chapters One and Two, the modern corporation is frequently typecast as 
the enemy of collective communal interests in the Niger Delta region. Critics portray it as the 
manipulator of workers, demolisher of neighbourhoods and the voracious and ravenous devourer of 
natural resources. For these critics, modern corporations are motivated only by the requirement to 
accumulate profit. Shielded by ‗limited liability‘ and encouraged by enormous investment resources, 
these critics argue, ‗the corporation has legal personality, but presumably no interest in humanity‘.1  
These allegations are made against modern corporations because of their perceived 
‗obsession‘ with shareholder value – especially in its modern form. Shareholder value2 insists that 
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only those corporations that champion profit maximization will become economically efficient and 
capable of surviving the fierce competitions occasioned by global capitalism.
3
 
Nevertheless, the global interconnectivity of modern corporations, coupled with the ‗survival 
war‘ occasioned by the capitalist constant of competition, make it imperative that issues concerning 
the governance of corporations are given careful considerations. Modern corporations stipulate 
policies that govern their activities, according to laid-down corporate legislations in their countries of 
origin. The contemporary reasoning is that since corporations have crossed borders and operate multi-




The global commitment towards developing principles of corporate governance led to 
changes in national corporate laws, for instance in the US with the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. 
Progressive legislative improvements have equally taken place in many other jurisdictions, as 
exemplified by national corporate governance codes initiated in many countries.
5
  
Supporting the need to realize extensive restructuring and bring about the creation of standard 
corporate governance norms, international organizations have consistently campaigned for the 
adoption of a more ‗rule-based‘ corporate governance model. Through the efforts of international 
organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
concerted efforts have been made to spread and consolidate good corporate governance principles on 
and for all nations. The OECD has worked assiduously towards disseminating ‗good corporate 
governance‘ principles among OECD members, as well as non-member developing countries, 
including Nigeria. They have done this by organizing numerous international conferences and by 
adopting the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in 1999 (revised in 2004). For some 
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Incidentally, it has also been argued that these principles only entrench the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance, which emphasizes shareholder value prioritization. The model 
supports a dynamic market orientation, with fluid capital which can quickly chase market 
opportunities wherever they occur, in the neoliberal free market tradition. Other international 
organizations like the World Bank, IMF and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) have all contributed 
in imposing this brand of corporate governance – with its mechanisms – on the international 
community. An increasing amount of corporate governance rating agencies observe changes at both 
corporate and national levels, to ascertain degrees of conformity with the principles.
7
 
Critics argue that in pursuit of the realization of the market dynamics, a range of corporate 
governance mechanisms have emerged to entrench and enforce the principles of shareholder value. 
The mechanisms include; performance-related pay; the use of Non-Executive Directors; and the 
operation of markets for corporate control. The contention is that these mechanisms operate in such a 
way that the pursuit of shareholder value is not a choice but an imperative for corporate managers. 
This has led to the suggestion that the international organizations which support the mechanisms are 
championing the imposition of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance on the 
international financial architecture, most especially on developing economies.
8
  
This chapter, therefore, explores the practical barriers to effective CSR – i.e. the corporate 
governance mechanisms which embed shareholder value. It begins by exploring the links between 
shareholder value and contemporary corporate governance. It argues that the implication of the belief 
that corporations should profit maximize is exemplified in the claim that corporate governance is a 
simple agency problem: how do you get corporate managers to act in the interests of inactive and 
often dispersed shareholders? It will, therefore, examine and evaluate the various mechanisms which 
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have been developed to solve this agency problem. While some of the mechanisms operate from 
within corporations – things such as performance related pay and the use of Non-Executive Directors 
to monitor managers –; others operate externally, such as the markets for corporate control. These 
mechanisms incentivize corporate managers to maximize shareholder value and raise the share price 
of corporations as high as possible. They are also put under pressures to avoid the wrath of ‗the 
markets‘ and threat of takeovers. The chapter contends that the resulting model of CG – which is 
essentially the Anglo-American, stock market based model
9
 – has been, and is being, promoted 
around the world by the OECD, the FSB, the World Bank and the IMF.  
 The chapter is divided into two sections: Section One deals with the corporate governance 
mechanisms embedding shareholder value and explores the activities of the OECD, FSB, IMF and the 
World Bank and how they support the entrenching of these mechanisms. It begins by offering two 
broad definitions of CG and suggests that the presently dominant definition is the one that views CG 
simply as a solution to the agency problem.
10
 It then discusses the various mechanisms entrenching 
SV and how their dominance has purportedly signalled ‗the end of history for corporate law‘.11  
The section then goes on to evaluate the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the 
suggestion that it promotes the Anglo-American SV model. It looks at the establishment of the FSB 
and the significance of the Board‘s actions in CG matters. The 12 key standards of sound financial 
systems as enunciated by the FSB are enumerated, with the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance as the 5
th
 standard. It will also examine the activities of the World Bank and the IMF and 
how they have been allegedly used in the imposition of shareholder value. 
Section Two will consider the application of the neoliberal corporate governance mechanisms 
in Nigeria. It aims to show that the practical barriers to effective CSR, discussed in section one, are 
also present in the Nigerian situation, rendering it unlikely that CSR in its contemporary form will do 
much to resolve the problems found in the Niger Delta.  
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MEANING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Corporations are organized within specific governance structures laid down by legislation, by custom, 
by the corporation‘s charter, by the shareholders, and by the prospects of people who benefit from 
their actions. These structures vary from country to country, because a particular corporation‘s 
governance framework is usually predicated on the history, culture, rules and institutions of its home 
country. The success of a corporation is therefore based on the ‗coherence‘ and level of confidence 
which can be ascribed to ‗its constituent‘ components and governance structure. This ‗framework‘ has 
to be amenable to changes and may be subject to improvements over time.
12
 
Definitions of corporate governance are numerous. However, in the context of this thesis, 
definitions based on a general (stakeholder) and specific (shareholder) perspective will be adopted. 
From the general perspective, corporate governance is an expression which relates to the set of laws, 
procedures, or rules by which corporations are managed, controlled and regulated. It is used to refer to 
internal features described by the directors, shareholders or charter of a business, and how these 




Viewed from this perspective, corporate governance is the mechanism through which the 
corporation is managed, as well as the link that connects it to other stake-holders. In this context, it is 
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a wide phrase that encompasses the methods through which rights and responsibilities are divided up 
between shareholders, corporate managers and other interest groups in a corporation.
14
  
From the specific perspective, corporate governance is defined as the ‗mechanisms‘ through 
which share owners protect their holdings in corporations. The definition, which appears to be the 
dominant definition of CG in the contemporary world, sees the concept as the means through which 
the ‗agency problem‘ is resolved in favour of the shareholder. The ‗agency problem‘ in this context, 
points to the difficulties investors encounter in seeking for guarantees that the capital they have 




For the proponents of this view, one distinguishing quality of the modern corporation is the 
severance of ownership from control. In this situation, the dispersed stock-owners usually entrust the 
daily management of corporations to professional managers. Accordingly, corporate governance is the 
attempt to create an alignment between the interests of the shareowners and that of the corporate 
managers, in order to solve the agency problem.
16
 It is about choosing the most competent managers 
and making them ‗accountable to the shareholders‘.17 
Shleifer and Vishny, perhaps, sum up the most-excellent characterization of corporate 
governance in the ‗specific sense‘, when they defined it as a set of methods directed towards the 
fundamental safeguard of the stock-holding interests of corporate owners. According to them, it is the 
various methods through which ‗suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investments‘.18 It tries to answer questions such as; 
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How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to 
them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply 






It is argued that professional managers‘ misdemeanours, whether in the shape of misappropriation of 
shareholders‘ funds or the wrong application of corporate resources, decreases the quantity of capital 
that investors are eager to provide ‗ex-post‘, to sponsor the corporation.20 
 
Much of the subject of corporate governance deals with constraints that 
managers put on themselves, or that investors put on managers, to reduce the ex 





Misappropriation of investor funds by managers can take various shapes and guises; it can be in the 
form of stealing of corporate profits or in the nature of selling a corporation‘s products, properties or 
other supplementary collaterals at a much lower market price to other corporations. This type of 
‗transfer pricing, asset stripping, and investor dilution‘, in many instances, are quite legitimate. Yet 
they amount to theft. Expropriation may still be in the form of re-routing ‗corporate opportunities‘, 
installing incompetent ‗family members‘ in administrative ranks or ‗overpaying‘ administrators.22 
In order to forestall the occurrence of these forms of misappropriation, therefore, corporate 
governance from this specific sense, is to a considerable extent, seen as the machinery through which 
‗outside investors‘ safeguard themselves against the ‗scheming and manipulative‘ tendencies of the 
managerial ‗insiders‘.23  
Finding solutions to the agency problem, it is argued, directly led to the formulation of 
mechanisms which embed the shareholder value model of corporate governance.  
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Brief Historical Evolution of Corporate Governance 
 
The passing of free registration laws
24
 led to an ‗ex-post‘ need to organize and manage corporations 
for the benefit of both shareholders and the wider society. The suggestion is that the transfer of the 
privilege to register corporations, from the state to shareholders, led to the former giving up ‗control 
rights over future changes in the articles‘ of registration of the corporation. Though special policies 
survived for some business activities like banking and insurance, the state principally had to surrender 
‗ex-ante‘ control of corporations and now concentrated on regulating them ‗ex post‘. State legislatures 
began to create practicable legal frameworks that could be used as an ‗ex-post‘ alternative to the ‗ex-
ante‘ control role they enjoyed initially. As a result, the shift towards free incorporation was 




The new corporate laws stipulated entry requirements that applied to all 
corporations and had to be met before a company could commence operation 
as a legally founded joint stock company. They included the minimum 
number of founders of a corporation, disclosure requirements regarding the 
contents of the companies' statutes, the scope of its activities, as well as 
capital requirements, in particular provisions on the amount of capital that 





The suggestion that states abandoned their rights to ‗ratify‘ new incorporations did not mean that they 
no longer participated in corporate relationships. What states did was to create opportunities through 
which corporate actions could be monitored and supervised by others. This was achieved through the 
employment of remarkably intricate corporate laws that assigned strategic ‗control rights‘ to 
numerous corporate interests, especially that of shareholders.
27
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The early corporate laws gave little consideration to the ‗governance structure‘ of 
corporations. Most state laws only contained provisions stating that corporations will be administered 
by directors, or by shareholder trustees.
28
 Over time, however, corporate ‗management was 
professionalized and entrusted to external hands, leading ultimately to the severance of ownership and 
control‘.29As corporations expanded, innovative ‗bureaucratic hierarchies‘ became essential. Thus, the 
activities of large corporations progressively came to rely on centralized organization. They were 
compelled to establish official managerial arrangements for efficient allocation of corporate resources 
and optimal maximization of corporate profits.
30
 This ultimately led to the creation of corporate 
governance models required to cater for the complex relationships between the corporation and its 
shareholders and between the shareholders and the professional managers who now administer the 
corporations. The materialization of ‗professionally managed‘ corporations took place much earlier in 
the US (e.g. the state of Delaware) than in England.
31
 
In both countries, however, the division of shareholders‘ and managers‘ responsibilities was 
principally entrusted to the corporate charter (articles of incorporation). This means that in theory the 
founding shareholders decided issues of responsibility, while in practice responsibility was left to the 
current shareholders of the firm. Directors could not act beyond their mandate and any director who 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
 
As was argued in chapter Three, shareholder value has arguably become the dominant corporate 
governance model, not only in the US and UK, but also internationally.
33
 Supporting the dominance 
of SV regime in the US, Bainbridge wrote that ‗shareholder wealth maximization long has been the 
fundamental norm which guides US corporate decision makers‘.34 For Armour and others, it is 
generally accepted that the UK‘s model of corporate governance, similar to that of the US, situates 
shareholder interest above those of other corporate stakeholders, including employees, creditors and 
local communities.
35
 International organizations like the IMF, World Bank and OECD also champion 
the dominance of this corporate governance model.
36
 
In order to realise the objective of shareholder value, a set of structural imperatives have been 
designed and implemented to further entrench the model internationally. These imperatives 





Internal mechanisms deployed include executive remuneration packages, which link pay to 
performance and the intensified use of independent, non executive directors (NEDS) to ensure that 
managers comply with shareholder primacy. 
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Executive Remuneration: Performance Related Pay Packages 
 
Performance-based remuneration is defined as the ‗transfer of money or material goods conditional 
upon taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target‘.37 As an example, 
where it is the ‗payer's‘ aim to increase the share price of a corporation, a performance related pay 
package would ensure that the corporate executive is paid only for an increase in the share price of the 
firm, rather than on inputs such as the number of goods produced or the number of new branches 
established. As Eldridge submits, ‗with performance-based payment, the contract is designed in a way 
that the objectives of both principal and agent are fully aligned‘.38 Performance based remuneration is 
calculated to link some percentage of salaries to employees‘ accomplishments, though it may also be 
in the form of non-cash payments such as shares and share options, superannuation or other benefits.
39
 
The notion of performance related pay is an important mechanism through which the 
activities of corporate managers are monitored, so as to prevent the agency problem discussed above, 
and ensure that they work effectively towards the realization of shareholder value. The implication of 
this, for corporate managers, is that they are incentivized to increase share prices, because there 
remunerations are tied to the ‗financial market values‘ of the corporate shares of the firm they 
manage. This puts them in lots of pressures and accounts for the numerous acts of recklessness, 
resulting in scandals and destructions of the environment in recent times. These inducement packages 
are alleged to be imprudent in many instances, because they afford no instrument for avoiding 
blunders and oversights or opportunistic conducts, and as such may lead to ‗bigoted‘ actions.40   
When it is considered that the performance indicators used to assess corporate executives are 
associated with capital aggregation and ‗short-term profit‘ creation, corporate executives are 
persuaded to adopt ‗high risk‘ attitudes to achieve instant profits. When this happens, their 
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accomplishments are optimistically evaluated, thereby expanding their pay packets. These extreme 
‗risk-taking‘ activities, with no appropriate deliberation on the ‗long-term sustainability‘ of the 
corporation, led to unnecessary failures and initiated ‗a systemic crisis in the financial sector‘ which 
became a global crisis in 2007-2008 – because of the inter-connectivity between national economies.41     
As Young and Scot reports; 
 
The life of a top manager has, by all accounts, become vastly more pressured 
in the past two decades...most top managers are acutely aware of the 
pressures not only to perform, but also to demonstrate by actions and words 
that they are high performers... It is therefore prudent to accumulate wealth 
quickly and perhaps, to get out of the heat at a relatively early age, before 





The same authors highlight the kind of pressures placed on managers, as a result of the alignment of 
remuneration and performance. Before the 1970s, corporations operated under the rule of their 
traditions and long established precedents. The speed at which work was carried out ‗was relatively 
gentle and the quality of relationships with clients‘ was on the basis of shared trust and respect. There 
was little or no pressure to accumulate short-term profits, as against the realization of long term goals 
of the business.
43
 According to them, a Fund manager who they interviewed stated that in the ‗good 
old days‘, meetings with pension trustees were held in the spirit of ‗mutual commitment and 
loyalty‘.44 This state of affairs was brought to an end the moment performance against index replaced 




The issue of pressures on corporate managers, however, is not within the exclusive preserve 
of Fund managers. The situation is replicated in the life of every corporate manager, including those 
in the oil sector. For oil MNCs – including those in the Niger Delta – manager‘s remunerations have 
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become increasingly tied to achieving targets set out in performance contracts. Bergin contends that, 
‗the brutality of the integration process and the performance-related remuneration packages meant 
[that] only ambitious, ends-focused people felt at home‘ in these oil corporations.46  
Those managers, who may be sympathetic to employees, host-communities or the 
environment, virtually lost their jobs in these establishments. The consequences of the pressure on 
managers to enhance profits led to constant squeezes on corporate finances, the cancellation of 
maintenance exercises for oil equipment and the non-replacement of old and out-dated machinery.
47
 
The tying of managers‘ remuneration and bonuses to the meeting of targets which increase 
shareholder profits, led to the jettisoning of process safety objectives, which in turn created moral 
hazards, not only for the managers, but also for the employees and surrounding communities. The 
departmental managers were advised to self-regulate themselves on health and safety issues. Yet, at 
the same time, they were given financial targets to achieve – which in most instances, meant 
particular sums of money to save for the corporation – over a given period of time. Since managers 
could only enjoy bonuses based on their ability to save costs, issues concerning the environment, 
health and safety became ‗vague goals and no longer firm targets‘.48 Thus, corporate managers in the 
oil sector – as in other sectors – became devoted servants of share price maximization, 




Appointment of Independent, Non Executive Directors (NEDs) 
 
Another distinct mechanism of the neoliberal corporate governance model is the appointment of 
‗outside, independent‘ non-executive directors (NEDs) into boards of corporations. There is no 
statutory definition of a NED, but such a director will usually devote part of his time to the affairs of 
the corporation, as an independent adviser or supervisor. NEDs usually stand back from the day-to-
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In the UK, beginning from 2003 – and in order to comply with corporate best practices – the 
published Combined Codes of corporate governance have recommended that ‗NEDs should make up 
at least half the board‘ of corporations. The significance of this is that a considerable number of both 
the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 mid-sized corporations now have boards dominated by NEDs, which 
separate the offices of chief executive from that of board chairman.
51
  
It is suggested that NEDs represent shareholders in the board of corporations and are used as 
one of the mechanisms for solving the agency problem highlighted by neoliberal agency theorists like 
Jensen, Fama and Meckling.
52
 These theorists argued that the financial theory of separating ownership 
from management in corporations ‗had created generic agency problems because the shareholder-
principal faced costs and other difficulties in monitoring the manager-agent‘.53 Through the 
mechanism of NEDs, they argued, shareholders‘ interests in the boardroom are protected. By 
representing shareholders‘ interests, NEDs conscientiously assist in decreasing the extent of the 
agency costs through better alignment of shareholder and manager interests. This is achieved through; 
the control and restriction of ‗management pursuit of the quiet life‘; curtailing the inefficient and 
profligate expenditures of managers in areas such as managerial bonuses and extravagant travels; or 
the managers‘ pursuit of discretionary and personal objectives like refusing to be accountable to 
shareholders‘.54 
A good example of how NEDs promote shareholder value is seen in the functions of the 
markets for corporate control (MCCs). As Froud and others have suggested, the activities of NEDs 
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and how they represent shareholders‘ interests in boards, is best explained in the processes leading up 
to the foreign take-over of the UK building material sector, the actions of the NED-dominated boards 
of the UK corporations and specifically, in the events leading up to the eventual sale of the glass 
manufacturing firm, Pilkington. According to Froud and others, there were no resistance from the 
NED-controlled UK boards against foreign take-overs beginning from 1997. This is against the back-
drop that most of these corporations were neither in financial distress nor lacking productive 
credibility. The NED-controlled boards, however, encouraged and eventually sold-out to foreign 
buyers without objections, ‗after efficiently extracting a higher price for shareholders and thus serving 
their role of representing the interest of shareholders on the board‘.55  
Furthering the argument that NEDs entrench shareholder primacy, the case of Pilkington is 
cited as proof. The corporation had received an earlier bid for take-over by the British conglomerate 
BTR in 1986. At this time, the corporation‘s board was made up of a majority of family members and 
long-term employees. The take-over bid was seen as not only insensitive, but also ‗entirely lacking in 
logic‘ and was, as a result, rejected. 20 years later, in 2005/2006, another bid by a smaller Japanese 
firm, NSG was accepted by the board of the corporation. The key difference between the 1986 
situation and that of 2005/2006 was that the board was now dominated by a majority of NEDs, who 
felt that the price which NSG offered to pay was high and a good outcome for shareholders.
56
  
The fact that the corporation was financially viable and productively credible and in a much 
stronger position in 2005 than it was 1986 was immaterial. The suggestion that it was equally illogical 
commercially, to sale at this time was not relevant. By selling at a premium, the transaction enhanced 
shareholder profits and that was all that mattered. The ancillary fact that employees, local 
communities and even politicians may be negatively affected by the sale was irrelevant. Shareholder 
profit maximization was all that counted and NEDs were in the board to ensure that this was 
actualized. Accordingly, the idea that ‗everything is for sale‘ as long as it enhances shareholder profits 
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has become the norm. The board that refuses to sale, ‗during friendly overtures or hostile takeovers‘, 
do so not because they will not sale, but because they are ‗holding out for the highest price‘.57 
In line with this argument, NEDs have become a corporate governance mechanism which 
ensures that corporate managers serve only the interests of shareholders. As a result, in many 
corporate boards, they represent the interest of finance capital and enforce the changing conjectural 
primacy of financialization. They aid in the prioritization of shareholder value through their efforts in 
the buying and selling of corporations in the MCCs.
58
  
In similar vein, it is argued that the increase in the number of non-executive directors is 
closely linked to the proliferation of shared directorship. This development is attributed to the fact that 
those in commanding ‗positions‘, usually identify with each other and have mutual and shared 
interests as a result of their connection with identical establishments. They naturally look up to each 
other for ‗shared problems‘.59 By implication, reactions to matters of corporate governance and 
shareholder value proliferated quickly amongst corporations through these shared directors. They 
operate as channels for the extension of ‗practices, information and norms‘ which explain ‗some of the 
surprising conformity among corporate managers‘ regarding ‗their approaches to corporate 
governance‘ and shareholder value. Shared NEDs not only created a means of collective political 
actions,
60
 but also led to a board-room culture which favoured its own and served as a network of 




As a number of commentators have noted, the non-executive director (NED) 
has become the new mechanism of directorial ‗interlock‘. NEDs do not 
represent the interests of specific financiers or investment banks in the same 
way as the nominee directors of the early twentieth century, but instead enforce 
the general priorities of financialization.
62
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For Froud and others, the interlocking or ‗exchange‘ of executive personnel at board level shows a 
very significant aspect of ‗corporate capitalism‘ and evidences one of the different mechanisms 
through which the ideology of shareholder value is realized. NEDs accordingly, ‗have the practical 
responsibility of auctioning‘ the corporation and deciding when and at what particular circumstance a 
particular transaction favours shareholders. Once this is determined, it is their responsibility to ensure 
that shareholder profits are realized.
63
 
The extent to which directorial interlocking enhances corporate performance is however 
doubtful.  In a review of empirical studies conducted on the issue, Froud and others maintain that ‗it is 
inherently unlikely that organisational changes such as the number of NEDs or the separation of 
chairman and chief executive would strongly influence a complex outcome like performance which 





The external mechanisms for entrenching shareholder value exist mainly in the stock markets and the 
markets for corporate control (MCCs). 
 
 
Markets for Corporate Control (MCCs) 
 
In chapter Three, the concept of markets for corporate control and the writings of Henry Manne were 
discussed. For Manne and other agency theorists, the argument in favour of MCCs is that the share 
price of a corporation acts as a kind of judgement on its management. To this end, ‗good managers‘ 
are usually rewarded with high prices in the stock market, while ‗bad managers‘ are rewarded with 
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 Essentially, the argument continues, a low share price renders a firm vulnerable to 
take-over by other firms who believe that they can manage the corporation more efficiently. The 
ultimate sanction for bad management, therefore, is not merely a low share price, but also a take-over 
bid. Inherent in this logic is the existence – in the form of the stock market – of a market for corporate 
control through which managers compete for the control of corporate assets.
66
 Accordingly, the MCCs 
ensure that corporate assets are used in the most efficient and profitable ways possible, leading Manne 
to declare that the ‗stock market is the only objective standard of managerial efficiency‘.67 
In recent corporate theory, the existence of the MCCs and the threats of take-over are 
principal instruments through which corporate managers can be ‗restrained‘ and obliged to operate in 
the shareholders‘ interests. Legitimized take-overs act as mechanisms through which poorly 
performing managers are removed and those better-suited given control. Significantly however, the 
MCCs perform effectively only when shareholders (and shareholders alone) possess the right to 
appoint and dismiss directors. Claims about the existence of MCCs, have thus become a justification 
for the continued hegemony of the principle of shareholder primacy and existing shareholder rights.
68
  
The apparent acceptance of the role of MCCs in the international financial system has 
practically elevated the concept to such a height that it now functions as a central apparatus for the 
contemporary justification of shareholder value and the debates about corporate governance in 
general. The importance of this mechanism to shareholder value is further substantiated by the 
increasing argument that the maintenance of the MCC is the key to good corporate governance.
69
 The 
MCCs, this argument holds, offer a simple procedure for controlling corporate managers and making 
them answerable to shareholders. This is in the interest of not only the shareholders but of society in 
general, since it ensures the most efficient allocation of resources. The policy implication of this view 
is that policy-makers should try to create MCCs where they do not already exist and that barriers to 
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takeovers should be kept at a minimum. According to the advocates of the MCCs, the preservation of 
shareholder rights promotes efficiency.
 70
  
However, the claim that MCCs lead to efficiency has been doubted. According to Franks and 
Meyer, ‗there is no broad-gauge support for the inefficient management displacement hypothesis that 
acquired companies are subnormal performers‘.71 As a result, they advocated for caution which 
‗mandates considerable scepticism towards the claim that mergers are on average efficiency 
enhancing‘.72 In reality, therefore, available evidence appears to favour the fact that mergers and 
acquisitions often bring little by way of efficiency.
73
  
Notwithstanding the likely advantages or disadvantages of MCCs, it is strongly suggested that 
‗the institutionalisation of the hostile take-over and the growth of the market for corporate control‘ has 
contributed immensely ‗to the capital market pressures on managers‘, redesigning the things they ‗say 





The functions of the active markets in contemporary financial systems portray the principal difference 




 In the markets of the 
20
th
 century, power was exercised directly by financiers and investment banks within corporations 
through board representation, thus operating at the level of the individual corporation. In the financial 
markets of the 21
st
 century on the other hand, power is predominantly exercised from outside, 
‗through the arms length mechanism of the market‘.76  
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This equates to a form of regulation which does not only unite ‗concentration with liquidity‘, 
but is also omnipresent and operational within the corporate sector in totality. For Ireland, it is this 
apparent all-pervading nature that has enabled Anglo-American finance to wield such effective 
disciplinary power. According to him, this veiled power which it possesses is clearly dissimilar with 
the explicit, but sometimes ‗less effective‘ varieties of power exhibited by finance in such places as 
Germany. Ironically, the ‗more direct forms of financial control that was prevalent in the 20th century, 
and which still exist in ―blockholding‖ territories, are contemporarily regarded as obstructing the 
smooth operation of the free markets. This is because ―blockholding‖ creates risks for minority 
shareholders‘ and impedes the functions of MCCs, ‗shackling capital to particular firms and 
diminishing the disciplinary and efficiency-enhancing power‘ that it can exercise in markets. 
Furthermore, the immobile nature of this ‗more ―committed‖ capital‘ boosts the position and 
negotiating standing of ‗non-shareholding groups‘, thereby assisting in creating a ‗more relational and 
more stakeholder-oriented‘ conception of the corporation. This situation invariably results in a 
corporation that is motivated by an extensive and longer-term planning, exhibiting a ‗more welfarist 
version of capitalism‘.77 This is not acceptable to those advocates steeped in the neoliberal free market 
ideology. In the words of Ireland; 
 
The key role played by markets in the exercise of contemporary financial 
power also accounts for the close links between resurgent finance and 
neoliberalism, with its supposition that free markets - private, contractual 
economic ordering and the unregulated forces of supply and demand - are 
the best way to maximise not only freedom but also growth, wealth and 
welfare. For neoliberalism champions precisely the kind of market 
mechanisms through which modern finance exercises its coercive power, 
hence claims that finance was the instigator of the transition to neoliberalism 
and that neoliberalism is best seen as the "ideological expression of the 





The ‗free market‘ origins of resurgent financial power equally make clearer, the reason for the 
ascendancy of the shareholder value principle. It is suggested that the re-emergence of shareholder 
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value did not occur as a result of changes in the fundamentals of corporate law per se. The 
contemporary revival of shareholder value is embedded in the power of shareholders, ‗re-united and 
re-concentrated in institutions‘ to utilize ‗the rights‘ bestowed on them by corporate law, ‗to impose 
themselves on corporations and corporate executives, both directly and indirectly through the medium 
of financial markets – within a largely unchanged company law regime‘.79  
As a result, the most important modifications on laws governing international finance have 
occurred, not in corporate law, but in the law regulating international capital flows and security 
markets. The reason for this is not far-fetched. According to Davies, it is more straightforward and 
unproblematic for institutional shareholders to manipulate and effect alterations to the system 
controlling securities markets, than it is for them to modify corporate law. Corporate law is subject to 
the customary law making procedure, ‗where institutional investors would be only one among a 
number of powerful influences on the ultimate shape of the legislation‘.80 The system of rules 
governing securities on the other hand, have ‗been devolved to regulators which are closer to the 
market participants, notably the Stock Exchange and, now, the Financial Services Authority, for the 
listing rules and the City Panel on Take-overs and Mergers for the rules on take-overs‘.81  
In the final analysis, the creation and maintenance of active stock markets is thus, another 
mechanism for the actualization of shareholder value. The existence of these markets casts shadows 
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE MECHANISMS 
 
In the last two decades, the struggle for investment has intensified – whether in developed countries or 
in the less developed ones. Consequently, the argument that it is necessary to realize an acceptable 
level of consistency in corporate governance practices has acquired additional momentum. 
Internationally, influential organizations have been at the forefront of bringing about improved 
corporate governance frameworks and in their supervision and observance of national CG practices. 
At international conferences, issues of corporate governance and supervisions are extensively debated, 
and many regional and international associations are presented with opportunities to dialogue and 
share information. Projects introduced and implemented at these forums heavily influence the 
direction of domestic laws and regulations. These organizations, through their positions and tactics, 
function as agents in influencing the course of ‗convergence‘ towards shareholder value primacy. 
‗Agents of convergence‘, writes Adegbite and Amaeshi, are viewed as ‗those entities... who are, 
directly or indirectly, actively involved in nudging national systems of corporate governance in one 
direction or the other, through their cross-border initiatives‘.82 
In the following sub-sections, this thesis will explore the part played by international 
organizations – including the OECD, the FSB, the IMF and the World Bank –, their influences in 
determining the assessment and understanding of corporate governance within the global economic 
framework and how their actions direct states towards the adoption of the Anglo-American SV model 
of CG. The mechanisms which are inherent in this model, as was argued above, act as practical 
barriers to the realization of effective CSR.  
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The OECD  
 
The Convention for the formation of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) was signed in Paris on the 14 December, 1960, but came into effect on the 30 September, 
1961.
83
 The original members were those of the Organisation for European Economic Corporation 
(OEEC) formed in 1947 to manage the US-financed Marshall Plan to rebuild war-torn Europe. As a 
result of the successes it recorded and in order to internationalize its scope, the US and Canada joined 
the organization. The new organization became the OECD and other countries like Japan and Finland 





The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
In 1999, the OECD published the Principles of Corporate Governance, made up of the best practices 
to be implemented by member and non-member countries, in order to be certified ‗compliant‘ with 
the dictates of a sound financial system. The principles, revised in 2004, are one of the 12 key 
standards for international financial stability, recommended by the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
85
 
They form the basis of the corporate governance component of the Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSCS) of the World Bank Group.
86
 The Principles were initially created in 
reaction to a request by the OECD Council Meeting at Ministerial level on 27-28 April 1998, 
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following the South-East-Asian financial crisis,
87




The OECD acknowledged four values against which governance exercise can be measured; 
fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility. According to the organization, the more 
extensively the principles are applied, the more resources will be shared justifiably and efficiently. 
The key to efficient allocation of resources is transparency and accountability. As long as corporations 
remained open about their objectives and the manner in which these objectives are achieved, they will 
earn the trust of those on whom they depend for their success. Resources will flow to corporations 
that inspire trust, through their approach to governance and through the integrity of those who manage 
corporate policies. Responsible governance is the basis on which trust is established and enterprise 
encouraged. The organization believes that improved corporate governance frameworks profit 
corporations through greater access to financing, lower cost of capital, better firm performance, and 
more favourable conduct of all participants. They equally hold that when a nation‘s general corporate 
governance and property rights system are weak, voluntary and market corporate governance 




The degree to which corporations observe basic principles of good corporate 
governance is an increasingly important factor for investment decisions. Of 
particular relevance is the relation between corporate governance practices 
and the increasingly international character of investment. International 
flows of capital enable companies to access financing from a much larger 
pool of investors. If countries are to reap the full benefits of the global 
capital market, and if they are to attract long-term ―patient‖ capital, 
corporate governance arrangements must be credible, well understood across 
borders and adhere to internationally accepted principles.
90
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The OECD Principles, following main-stream economists, insists that private, market based 
investment processes, are invaluable factors in the successful operations of international economies. 
These processes are better enhanced when economies have sound corporate governance frameworks. 
By virtue of the ever-expanding nature of modern corporations, coupled with the increasing relevance 
of economic investors and institutional mediators, the recruitment of capital has assumed a life of its 
own, devoid of principal-owners‘ control. In the same vein, the distribution of capital has become 
more complicated as investment options broaden, made possible by the unobstructed liberalization of 
fiscal and actual markets. Structural modifications and allocations, including price deregulation and 
increased market rivalry, have improved corporations‘ exposures to risks associated with market 
forces. These occurrences have made the supervision of the various uses of corporations more 
complicated, necessitating the need for high-quality corporate governance.
91
 
The OECD Principles, in its preamble, states that ‗the presence of an effective corporate 
governance system, within an individual company and across an economy as a whole, helps to 
provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy‘.92 
Accordingly, the preamble continues, ‗the cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use 
resources more efficiently, thereby underpinning growth‘.93 
The Principles are broadly divided into six sections. Section I deals with ensuring the basis 
for an effective corporate governance framework. Section II is on the rights of shareholders and key 
ownership structures. Section III concerns the equitable treatment of shareholders. Section IV deals 
with the role of stakeholders in corporate governance while section V deals with issues of disclosures 
and transparency. The final section VI is on the responsibilities of the Board.  
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Section III, dealing with the equitable treatment of shareholders is concerned with protecting 
the rights of minority shareholders in foreign countries, situated mostly in developing economies. The 
‗apparent‘ emphasis on the protection of minority shareholders by the Principles is one of the reasons 
for the suggestion that it promotes the Anglo-American model of corporate governance.
94
  
The Principles make provisions for the role of stakeholders in section IV. The section states 
(amongst other things) that ‗the corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements
95
 and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of financially 
sound enterprises‘. Section IV (A) goes on to state that the rights of stakeholders that are established 
by law or through mutual agreements are to be respected. This means that the rights of stakeholders 
have to be established either by law, outside of corporate law (e.g. labour, business or commercial and 
insolvency laws) or by contractual relations, in order to be recognised and respected.
96
 
It has been strongly suggested that this section introduced nothing new to the corporate 
governance debate. Rather, it merely re-enacts the position of the neoliberal shareholder value 
advocates, who hold that the right of stakeholders in corporate governance must be protected outside 
of corporate law. For instance, Hansmann and Kraakman (neoliberal advocates) had argued that; 
 
...asserting the primacy of shareholder interests in corporate law does not 
imply that the interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go 
unprotected. It merely indicates that the most efficacious legal mechanisms 
for protecting the interests of non-shareholder constituencies—or at least all 
constituencies other than creditors—lie outside of corporate law. For 
workers, this includes the law of labour contracting, pension law, health and 
safety law, and anti-discrimination law. For consumers, it includes product 
safety regulation, warranty law, tort law governing product liability, anti-
trust law, and mandatory disclosure of product contents and characteristics. 
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From the OECD principles therefore, corporations are not under any obligation to engage in social 
responsibility practices, except when those practices are stipulated either by law (outside corporate 
law) or by contract. This is the major reason why the Principles are said to be constructed on the 




As Ireland observes, ‗when the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance first emerged in 
1999 following the East-Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, it was clear that they were firmly rooted in 
an Anglo-American, stock market-based, shareholder-oriented model of the corporation, 
notwithstanding nods in the direction of diversity‘.99 Other writers, including Soederberg agree with 
this assertion.
100
   
Furthermore, the OECD aids the World Bank in the implementation of the Key principles of 
Sound Financial Systems with regards to corporate governance.
101
 The organization defines the 
meaning of corporate governance and what makes up good corporate governance practices. This 
definition is accepted by both the World Bank and the rating agencies like Standards & Poor‘s. In 
theory, therefore, adherence to the tenets of the Principles is voluntary even though in practise, it is 
more or less compulsory.
102
 
In any case, the creation of these principles further entrenched the shareholder model of 
corporate governance across the globe. The Principles are in agreement with the argument that 
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Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
 
The Financial Stability Board was established in April, 2009, as a successor to the earlier Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF). It was created by the Group of 20 (G20) Summit of Heads of Government to 
tackle the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and bring about stability in global finance. The FSF which it 
replaced, was itself established in 1999 by the Ministers of Finance of the Group of Seven developed 
Nations (G7) and their Central Bank Governors, after the South-East-Asian financial crisis of 1996-
97. The first meeting of the earlier FSF was convened in Washington in April 1999.
103
 
According to the FSB, the Board will integrate three areas of international finance including; 
 
...national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant 
international financial centres, namely treasuries, central banks, and 
supervisory agencies; sector-specific international groupings of regulators 
and supervisors engaged in developing standards and codes of good 
practice; international financial institutions charged with surveillance of 
domestic and international financial systems and monitoring and fostering 
implementation of standard; committees of central bank experts concerned 





In 2008, in order to bolster the Forum‘s value as a medium through which organizations all over the 
world can tackle the problem of financial susceptibilities and build a strong and dynamic regulatory 
framework for international finance, the G20 Summit called for the expansion of the forum‘s 
                                                             






membership to accommodate other developing economies‘ interests. With this expansion, the Forum 
was re- launched as Financial Stability Board.
105
 
The mandate of the FSB is to: assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system and 
identify and oversee action needed to address them; promote co-ordination and information exchange 
among authorities responsible for financial stability; monitor and advice on market developments and 
their implications for regulatory policy; advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory 
standards; undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development work of the international 
standard setting bodies to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, focused on priorities, and 
addressing gaps; set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges; manage 
contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to systemically 





 FSB and Good Corporate Governance Standards 
 
In pursuing the objective of maintaining international economic stability, the FSB has engaged in the 
production of various instruments for the surveillance and regulation of the international financial 
system. One of such instruments is the 12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems. Standards are 
explained as those principles which are widely ‗accepted as representing minimum requirements for 
good practices‘ in countries.107  
Each of the key standards is under the supervision of  particular institutions and they are: 
Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies (IMF); Code of Good 
Practices in Fiscal Transparency (IMF); Special Data Dissemination Standard/General Data 
Dissemination System (IMF); Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights 
Systems (World Bank); Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD); International Accounting 





 See Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems <www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_standards.htm> 
accessed 24 April 2013 
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Standards (IASB); International Standards on Auditing (IFAC); Core Principles for Systemically 
Important Payment Systems (CPSS) and Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (CPSS-
IOSCO); The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and Nine Special 
Recommendations on financing terrorism (FATF); Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 




The 12 standard areas enumerated above have been selected by the FSB as fundamental for 
every sensible financial system in the world. According to the Board, these key areas are ‗deserving of 
priority implementation‘, depending on country situation and though there are differences ‗in terms of 
their degree of international endorsement,‘ the keys are generally acknowledged as indicative of 
‗minimum requirements for good practice.‘109  
It was concluded by the Board that success in implementing the international benchmarks will 
reinforce national economic arrangements, promote positive control and management, better 
transparency and efficiency of institutions, markets, and infrastructures. Again, the standards will 
‗promote international financial stability by facilitating better-informed lending and investment 
decisions, improving market integrity, and reducing the risks of financial distress and contagion‘.  110 
In this way, it is contended that the Board has succeeded in establishing a common threshold 
for all countries, irrespective of geographical or cultural differences. While it is conceded that the 
Board permits priority implementation to depend on country circumstances, the fact that the principles 
represent the ‗minimum requirements‘ for good practice, means that every country must attain that 
stipulated level. In other words every country must adhere to the standards as produced.
111
 
As a follow up to the publication of the standards, the World Bank, in conjunction with the 
International Monetary Fund, established the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
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(ROSCs) to ensure that countries observe the standards as approved by the FSB. As reported in the 
World Bank‘s website;  
 
The international community has emphasized the important role of 
international standards in strengthening the international financial 
architecture. In a world of integrated capital markets, financial crises in 
individual countries can imperil international financial stability. This 
provides basic public goods rationale for minimum international standards 
which would benefit both international and individual national systems.... In 
this connection, the IMF has invited the World Bank to embark on a joint 
pilot exercise preparing ‗Reports of the Observance of Standards and Codes’ 
(ROSCs). In this exercise, the two institutions are undertaking a large 
number of summary assessments of the observance of selected standards 
relevant to private and financial sector development and stability. These 




As part of the ROSCs project, the World Bank has launched a plan to aid member states reinforce 
their corporate governance structures. The purposes of the plan are;  to measure a country‘s ‗corporate 
governance framework and company practices against the OECD Principles for Corporate 
Governance‘; to support a country to build and execute its ‗action plan for improving institutional 
capacity with a view to strengthening the country‘s corporate governance framework‘; and to increase 
consciousness and knowledge of ‗good corporate governance practices amongst a country‘s public 
and private sector stakeholders‘. The Bank accomplishes this ‗corporate governance country 
evaluation‘ using a five parts guide, grounded on the OECD Principles.113 
These country assessments have been used to monitor the level of implementation of the 
FSB‘s standards by different countries. It is the responsibility of states to ensure that they ‗make the 
grade‘ in the assessment tests. In this way, they strive to comply with the neoliberal ideas contained in 
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the assessments.  Peer review reports are published regularly to assess the level of compliance with 
the standards by individual countries.
114
  
According to the Board, the reports; 
 
...form part of a regular programme of peer reviews of FSB member 
jurisdictions, which began with the publication of the peer review of Mexico 
in September 2010. The objective of FSB country peer reviews is to examine 
the steps taken or planned by national authorities to address IMF-World 
Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) recommendations 






From the foregoing, even though ‗good corporate governance‘ symbolizes 'universal principles', the 
classification proposed and adopted by the ROSCs relies on the Anglo-American model. The 
minimum requirement necessary for corporate governance compliance is none other than that 
formulated by the OECD (with the support of the World Bank) and which promotes the Anglo-
American shareholder value model. Conformity with the ROSCs is not voluntary, as non-conformity 
would transmit damaging indicators to the international community, resulting in potential resource 
flight and investment strike.
116




FSB and Corporate Governance: Deployment of the Panopticon  
 
 
The Financial Stability Board is established to provide regular meeting opportunities for state 
establishments responsible for international financial stability, in order to ‗enhance discussions about 
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the financial supervision and surveillance of economies‘.117 In the context of the supervision and 
surveillance of economies (including corporate governance), an interpretive analysis of the concept of 
surveillance, its liberal roots, and how it operates in the international financial architecture, is found in 
Vestergaard‘s The Asian Crisis and the Shaping of Proper Economies.118 According to Vestergaard, 
the concept is best understood by reference to Michel Foucault‘s analysis of Jeremy Bentham‘s 




From a regime of disciplinary power based on minute regulation and 
supervision of men and their affairs, the move from ‗state reason‘ to 
liberalism was a move towards a regime of disciplinary power founded upon 
a new modality of surveillance, the strength and economy of which resided 





By way of illustration,
121
 men are placed in a building in the periphery of a given space. A tower with 
a supervisor-in-residence is built in the centre of the space and the building in the periphery is divided 
into cells. The architecture of the peripheral structure and that of the central tower is designed in such 
a way that the inspector inside the tower is able to see what those in the cells are doing, without the 
inmates knowing whether he is there or not. Since these inmates do not know when or whether the 
inspector is watching, they are compelled to conform to set down rules, in order to avoid punishment. 
The strength of this ‗disciplinary‘ regime is that its exercise is simultaneously visible and unverifiable. 
By being unaware of whether or when the supervisor is watching, inmates will always behave as ‗as if 
surveillance were perpetual and total‘.122  
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The panopticist form of punitive control, not only offers functional rationality tending 




In workplaces, schoolrooms, hospitals and welfare offices; in the family and 
in the community; and in prisons, mental institutions, courtrooms and 
tribunals, the human sciences have established standards of ‗normality‘...The 
human sciences attempt to define normality; and by establishing this 
normality as a rule of life for us all, they simultaneously manufacture- for 






The normalizing society is accordingly established on a disciplinary power anchored on the double 
mode of binary division and coercive assignment. Binary division, in this case, brands things into 
normal/abnormal, mad/sane, dangerous/harmless, proper/improper, etc. Coercive assignment involves 
differential distribution of who he is, where he must be, how he is to be recognised and how 
surveillance is to be applied over a particular individual.
125
  
When this theoretical framework is applied to what obtains in the global financial 
architecture, the FSB has established standards which are good and those which are not, thereby 
instituting the proper standards and the improper ones. They also engage in the exercise of coercive 
assignments by defining what an economy is, how it should operate and be accounted for and how 




The panopticism in the international financial architecture consists of three key fundamentals, 
normalizing, surveillance and punishment. Under the normalizing stage, there emerges a distinct norm 
for the creation of proper economies. This culminates in the promulgation of standards for the 
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 The 12 key standards of sound financial systems as promulgated by the 




 At the surveillance phase, a far more comprehensive system of supervision is created and 
involves a three dimensional regulatory regime. First, national economies are under the surveillance 
of the international financial institutions, notably the IMF and the World Bank. Secondly, the private 
sector is under the surveillance of each member state and thirdly, the economy is under the 
surveillance of the market. This surveillance in the international financial architecture is undertaken 
by international financial institutions in conjunction with other bodies, including credit rating agencies 
such as Moody‘s and Standards and Poor.129 In this context, the Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSCs) become means through which the surveillance of national economies 
is perfected.  
As argued by Vestergaard, for the system of surveillance to operate effectively, every 
economic agent in the financial system must be rendered visible.  
 
This role of rendering economies visible is performed by a cluster of 
techniques, including high standards of financial accounting and disclosure, 
transparency reports and data dissemination standards. In terms of panopticism, 
these standards combine to produce the effect of backlighting necessary for the 





In the third fundamental of panopticism - punishment - a breach of the rules as handed down to the 
inmates in a panopticon incurs punishment. The same thing is applicable in the financial sector. Any 
breach of the ‗proper standards‘ set out by the principal actors will attract punishment. This is usually 
in the form of financial crisis as experienced, for instance, by countries in South-East Asia in 1996-97. 
Financial crisis becomes the method through which markets performing surveillance functions over 
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economies, punish erring participants. By means of its punitive movements in and out of economies, 
‗free capital‘ helps enforce compliance with its terms.131 
Taken together, the main objective of the FSF (now FSB) is to ‗achieve systemic stability by 
ensuring that emerging market economies adopt the rules of the global capital markets through 
adherence to free market principles, including free capital mobility‘.132 Put in another way, the main 
objective of the FSB appears to be the ‗neoliberalization‘ of world economies and the eventual 
domination of shareholder value. 
 
 
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 
After World War II, which followed the Great Depression, the post-war planners contracted to end the 
economic prejudice and isolationism which had characterised both the Great Depression and the inter-
war era and caused a significant decline in international trade. There was an eagerness on the part of 
allied participants to ensure the economic growth and development of nations globally. This intention 
was summed up by the US Secretary of the Treasury, who, in his closing remarks as the Chairman of 
the Bretton Woods Conference in July, 1944, stated that the fundamental condition under which 
commerce could flourish among nations, was to have a stable standard of international exchange 
rate.
133
 In pursuance of this objective, a new moderate economic system was designed to provide the 
fundamentals for world prosperity.
134
  
This led to the formation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The 
IMF was formed to re-establish the quantity of global commerce which took a considerable dip as a 
result of volatile national economies beginning from the 1930s, after states decided to discard the gold 
paradigm. A fund of currencies would be donated by member countries and from the pot; members 
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who are in need can withdraw the amount they require, to help rectify any balance of payment deficit 
in the economy. The agreed collective benchmark was the US currency (dollar) and this was 
exchangeable with Gold at a set price, with no limits.
135




Essentially, the Fund‘s purpose is set out in Article I of the Articles of Agreement and 
mandates it to promote international monetary cooperation among nations and facilitate the expansion 




In carrying out its functions under Article I, the Fund uses the pervading principles of 
surveillance and conditionality. It is argued that these principles of surveillance and conditionality are 
the two instruments through which the policy package of the Washington Consensus has been 
modified in favour of neoliberalism, after the East Asian financial crisis of 1996-97.
138
 
As a result of the enormous debt problems facing many countries, the IMF engages in a 
number of debt deferment and salvage operations. As a prerequisite for giving additional loans and 
special help, it usually requires reductions in government spending, engaging in fiscal policy 
discipline, stimulation of exports and initiation of self-sustaining projects.  These prerequisites are 
known as the conditionality principle, and any country wishing to obtain loans from the Fund has to 




On the other hand, the surveillance principle of the Fund empowers the institution to exercise 
full surveillance over the exchange rate policy of members and adopt measures for the guidance of 
these policies. The implication of this, it is suggested, is that the Fund shall supervise national 
economies to assess whether their policies are in harmony, not only with the country‘s own interest, 
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but also with the interest of the international community.
140
 Accordingly, ‗no narrow fence is to be 
drawn around the scope of scrutiny by the Fund, over the economic policies of member states‘.141 This 
process ensures that the organization carries out surveillance operations on countries in need of 
financial assistance, to ensure that neoliberal policies, including that of corporate governance, are 
continually implemented in their domestic legislations. 
 
 
The World Bank 
 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, commonly known as the World Bank 
was formerly established to assist in the rebuilding of Europe after the end of the Second World War. 
It now helps developing countries, not yet in the main stream, to develop by granting loans to them 
where it is impossible for them to secure such loans through the private sector. Its basic purposes 
include the alleviation of poverty in developing economies, the defence of the environment, and the 
encouragement of growth both in the private sector and in human supply.
142
 
Reconstruction of battered economies remains a significant aspect of the work of the World 
Bank. However, different challenges existing in the international financial framework requires the 
bank to concentrate on; poverty alleviation and the sustainable growth of the poorest countries, 
especially in Africa; solutions to the special challenges of post-conflict countries and fragile states; 
development solutions with customized services as well as financing for middle-income countries; 
regional and global issues that cross national borders- e.g. climate change, infectious diseases, and 
trade; greater development and opportunity in the Arab world; pulling together the best global 
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The IMF, the World Bank and the Imposition of Shareholder Value 
 
The historical facts surrounding these international financial institutions have been narrated – albeit 
briefly – in order to highlight the perceived contradictions between their founding principles and 
contemporary practice. The connection between these institutions today and neoliberalism appears 
very strong. As stated above, the IMF and the World Bank are the principal institutions mandated to 
ensure compliance with the 12 key standards of Sound Financial Systems, using the mechanism of 
ROSCs produced by the FSB. In conjunction with other organizations like the OECD, and rating 
agencies like Standards & Poor‘s, the World Bank ensures that countries comply with the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance.
144
 Many other standards are under the supervision of either the 
IMF or World Bank. In this way, the institutions act as watch dogs for the FSB.  
Again, the role of these financial institutions in proliferating neoliberal ideas is evidenced in 
the operational changes they have undergone in recent times. With the ascendancy of neoliberalism, 
the institutions jettisoned their ‗welfarist‘ leanings in favour of liberalization and deregulation. The 
introduction of SAPs are seen by many as the coercion (albeit subtly) of states in economic 
difficulties, into implementing neoliberal policies. According to Soederberg, regarding the IMF; 
 
Lately, however, there has been much concern not only about the increase in 
the actual number of conditionalities, especially over the past decade, but 
also about their overly intrusive, and thus largely ineffective quality. This 
later point is particularly salient in light of the Fund‘s new mandate to 






On the part of the World Bank, she submits that the Bank is able to fundamentally control the 
implementation of the ‗good corporate governance‘ principles in poor countries, by integrating the 
principles into its poverty reduction schemes. Beneficiary states are usually denied ‗poverty reduction 
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assistance‘, unless they demonstrate compliance with these principles, based strongly on the free 
market-oriented philosophy of Anglo-American neoliberalism.
146
 
In summary, any country in need of financial assistance has to comply with the dictates of 
these international institutions. There dictates, it is suggested, are no more than the application and 
entrenchment of the neoliberal economic framework, including that of corporate governance, in the 









Generally, the concept of corporations was alien to the pre-colonial Nigerian society and was only 
introduced towards the middle of the nineteenth century. The earliest corporations were mainly 
British firms, granted Royal Charters to trade in British protected territories. The most influential 
amongst them was the United African Company (UAC), recorded as the first modern MNC to trade in 
Nigeria. It was founded by George Goldie in 1879 and was granted royal concession to control trade 




Historically, the RNC was the most powerful business organization trading in the Niger River 
area in the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, before the RNC, there were considerable clusters of 
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less influential ‗rough-hewn British merchants‘ who engaged in the ‗triangular trade‘, buying slaves 
from West Africa and shipping them to the Americas and West indies.
148
 With the abolition of slave 
trade,
149
 these merchants began to buy raw materials from the West African coast and transport them 
to Britain and other parts of the western world.
150
 The raw materials included palm oil, ivories, 
copper, gold, cotton cloth, rubber, ground nuts, metal ornaments and leather goods.
151
 
According to Robin Law, these British corporations – especially the RNC – were vicious and 
cold-bloodedly competitive. They commonly used force to intimidate host-communities in order to 
obtain favourable trade conditions and on many occasions, resorted to outright brigandage to compel 
local obedience.
152
  In this context, it was alleged that pioneer British corporations were able to do this 
because of the freedom which colonial policies afforded them. The suggestion is that because of the 
‗historical link‘ between the merchants and colonial authorities, the former were allowed to operate 
under a ‗complimentary‘ legal regime and could easily request for the aid of the latter ‗militarily‘, 
against local communities suspected of impeding British trade. Thus, gun-boat diplomacy was 
commonly used by the British, to whip ‗dissident‘ host-communities into line.153  
The first recorded conflict between a Nigerian community and ‗a multinational corporation‘ 
occurred in 1895, between the Nembe community, in present day Niger Delta and the RNC. Available 
record suggests that the crisis was as a result of the community‘s refusal to sign a trade treaty 
proposed by the British, permitting the RNC to monopolize all commercial activities along the Nembe 
River, which would have alienated the community from access to ‗long-enjoyed‘ markets. The stand-
off generated a considerable amount of bad blood, culminating in the community‘s attack of the 
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MNC‘s headquarters at Akassa on 29 January 1895, destroying its equipment and taking many 
employees as hostages. In a reprisal attack on 20 February 1895, the British Royal Navy killed about 
300 villagers and totally destroyed the community.
154
 
The second MNC inspired ‗commercial war‘ in Nigeria occurred in 1904, in the Jos valley of 
present day Plateau State. Before oil was discovered, tin was the prominent natural reserve extracted 
in Nigeria. The RNC established a subsidiary
155
 to mine this mineral and logically, the indigenous 
communities were hostile to the corporation for interfering with their main source of livelihood.
156
 
The RNC, with the support of colonial administrators, ‗forcefully‘ invaded the community and 
expropriated local rights to mining tin in the area.
157
 
For Amaeshi and others, therefore, the significance of these conflicts is that the culture of 
exploitation by modern corporations in Nigeria could be traced to the earliest approaches of colonial 
corporations in their commercial dealings with local communities. As a result, the conflict between 




The number of recorded commercial disputes between local communities and foreign 
corporations reduced significantly towards the middle of the twentieth century, which incidentally 
was the time when oil was discovered in commercial quantities at Oloibiri, in present day Bayelsa 
State.
159
 This discovery led to a high influx of MNCs into the region, meaning that by the beginning 
of the 1970s, a considerable number of them were operating in the country‘s oil sector. Naturally, 
their activities significantly increased the quantity of oil produced for the Nigerian government, 
thereby making the country more dependent on oil exports for its continued subsistence. Many have 
suggested that the growth in oil business introduced bribes and financial fraud into the country‘s 
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In order to further investigate these points, this section shall now focus on the corporate 
governance framework regulating corporations in Nigeria. It begins with an evaluation of the various 
laws regulating corporate governance, contending in the process that an examination of these laws 
show that there are good reasons for thinking that the country‘s corporate governance framework 
mirrors the neoliberal Anglo-American model, with its shareholder value obsession discussed in 








It has been argued that the success of any country‘s corporate governance framework is usually 
determined by many aspects of the state‘s wider environment.162 These include the legislative 
environment, an effective and independent judiciary, as well as the broad environmental support for 
business.
163
 In this context, therefore, the legal system is an important determinant of a country‘s 
corporate governance structure.
164
 This argument holds true for many countries, not least Nigeria. 
Corporations registered and operating in Nigeria differ in size and structure, from the 
subsidiaries of big MNCs, to the small indigenous firms made up of only one or two shareholders. 
The activities of these firms stimulate the Nigerian economy in many aspects and have necessitated 
the establishment of processes through which their actions can be regulated, in order to protect the 
interests of all stakeholders. Nigeria‘s corporate governance structure is embedded in statutes and 
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through the promulgation of a variety of legislations; the federal government performs the critical task 
of moulding the country‘s corporate governance framework.165  
In this respect, the following sections will briefly trace the historical development of 




Colonial Legislations/ Post-Independence Companies Decree of 1968 
 
With the abolition of slave trade in the late nineteenth century, British slave merchants began to trade 
in ‗legitimate‘ goods. This trade, coupled with the subsequent establishment of Her Majesty‘s 
government over the entire Niger River area – with the stability it promised – led to the influx of more 
businesses and increased the volume of commerce within the region.
166
 In this context, it became 




Through colonial decrees made between 1876 and 1910, the English common law, the 
doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application in England on 1
st
 January 1900 were 
introduced to regulate commercial activities. For Amaeshi and others, this meant that the common law 
notions of separate and independent legal personality of corporations
168




As commercial activities developed and expanded, applicable colonial decrees began to prove 
ineffective in regulating corporate activities. In order to enhance the free-flow of commerce in the 
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region, colonial officials were compelled to review existing legislations, in order to bring them into 
conformity with prevailing economic conditions. The first full corporate legislation in Nigeria was the 
Companies Ordinance of 1912,
170
 which applied only to the Lagos area of Southern Nigeria.
171
 It was 
a local endorsement of the English Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908 and was in force for five 
years, before it was amended in 1917.
172
 Earlier in 1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates had 
been amalgamated by Lord Lugard
173
 to form Nigeria. The 1917 Act was subsequently repealed by 
the Companies Act of 1922.
174
 
The 1922 Act was in force till after the country‘s independence in 1960 and was eventually 
repealed by the Companies Decree of 1968. By this time, Nigeria had become an independent 
country
175
and wanted to remove the vestiges of colonialism apparent in its corporate law. It has been 
suggested that this was necessitated by the dominant ideological convictions of the post-colonial era, 
which emphasised the concept of economic self-dependence for the newly de-colonised country.
176
 
 Moreover, the national government argued that a new legislation was necessary to control the 
activities of foreign MNCs in the country. In pursuing this objective, the federal government 
introduced Part X in the 1968 Act; arguably to curb the perceived excesses of foreign MNCs.
177
 
Specifically, sections 368-370 stipulated that all corporations
178
 with established presence in Nigeria 
must register as Nigerian corporations. It is suggested that the introduction of Part X made foreign 
corporations (in theory at least) more accessible to government in issues of tax than when they were 
incorporated outside the country.
179
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However, Okike contends that despite the attempt to emphasize independence and economic 
self-determination by post-colonial military administrators, the 1968 Decree, ironically, still mirrored 





Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 
 
After 22 years, the 1968 Decree was eventually repealed by the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) 1990.
181
 It is the principal applicable corporate law in Nigeria presently, and is broadly 
divided into three parts; Part A deals with matters relating to incorporation, representative actions, 
membership, share capital and shares, debentures, meetings and procedure, directors and secretaries, 
protection of minorities against illegal and oppressive conduct, financial audits, dividends and profits, 
receivership and managers, winding up, arrangements and compromise and other miscellaneous 
matters. Part B deals with issues of incorporated trustees, while Part C deals with schedules.
182
 
It has been suggested that CAMA 1990 is largely fashioned along the lines of the UK 
Companies Act 1948.
183
 There is also a strong argument that it borrowed extensively from the 
provisions of the English Companies Act 1985.
184
 The influence of the two English Acts is most 
significant in the areas of the general rights of shareholders and the protection of minority 
shareholders. As such, shareholders in Nigeria practically enjoy the same rights as shareholders in the 
Anglo-American model of corporate law.
185
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Generally, features linking the Nigerian CAMA 1990 to the Anglo-American model include; 
the fact that the death of or transfer of a shareholder does not affect the corporate existence of the 
corporation (it enjoys perpetual succession);
186
 shareholders are the owners of the corporation;
187
 it is 
managed by its duly elected board of directors or/and officers;
188
 individual shareholders cannot bind 
the corporation by their acts, unless ratified by the corporation in a general meeting;
189
 corporations 
enjoy limited liability (the debts of the corporation are its debts, members are not liable personally);
190
 
and it has the capacity to sue or to be sued in its own name.
191
  
CAMA 1990 is principally regulated by the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), a body 
corporate with perpetual succession and common seal.
192
 The key functions of the Commission is 
contained in s. 7 (1) of the Act
193
 and include; the administration, advice, regulation and supervision 
of the formation, incorporation, registration, management and winding up of companies; to have 
registries and offices in all the states of the federation; and to arrange or conduct an investigation into 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms in Nigeria 
 
Apart from CAMA 1990, the Investments and Securities Act (ISA) 2007 is another legislation 
(though a subsidiary one) regulating corporate governance in Nigeria. The Act repealed the earlier 
Investments and Securities Act of 1999, which previously regulated the country‘s capital market and 
securities. Section 1of the 2007 Act establishes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to 
regulate investment and securities business in Nigeria. The Act empowers the Commission to carry 
out various functions in relation to the governance of corporations in the country. These functions 
include; to register and regulate securities exchanges, capital, trade points, futures, options and 
derivatives exchanges, commodity exchanges and any other recognized investment exchanges; to 
register securities to be offered for subscription or sale to the public; to render assistance in all aspects 
including funding as may be deemed necessary to promoters and investors wishing to establish 
securities exchanges and capital trade points; to prepare adequate guidelines and organise training 
programmes and disseminate information necessary for the establishment of securities exchanges and 
capital trade points; to register and regulate corporate and individual capital market operators as 
defined in section 30 of the Act; to  register and regulate the workings of venture capital funds and 





SEC’s 2011 Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
 
In order to comply with the requirements of the ‗universal‘ best practices in corporate governance 
mandated by international financial agencies such as the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank 
(discussed in section One above), the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), working 
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in partnership with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), produced the 2003 corporate 
governance code.
195
 The 2003 Code failed to sufficiently tackle emerging corporate governance 
challenges faced by corporations in the country and was eventually replaced by the 2011 Code of 
Corporate Governance in Nigeria.
196
  
The 2011 Code is a more comprehensive code of corporate governance, compared to the 2003 
Code. It applies to all corporations whose securities are listed on a recognized securities exchange in 
Nigeria, and all corporations seeking to raise funds from the capital market through the issuance of 
securities, or seeking listing by introduction.
197
 The SEC Code is not intended to be a rigid set of 
rules; it is intended to be seen and understood as a guide to facilitate sound corporate practices and 
behaviour. It is a dynamic document defining minimum standards of corporate governance expected 
particularly of corporations with listed securities in Nigeria. On the part of the corporations, the SEC 
code is voluntary and self-compliant, in line with contemporary global practice. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the code is voluntary and does not have the force of law, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission enjoins corporations in the country to comply with its provisions.
198
 
In pursuance of the earlier mentioned requirements for  universal best practices advocated for 
by the international financial institutions, Nigerian registered corporations, through the operations of 
the 2011 Code, are currently enjoined and have started adopting and implementing both the internal 
mechanisms – performance related pay and the appointment of NEDs – and external mechanisms – 
operations of markets for corporate control (MCCs) and the stock markets – which promote and 
embed shareholder value, as discussed in section One.  In this context, from the subsequent analysis 
contained in this section of the chapter, it appears reasonable to suggest that the practical barriers 
which operate against the realization of effective CSR are also present in Nigeria. 
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Executive Remuneration: Performance Related Pay Packages in Nigeria 
 
The 2011 Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria requires a significant proportion of the 
remuneration of senior management and executives to be tied to business performance.
199
 According 
to the Code, the performance measures need to be clearly defined and should be subject to periodic 
reviews to ensure that employees do not manipulate the scheme to their personal advantage.
200
 In this 
context, the SEC insists that there should be no gap in the administrative process that may create 
potential risk from a compliance perspective. According to the Commission, the over-riding interest 
of corporations in contemporary Nigeria should be one of accountability and change.
201
  
As contained in the 2011 Code, corporations are mandated to ‗develop a comprehensive 
policy on remuneration for directors and senior management‘, and the levels of remuneration should 
be sufficient to attract, motivate and retain skilled and qualified persons needed to run the 
corporations successfully.
202
 Furthermore, in relation to the process of determining directors‘ 
remuneration, the Code states that a corporation‘s remuneration policy should define both the criteria 
and mechanism for determining levels of remuneration, and the frequency for review of such criteria 
and mechanism; the policy should define a process, if necessary with the assistance of external 
advisers, for determining executive and non-executive directors‘ compensation; it should also define  
how and to what extent executive directors‘ reward should be linked to corporate and individual 
performances. It further requires the board to approve the remuneration of each executive director 
(including the CEO) individually, taking into consideration direct relevance of skill, experience and 
performance to the corporation at that time.
203
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According to Salisu, financially packaged incentives and other monetary rewards are 
frequently used by contemporary Nigerian registered corporations as motivations for better 
performance.
204
 To him, the current performance of Nigerian corporations is invariably connected to 
the type of employees‘ financial incentive systems implemented in the corporate sector.205 Arguing in 
similar vein, Babaita contends that beginning from the turn of the new millennium, corporations in 
Nigeria have actually come to take the tying of pay to performance quite seriously. According to him, 
it has become such an important subject-matter in the Nigerian corporate system that it is now 
presented as a major chapter in most corporations‘ Annual Reports and Accounts.206  
The elevated position attached to the tying of pay to performance is further evidenced in the 
fact that a significant number of Nigerian registered corporations clearly indicate that they are only 
prepared to employ those who are willing to meet set targets into their organizations. For most of 
these corporations, their continued survival in the current globally-competitive market-based economy 
can only be guaranteed through the utilization of performance related pay packages.
207
 
Again, it is argued that as a result of the losses suffered during the financial crisis of 2007-
2008, shareholders in Nigeria are more sensitive to issues of pay packages and are demanding to have 
more input in the remuneration of senior management and executives. Most organizations are, 
therefore, restructuring their remuneration packages to align them to performance and to include 
variable pay, or revising existing schemes to ensure they remain effective. According to these 
shareholders, it is important that organisations get their pay for performance programs right.
208
  
In pursuit of the mechanism of performance related pay packages, Maycock reports that most 
corporations in Nigeria (including those in the oil sector) now offer elements of variable pay or 
performance related pay packages to their employees. Variable pay or performance related pay, in this 
sense, means an element of pay which is dependent on organizational and individual performances. 
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Some of the performance related packages operational in the country include; prompt promotions; 
granting of staff loans for cars; houses, share purchase and options; land purchase loans; in-service 




Corporations apply variable pay as a result of different reasons. Some of the reasons adduced 
by Nigerian corporations for utilizing this corporate governance mechanism (much like what is 
obtainable in other parts of the world where the neoliberal shareholder value model of corporate 
governance is practiced)  include; to obtain and retain top performing employees, thereby reducing the 
turn-over of top employees.; to offer a competitive salary to employees according to their contribution 
to the profitability of the organization; to motivate employees to increase efforts towards their jobs 
and; to help the organization to save cost by paying only those who have performed extremely well 
and getting rid of those who fail to contribute to the bottom line of profit maximization, thereby 
helping the organizations to increase their profitability and market value.
210
  
In this sense, there is a significant relationship between incentive system and employee 
motivation in corporate Nigeria. Corporations hope that through the application of the performance 
related pay packages, they will enjoy improved employee productivity, which will lead to more 
profits for the shareholders.
211
 Accordingly, corporations in Nigeria consistently argue that the 
application of performance related pay packages would encourage corporate managers to meet set 
targets and expend extra efforts and energy towards achieving breathtaking results in all operations.
212
 
Incentive systems have, therefore, been put in place by most corporations at all levels and for 
all categories of employees, in order to ‗motivate them and ultimately enhance, maintain and sustain 
employee performance and by implication, shareholder profits. Corporate executives are thus 
pressurised into enhancing and maximizing shareholders‘ profits in order to enjoy the dividends of 
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performance related pay packages. Through the operations of this neoliberal corporate governance 
mechanism, corporate managers in Nigeria become subjected to shareholder value prioritization.
213
 
For these corporations, social and environmental goals, when and if they engage in them, 
must be to promote the interest of their share-owners and nothing else. For oil MNCs in the Niger 
Delta, executive remunerations have become increasingly tied to achieving targets set out in 
performance contracts. Those executives concerned about the welfare of the Niger Delta environment 
usually suffer financial losses as a result of their inability to maximize shareholder profits. Those who 
intend to benefit from enlarged pay packages have to cut costs, which leads to the cancellation of 
maintenance exercises for oil equipment and the non-replacement of old and out-dated machinery.
214
 
This naturally and inevitably has led to increased oil spills and pollutions, gas flaring, forest and 
community fires, environmental degradations, unemployment and eventual deaths.
215
  
By linking executing remuneration and bonuses to the performance of set targets, corporate 
executives in the Nigerian oil sector treat environmental issues as fuzzy objectives and not serious 
targets to be pursued. In this context, it is arguable that corporations in Nigeria (especially those in the 
oil sector) attach a considerable amount of importance to performance related pay as a strong weapon 
in the realization of shareholder value imperatives. The application of the neoliberal corporate 
governance mechanism of performance related pay packages, therefore, amounts to a practical barrier 
to effective CSR in Nigeria. 
 
 
Appointment of Non-Executive Directors 
 
Generally, the responsibility of directing and managing the affairs of a corporation is imposed on the 
board of directors, who act on behalf of the shareholders. Accordingly, Section 63 (3) of CAMA 1990 
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states that the board of directors is the sole organ of the corporation responsible for its management. 
Furthermore, section 244 (1) of the same Act provides that directors of corporations are ‗persons duly 
appointed by the company to direct and manage the business of the company‘. The Act is silent on 
what the day to day role of the director is, thereby making it the duty of the shareholders (usually in a 
general meeting) to determine what these roles are. The first directors are appointed by the subscribers 
to the memorandum and articles of association, while subsequent directors are appointed by the 
shareholders in a general meeting.
216
 
The implications of the above provisions of CAMA are two-fold. The first is that the Act 
supplies the means through which persons that claim to act as corporate directors can be identified. 
Essentially, the provision signifies that a person becomes the director of a corporation from the 
moment he is appointed as such by the shareholders (in a general meeting). In the second instance, 
from the wordings of section 244 (1) of CAMA 1990, a person becomes a director of a corporation 
once he/she is appointed to direct and manage the affairs of the corporation, notwithstanding the name 
that may be given to such an employee of the corporation. In these situations, once a person is in 
control of the day-to-day management of any corporation, he is a director of that corporation for the 
purposes of CAMA. It is immaterial that such a person assumes a different name or attaches a 
different title to his office.
217
 
Under CAMA 1990, there is no distinction between the duties of the executive directors and 
that of the NEDs. Interestingly, however, the Nigerian Court of Appeal in the case of Longe v First 
Bank of Nigeria Plc
218
 tried to introduce a distinction between the two by differentiating between 
executive directors and NEDs.  According to Salami JCA;  
 
The respondent‘s board in the instant case consists of two classes of 
directors, executive and non-executive. The non-executives are directors 
appointed directly under Sections 247, 248 and 249 of the Companies and 
Allied Matters Act, Cap. 59. The second tiers of directors are not employees 
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Furthermore, the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal, using the distinction above classified the 
NEDs as ‗employees‘ who owe their tenure of office to their contract of service, while the ‘executive 
directors are mere senior managers appointed by the board under the Articles of Association for 
governance and interest of running the company‘.220  
This distinction was, however, rejected by the Supreme Court in the same case on appeal and 
the apex Court stated the correct position of Nigerian law in this regard. The Court held that under 
CAMA, there is in fact no distinction between executive directors and NEDs. The court clearly made 
the pronouncement that ‗all directors whether executive or non-executive are the same as long as they 
are all engaged to direct and manage the business of the company‘.221  
The position of the Nigerian Supreme Court in the above stated case appears to have currently 
been overshadowed by the CA decision. This is because the Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission, in its oversight and supervisory role and for the purposes of properly implementing the 
provisions of CAMA, produced the 2011 Code of Corporate Governance, which introduced a 
distinction between executive and non-executive directors. The courts have not declared that the Code 
is illegal or contrary to the provisions of CAMA and it continues to be applied in Nigeria, even though 
in its voluntary form. 
 In the context of the 2011 Code and the appointment of NEDs, article 4.1 of the Code 
provides that the board of directors of corporations in Nigeria ‗should be of a sufficient size relative to 
the scale and complexity of the company‘s operations and be composed in such a way as to ensure 
diversity of experience without compromising independence, compatibility, integrity and availability 
of members to attend meetings‘. Going further, article 4.3 of the Code mandates corporations in 
Nigeria to ensure that their boards of directors are made up of a mix of executive directors and non-
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executive directors, with the non-executive directors being in the majority. The sub-article enjoins 
corporations to ensure that at least one of the non-executive directors should be an independent non-
executive director. The NED, being a director is also subject to the duties directors owe the 
corporation, both the duty of care and skill and fiduciary duties under common law and CAMA. 
In addition, the 2011 Code insists that the principal objective of corporate boards (which has 
to be made up of a majority of non-executive directors) is to preserve and enhance shareholder value. 
They are, therefore, legally empowered to make the needed commitments and take the necessary steps 
towards performing their role of maximizing shareholders‘ profits.  
According to the 2011 Code;  
 
The principal objective of the Board is to ensure that the company is 
properly managed. It is the responsibility of the Board to oversee the 






The phrase ‗enhance shareholder value‘ has been interpreted to mean that the directors of corporations 
in Nigeria are expected to maximize the interests of the shareholders before considering other 
interested parties who might have claims against the corporation.
223
 According to Adelegan, a study of 
the internal governance mechanisms utilized by Nigerian corporations found that many of them 
(especially those in the oil industry) currently employ a considerable number of non-executive 
directors. This suggests that a high proportion of NEDs are now engaged by oil corporations to 
monitor corporate activities and promote shareholders‘ interest in boards of corporations.224    
Thus, it can be inferred from the 2011 Code that although non-executive directors may 
consider the interests of other stakeholders who are affected by corporate activities, their overriding 
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function should be to act in the interests of shareholders. In this context, the mechanism of NEDs is 
used to promote shareholder value, which as was discussed in section one above, is antithetical to 
effective CSR. Viewed from this perspective, it appears reasonable to hold that the operations of 
NEDs in Nigeria amount to a practical barrier to effective CSR. 
 
 
Markets for Corporate Control (MCCs) in Nigeria 
 
As was discussed in section one above, the existence and operations of MCCs impose substantial 
discipline on corporate executives and compel them to manage corporations in favour of shareholders. 
It was argued in that section that MCCs are used to continuously monitor the activities of corporations 
and by implication their managers, in order to ascertain how efficient and effective they are in 
accumulating profits for shareholders. The disciplinary nature of these ‗free market‘ imperatives 
places an objective value on the corporations and compels obedience to the dictates of shareholder 
value. This is because the daily performance of a corporation‘s shares in the stock market is a 
transparent reminder to managers and shareholders that the corporation is either viable or in-viable 
and as a result, whether it should be subjected to a take-over bid or acquisition. This assessment 
allows shareowners to scrutinize and gauge the performance of managers and the pressure this exerts 
on corporate managers incentivizes them to strive to minimize costs and increase profits, since failure 
to do so will make them vulnerable to takeovers. An active market for corporate control (MCC), 
therefore, helps to keep managers focused on efficiency and shareholder value maximization. 
Prior to the intensified activities of the MCCs in Nigeria, the first recorded take-over of a 
corporation by another in Nigeria was the acquisition of African Banking Corporation in 1894 by the 
British Bank for West Africa (now First Bank of Nigeria Plc). In more recent times, however, the 
purchase of Leventis Stores by the AG Leventis Co. Ltd in 1983 marked the beginning of the 
operations of MCCs in the country. Thereafter, in 1984, Lever Brothers Nigeria Plc also acquired 
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Lipton Nigeria Ltd and in the same year, Union Bank of Nigeria purchased and took over the 
management of Citi Trust Merchant Bank in 1995.
225
  
The Nigerian corporate sector has gone through a considerable degree of transformation as a 
result of the operations of the markets for corporate control (MCCs). It is imperative to note that 
compared to other markets in the developed world, the volume of trade in the Nigerian MCC is small 
and volatile. This is because a lot of institutional and individual investors were (and a significant 
number appears to still be) unaware of the existence and operations of the market, even after the 
introduction of CAMA 1990. Nevertheless, the activities of the market have grown considerably in 




Beginning from the new millennium, there was a significant increase in the operations of 
MCCs in Nigeria, leading to more take-overs and acquisitions by corporations in the country. This 
intensified wave of corporate acquisition (especially in the banking sector) was mainly as a result of 
the Bank Consolidation exercise which was introduced by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
Governor in 2004. The consolidation process forced withdrawal of banking licences from institutions 
that were unable to achieve the new paid-up capital of N25 billion (US$131.1 million). Out of the 25 
banks that achieved the required threshold for consolidation, fourteen of them were the product of 
acquisitions involving sixty nine banks.
227
  
Even after 2004, the wave of acquisitions did not subside, but rather continued. In this 
context, after the expiration of the deadline for bank consolidations on 31 December 2005, Stanbic 
Bank of Nigeria Limited acquired the IBTC Bank Plc in 2006. As a result, the number of banks in 
Nigeria was further reduced from 25 in 2004 to 24 in 2006.
228
 Even those banks that were not able to 
re-capitalize at the time and where subsequently earmarked for liquidation by the banking regulatory 
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authorities were eventually acquired by successfully recapitalized banks.
229
 In January 2012, Access 
Bank Plc acquired the former Intercontinental Bank Plc, thereby creating an expanded bank and 
becoming one of the four largest banks in Nigeria.
230
  
In the Nigerian oil industry, there are no recorded acquisitions or take-overs by the 
corporations registered in the country. However, it is noted that there have been a series of mergers 
between the parent corporations of the subsidiaries operating in Nigeria. For instance, the US 
corporations of Exxon and Mobil merged and now have its ExxonMobil subsidiary in Nigeria. 
Similarly, Elf merged with Total to produce Total Plc, which is the subsidiary corporation registered 
in Nigeria. Though there are no recorded take-overs and acquisitions between oil MNCs in Nigeria, it 
is argued that the same pressures which the markets exert on other corporations are equally applicable 
to these oil corporations. According to Sanusi (a former CBN Governor), prevailing economic 
sentiments – which mandates all corporations (including oil corporations) in the country to be subject 
to the powers of the markets – have encouraged the rapid and explosive growth in the operations of 
MCCs in contemporary Nigeria.
231
  
The contention, therefore, is that the operations of the markets for corporate control have 
become the overriding determinant of how corporations are acquired in Nigeria and are now used to 
facilitate shareholder value through the expansion of efficient and effective ‗acquiring‘ activities. 
Furthermore, in the bid to prevent hostile acquisitions and takeovers, corporate managers (including 
those in the oil sector) are pressurized into pursuing activities that enhance the market value and 
future earnings of their corporations. In prioritizing the interest of shareholders, other interests in 
Nigeria, including those represented by CSR, are neglected. In this way, the activities of the MCCs 
constitute practical barriers to the realization of effective CSR. 
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The Nigerian Stock Market 
 
As was stated earlier, the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established to 
protect investors and promote the growth and development of the capital market in Nigeria. It is the 
apex regulatory organ of the Nigerian stock market.
232
 The Nigerian stock market was established in 
1960, as the Lagos Stock Exchange and was subsequently converted to the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) in 1977, with different branches later opening at different locations across the country. Kaduna 
branch was opened in 1978, Port Harcourt in 1980, Kano in 1989, Onitsha in February 1990 and 
Ibadan in August 1990. The NSE is self-regulatory and supports the SEC in the supervision of 
securities markets by exercising a degree of control through its financial reporting and disclosure 
rules, which apply to listed corporations.
233
 
The Nigerian stock market (similar to what is obtainable in other jurisdictions) is a market 
where listed corporations are permitted to raise capital. This market is often referred to as a primary 
market and operates by allowing shares to be issued for the first time to the public. There is also a 
secondary market in the stock exchange, where shareholders are permitted to trade in shares of listed 
corporations through the buying and selling of already existing shares.  
As Anyanwu suggests, the Nigerian stock market supplies the ‗necessary lubricant‘ that aids 
in the rotation of the wheel of the country‘s economy. For him, ‗it not only provides the funds 
required for investment, but also efficiently allocates these funds to projects of best returns to fund 
owners‘.234 This distributive function is essential in defining and shaping the growth of the economy 
as a whole, because ‗the functioning of the capital market affects liquidity, acquisition of information 
about firms, risk diversification, savings mobilization and corporate control‘.235 
                                                             
232 M.A. Babatunde and O. Olaniran (n 226) 331 
233 Ibid, 
234
 Pat Donwa and James Odia, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of the Nigerian Capital Market on Her 
Socio-Economic Development’ (2010) Journal of the Social Sciences Vol.24 (2) 135-142  
235
 J.C. Anyanwu, ‘Stock Market Development and Nigerian Economic Growth’ (1998) Nigerian Financial 
Review, 7(2) 6-13 
266 
 
The introduction of the SAPs in Nigeria (discussed in chapter Three) has resulted in a very 
significant growth in the country‘s stock market. The operations of the SAPs directly led to the 
deregulation of the financial sector and the privatization exercise which exposed both investors and 
corporations to the disciplinary imperatives of the stock market.
236
 
With the ascendancy of neoliberalism in the international financial architecture and the 
introduction of neoliberal reforms across different economic sectors in Nigeria, the total number of 
listed securities increased from nine in 1961 to 52 in 1971 and 71 in 1978. It also increased from 157 
in 1980 to 276 in 1994, but declined to 260 in 2000, and then increased again to 277 in 2004, with an 
average annual growth rate of 17 per cent for the entire period. As at 2009, the aggregate quantity of 
listed corporations stood at 214.
237
 
The value of shares traded in 2009 was N262.94 billion (US$2.023 billion), while the value of 
new issues approved was N282.3 billion (US$2.172 billion). Market capitalization in 2009 stood at 
N2.9 trillion (US$22.308 billion), while new issues as a proportion of GDP was 5 per cent on average 




Additional economic reforms were introduced by the civilian government of Obasanjo in 
2004. The reforms led to intensified corporate activities in the stock market beginning from 2006. As 
a result, there was increased recourse to the stock market by corporations and this led to a sustained 
market performance on the stock exchange.
239
 In this context, there was a further revitalization of the 
Nigerian stock market after 2006. Essentially, the total market value of securities listed on the stock 
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In the preceding section one of this chapter, it was argued that in the corporations of the 21
st
 
century, corporate power is predominantly exercised through the arms-length mechanism of the 
market. Essentially, the operations of the stock market equates to a form of regulation which unites 
concentration with liquidity and enables financial power to wield a strong disciplinary power over 
market actors. Through the operations of the stock markets in Nigeria, therefore, the disciplinary 
power of the market is brought to bear on corporations (as market actors) and corporate managers are 
pressurized into pursuing shareholder profits and keeping the price of corporate shares as high as 
possible. In doing this, considering the interests of other stakeholders by engaging in effective CSR 
becomes a distant objective and is de-prioritized. This is because engaging in a moral imperative such 
as effective CSR invariably impinges on corporate profits and will inevitably decrease the value of 
corporate shares in the stock markets. In this context, therefore, the operation of the stock market in 
Nigeria acts as a barrier to the realization of effective CSR. 
 
 
Foreign Corporations and CAMA 1990 
 
Foreign corporations are permitted to carry-on business in Nigeria. Under section 54 of CAMA 1990 
(subject to sections 56-59), every foreign firm, with the intention of carrying on business in Nigeria, 
shall register a separate entity in the country. Until this is done, the firm shall not carry-on business, 
exercise any of the powers of a registered corporation or have a place of business in Nigeria. The 
foreign corporation is only permitted have an address for the receipt of documents and other notices.  
However, foreign corporations may incorporate a branch or subsidiary by giving a power of 
attorney to a qualified solicitor in Nigeria for this purpose. The incorporation documents, in this 
instance, would disclose that the solicitor is merely acting as an ―agent‖ of a ―principal‖ whose names 
should also appear on the document. The power of attorney comes to an end and the appointed 
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solicitor terminates all functions, once the registration paperwork is completed. The locally 
incorporated branch or subsidiary will then register with the Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission (NIPC) before commencing official business. The subsidiary may also apply to the NIPC 
for other investment approvals – like expatriate quota – and incentives.241  
Foreign corporations can apply (to the National Council of Ministers) for exemption from the 
requirements stated above, if they have been invited to Nigeria by or with the approval of the federal 
government to execute a specific project; are in Nigeria to execute a specific loan project on behalf of 
a donor country or international organization; are corporations owned by foreign governments and are 
engaged solely in export promotion activities; are engineering consultants and technical experts 




Any application made to be exempted from the above stipulation has to be made in writing 
and addressed to the Secretary of Government and should include the name and place of business of 
the foreign corporation outside Nigeria; the name and place of business or the proposed name and 
place of business of the foreign corporation in Nigeria; the name and address of each director, partner 
or other principal officer of the foreign corporation; a certified copy of the charter, statutes, or 
memorandum and articles of association of the corporation or any other documents that defines the 
constitution of the corporation (if the document is not in English, then a certified translation is 
required); the names and addresses of one or more person(s) resident in Nigeria that are authorised to 
accept notices on behalf of the foreign corporation; the business or proposed business of the foreign 
corporation in Nigeria and the duration of such business; the particulars of any project previously 
carried out by the corporation as an exempted foreign company and finally, any other particulars that 
may be required by the Secretary to the Government.
243
 
The provision of section 54 is exclusive to the Nigerian Act and was introduced in the legal 
jurisprudence of the country‘s corporate law in the 1968 Companies Act. This provision does not exist 
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in any of the English Company Acts from which it borrowed many of its provisions. Thus, in 
England, a foreign corporation has no obligation to re-register before commencing business, but only 
has to submit the names and addresses of the persons permitted by it to accept services on its behalf 
with the Registrar of companies.
244
 A corporation is only required to register in the UK before doing 




Commenting on the local incorporation provision of the Nigerian Act, Amao states that the 
worrying characteristic of the said section 54; 
 
...is that it makes it easier for the parent company of the [multinational 
corporation] subsidiary in Nigeria to deny liability for any adverse 
consequences of the operations of the subsidiary, since the subsidiary is 
incorporated and legally recognised as a Nigerian company. This argument was 
canvassed in a suit brought by a community in the oil producing area against 





In the case in question, Mobil Producing (Nig) Unlimited and another V Monokpo
247
 a group of Niger 
Delta citizens had instituted a case against Mobil Producing USA (the parent corporation) and Mobil 
Producing Nigeria Unlimited (the Nigerian subsidiary) for ecological damage and injurious affection 
as a result of the former‘s operations in the region. They claimed for special and general damages for 
shock, inconveniences, loss of amenities, cost of surveys and expert reports. In the course of the 
hearing, the parent corporation brought a motion for dismissal of the plaintiffs' case against it on the 
ground that the plaintiffs on the pleadings and the evidence led, disclosed no cause of action against 
the parent corporation. The Supreme Court, while agreeing with the parent corporation, held that only 
a party who is interested in a judgment can be a party to it. Having found that the parent corporation 
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has no interest in the matter, since the Nigerian subsidiary was incorporated according to the 
provisions of section 54, the parent corporation cannot in law be a party to the case. 
Again, the provision may hamper the chances of Nigerian indigenes who may want to file for 
compensation in the home jurisdictions of the parent corporations of the subsidiaries. It is argued that 
the significance of this provision in the Nigerian corporate governance framework or what it is meant 
to achieve is not clear.
248
 Its inclusion is even more surprising considering that – as is obtainable in 
other common law jurisdictions – these MNCs are already subject to the jurisdictional authority of the 
Nigerian state by virtue of their operating in the country. According to Amao, when it is considered 
that section 60 of the Act has already given corporations the capacity to sue and be sued in the country 
– in their name or by their agents –  the provisions of section54 become superfluous.249 
Adoga agrees and states that the provisions of the CAMA (especially section 54, dealing with 
foreign corporations) are limited and inadequate to appropriately regulate and manage foreign MNCs 
and their incorporated subsidiaries in Nigeria. According to him, complicated multinational ownership 
arrangements are used by MNCs to evade tax payment obligations and CAMA‘s inadequacies are the 
major reasons why MNCs manipulate the country‘s national laws and regulations, evade operational 
transparency and deny liability for acts of subsidiaries.
250
 
Notwithstanding this strong criticism of section 54, it is suggested that the major flaw which 
undermines the effectiveness of the Act as a whole, is that it has become out-dated. According to 
Adegbite and Amaeshi; 
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It is even more important to note that the CAMA has not undergone an 
extensive review since 1990, two decades later. Thus there are increasing 
concerns with regards to the ability of the Act to tackle specific corporate 





The World Bank supports this statement. In its country Report on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSCs) 2011, the organization stated that many of the provisions of CAMA 1990 fall short 





CAMA and Corporate Governance in Nigeria: A Practical Barrier to Effective 
CSR? 
 
In the context of the discussion above, it appears reasonable to conclude that there are significant 
reservations regarding the extent to which the Anglo-American corporate governance framework is 
effective in the Nigerian situation. Since the Nigerian corporate legal structure is a mirror-image of 
the Anglo-American system in theory, Okike submits that it will be considered imprudent for one to 
‗believe that the Nigeria corporate governance framework‘ favours – in application and practice – the 
efficient allocation of resources.
253
  
As was argued above, the main provisions of CAMA 1990 mirror the neoliberal Anglo-
American shareholder value maximization model discussed in section one. The contention in that 
section was that the existence of various mechanisms which embed and promote shareholder value act 
as practical barriers to effective CSR. Since the Nigerian framework reflects the Anglo-American 
model, it appears reasonable to conclude that these mechanisms exist in the Nigerian situation, 
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rendering it unlikely that CSR in its contemporary form will do much to resolve the problems found in 
the Niger Delta.  
In this context, it is submitted that the Anglo-American corporate governance framework in 
Nigeria appears utterly deficient in grasping indigenous challenges and ways of tackling them. For 
Adegbite and others, the country‘s corporate governance framework does not allow for variety in its 
application; the result is a ‗forceful legitimization of the Anglo-American (shareholder) variant of 
corporate governance‘, and the attendant favouring of foreign capital.254  
These challenges are worsened by endemic and prevalent ‗corruption, political instability, bad 
leadership, ethnic rivalry and religious tensions‘.255 These are serious drawbacks which have 
permeated all facets of the Nigerian economy, lead to abuse and defilement of the system and an 







This chapter has been able to identify a second set of barriers that confront the supporters of effective 
CSR – the practical barriers. It argued that the implication of the belief that corporations should profit 
maximize finds expression in the claim that corporate governance is a simple agency problem: how do 
you get corporate managers to act in the interests of inactive and often dispersed shareholders? To this 
end, the chapter explored the various mechanisms which have been developed to solve this agency 
problem. While some of the mechanisms are internal to the corporation – performance related pay and 
the use of Non- Executive Directors to monitor managers – others are external to it – the stock 
markets and the MCCs. It argued that these mechanisms have incentivized managers to maximize 
shareholder value and get the share price of their corporations as high as possible. The resulting model 
                                                             
254 E Adegbite, K Amaeshi and C Nakajima, ‘Multiple influences on corporate governance practice in Nigeria: 
Agents, Strategies and Implications’ (2013) International Business Review Vol.22 524–538 at 533 
255
 ibid  
256Other subsidiary legislations regulating the operations of MNCs in Nigeria include the Investment and 
Securities Act (CAP 124) LFN 2004; the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Cap F34) 
LFN 2004; and the Immigration Act (Cap 171) 1990 
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of corporate governance, which is essentially the Anglo-American stock-market based model, is 
promoted and supported by international organizations like the OECD, FSB, IMF and the World 
Bank.  
The chapter, in section two, also explored the Nigerian corporate governance framework and 
argued that there are good reasons for thinking that the country‘s corporate governance framework 
mirrors the neoliberal Anglo-American shareholder value model, with its practical barriers to effective 
CSR discussed in section one. In this context, the chapter concludes with the contention that the 
operations of these corporate governance mechanisms constitute major practical barriers to effective 









In chapter Three, the main ideological barriers to effective CSR – neoliberalism and shareholder value 
– were discussed. Chapter Four dealt with the various corporate governance mechanisms used to 
embed shareholder value. These mechanisms incorporate practices and cultures that act as practical 
barriers to the realization of effective CSR. In this concluding chapter of Part Two, the aim is to 
highlight another barrier to the realization of effective CSR, both in the Niger Delta and at the 
international level: the re-asserted power of finance. It represents the ability of a powerful group of 
financial interests
1
 – in their quest for personal wealth accumulation – to politically stifle any intended 
policy decision towards ‗the collective good‘, including effective CSR. 2  
As was discussed in chapter Three, there are good reasons for thinking that the ideas of 
neoliberalism and shareholder value are fundamentally antithetical to any engagement with 
meaningful or transformative CSR. This is because effective CSR tilts towards collectivism, while 
shareholder value – rooted in the neoliberal free market imperative – promotes individualism. It was 
                                                             
1
 In the context of this thesis, the re-asserted power of finance describes a powerful group of financial 
interests who rose to prominence with the ascendancy of neoliberalism as an economic theory.  It is necessary 
to point out, however, that even though they all support shareholder value, these interests are by no means a 
homogenous group; their interests vary. This powerful group includes shareholders, financial institutions, 
corporate CEOs and senior executives. For Dobbin and Zorm, the interests that benefit from shareholder value 
include; managers of hostile takeover firms who, through their activities in markets for corporate control 
(MCCs), focus corporations’ attention on realizing shareholder value; institutional investors who, by focusing 
management attention on earnings through popularizing stock options, see ‘earnings management’ as the best 
means of increasing shareholder value; and securities analysts who aggressively market their ‘profit 
projections’ as the dominant statistics of corporate performance, thereby making a lot of money for 
themselves in the process. These three were able to convince corporate executives that it is in their interest to 
manage share price. They were also able to convince shareholders that they stood to gain more after hostile 
take-overs and that they benefited more when firms manage earnings instead of expansion through 
diversification; See F Dobbin and D Zorn, ‘Corporate Malfeasance and the Myth of Shareholder Value’ in DE 
Davis, Political Power and Social Theory Vol. 17 (Cambridge, MA: MIT 2005) 179-198 
2
 Ismail Erturk, Julie Froud, and others, ‘Deep Stall: The Euro Zone Crisis, Banking Reforms and Politics’ (2012) 
Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC) Working Paper Series No. 110 45 
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suggested that it will be quite challenging to realize the ‗general interests‘ embodied in CSR, in a 
system dominated by ‗entrenched special interests‘ exemplified by shareholder value.3 
It was also argued that the strengthening of the power of financial elites by international 
organizations, through the promotion of neoliberal economic policies, and the concurrent 
‗disempowerment of the critics of finance‘, through the introduction of a string of democratic 
disengagements, has led to ‗a stifled revolution and the re-assertion of power by traditional elites‘.4  
The contention was that beginning from the 1980s; national governments began to sponsor 
and protect finance, through the processes of deregulation and privatization. The deregulation of the 
stock markets and the implementation of an extensive privatization process made it easy for finance to 
increasingly move freely around the world, and contributed to the creation of gigantic financial 
institutions. Through the process of globalization, the institutions created were able to spread and 
dominate world economies. The ‗socially and geographically narrowly confined elite‘, which this 
form of developmental process produced, established a ‗cosy‘ relationship with government officials 
and policy makers. With the use of lobby and sundry pecuniary inducements,
5
 these financial elites 
have been able to influence government policies towards the protection of their special interests.
6
  
This aligns with the argument that the first requirement of financial power is to create 
powerful and sophisticated lobbying networks which will connect financial elites with government 
policy-makers.
7
 Through the ‗slick‘ operations of this network, governments ostensibly ceased to be 
‗the suspicious or adversarial regulator of a dangerous financial sector‘ and now became ‗the sponsors 
of an apparently successful‘ financial elite.8 
                                                             
3
 ibid  
4 Julie Froud and others, ‘Groundhog Day: Elite Disconnects and the Failure of Financial Reform in the UK’ 
(2011) Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC) Working Paper Series No. 108 5 
5 Especially in developing economies like that of Nigeria 
6 Julie Froud (n 4) 15 
7
 Andrew Bowman and others, ‘Business Elites and Undemocracy in Britain: a Work in Progress’ (2013) Centre 
for Research on Socio-Cultural Change (CRESC) Working Paper Series No. 125 18 
8
 Andrew Bowman and others, ‘The Finance and Point Value-Complex’ (2012) Centre for Research on Socio-
Cultural Change (CRESC) Working Paper Series No. 118 12 
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The support and protection of these financial interests continued even after the global 
economic recession of 2007-2008.
9
 Through the use of a well-oiled lobby system, this financial class 
was able to influence policy makers and limit attempts to regulate financial activities.
10
 As Froud and 
others submit, in the UK for instance;  
 
After 2008, the British economy moved into an L shaped recession and 
every elite assumption about the world and the national economy was 
discredited, but our national political and policy elites managed to retain 
control of everything that mattered to the exercise of their power in 
financialized capitalism. Specifically, the primacy of shareholder value was 
never challenged; the changes to the regulatory system continued to be 





In view of the foregoing, therefore, this chapter is concerned with neoliberalism, not as an ideology 
but as a practical political project, aimed at furthering the interests of a class. The argument is that SV 
is championed by this class as a means of perpetuating their monopoly of international finance – 
maximizing shareholder profits to their advantage. This political project is what has been labelled 
‗financial power‘ or ‗the power of resurgent finance‘.12 It is believed that the apparent dominance of 
SV in the international financial system would not have been possible without the existence and 
influence of this powerful interest group, whose reach and power took on frightening dimensions with 
the rise to prominence of neoliberalism. The existence of this capitalist elite – with a strong bias for 
capital accumulation – and their ability to influence government decisions, will always act as a barrier 
to the realization of effective CSR. This is because both concepts are directed by different 
imperatives. 
To this end, section one of the chapter begins with the concept of globalization and the 
argument that globalization aids the neoliberal class project. It will then go on to look at how 
international organizations have promoted and protected the interests of this powerful group through 
                                                             
9 This is against the widely held belief that the recklessness of the financial sector contributed in no small 
measure to the crisis. 
10
 Andrew Bowman ‘Business Elites and Undemocracy in Britain’ (n 7) 19 
11 Julie Froud (n 4) 6-7 
12
See  Paddy Ireland, ‘Financialization and Corporate Governance’ (2009) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly Vol. 
60 (1) 4 
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policies contained in the Washington Consensus and the later Post-Washington Consensus.
13
 The 
section will trace the evolution and transformation of these policy decisions into what Gill and 
Schneiderman labels ‗disciplinary neoliberalism‘ and ‗the new constitutionalism‘ respectively.14 The 
contention is that through the process of disciplinary neoliberalism or the new constitutionalism, the 
neoliberal economic project transforms into a political project for the protection of financial interests.  
The section will also look at the contemporary activities of corporate managers, whose 
activities, by virtue of their becoming part of the share-holding class – made possible by the 
introduction of managerial performance related pay – arguably constitute a barrier to effective CSR. 
In section two of the chapter, the application of the new constitutionalism in Nigeria and how 
this has created a class of financial elites fundamentally opposed to the realization of effective CSR 
will be discussed. The chapter will finally examine the problem of institutional corruption in the 
country and will argue that the ‗slick alliance‘ between oil corporations and the Nigerian government 











                                                             
13 This modification became necessary as a result of the South-East-Asian financial crisis of 1996-1997 
14 This concept is discussed below; See also Stephen Gill, The Constitution of Global Capitalism (Paper 
presented to a Panel: The Capitalist World, Past and Present at the International Studies Association Annual 
Convention, Los Angeles, 2000) 
<www.uv.es/~mperezs/intpoleco/Lecturcomp/Geoeconomia%20y%20Globalizacion/Constitution%20of%20Gl
obal%20Capitalism%20S%20Gill.pdf> accessed 20 October 2013; David Schneiderman, ‘Investment Rules and 








 NEOLIBERALISM AND THE RE-ASSERTED 
POWER OF FINANCE 
 
Before looking at the re-asserted power of finance (or neoliberalism in practice), it is necessary to 
examine a closely related phenomenon which helped in spreading this movement internationally – 
economic globalization. Economic globalization, in this context, is taken to mean the ability of capital 
to move freely and rapidly around the world. Neoliberalism and economic globalization are so 
connected that they are sometimes mistaken as one and the same thing. Treanor asserts that economic 
globalization has been labelled by many, as an ideologically neutral term for the re-asserted power of 
finance and that both has been used interchangeably.
16
  
Economic globalization has become a popular catchphrase in recent years. In the 
contemporary world, ‗politicians, government officials, business people, trade unionists, 
environmentalists, church leaders, public health experts, third world activists, economists and 
lawyers‘ have all become experts in the field of economic globalization. The notion of globalization – 
especially economic globalization – is seen by many as a major ‗defining feature of the Post-Cold 
War World‘.17 
According to Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, economic globalization is 
‗the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the 
enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial 
                                                             
15Globalization is a tricky and controversial concept. It means different things to different people. In the 
context of this thesis, it is taken to mean the freedom of finance and the liberalization of capital across 
boundaries and territories. It is the lifting of the ban on capital and the ability of finance to move freely and 
rapidly around the world. 
16
 Paul Treanor, ‘Neoliberalism: Origins, Theory and Definition’ (2005) 
<http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/neoliberalism.html> accessed  1 April, 2013 
17
Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation (2
nd
 Edition, London: Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 3 
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barriers to the flow of goods, services, capital, knowledge and (to a lesser extent) people across 
borders‘.18 Thomas Friedman similarly defines it as;  
 
The inexorable integration of markets, nation states and technologies to a 
degree never witnessed before - in a way that is enabling individuals, 
corporations and nation states to reach around the world farther, faster, 
deeper, cheaper than ever before and in a way that is enabling the world to 
reach into individuals, corporations and nation-states, farther, faster, deeper 





From the above definitions, one can deduce that it is a move towards the gradual but steady 
assimilation of national economies, such that there will be only one global, borderless economic 
regime.
20
 Stiglitz accepts the fact that there are benefits derivable from economic globalization. 
According to him; 
 
...opening up to international trade has helped many countries grow far 
(more) quickly than they would otherwise have done. International trade 
helps economic development when a country‘s exports drive its economic 
growth. Export led growth was the centre piece of the industrial policy that 
enriched much of Asia and left millions of people there far better off. 
Because of globalisation, many people in the world now live longer than 
before and their standard of living is far better... Globalisation has reduced 
the sense of isolation felt in much of the developing world and has given 
many people in the developing countries access to knowledge well beyond 
the reach of the even the wealthiest in any country a century ago...Even 





The suggestion is that there is indeed a connection between neoliberalism and economic globalization. 
In the past two centuries, capitalism was almost associated with nationalism. There were native 
markets, bounded territories and strong protection from the state. During its formative years, the UK 
and the US dictated the pace and set the rules as to how capitalism should be practiced. In recent 
                                                             
18 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontents (London: Penguin Books 2002) 9 
19Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and The Olive Tree: Understanding Globalisation (2nd Edition, New York: First 
Anchor Books 2000) 9 
20Van Den Bossche (n 17) 4; This is achieved through free trade on an international scale and an unrestricted 
(but usually state protected) foreign direct investment 
21
 J Stiglitz (n 18)  12 
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years, however, the role of national governments
22
 in the operations of the principle of capitalism has 
been drastically whittled down by capitalist actors. Except in those instances where the coercive 
powers of the state are needed to advance or protect the interests of capital, the role of governments 
has become minimal and almost extinct.
23
  
According to Burgi and Gollub; 
 
 Globalization is said to be making the nation state obsolete, politics 
irrelevant and national sovereignty an empty shell. This alleged demise of 
the nation state and national sovereignty is part and parcel of the Universalist 
claims of contemporary capitalism. For the first time in history, capitalism 
has spread its reach to the remotest parts of the world and posits itself as a 
global system. Neither British capitalism in the 19th century nor even the 
American Post-1945 version was truly universal. Today, capitalism is said to 
have finally broken away from its national moorings. It has become, as it 




Furthermore, they argue that the current character of national governments can be described as ‗at 
best, just one among a number of otherwise private players in the international system (and) at worst, 
to have lost control altogether and to be no longer capable of influencing the course of events‘.25 In 
this sense, with the intensified globalizing trend, national governments have become mere spectators 
in the daily affairs of human existence (except where capitalist interests are to be protected). They 
watch indifferently as the balance of power shifts away from them, towards the globalized markets. 
With globalization and the dominance of neoliberalism, there is a continuous growth in the powers of 
markets which has impacted significantly on the powers of the state. However, the importance of 
governments is not entirely diminished because the ‗re-asserted power of finance‘ recognises that 
governments play key roles in creating and maintaining markets, unlike the classical liberals, who 
believed that states should not interfere at all in the operation of the naturally occurring markets.
26
 
                                                             
22At least rhetorically – for as discussed below, the reality is often the opposite 
23N Burgi and PS Gollub, ‘Has Globalisation Really Made Nations Redundant?: The States we are still in’ (2000) 






 See Chapter Three, the section on the differences between classical liberalism and neoliberalism. 
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Even though the two concepts of neoliberalism and globalization are complementary and the 
application of one may lead to the actualization of the other, they are not the same. While 
neoliberalism purports to have global application, globalization is the tool through which the concept 
is disseminated internationally. As a result, globalization has become an important instrument for the 
actualization of the political project of neoliberalism. Shah supports this trend of argument and holds 
that it has come to be accepted that globalization is an instrument for international commerce and 
investment, allegedly required for all countries to advance reasonably and progress fairly.
27
 Who 
gains from the growth of international commerce and investment and in the spread of markets and 
market mechanisms? There can be only one answer – those with financial power.  
For Burgi and Gollub, therefore, it is apparent that globalization greatly aided the spread of 
capitalism internationally. The proliferation of this capitalist movement has created a new form of 
capital accumulation and global investment which has transformed virtually all aspects of society into 
commodities capable of being transacted in markets. This capitalist form is neoliberalism, which 
according to Harvey, is a political project that favours a particular class – the rich.28 Burgi and Gollub 
agree and similarly observe that the last three decades have witnessed the birth of a capitalist 
movement so enormous, that the old industrial capitalism has now been replaced by ‗finance 
capitalism‘.29  
According to Ireland, the term ‗finance capitalism‘ was first coined by the Austrian 
Economist, Rudolf Hilferding in 1910
30
 and was brought about by a development in which the 
economies of industrialized nations of the West became dominated by a relatively small amount of 
large incorporated corporations. This led to a form of capitalist inclination in which productive 
activity in the developed or capitalist world came to be dominated by high finance and the 
                                                             
27Anup Shah, ‘A Primer on Neoliberalism’ (2010) Global Issues <www.globalissues.org/article/39/a-primer-on-
neoliberalism> accessed  16 February 2013 
28 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) 79; The idea that 
neoliberalism is a project t for maintaining class power is discussed further below 
29
 N Burgi and PS Gollub (n 23); this finance capitalism is what sets the parameter of what should or should not 
be done and coerces all into a particular acceptable behaviour. 
30
 Rudolf Hilferding, ‘Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development’ (1910) Marxist 
Internet Archive <www.marxists.org/archive/hilferding/1910/finkap/> and accessed 2 April, 2013 
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‗marketization‘ of almost all corporate ventures.31 This has necessitated the claim that finance was the 
instigator of the transition to neoliberalism and that neoliberalism is best seen as the ideological 






INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL POWER 
 
The activities of international financial organizations in the governance and regulation of MNCs were 
highlighted in chapter Four. The point was made that these international institutions are merely 
working in partnership with the governments in Washington and London, who in turn are influenced 
by the owners and financiers of industries.
33
The argument is that with the ascendancy of neoliberalism 
and the ideological re-assertion of shareholder value, contemporary mechanisms of corporate 
governance have enabled a ‗small minority to appropriate a grotesquely disproportionate share of total 
social wealth and production, both nationally and internationally‘.34 Using their prevailing powers – 
through the various networks created – they have been able to dominate national and international 
arrangements, thereby determining and altering the direction of the social order.
35
  
The financial class created with the re-emergence of shareholder value, controls national 
financial and industrial systems, using their ‗power‘ over the transfer ‗of current funds through bank 
                                                             
31
Paddy Ireland (n 12) 4; Throwing more light on the intimate relationship between this new form of capitalist 
accumulation (neoliberalism) and finance, Ireland holds that “the key role played by the markets in the 
exercise of contemporary financial power also accounts for the close links between resurgent finance and 
neoliberalism, with its supposition that free markets- private, contractual, economic ordering and the 
unregulated forces of supply and demand- are the best ways to maximize not only freedom but also growth, 
wealth and welfare. See ibid, 22 
32
Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, ‘Costs and Benefits of Neoliberalism: A Class Analysis’ in Epstein (ed.) 
Financialization and The World Economy (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing 2005) 17 
33 See Chapter Four 
34
 Paddy Ireland, ‘Defending the Rentier: Corporate Theory and the Reprivatisation of the Public Company’ in J 
Parkinson, A Gamble and G Kelly (eds.) The Political Economy of the Company (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2001) 
35 ibid; see also C Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time  Vol. 1 -8 (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1986) <www.wanttoknow.info/war/tragedy_and_hope_quigley_full1090pg.pdf> 
accessed 7 February, 2014 
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loans, the discount rate, and the re-discounting of commercial debts‘.36 In similar vein, they control 
and influence national governments by dominating government loans and the operations of 
international foreign exchanges. With corporate shareholders elevated to a position of ‗glory‘ with the 
re-assertion of shareholder value, they have succeeded in establishing an international system where 
finance is in the management of a few private hands. Using international financial organizations such 
as the IMF, World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Switzerland, they ensure 




It has been suggested that the birth of this capitalist class – with the emergence of 
neoliberalism – led to the centralization of the hegemony of international finance. It equally led to the 
use of international organizations for the promotion of the interests of financiers, to the detriment of 
all other interests, including those that embrace moral imperatives such as CSR.
38
 With the process of 
globalization rendering national boundaries obsolete, the states of origin of financial elites and their 
corporations became less important and international agreements reached at international 




The following sections will now explore how these international organizations have aided and 
promoted the activities of resurgent finance, using policy packages which later came to be labeled ‗the 
Washington Consensus‘ and ‗the Post-Washington Consensus‘.  
 
The Washington Consensus (WC) 
 
The phrase ‗Washington Consensus‘ has been credited to the economist John Williamson, who coined 
it in 1989. At the time he articulated his view under the general title of the Washington Consensus, 
                                                             
36 C Quigley, Tragedy and Hope (n 35)  
37
 ibid  
38 ibid  
39
 L Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, (Oxford; Wiley-Blackwell, 2001) 1-352; see also W. Carroll, The 
Making of a Transnational Capitalist Class (London: Zed Books 2010) 1-320 
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there had been wide-spread crisis in the Latin American continent. The Institute for International 
Economics (IIE) organised a conference in which they sent out invitations to representatives of 10 
Latin American countries to participate. The representatives were expected to present papers on the 
crisis in their respective countries. In order to aggregate a mutual collection of questions for the 
representatives to address, Williamson wrote a paper – presented at the conference – where he 
enumerated a blue-print for reforming and solving the crisis in the Latin American economies. He 
labelled this reform agenda the Washington Consensus.
40
  
The Washington Consensus eventually came to be identified with what Thompson calls the 
triptych; liberalization, privatization and deregulation.
41
 According to Williamson, the ‗Washington‘ 
in the agenda includes ‗both the political Washington of Congress and senior members of the 
administration‘, as well as ‗the technocratic Washington of the international financial institutions, the 
economic agencies of the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the think tanks‘.42 
The ten explicit economic recommendations were: fiscal discipline; reordering public 
expenditure priorities; tax reforms; liberalization of interest rates; competitive exchange rates; trade 




The term has come to refer to one of two things. In the first instance, it may be used to refer to 
market responsive guidelines which were used for both the developed and the developing economies. 
On the other hand, it has also been used to cover policies prescribed only for developing countries, for 
the reduction of budget deficits, deregulation and liberalization of commerce and transnational 
investments.  
                                                             
40G Thompson, ‘Wither the “Washington Consensus”, the “Developmental State”, and the “Seattle Protests”: 
Can “Managed Free Trade and Investment” Become an Alternative Development Model?’(2002) E-Journal Vol. 
33(131) 221 <www.ejournal.unam.mx/pde/pde131/PDE13107.pdf> accessed 6th April 2011   
41 ibid 
42 John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus  (Fundación CIDOB Conference “From the 
Washington Consensus towards a new Global Governance”: Barcelona, September 24–25 2004) 
<www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf> accessed 12 March 2011 
43 John Williamson, ‘From Reform Agenda to Damaged Brand Name: A Short History of Washington Consensus 
and Suggestions for What to Do Next?’ *September, 2003+ Finance and Development, Vol. 40 (3) 
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/09/pdf/williams.pdf> accessed 12 March 2011 
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Williamson argued that the term Washington Consensus came to mean something he never 
intended and that the recommendations contained in his original paper were later implemented in 
ways different from his original intention. For instance, he argues that the second recommendation in 
his original paper was the re-ordering of public expenditures. This particular recommendation was 
eventually not part of what the Consensus came to be understood for. In fact, as practiced by the 
Washington-based financial institutions, the reverse was the case.
44
 
However, many critics disagree with Williamson. To this group, Williamson‘s Washington 
Consensus is exactly the same as Neoliberalism. Krever, for instance, argues that the policies 
deployed by the IMF and the World Bank already encompassed the policies long before Williamson 
coined his term in 1989. According to him; 
 
The neoliberal agenda that emerged was to become a familiar set of policies 
labelled the ‗Washington Consensus‘ by economist John Williamson. Deployed 
by the Bank and other mainstream development agencies throughout the 1980s, 
this agenda had by the time Williamson coined his term in 1989, gained 





From this point of view, Krever makes the case that the policy guidelines in the Washington 
Consensus were already being applied by international financial institutions, long before Williamson 
formulated his Consensus. After all, the market-oriented policies and reductions in government 
expenditures advocated by the Berg Report (commissioned by the World Bank in 1981) were reflected 
in the Bank‘s lending practises as early as 1982. The only thing Williamson did, the argument 
continues, was to bring these policies together under the heading of the Washington Consensus.
46
 
In practical terms, the Washington institutions (the IMF, The World Bank, The BIS etc), 
given the power to supervise the implementation of the recommendations by the economically hard-
hit countries, chose the policies that suited their neoliberal ideology, while ignoring the ones that did 
                                                             
44 John Williamson, ‘Did the Washington Consensus Fail?’ (2002) 
<www.iie.com/publications/papers.paper.cfmResearchID=488> accessed  25 April 2011 
45 Tom Krever, ‘The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law and the World Bank’s 





not advance liberalization, privatization and deregulation – i.e. neoliberalism. This led to the 
promotion and imposition of the neoliberal corporate governance framework, with its shareholder 
value bias on most countries in need of financial aid. 
 
 
The South-East-Asian Financial Crisis 
 
As was stated in chapter Three, the neoliberal approach to economic development had spread across 
many countries by the 1990s, irrespective of geographical divides. Through the application of the 
various structural policies embodied in the Washington Consensus, coupled with the proliferation and 
increase in the number of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment treaties, many state 
economies were opened up to international trade and commerce. The South-East-Asian countries were 
part of this liberalization process, though it has been argued that their own method of liberalization 
was not on all fours with the dictates of the neoliberal paradigm.
47
 At a time, the economies of these 
countries grew quite rapidly that they became known as the miracle economies of South-East-Asia. 
They were also used as examples of how neoliberalism can transform a country‘s economy for good.48 
However, this miracle economy did not last for long. By 1996-1997, there was an economic 
crisis in the region, of such a magnitude that the entire global financial system was threatened. As was 
reported by the IMF;  
  
The economies of East Asia, at the centre of the recent crisis have been some of 
the most successful emerging market countries in terms of growth and gains in 
living standards. With generally prudent fiscal policies and high private saving 
rates, these countries had become a model for others. That this region might 
become embroiled in one of the worst financial crisis in the post-war period was 
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The region became embroiled in financial crisis and by July 2 1997, the Central Bank of Thailand 
announced that it would let market forces determine the value of the Thai currency, the Baht. Until 
then, the Baht had been tied to a basket of currencies essentially based on the US dollar. The Baht 
immediately fell against the dollar by about 17 per cent and somewhat less against the yen. On 11 
July, the Central Bank of the Philippines announced that it too was abandoning the policy of 
defending its currency, and the Peso quickly dropped by 11 per cent. Malaysia followed three days 
later, and a month later, so did Indonesia. The South Korean Won, which had not been pegged, slid 
steadily throughout the summer.
50
 
A number of factors have been adduced as causing the economic crisis in South-East-Asia in 
1996-1997. For one, it is contended that an unsustainable current account deficit contributed in the 
crisis.
51
 Secondly, these countries were over dependent on short-term foreign funds.
52
 As Goldstein 
suggests;  
 
Heavy reliance on short term, foreign currency denominated borrowing makes it 
easier to get into a crisis and tough to get out of one, and when the true cost of 
this borrowing strategy are included in the over-all calculus, the true cost of this 





Thirdly, the regulation of the economy was very poor. It is argued that there was a dearth of 
regulatory structures for commercial activities, most especially as they related to banks. It was not 
necessary for the organizations to possess enough ‗equity in their balance sheets‘.54 As a result, they 
were exposed to critical levels of  the ‗moral hazard‘ crisis, which made the proprietors of these 
institutions to engage in extreme and usually unwarranted ‗risky lending‘, with the hope that they 
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would be bailed-out by the state if their ventures failed.
55
 Soederberg maintains that as far as the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) were concerned, the crisis was a result of both state and 
market failures. The state failed to properly supervise the financial actions of participants in the 
economy and in so doing, could not decrease the exposure of the financial and corporate sector to 
foreign exchange speculations. Furthermore, this was worsened by the very relaxed regulation of the 
financial sector, which in turn came about as a result of the high concentration in corporate 
ownership, otherwise known as cronyism.
56
 
Fourthly, it is argued that the greed and profit-oriented mentality of foreign investors 
contributed to the crisis. The suggestion here, which is also central to this chapter, is that the greed of 
foreign investors – a trait which is common to most neoliberal actors57 – was the reason for their 
unrelenting focus on returns. In any situation where there is borrowing, there is also lending. 
Conversely, where there is over-borrowing, there is also over-lending. The cause of the crisis was thus 
dual: the carelessness of domestic financial intermediaries and the greed of foreign investors insistent 
on maximizing profits to the detriment of the Asian economy.
58
 The international investors equally 
suffered from the moral hazard of over-investment and as a result, for as long as they made profits, 
they were not bothered about the perceived vulnerabilities existing in the Asian economy.
59
  
In reacting to the crisis, the international financial institutions – particularly the IMF – were 
mandated to help these ailing economies. The Fund gave out US$100 billion to help rescue Indonesia, 
Thailand and South Korea. For these financial institutions, the only way to ensure that there is no 
repeat of such a crisis was to eliminate the ‗legitimacy crisis‘ that was threatening to engulf the 
neoliberal ideology, as contained in the Washington Consensus policy package. In this context, the 
status-quo needed to be modified.  
For Stiglitz;  
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The US Treasury had during the early 1990s heralded the global triumph of 
capitalism. Together with the IMF, it had told countries that followed the ‗right 
policies‘—the Washington Consensus policies—they would be assured of 
growth. The East Asia crisis cast doubt on this new world view unless it could 
be shown that the problem was not with capitalism, but with the Asian countries 
and their bad policies. The IMF and the US treasury had to argue that the 
problem was not with the reforms-implementing liberalization of capital 






The reform of the Washington Consensus policy package had to be done in three ways. The first was 
to change the development theory underlying neoliberalism, through the incorporation of institutions 
in the market process and the importation and enshrining of the policy directives in national laws. 
This led to the Post-Washington Consensus era (discussed below) and to the adoption of the slogan 
that ‗institutions matter‘, beginning from the 2000s. The second was through the creation of the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) – later renamed the Financial Stability Board (FSB)61 – to oversee the 
operation and function of international financial systems. The third was through the imposition, on 






The Post-Washington Consensus  
 
As was discussed above, one of the ways through which the failed Washington Consensus could be 
reformed was to modify its core principles. Leaving markets to organize themselves was not yielding 
the desired results, thereby, rendering a higher level of institutional involvement necessary. 
Neoliberals now called on states to provide institutional supports to enable markets function 
effectively. It has been suggested that in order to prevent a re-occurrence of the financial crisis, some 
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states introduced different methods of financial markets‘ regulation, while others were compelled to 
standardize their financial sectors. In this context, Malaysia began to control its capital flow, Vietnam 
and China pursued successful state-oriented policies and other states in the region began to build up 
sovereign wealth funds (SWF) to eliminate dependence on IMF loans. From Chiapas to Argentina and 
the ‗battle of Seattle‘ in 1999, there was a growing emergence of economic and political legitimacy 
crisis directed at neoliberalism.
63
  
The protagonists of neoliberalism saw all these as threats to their hegemony and began to look 
for ways to solve the legitimacy crisis, without harming the principal idea of free markets. They 
advocated for the development of appropriate institutions and a greater role for states in supporting 
markets. Thus, the idea that ‗institutions matter‘ was introduced in the classical neoliberal literature. 
Neoliberals now realized that institutions matter – they matter not as institutions per se – but only 
when markets rely on them to function properly.
64
 
This change in policy towards ‗constitutionalism and governance‘ authorized a more active 
role for states, which amounted to an acknowledgement of the ‗revisionist accounts of the East-Asian 
successes‘.65 Neoliberals now saw the state as supplementary to markets and not a substitute for it. 
From anti-market, through market-conforming, to market-friendly, the state was seen in a more 
positive light. The neoliberals at the Post-Washington Consensus stage advocated for the use of 




The Post-Washington Consensus also approved the importance of ‗specificity‘ and advocated 
for the moving away from the former ‗best practice, one size fits all approach‘ that had been the 
hallmark of the Washington Consensus era. It advised that country specific institutions, based on a 
proper understanding of cultural values and social norms, should be incorporated into the neoliberal 
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agenda of the Post-Washington Consensus.
67
 This led, for instance, to the introduction of the OECD 
principles of corporate governance which was discussed extensively in chapter Four. 
In the final analysis, Sheppard and Leitner submit that the Post-Washington directive 
involved an innovative idea of policy instruments used as governance and poverty reduction 
alternatives to the seemingly failing ‗discourse of structural adjustment and privatization‘ formerly 
advocated by neoliberalism.
68
 According to them, ‗this shift was a failed response to the failures of the 
Washington Consensus to make good on its claims, to the 1997 Asia Economic Crisis, and to 
increasing trenchant contestations of neoliberalism in civil society and states‘.69  





THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM/ DISCIPLINARY NEOLIBERALISM  
 
As was discussed in chapter Three
70
, the fundamental assumption of neoliberalism is that a free 
market
71
 is the best means of ensuring the most-efficient allocation of resources and to the optimal 
maximization of economic growth, wealth and welfare for the benefit of society as a whole. In 
neoliberal ideology, politics (and by implication, the state) is made up of ‗self seeking bureaucrats and 
politicians with limited capabilities, operating under influences from interest groups‘.72 As a result, 
politics is an avenue for ‗sectional interests‘ which ‗distort the rationality‘ of the market imperative. 
Undeniably, neoliberal advocates assume that the inability of any economy to be deferential to the 
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governance mechanism of the free market is a formula for economic calamity, be it within an 
individual organization or that of the nation-state. This assumption has led to the ascendancy of the 
idea of ‗competitive deregulation‘.73 
In the last two decades, as a result, a significant feature of global ‗economic policy and 
development‘, has centred on the ‗revolution‘ created by resurgent neoliberalism. Within the same 
time, ‗the ambit and power of the market extended and extended again‘ as market imperatives were 
imposed on sectors formerly outside market jurisdictions and deepened in other areas where markets 
controlled initially.
74
 As Ireland observes;  
 
Financial markets have been transformed, with dramatic consequences, and 
organisational forms within both the private and public sectors have been re-
shaped. Out-sourcing and subcontracting have become the order of the day 
and markets and quasi-markets have appeared in sectors in which the 
operation of markets forces had hitherto been limited, most notably perhaps 





The transformation of financial markets is generally attributed to the slow destruction of welfare 
states and the momentous swing in the allocation of resources, nationally and internationally. In 
bringing about this transformation, neoliberals have utilized the major tools of privatization, 
liberalization and deregulation, terms that indicate the broadening of the reach ‗of private property, 
contract and market mechanisms, and to the free unhindered operation of those mechanisms once in 
place‘.76 These are concepts which neoliberals use to ‗de-politicise the economy‘, by limiting the 
reach of the state and ‗by reducing the room for policy discretion in those areas where it is allowed to 
operate‘.77 When this is done, they argue, efficient allocation of resources will be the end result. 
The practical application of these neoliberal concepts, through the exploitation of 
globalization, has seen the financialization of financial markets and deployment of market-based 
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structures, as a form of disciplinary mechanism over states. This form of ‗market rationality‘ requires 
structural reforms in many sectors including banking, corporate governance, tax administration, legal 
systems and property rights, etc. The requirements for restructuring in the various policy sectors 
operate as a ‗political counterpart‘ to the socio-economic authority of ‗market forces (or the 
dominance of disciplinary neoliberalism) and the power of capital‘.78  
Disciplinary neoliberalism ‗involves the extension of the processes of commodification and 
alienation based on the intensification of the discipline of capital in social relations‘.79 It insists that 
state action is necessary to guarantee social control and to provide laws and ‗coercive potential‘, 
which will ‗ensure that the owners of capital determine how production‘ operates. This process is best 
achieved through the imposition on states, of the ‗political-juridical form‘ of neoliberalism, eminently 
recognized as the ‗new constitutionalism‘. The new constitutionalism demands for a more conscious 
emphasis on actively moulding and reinforcing the state to provide a more stable political 
environment for capital. The essential nature of the new constitutionalism is made clearer in the words 
of Renato Ruggiero, a one-time Director-General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), who 
declared that ‗we are writing the constitution of a single global economy‘.80  
The new constitutionalism is the ‗quasi-legal restructuring of the state and internationalization 
of international political forms‘ which bestow ‗privileged rights of citizenship and representation on 
corporate capital‘.81 They are a set of projected changes with political and constitutional dimensions 
in the neoliberal scheme, ‗to politically ―lock-in‖ neo-liberal reforms‘ in the areas of ‗macroeconomic 
stability, protection of property rights and capital mobility‘.82 The purpose is to whittle down the 
power national politics exercises over markets.
83
 Inherent in the hegemony of the new 
constitutionalism is the fact that not only is the freedom of capital guaranteed, there is also the 
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imposition of binding constraints on the state‘s – internal and external –  macroeconomic, trade, 





The New Constitutionalism: Neoliberal Practice versus Neoliberal Theory – 
Entrenching the Power of Resurgent Finance 
 
These beliefs which underline neoliberal philosophy have been criticised by both lawyers and 
economists alike. Apart from the gulf between neoliberal rhetoric (anti-state, reduce state welfare 
etc.) and neoliberal practice (increased state support for finance),
85
 these critics have noted ‗the 
socially, politically and legally constructed nature of private property and exchange rights‘.86 As 
Ireland recounts, the underlying nature of property as a bundle of rights is always legally constituted. 
To this end, ‗markets are as much products of regulation as they are subjects of it‘.87 He refers to the 
writings of Robert Lee Hale,
88
 a legal critic of early twentieth century laissez-faire
89
, who observed 
that; 
 
 ...as property and exchange rights were to a significant extent socially 
(politically and legally) constructed, there was no such thing as an 
‗unregulated market operating according to purely ‗economic rationality. 
Like private property rights, markets could be (and were) legally and 
politically constituted in many different ways, generating different 
rationalities and different distributional outcomes.
90
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Markets, he continues, are not merely territories where people use their freedoms, but are also 
dominions of compulsion. This is because market participants, with the support of the state, utilize 
their rights – particularly those dealing with private property – coercively against each other. Markets, 
as a result, are actually ‗structures of mutual coercion‘.91 Hale is suggesting here that markets are sites 
in which power is exercised. The development and expansion of financial markets has enabled finance 
to exercise more and more coercive powers over other economic actors. 
From an economist‘s perspective, Chang similarly maintains that there are no free functioning 
markets. According to him, the materialization of markets was as a result of an intentional contrivance 
by the state, particularly during the early part of capitalist development. This is true, he argues further, 
because ‗even in the UK, where the market economy‘ is assumed to have been established of its own 
accord, ‗state intervention played a critical role in the emergence of individual markets and of the 
market system‘.92 
 He criticizes the highly political nature of property rights and other legal entitlements that 
neoliberalism assumes as given. He argues that the policies that were followed by the countries of the 
developed world – such as US and UK – when they were seeking development were not liberal. On 
the contrary, they were extremely proscriptive and anti-free market. By attempting to enforce 
neoliberal, free market policies on developing states, these developed countries are only acting like 
‗Bad Samaritans‘.93 
 In similar vein, Polanyi states that, ‗the road to the free market was opened and kept open by 
an enormous increase in continuous centrally organised and controlled interventionism‘.94 Again, 
Freeman observes that, ‗the US was the birthplace of the idea of infant industry protection‘95 and 
operated one of the most profound protectionist economies for more than a century, before the Second 
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 In reality, therefore, contrary to what neoliberals believe, there are no free unregulated 
markets. 
Furthermore, neoliberal critics point to the fact that neoliberal policies have not actually 
produced smaller states, despite anti-state rhetoric that accompanies them. Rather, neoliberalism has 
produced ‗a market state instead of a small state‘.97 As Plant argues, minimizing the state has proved 
politically impracticable, making neoliberals to converge instead towards utilizing the state as a tool 
for restructuring social institutions and bringing them into conformity with market imperatives – an 
undertaking that a small state cannot perform.
98
 Increasing the power of the state, he argues further, 
despite what its theory says, ‗has always been the inner logic of neoliberalism, because, in order to 
inject markets into every corner of social life, a government‘ has to be substantially omnipresent. The 




What neoliberals have done is to strategically increase the positional power of neoliberal 
ideas and their application in the practices of key social institutions – including the state, market, 
schools hospitals etc. This situation is made possible by the ‗re-configuration of power relations, a re-
distribution of wealth and the intensification of new patterns of social and economic inequality‘.100  
Put in another way, what the neoliberals have done is to significantly reconstruct market 
relations, by effecting radical changes to prevailing structures of legal rights, in order to enhance the 
coercive power of owners of capital and their institutional representatives. This power of finance, of 
the owners of financial properties like shares, acting through their different representatives, explains 
the more arduous enforcement of shareholder value and why it undermines effective CSR. Perceived 
as the project of the shareholder class, the ‗free market‘ is used ‗not as an instrument of efficiency, but 
as an instrument of private power‘, as one of the strategic instruments through which ‗financial 
property owners can exert pressures on workers, on corporate managers and on states‘, in order to 
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guarantee that they appropriate a greater percentage of industrial and economic dividends 
internationally.
101
 For Dumenil and Levy, what is witnessed is the ‗attempt by a class of capitalist 
owners to restore, in alliance with top management, its power and income after a setback of several 
decades‘.102 Thus, while the overall economic record of neoliberalism may be poor, the widespread 
adoption of neoliberal policy programmes has generated major increases in income and wealth 
inequality, both within and between nations.
103
  
Harvey and Soederberg similarly argue that neoliberalism is indeed best seen as a political 
project to restore the power and wealth of capital and financial property owning elites. Thus viewed, 
they insist, there is a contradiction between the theory and practice of neoliberalism. For Harvey, 
there are two glaring disparities in proof of the rhetoric of neoliberalism. The first lies in the ‗need to 
create a good business or investment climate‘ for neoliberal actions. While some conditions for 
realising this objective, like ‗political stability or full respect for the law‘, are class-neutral, other 
conditions like ‗the treatment of labour and the environment as mere commodities‘, are biased, in 
favour of class power. Thus, where there is a conflict between business and society, neoliberalism will 
always side ‗with a good business climate, against the collective rights (and quality of life) of labour 
and the environment to regenerate itself‘.104 Secondly, as between the integrity of both the financial 
system (including the solvency of financial institutions) and that of the welfare of the public or 
environment, neoliberalism will be biased in favour of the former, against the latter.
105
As an example, 
neoliberalism – represented by the IMF and World Bank – will prioritize the needs of banks and 
financial institutions, while diminishing the standard of living of a debtor country through the 
imposition of structural adjustment programmes.
106
As a result, Harvey maintains that there is a 
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‗burgeoning disparity between the declared public aims of neoliberalism – the well-being of all – and 
its actual consequences – the restoration of class power‘.107 
For Soederberg, on the other hand, the actual purpose of the ‗good corporate governance 
measures,
108
 which neoliberalism coerces from mainly developing nations is to guarantee that 
investors – suppliers of finance and shareholders – enjoy the dividends of their investments. The 
claim that good corporate governance embodies ‗universal principles‘, for her, cannot be 
substantiated. By concentrating only on mechanisms for the realization of the Anglo-American 
neoliberal model, these measures are merely the means through which ‗the interests of foreign capital 
are protected‘.109  
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (discussed extensively in chapter Four) is a 
good example of such a mechanism. According to Soederberg, the principles were purportedly 
formulated to create ‗coherence‘ between OECD and non-OECD states, and to help both members 
and non-members ‗more efficiently reap the rewards of a neoliberal world order based on free market 
mobility‘.110 However and on the contrary, such policy directives as the OECD Principles are 
formulated purely to wear down national boundaries in the name of global stability, unlock new 
territories and ease the incursion of powerful transnational institutional investors into new markets in 
developing economies. In the end, the principles merely symbolize particular ‗material interests‘ 
associated with stock markets and powerful multinational corporations. They are only used as a 
disciplinary mechanism, to regulate the activities of budding economies better, rather than the 
fostering of development in these developing economics.
111
 
From the foregoing, it is suggested that the power of finance – supported and promoted by 
states
112
 and international organizations including the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank – having 
transformed shareholder value maximization into an economic imperative – acts as a political barrier 
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to effective CSR. To the financial interests involved, effective CSR impinges on profits and 
undermines class power. The growing power and continued hegemony of this political class 




CORPORATE MANAGERS AS BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE CSR 
 
In chapter Three, Friedman‘s contestation that the ‗business‘ of business is the maximization of 
shareholder value and that any consideration of other issues is a distraction at best, or a cost at worst 
was discussed. Following from this, neoliberals argue that managers who forfeit shareholder profit for 
social purposes like CSR ‗are in effect imposing a tax on their shareholders and arbitrarily deciding 
how that money should be spent‘, which means that they are practically ‗usurping the role of elected 
government officials, if only on a small scale‘.113 This apparently is against the tenets of SV primacy.  
In order to make corporate managers accountable to shareholders, neoliberals aligned the 
remuneration of managers‘ to the performance and share price of the corporation in the stock market. 
Through this alignment, there are good reasons for thinking that corporate managers have now 
become a political barrier to the realization of effective CSR. This is because under these 
circumstances, business comes first, social issues like CSR are relegated to the background and CSR 
initiatives are only considered relevant when they do not impinge negatively on corporate profits. 
Adams submits that the aligning of remuneration with performance ‗prevents widespread 
improvements consistent with social welfare‘.114 
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Through the mechanism of share options,
115
 for instance, managers become stock owners 
themselves and are incentivized to prioritize share profits above effective CSR. As a result, they 
become locked in a battle between supporting effective CSR – thereby suffering from dwindling 
personal income – and supporting shareholder value – thereby enjoying higher dividends from shares 
prices. In this context, the suggestion is that support for shareholder value has trumped pursuit for 
effective social welfare imperatives. By embracing the mechanism of performance related pay, 




Again, the fear of personal job losses, either through termination or through the operations of 
MCCs,
117
 imposes obligations on corporate managers to fight against the realization of effective CSR. 
In situations where corporate managers are inclined to relinquish a part of corporate profits to promote 
social causes, they could be fired as a result and their positions taken over by those who will prioritize 
profit. Viewed from this perspective, it appears reasonable to think that supporting effective CSR 




In contemporary societies, corporate managers usually struggle with how to widen the gap 
between profits and costs, to enable the former outstrip the latter. In this struggle, expecting them to 
pay more attention to effective CSR appears untenable, since CSR will only narrow this gap. 
Ensnared by short-termism, managers appear unwilling to tolerate the cost imperatives of CSR, more 
so when they cannot promptly establish the financial gains of such activities.
 119
 As Adams reports, an 
interview-based research on managers in chemical and pharmaceutical corporations in the UK and 
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Germany found that managers see CSR projects as secondary to the major issue of economic 
performance.
120
 To this end, CSR practices of corporations are not likely to be effective. 
 Strandberg reports that in many cases; 
 
Boards and CEOs are under huge pressure from shareholders to deliver 
shareholder value through cost cutting. Under these conditions it is very 
tempting to turn a blind eye to CSR or the full implications of their choices 
and to initiate courses of action that lead to irresponsibility. (The BP Texas 
oil refinery deadly explosion was cited often as an example of this in which 
while BP is perceived to have strong CSR values at the top, yet management 





Following from these arguments, corporate managers subject issues of CSR to ‗financial 
calculations‘, in the same way as other business ventures. The question they eventually ask 
themselves is; what is the performance of a CSR initiative going to cost us? The fear of slashed 
remunerations, job losses and outright takeovers by other corporations force managers into opposing 
effective CSR initiatives.  
By aligning managerial remuneration with share price and performance, structural and legal 
imperatives have apparently permitted a merely ameliorative form of CSR, with corporate managers 
arguably acting as barriers to the realization of effective CSR. It is suggested that effective CSR will 
be supported by corporate managers, not only when they are made to understand that performing 
useful CSR initiatives for the benefit of society as a whole is a by-product of the pursuit of 
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Political Barriers to Effective CSR in Nigeria  
The Power of Resurgent Finance 
 
As was discussed in section one above, the new constitutionalism – that is the ‗quasi-legal 
restructuring of the state and internationalization of international political forms which bestow 
privileged rights of citizenship and representation on corporate capital – created a class of financial 
interests who support and promote shareholder value. The argument was that the activity of these 
powerful financial elite invariably acts as a political barrier to the realization of effective CSR. In 
similar vein, in section two of chapter Three, it was argued that Nigeria, much like many other 
developing economies that found themselves in financial difficulties, went to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the early 1980s for loans. The country was giving 17 
conditions to fulfil, in order to benefit from any loan facility from the international financial 
organizations. According to Adeyemo and Salami, these conditions were all linked to the structural 




Through the efforts of these international financial institutions, the country was pressurized 
into adopting and implementing far-reaching neoliberal reforms; mainly those of privatization, 
liberalization and de-regulation of many aspects of the country‘s economy. In pursuance of these 
neoliberal imperatives,  the country‘s borders were opened up to international market forces, with the 
intention that this will attract more foreign direct investments, foster economic growth and lead to the 
stabilization of the country‘s macro-economic system. It was also hoped that the adjustment 
programmes will lead to a reduction in the role that government plays in the provision of social 
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welfare to Nigerian citizens, bring about a reduction in the country‘s fiscal deficits, diminish public 
sector borrowing and aid the reduction of government subsidies towards unprofitable ventures.
124
 
Consequently, the country has witnessed an intensified deregulation in many sectors of the 
economy, especially the downstream sector of the Nigerian economy, privatization of most 
government-owned enterprises and the liberalization of trade and opening up of the country‘s borders, 
through the mechanisms of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. In the post-neoliberal 
Nigerian system, therefore, the process of the new constitutionalism has through the application of 




In this context, the downstream sector of the Nigeria economy has continuously been 
deregulated. The downstream sector is a term commonly used to refer to the refining of crude oil and 
the selling and distribution of natural gas and products derived from crude. Such products include 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), gasoline or petrol, jet fuel, diesel oil, other fuel oils, asphalt and 
petroleum coke. The downstream sector also includes oil refineries, petrochemical plants, petroleum 
product distribution, retail outlets and natural gas distribution corporations. Before the intensification 
of the process of disciplinary neoliberalism in the country, government regulated the sector and 
provided subsidies for the Nigerian citizens. The argument is that subsidies are economically 
beneficial in the sense that the lower prices are used to motivate specific economic segments or 
sections of the country.
 For example, it is used to ease the country‘s poverty level and enhance the 
enjoyment of energy resources. Again, at the communal level and for purposes of promoting 
collective interests, fuel subsidy is a veritable tool used to maintain employment, especially in periods 
of economic transition.
126
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The government has always maintained a high level of control over the downstream sector, 
especially through the provision of subsidies for internally used oil. The reluctance of many past 
governments in Nigeria to fully deregulate fuel price for local consumers reflect unease about the 
unfavourable effect of higher prices on household real incomes.
127
 Of specific concern is the effect 
this will have on lower-income households who are least able to soak up pressures that arise from the 
welfare cost of higher prices. Consequently, proof of the enormity of the welfare impact of fuel price 
hike, and how this is distributed across income groups, is usually an important and very critical 
consideration when deciding how best to protect households from higher fuel prices.
128
  
With the introduction of neoliberal policy packages in the country, however, and on the 
advice of the IMF and the World Bank, there have been important changes in this regard. Following 
the introduction of the SAPs of Ibrahim Babangida, successive governments have variously 
implemented polices geared towards the whittling down of governmental control and the eventual 
deregulation of the sector. In doing this, majority of Nigerians, already over-burdened by the effects 
of the structural adjustment programmes, continue to suffer as a result of the higher fuel prices.
129
  
In the area of privatization, until recently, Nigerian governments had participated in the 
ownership and management of enterprises. This tendency dates back to the colonial era, when the 
British colonial government owned most agencies including enterprises such as the Nigerian Railway 
Corporation (NRC), Nigerian Telecommunications (NITEL), Nigerian Postal Services (NIPOST) and 
others. With the introduction of neoliberal ideas and SAPs, successive governments – especially that 
of Obasanjo between 1999-2007– began to pursue an aggressive privatization of state-owned 
enterprises. In fact, the government did not restrict its privatization drive only to state enterprises. 
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Many other aspects of the economy, including education, health, pensions, power and 
communications were also privatized.
130
 
In the area of liberalization of trade, and in the spirit of the process of the new 
constitutionalism (as advocated by the IMF, World Bank and other international financial 
institutions), Nigeria has continued to open its economic borders and has joined a host of other nations 
in entering into bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. In this regard, Nigeria is a current member 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and as at the time of conducting this research, has entered 
into bilateral trade and investment agreements with many developed economies including; France 
(which entered into force 19 August, 1991); United Kingdom (11 December 1990); Netherlands (1 
February, 1994); Germany (20 September, 2007); Switzerland (1 April, 2003); Spain (19 January 
2006); and Sweden, signed on 18 April, 2002 (but yet to enter into force at the time of this 
research).
131




In theory, these bilateral and multilateral investment treaties are expected to protect and 
realistically safeguard the assets and treaty rights of foreign investors in a particular host-community. 
They are equally supposed to safeguard and insulate these foreign investors from political and other 
economic hazards which are common in many developing countries. Instead of being neutral, 
however, foreign investors are often granted higher security and better treatment than their local 
counterparts.
133
 Moreover, it is also argued that these BITs/MITs in developing countries like Nigeria 
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encourage the promulgation of twisted ‗government policies such as protective tariffs or tax 
incentives‘ in favour of foreign investors.134  
As a result of the lopsided nature of these investment treaties, the argument is that it is 
increasingly difficult for a developing economy such as Nigeria to encourage the growth and efficient 
operation of local businesses, in the midst of heavily protected and superior foreign investment. This 
situation is most evident in the oil sector, where foreign oil corporations have practically snuffed out 
the growth possibilities of local firms. For Neumayer and Spess, international investment treaties 
‗seriously restrict the ability of host-states to regulate foreign investment‘.135In similar vein, Elkins 
and others contend that as far as bilateral (and multilateral) treaties are concerned, ‗developing 
countries are trading sovereignty for credibility‘.136 
Through the joint implementation of these neoliberal policies (i.e. deregulation, privatization 
and liberalization), few local financiers and powerful MNCs are afforded more opportunities to 
pursue their profit accumulation tendencies with much more vigour. In this way, the convergence of 
ideological, political and practical forces propelling the process of economic globalization continues 
to move away from the Nigerian government (primarily responsible for the welfare of  its citizens in 
general), towards a handful of individuals and corporations. The financial interests, thus created, 
driven by the singular quest for short-term financial gains, dominate and in some instances, determine 
the country‘s economic and political arrangements.137 
It is argued that the ‗normative theories‘ promoting disciplinary neoliberalism as a public 
policy directive in Nigeria drew its inspiration principally from the vision ‗grounded in individualism‘ 
and the expanding domain of private property rights and intensified market forces.
138
 As a result, the 
re-asserted power of finance has unleashed ‗the competitive profit motive‘ in the political economy of 
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 The new constitutionalism in Nigeria has, therefore, translated into a system where few 
individuals now constitute the majority of property owning class, with most corporate and commercial 
profits swelling their pockets. In this context, the neoliberal concept of privatization for example, has 
allowed individuals to reap the advantages of the free market system, and arguably created a class of 




Furthermore, the argument that private capital accumulation in Nigeria has benefited the 
power of resurgent finance is evident, for instance, in the joint support for liberalization and 
privatization by the MNCs and the local elite, who both claim that liberalization and privatization 
would create wealth and generate employment opportunities for Nigerians. This collaboration is 
possible because the foreign investors (MNCs) have come to realize that they require the support of 
the local political and economic elite to succeed in their quest to replicate forms of capitalist relations 
similar to the ones they have at home.
141
 Conversely, the economic and political elite in Nigeria 




In this sense, Berkman (a former employee of the World Bank) contends that the development 
strategies forced by the international financial institutions (as symbolized in the Post-Washington 
Consensus package and the new constitutionalism/disciplinary neoliberalism) upon developing 
countries like Nigeria, beginning from the 1980s, have generally diverted development resources into 
the pockets of corrupt local elites and their corporate partners from industrialized countries. This 
imposition of neoliberal imperatives, according to him, has created a minority class of wealthy 
individuals and a widening gap between the rich and the poor.
143
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As a result, the  international financial institutions, prodded on by international investors and 
multinational corporations, are often motivated by the need to advance the interests of the investors 
and that of the local elite, rather than by the interests and welfare of the generality of the people in 
these developing countries. According to John Perkins, (who worked as an international consultant for 
many years), the international financial institutions, some developed countries (for instance the US) 
and multinational corporations persuaded other foreign governments (like Nigeria) to enter into 
various kinds of economic arrangements and contracts, and into accepting billions of dollars of loans 
from the international financial institutions, to ‗build infrastructure that they could not afford‘, and in 
the process, enrich a few local and foreign financial investors.
144
 
Korten further expounds on some of the arguments underlying the contentions of Berkman 
and Perkins. According to him, the allegiance of the world‘s MNCs is ‗purely to further their own 
bottom lines‘, and not to promote ‗national or local interests‘. In this context, investors are less 
concerned with advancing national goals than with pursuing objectives which advance the interests of 
the shareholders – including growth, profits and market power.145 Much like the European powers that 
colonized territories in other continents, mostly because they wanted to establish bigger markets and 
channels to further intensify their investment motives, international investors (including multinational 
corporations) search for markets and outlets through which there surplus capital can be re-invested, in 
order to accumulate more profits. These channels and outlets are radically extended when countries 
sign free trade agreements and adopt economic reform policies like the SAPs, liberalization and 
privatization, which are generally promoted by the World Bank and the IMF.
146
 
As evidence of the collaboration between international investors and local elites, a leaked 
document from the US Embassy by Wiki Leaks shows how the oil MNC, Shell, has been complicit in 
the country‘s political and economic arrangements. In the document, Ann Pickard, then Shell's vice-
president for sub-Saharan Africa, informed the US Ambassador to Nigeria, Robin Renee Sanders, in a 
confidential memo from the US embassy in Abuja on 20 October 2009, that;  
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Shell had seconded people to all the relevant ministries [in the government 
of Nigeria] and that Shell consequently had access to everything that was 





This information supports the argument that Shell (and indeed many other MNCs in Nigeria) has a 
‗vice-like grip‘ on the country's oil wealth. Akpobari states that MNCs and the political elite in 
Nigeria are two sides of the same coin. According to him, the MNCs in Nigeria have become even 
more powerful than the Nigerian government and are everywhere and have an eye and an ear in every 
ministry in Nigeria.
148
 This argument is supported by Amunwa, who contends that even though MNCs 
claim that they have nothing to do with local politics, in reality however, they work ‗deep inside the 
system, and has long exploited political and economic channels in Nigeria to their own advantage‘.149  
This ‗collaboration‘ for economic gains has resulted in a ‗healthy‘ relationship between the 
Nigerian political/economic elite and the international investors represented by oil MNCs. Thus, 
MNCs have been able to use their immense capital to infiltrate and persuade domestic economic and 
political actors to pursue their special interests. Through this partnership, the MNCs end up enriching 
both their international shareholders and the local economic and political elite. Issues of host-
communities‘ welfare, environmental protection and preservation and respect for ecosystem limits – 
subjects of sustainable development and effective CSR – are thereby relegated to the background. 
 
II 
Institutional Corruption in Nigeria: A Political Barrier to Effective CSR? 
  
In Nigeria, as in many other African countries, issues of corporate governance are usually debated 
alongside the problem of institutional corruption, which has acted as an impediment to the realization 
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of socio-economic and political development of the continent. It is, therefore, not surprising that in 
recent years, issues of corporate governance in the continent have been earmarked as ‗one of the most 
useful tools for reducing corporate corruption.
150
 As Adegbite submits; 
 
In the wake of the financial crises of the late 1990s, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) emphasized the major role that the 
observance of international standards and codes of best practices can play in 
strengthening national and international financial systems. They therefore 
called for the preparation of Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC), which constitute an assessment of the degree to which an 





In its 2011 ROSC (accounting and auditing) on Nigeria,
152
 the World Bank, while re-iterating the 
contents of an earlier report in 2004,
153
 suggested that corruption is a principal impediment to the 
realization of development in the country. The reports declared that there is a broad-spectrum descent 
in the quality of standards‘ observance amongst stakeholders in Nigeria, attributable to the corrupt 
practices of these officials.
154
 
Though the problem of corruption is wide-spread in Nigeria, it appears to be worse in the oil 
sector. As Gandy suggests, corruption in Nigeria is generally attributed to oil. This is because ‗oil 
does not just dominate economic life; it also dominates politics‘ in the country. As a result, the 
politics of Nigeria is classified as ‗authoritarian governmentality‘, ‗petro-capitalist‘ or petro-business. 
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In this context, ‗the Nigerian government operates with corporate oil interests‘ and not the livelihood 
or well-being of its citizens.
155
 
 In the last three decades, the allegation is that Nigerian state officials, in conjunction with 
employees of oil corporations, have engaged in various acts of corruption. This manifests not only in 
the way the sector operates, but also in the relationship between the government and the oil 
corporations. Even though Nigeria is by no means a small country – its population today is estimated 
to be over 160 million
156
 – the suggestion is that oil MNCs have besieged the country and used their 
influence and power to ride roughshod over the country‘s legal and regulatory systems.157  
Critics support this assertion by stating that while the oil industry has witnessed considerable 
infrastructural development, ordinary Nigerians lack basic social amenities necessary for their 
subsistence. The progress recorded in the areas of high speed transportation of oil and advanced 
exploratory devices have unfortunately not been replicated anywhere else in the country. Beginning 
from the 1970s, through what has been labelled a corrupt alliance, it is suggested that the state has 
transferred allegiance and accountability from local communities to MNCs.
158
 
As Obi, recounts; 
 
Oil MNC‘s are much richer than the individual petro-states with which they 
do business. Such states are not accountable to their citizens as they live off 
external oil rents, while the companies are not accountable to the citizens of 
the countries that they do business with. As such it is often easy for the 
transnational partners to collude and unleash violence when their interests in 
oil extraction are threatened.
159
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In similar vein, while commenting on the level of corruption in the oil industry, the Secretary of the 
Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI),
160
 Orji Ogbonnaya Orji, stated that,  
 
…the massive corruption [which] had been perpetrated in the oil sector of 
the country‘s economy were not surprising given the prevailing poor 
institutional linkages, infrastructural weakness, governance and process 
lapses as well as some kind of impunity which appear to frustrate all efforts 
at enthroning openness, transparency and good business ethics in the oil and 





Shell, ExxonMobil and other oil corporations in the country have all been variously accused of 
complicity in encouraging corruption in the oil sector.
162
 However, they are not alone. Numerous other 
MNCs have been indicted for encouraging corruption in the oil industry. In 2003, Halliburton
163
 was 
indicted – in conjunction with other MNCs – of corruption charges. In the Halliburton‘s case, in 1999, 
a US$4 billion gas plant was earmarked for construction in Bonny Island, off Nigeria‘s coast. Contract 
was granted to a consortium of MNCs, with Halliburton‘s subsidiary in the country as a principal 
partner. The other MNCs involved included; Brown & Root (the British Subsidiary of Halliburton), 
Technips of France, Spamprogetti of Italy and JGC Corporation of Japan. A total consultancy fee of 
about US$137 million was allegedly paid to Nigerian officials and foreign consultants in order to 
prevent competitive bidding. Jeffery Tessler, the foreign consultant hired by Halliburton, was paid 
US$32.5 million to sustain beneficial dealings with government officials.
164
 Halliburton admitted to 
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the US Security and Exchange Commission that its junior cadre staff had bribed employees of the 
Nigerian Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) in other to gain advantageous tax concessions.
 165
  
In 2007, Vetco Gray Controls Incorporated, Vetco Gray Controls Limited and Vetco Gray 
UK Limited, subsidiaries of Vetco International Limited, all admitted complicity in a bribery 
allegation amounting to US$2.1 Million, offered to staff of the Nigerian Customs Service to obtain 
trade favors. In the same vein, a former manager of Wilbros Group
166
 was convicted of bribery 
allegations worth US$6 Million, made to obtain a contract to construct gas pipelines in Nigeria worth 
US$387 Million. Within the same time also, Siemens was found guilty by a court in Germany of 
having paid bribes to Nigerian officials to the tune of 10 million Euros.
167
 
In view of this situation, Okorie alleges that;  
 
Over the decades of oil production, the severe corruption problem at the 
federal level has seeped down to local levels, to the heads of the 
communities in the Niger Delta. With numerous complicated layers 
composing the system of bribery, payoffs and kickbacks, oil-motivated 
crime and conflict between indigenes and the government-backed 
multinationals, have given rise to unsafe, violence-ridden communities. 
These problems have been worsened by a chronic lack of transactional 
transparency and concern for the welfare of indigenes. Federal and state 
government officials, the military, representatives of multinational oil 
companies, heads of local communities, and gangs have jointly woven the 





In summarizing the points made in this section, it has been suggested that due to the huge and largely 
unjustified profits which oil business represents, it has come to be the overriding economic sociology 
in the governance philosophy of the Nigerian state. This has led to the massive centralization of 
activities in the sector and symbolizes the negative alliance between state and capital. Using the over-
reliance on oil by the Nigerian state to their advantage, oil corporations initiate and encourage 
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The argument is that in a situation where the ruling elite deploy governmental might to 
preserve and protect oil wealth at all costs, the Nigerian state inevitably acts like a ‗corporation‘, for 
the purpose of aiding oil MNCs.
170
 The system which this engenders translates to one in which local 
communities are neglected, host-communities‘ welfare are seldom discussed, and effective CSR is 
seen as an obstacle to the business of profit accumulation.  
Viewed from this perspective, it appears reasonable to argue that corruption is a political 





In this chapter, it has been suggested that apart from the ideological and practical barriers to effective 
CSR discussed in the preceding chapters, there is another barrier; the political barrier, made possibly 
by the activities of the re-asserted power of finance. The chapter began by looking at the concept of 
globalization and how it has aided the spread of disciplinary neoliberalism and the power of finance 
internationally. It equally explored how international financial organizations – The IMF, the World 
Bank etc – use policies linked to the Washington Consensus and the Post-Washington Consensus to 
promote a new form of constitutionalism, which merely promotes the interest of financial elites. The 
chapter contended that the effect of this new constitutionalism has led some critics to conclude that 
neoliberalism is a class project aimed at protecting and furthering the interests of financial elites. The 
chapter equally discussed the activities of corporate managers and suggests that it is arguable that 
corporate executives are now themselves one of these financial interest groups, even if their interests 
seem at times to conflict with those of shareholders.   
                                                             
169
Michael Watts, ‘Resource Curse?  Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’ (2004) 
Geopolitics Vol. 9 (1): 50–80 at 60 
170
Cyril I Obi, ‘Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Niger Delta’ (2010) 
Canadian Journal of Development Studies Vol. 30(1–2) 222 
315 
 
The chapter also looked at the activities of the new constitutionalism in Nigeria and how, 
through its protection and promotion of the power of finance, it has contributed to the establishment 
of a financial class whose interests are fundamentally antithetical to the realization of effective CSR in 
the country. The chapter finally examined the problem of institutional corruption in the country and 
argued that the ‗slick alliance‘ between oil corporations and the Nigerian government officials, has 
become a major political barrier to the realization of effective CSR in the Niger Delta and Nigeria.   
The chapter concludes with the argument that the activities of this powerful financial interests 






IS CONTEMPORARY CSR AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE NIGER DELTA 
CRISIS? 
 
From the findings in Part One of this thesis (chapters one and two), there are good reasons to conclude 
that the experience of people in the Niger Delta suggests an ineffective CSR, despite the claims of oil 
MNCs. In Part Two (chapters three, four and five), a number of inter-connected but distinguishable 
barriers to effective CSR were identified and separated for purposes of analysis: ideological, practical 
and political. The Part also explored these barriers to effective CSR in the Nigerian context and 
argued that their existence and operation in Nigeria renders it unlikely that CSR, in its contemporary 
form, will do much to resolve the problems in the Niger Delta. In this final section, the thesis shall 
conclude by bringing all the points and arguments together. 
 
Main Ideological Barriers to Effective CSR: Neoliberalism and Shareholder Value 
 
The thesis has argued that shareholder value arose out of the campaign by inactive, uninvolved 
shareholders with completely financial – and habitually short-term – interests, functioning through an 
assortment of various kinds of financial arrangements, to re-assert their power over corporate 
activities. Endowed with absolute control rights, this powerful group function actively in financial 
markets and in MCCs, intermittently prevailing directly in corporate decisions. This exploitative class 
have dominated corporations, and imposed shareholder value obligations on corporate managers, 
which the latter must fulfil in order to survive. 
 In chapter Three, it was contended that there is a fundamental tension between ideas about 
the desirability of socially responsible corporate behaviour (CSR) and the belief that it is to the benefit 
of society as a whole for corporations to be run solely in the interest of their shareholders, and for 
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managers to seek to maximize shareholder value. The first (and perhaps most obvious) barrier to 
effective CSR is, therefore, ideological. 
In the context of examining the underlying tension between the ideas of neoliberalism (and 
shareholder value) and that of effective CSR, it was argued that neoliberal societies are generally 
classified as „societies of traders relentlessly striving to improve their financial positions‟, in a state of 
unhindered natural selection. They are societies in which it is normal and legitimate to acquire 
unlimited material wealth, as long as it is done through „voluntary agreement instead of force‟.1 
Accordingly, an „open-ended‟ maximization of economic gain is a cardinal norm which drives the 
neoliberal theory and in any society where the theory is practiced, the successful trader is the one who 
strives to accumulate more profits, notwithstanding previous accomplishments in profit aggregation, 
or the effects of his actions on others. Indeed, maximization is the „hallmark‟ of neoliberalism, while 
restraining economic activities to only those things that are essential for one‟s requirements (including 
ideas such as CSR) are the product of economic traditionalism and collectivism. In a neoliberal 
economy, therefore, maximization is rational, normal and legitimate, while traditional and effective 
CSR is not.  
Going further, it was also suggested that the intrinsic vitality of neoliberalism as a social order 
is strengthened by the existence of „competitive pressures‟ in its free markets. Competition compels 
actors to endlessly scrutinize their place and actions, in connection with the conduct of competitors 
and that of society, and encourages the development of an approach of undeviating vigilance. It exists 
in situations „where there is a social licence for actors‟ to strive and advance their status to the 
detriment of others. An authorization to compete entails an authorization to act in ways that are the 
opposite of shared objectives. As a result, „capitalism is characterised by a high reward for those 
actors who skilfully and innovatively breach norms of solidarity in order to enrich themselves, even if 
this means impoverishing others who are less successful‟.2 
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Political Economy’ (2011) Socio-Economic Review Vol. 9 143 
2
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In this context, it was argued that the authorisation to compete in the maximization agenda 
bestows on the capitalist actor an extraordinary and inventive re-interpretation of prescribed collective 
norms, with the aim of deviating from them in a legally incontrovertible manner. This imaginative 
construal requires a deliberate lack of „good faith‟, evidenced in the shape of a strong-minded 
denunciation of the collective familiar conception of what the norm in question means, coupled „with 
an under-socialised attitude‟ of ingenious pragmatism when it comes to social rules. Neoliberal actors, 
in essence, are „socialized in a culture in which the deliberate outwitting of social rules is an 
approved, and indeed prestige carrying behaviour‟.3       
This culture makes discontentment with present situations a major characteristic of neoliberal 
capitalism. As Utting submitted, the reason why conventional capitalists have shown remarkable 
capacity to accommodate opposition and resistance, and to deal with crisis conditions and 
contradictions by developing new institutions – through the reform or strengthening  of existing ones 
– is because they are „born opportunists‟ in matters of collective stability and harmony.4  
In similar vein, McBarnet contended that corporate capitalists are exceptionally proficient at 
discovering „dubiously‟ legitimate methods of evading „regulatory control‟, by applying the genius of 
„creative compliance‟ – or what Boltanski and Chiapello identified in chapter Three as the „motivating 
spirit of capitalism‟ – in order to „simultaneously escape legal control and any threat of penalty for 
doing so‟.5 The culture which this engenders is one in which people always look for ways to convert 
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By destroying collective and institutionalized social arrangements, through opportunistic and 
greedy activities, modern corporations use CSR codes and declarations as alternatives to the destroyed 
social arrangements. Kinderman argued that the establishment and growth of business-led CSR is 
associated with the erosion and dismantling of institutionalized social solidarity.
7
 To him, 
contemporary CSR is not a countervailing force that follows neoliberal market exposure; rather, it is 
the alternative to an already decimated institutionalized social solidarity. Accordingly, both in the US 
and the UK, (where shareholder value is championed), the chronological route to contemporary CSR 
surfaced as an integral aspect of the triumph of „business over institutionalised social solidarity‟.8 
 As a consequence, the increase in contemporary CSR practices is attributed to the triumph of 
neoliberalism, the dismantling of the Keynesian hegemony and the systematic modification of 
capitalism beginning from the 1970s. It was used to support the authority of private commercial 




Since this form of CSR is based on a „market driven logic‟, it is intrinsically limited to those 
circumstances where „a business case for CSR‟ is projected. The interpretation of contemporary CSR 
as a discipline of voluntary interest, aids in clarifying how the contradictions of shareholder value and 
social responsibility are contemporarily re-united. CSR implementation is, thus, meticulously united 
with the „business case and market logic‟ of private corporations, leading Aguilera and others to 
suggest that, „it is more strongly shaped by the instrumental motives relative to moral or relational 
demands for CSR‟.10  
The argument was that contemporary CSR is devoid of the „radical spirit‟ with which CSR 
was identified in the 1950s and 1960s. According to Newell and Frynas, contemporary CSR is little 
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 Daniel Kinderman, ‘The Political Economy of Corporate Responsibility Across Europe and Beyond: 1977-2007’ 
(2010) Unpublished PhD Dissertation cited in Daniel Kinderman, ‘Free us up so we can be Responsible! The Co-
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8 Daniel Kinderman, ‘Free us up so we can be Responsible! The Co-Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Neo-liberalism in the UK, 1977-2010’ (2012) Socio-Economic Review Vol.10 32 
9 ibid, 33 
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 RV Aguilera, D Rupp, CA Williams and J Ganapathi, ‘Putting the ‘S’ Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
Multi-level Theory of Social Change in Organisations’ (2007) Academy of Management Review Vol. 32, 836-863 
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more than a public relations tool adopted by MNCs to ward-off criticisms, win detractors and at the 
same time potentially capitalize on „emerging business opportunities associated with doing and being 
seen to be doing good‟.11 Viewed from this perspective, contemporary CSR is merely an aspect of a 
broader understanding „of “enlightened” shareholder value‟.12 Such business case situations are only 
capable of provoking insignificant adjustments that fail to tackle systemic un-productivity and 
governance insufficiencies in most economies.
13
  
Apart from being an avenue for profit maximization, declaring a commitment to CSR helps to 
anticipate and prevent any form of government regulation. As Gjolberg submitted, deliberate 
approaches to CSR by corporations are sufficient indication of how corporations rally against 
expected regulations and use voluntary proposals to contain criticisms. The result „is a regulatory 
capture in which the regulation (or lack thereof) favours the interest of the regulated rather than the 
public interest and common good‟.14   
It was contended that as a result of the breach in governance and „regulatory failure‟ 
occasioned by neoliberal shareholder value obsession, and the inability of governments to control the 
excesses of corporations, civil society organizations became discontented with the activities of 
modern corporations and began to target them directly. Corporations then resorted to CSR as a kind of 
forced reaction to civil society attacks. In this context, it was suggested that the proliferation of 
corporate codes of conducts from the 1980s was mainly as a result of the influences and pressures 
applied on corporations by civil society movements. By engaging in CSR-linked projects, the thinking 
was that corporations will eventually evade the assessment that they are insensible, callous and 
heartless. These projects will convey the emotion that as a minimum, corporations are doing well, 
thus, drawing criticisms away from themselves. With the reception and dominance of the neoliberal 
                                                             
11 Peter Newell and JG Frynas, ‘Beyond CSR? Business, Poverty and Social Justice; An Introduction’ (2007) Third 
World Quarterly Vol. 28 (4) 670 
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theory in Nigeria, the ideology of shareholder value has become the dominant corporate governance 
model in the country. As a result, this insincere model of CSR is also applicable in the Nigerian 
situation. As was discussed in chapter three, this form of CSR appears ineffective, both in the Niger 
Delta specifically and, perhaps more generally.  
Viewed from this angle, it appears reasonable to conclude that neoliberalism and shareholder 
value are the main ideological barriers to effective CSR. 
 
Major Practical Barriers to Effective CSR: Contemporary Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms 
 
The barriers to effective CSR are not only – or largely – ideological. If it were to be, there would 
clearly be hope for effective CSR: all its supporters would have to do is to persuade corporations and 
their executives that they should take account of the wider social interest in their decision-making – 
either because it is worthwhile in itself or because (as many supporters of „stake-holding‟ have tried to 
argue) acting in a socially responsible manner is in the long-term interests of shareholders.
15
  
As was shown in chapter Four, there are good reasons for thinking that the barriers/obstacles 
standing in the way of effective CSR are not purely or even predominantly ideological. Indeed, it 
appears reasonable to think that achieving effective CSR will require much more than just winning the 
battle of ideas. In this regard, the thesis identified another related barrier that confronts the supporters 
of CSR; the practical barriers to effective CSR. 
In the said chapter, the various obligations imposed on corporate managers and how they have 
metamorphosed into key practical barriers to effective CSR were examined. The implication of the 
belief that corporations should profit maximize, it was suggested, found expression in the claim that 
corporate governance is a simple agency problem: how do you get corporate managers to act in the 
interests of inactive and often dispersed shareholders? The mechanisms which were developed to 
solve this agency problem –  performance-related pay; the use of NEDs; the operation of MCCs and 
the stock markets – operate in such a way that they have incentivized corporate managers to maximize 
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shareholder value and get the share price of the corporations they manage as high as possible. 
Managers were compelled to do so in order to avoid the wrath of „the markets‟ and threats of 
takeovers. These entrenched mechanisms have led to an essentially Anglo-American market-based 
model of CG, championed and supported by international organizations such as the OECD, IMF, 
World Bank and the FSB. The consequence of this CG model is the financialization of corporate 
governance, short-termism, rent seeking, financial manipulation, engineering and fraud, productive 
decline, growing social inequality and environmental degradation.  
Since the Nigerian corporate governance model mirrors the neoliberal Anglo-American 
model, it appears reasonable to conclude that these mechanisms are equally present in the Nigerian 
situation. The contention, therefore, is that both in the context of Nigeria and in the global corporate 
governance system, there are good reasons for believing that the existence and operation of these 
entrenched mechanisms now constitute major practical barriers to effective CSR. 
 
Political Barrier to Effective CSR: The Power of Resurgent Finance 
 
As was discussed in chapter Five, the strengthening of the power of financial elites by international 
organizations, through the promotion of neoliberal economic policies, and the concurrent 
„disempowerment of the critics of finance‟, through the introduction of a string of democratic 
disengagements, led to the re-assertion of power by traditional elites. The highly restrictive class 
which this form of developmental process created established a „cosy‟ relationship with government 
officials and policy makers. Through the use of lobby and financial inducements, these financial elites 
were able to influence government policies towards the protection of their special interests, against the 
interests of the collective, including CSR.  
The existence and role of this powerful interest group
16
 contributed to the imposition of 
shareholder primacy and the entrenching of the corporate governance mechanisms discussed in 
chapter Four. In this context, it was argued that globalization aided the spread of neoliberalism. It was 
also argued that international organizations – through the application of the Washington Consensus 
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and Post-Washington Consensus policy packages – have helped to strengthen the power of this 
financial interest group. The suggestion was that the Post-Washington Consensus package is the 
precursor of what has been termed disciplinary neoliberalism or the new constitutionalism. The effect 
of this new constitutionalism has led some critics to conclude that neoliberalism is a class (political) 
project aimed at protecting and furthering the interests of „a financial elite‟. Arguably, the activities of 
this group explain the contrast between neoliberal rhetoric and neoliberal practice. 
Indeed, it is also arguable that corporate executives are now themselves one of these financial 
interest groups, even if their interests seem at times to conflict with those of shareholders. The 
conclusion, therefore, is that the activities of this powerful financial interests amount to political 
barriers to effective CSR. 
In the Nigerian context specifically, it was argued that beginning from 1986, when the 
international financial institutions‟ imposed structural adjustment policies on Nigeria, the interlocking 
of international investment laws through the application of the new constitutionalism, has led to the 
rise of a minority elite made up of a handful of local economic and political elite on the one hand and 
their foreign collaborators (in the form of MNCs) on the other hand. The collaboration between these 
international investors and the local economic and political elite has resulted in the domination of 
entrenched private interests and relegation to the background of collective interests like social welfare 
and effective CSR. To this end, the activities of this financial interest amounts to a political barrier to 
effective CSR. 
The problem of institutional corruption occasioned by oil business and the „slick alliance‟ 
between oil corporations and government officials were also highlighted. It was contended that 
corruption has become a major political barrier to the realization of effective CSR in the Niger Delta 










IS THERE HOPE FOR THE NIGER DELTA AND NIGERIA? 
 
Having identified the possible barriers that make contemporary CSR ineffective as a solution to the 
Niger Delta crisis, this thesis will suggest recommendations, which it is hoped, will help to scale 
down the crisis in the region. 
 
 
To The Nigerian Government 
 
As was discussed in chapter one, it is clear that the Nigerian government has failed to properly 
regulate the activities of oil MNCs in the Niger Delta region. As a result of the factors enumerated in 
that chapter, the legal framework for the regulation of the oil industry appears to be ineffective. This 
position is worsened by the fact that the various petroleum contracts which determine the roles, duties 
and responsibilities of parties do not make adequate provisions for the protection of the environment. 
It is recommended that the Nigerian government should devise an effective environmental policy that 
will properly regulate the conduct of economic actors in the oil industry. In recent years, government 
has introduced legislations (for instance the NESREA Act 2007) which ordinarily should adequately 
tackle issues of environmental degradation, but this has not been the case. It is, therefore, suggested 
that government should put in place effective machinery to ensure the strict enforcement of these 
legislations. It is not enough to create environmental legislations and agencies, when they are not put 
to their proper use.  
In this context, the recommendation is that the Nigerian government should establish strong 
and competent agencies, with the mandate to investigate and sanction oil MNCs found to be guilty of 
environment abuse. As was discussed in chapter two, failure of the oil MNCs to perform the negative 
injunction CSR duty is at the heart of the crisis in the Niger Delta. To this end, it is the duty of the 
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Nigerian government to put in place machineries for the investigation of alleged environmental abuses 
like oil spills, and sanction erring corporations appropriately. Allowing oil MNCs to transfer the 
negative consequences of their operations to the host-communities is not in the best interest of the 
communities.  
Furthermore, the Nigerian government should be pro-active enough to re-write the various 
petroleum contracts it has entered into with the oil MNCs, in order to include terms that will preserve 
and protect the environment. In chapter one, it was stated that this appears to be the current trend in 
many international investment contracts, and many other countries working in partnerships with 
MNCs have made provisions for the protection of the environment in their contracts and model 
investment treaties. There is no reason why the Nigerian government should not do so. The 
government should not compromise the welfare and survival of its citizens because of its profit-
motivated partnership with the oil MNCs. 
Again, in Nigeria, it is generally accepted that wide-spread corruption in the oil sector is a big 
barrier to effective CSR in the Niger Delta region. As was shown in chapter Five, corruption has 
become endemic in the Nigerian socio-political economy. It appears reasonable to conclude that it 
will be difficult to end the crisis in the region, except the Nigerian state purges itself of corrupt public 
officers who embezzle public funds meant for development purposes. The cankerworm of corruption 
and institutional decay manifests in public office holders condoning and in many cases encouraging 
the „gross violation of Nigerian laws‟ for personal advantages and corporate profits.  
In this context, the reality is that the overdependence of the Nigerian state on oil proceeds 
logically directs most of its policies „towards minimizing loss of oil revenue at the expense of 
environmental protection or the protection of citizens‟ rights‟.17As Ikporukpo pointed out over two 
decades ago, when the significance of oil to the Nigerian economy is considered, the negligence in 
implementing existing laws may in reality amount to a premeditated and conscious strategy to 
promote foreign direct investment in the country‟s oil industry.18 
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Oil revenues promote the volatility, insecurity, corruption, and patronage-driven politics 
which typify state authority in the country. Corruption, whether concerning government officials or 
encouraged by their inability to act, limits the country‟s earning prospects by „misallocating‟ revenues 
and contracts, remunerating incompetence and ineptitude, and by directly or tacitly encouraging the 
bunkering of the country‟s oil. Oil-related corruption equally damages the „national interest‟, by 
multiplying the quantity of money acquired through unlawful channels.
19
 
 In the final analysis, „responsibility and accountability‟ organizations, including the country‟s 
legislature, judiciary, anti-corruption institutions, civil society, media and citizens must exert 
meaningful efforts to provide adequate and efficient supervision of the oil sector, if the cankerworm 
of corruption is to be eradicated. It is accepted that all the listed organizations do not have the same 
capacity to influence governance processes. Nevertheless, where each group operates according to its 
capacity, there is no doubt that corrupt practices will be reduced, if not eradicated, and the application 
of effective CSR will be encouraged. 
 
 
To The Oil MNCs 
 
As was stated in chapter one, oil MNCs and other private corporations are expected to contribute 
positively towards the sustainable development of their host-communities. Apart from performing 
their obligations under national laws and according to the provisions of the contracts governing their 
commercial activities, they are also expected to act in a socially responsible manner. In chapter two, it 
was suggested that CSR is made up of positive affirmative duties, as well as duties to care for the 
environment – negative injunction duties. These duties are reciprocally strengthening.20 Adherence to 
the positive duties – by constructing class room blocks, roads, health clinics, etc – while 
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simultaneously neglecting the duty to the environment – through continued pollution of rivers and the 
environment, gas flaring, forest fires and causing acid rains etc –  does not support the claim that 
MNCs are being socially responsible. As was suggested in that chapter, Niger Delta inhabitants are 
mainly aggrieved with oil MNCs because of their inability of to perform the negative injunction duties 
and this lies at the heart of the crisis in the region. Host-communities allege that corporate activities 
have led to the environmental degradation and unsustainable development of the communities.  
The argument was that issues of water and air pollution, gas flaring, acid rains, inadequate 
clean up of oil spills and arbitrary waste disposal are environmental hazards which threaten the very 
existence of Niger Delta inhabitants. Many of the recorded demonstrations in the area were caused by 
the failure of multinationals to perform one or more of the negative injunction duties. It was 
contended that no amount of philanthropy – building of schools, hospitals, roads, etc – will prevail 
over the pollution of a river which is a community‟s only source of drinking water. The reasoning is 
that no amount of boreholes constructed by oil multinationals will cover the effects of gas flaring and 
acid rain on the inhabitants. It was suggested that if oil multinationals are actually committed to the 
spirit, as well as the letters of effective CSR, they must be ready to extend their dedication to 
development, beyond the current rhetoric. They will have to produce long-lasting blue-prints for 




Generally, it was argued that the pre-occupation of corporations in their relationship with the 
wider society should not be one of accumulating profits for shareholders by all means and then 
handing out a small portion of it to communities as philanthropy. It should be about how a corporation 
earns its money, how that corporation is run and how it interacts with communities. The MNCs in the 
Niger Delta appear not to have complied with this philosophy. Indeed, there are good reasons for 
thinking that the obvious inconsistencies between the theory of CSR and the practice of same by 
multinationals in the area, coupled with a significant dependence on a „blame-game‟ oratory regarding 
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the actual causes of oil spills, indicate an inherent acknowledgment of MNCs‟ failures to meet their 
corporate social obligations in the Niger Delta.  
It is asserted that contrary to the nature of the modern oil corporations, framed around the 
neoliberal free market rhetoric and propelled by profit accumulation and the supposition that all 
would gain from oil exploration activities, host-communities see oil MNCs as integral parts of 
communal existence.
22
 As a result, corporations are expected – like every other member of the 
community – to automatically confer with the people and take into consideration, community 
concerns in their decision making processes. They are equally expected to deal urgently with 
community matters and not wait until there is rebellion before doing so. In this context, oil MNCs are 
enjoined to see themselves, not as neutrals in the conflict in the region, but as partners and facilitators 
of social, economic and environmental development. 
On this issue of corporate-community partnerships, it was pointed out in chapter two that 
some oil MNCs in the Niger Delta have recently taken steps towards the introduction of the 
Corporate-Community-Partnership (CCP) initiatives in many Niger Delta host-communities. The 
introduction of these schemes is arguably predicated on the need to align corporate interests with the 
sustainable development of host-communities. The MNCs have also begun to adopt and use global 
memorandum of understandings (GMOUs) to design and implement development plans, in order to 
create and sustain a safe and peaceful working environment. Although these are welcome 
developments, the suggestion is that much still needs to be done, especially in the area of the duty to 
care for the environment. 
 
To the Niger Delta Communities 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Niger Delta host-communities may have legitimate grievances, it is also 
important for them to understand that they have a role to play in the de-escalation of the crisis and the 
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actualization of sustainable development in the region. In this context, their principal pre-occupation 
should be to work towards the preservation of the „carrying capacity‟ of the delicate Niger Delta 
ecosystem, and not the pursuit of monetary rewards. As was argued in chapter One, many inhabitants 
of the Niger Delta region have compromised their positions and are now pursuing selfish intentions or 
monetary rewards. It was suggested that some of the traditional chiefs and elites have forgotten their 
initial struggles for social and environmental justice, and have now become compensation 
professionals. They invent different schemes to obtain compensation from the government, oil 
corporations and international relief agencies. In situations like this, money meant for developmental 
purposes are usually diverted into private pockets, instead of being used to execute developmental 
projects in the communities. 
As a result, it is strongly recommended that members of the oil host-communities should 
eschew selfish economic pursuits and work instead towards the general development of the region. 
The militant youths should stop their acts of violence and work harmoniously with the government 
and the oil MNCs, in order to effectively utilize oil rents for the development of the region. 
In this context, the suggestion is that the advancement of monetary compensation to some 
members of the Niger Delta communities should be de-accentuated, and completely eliminated if 
possible. Rather than hand out money to community elites and traditional chiefs, both the government 
and oil MNCs should consult extensively with the communities and apply any due compensation fund 
towards the provision of agreed projects within the communities. This will generate a sense of 
belonging and the communities will believe that they are been carried along when decisions affecting 





From the arguments developed in this thesis, it appears reasonable to conclude that contemporary 
CSR is not an effective solution to the Niger Delta crisis. The thesis has argued that contemporary 
CSR, in its voluntary and ameliorative form, merely scratches at the surface of social responsibility. 
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In this context, the thesis suggests that any intention of making CSR effective in the Niger Delta, and 
perhaps more generally, will require challenging powerfully vested financial interests. It will equally 
entail challenging conventional wisdoms and understandings, one of the most important of which is 
the idea that shareholders are corporate „owners‟, which in turn underlies the belief that corporations 
should be run solely in their interests.
23
 
This will involve embarking on a programme of „institutional re-design‟, which would surely 
include a re-appraisal of the rights-obligations structures that make up modern corporations, 
necessitating a rejection of these structures as fundamentally unalterable „givens‟. It will compel a 
significant examination of the constituent elements of corporate rights and duties and a willingness to 
alter them. It will also require an analytical de-construction, and if necessary, a radical alteration in 
the nomenclature of shareholder rights. This process will require underlining the separation (both in 
law and in reality) of the corporation from its shareholders (particularly those with merely pecuniary 
interests). Put in another way, it will require taking separate corporate personality seriously. However, 




What this thesis has done is to investigate whether the CSR practices of the oil multinationals 
is an effective solution to the unrest in the Niger Delta region. In doing this, it gave an account of the 
history of the Niger Delta conflict and the CSR practices of the MNCs. In the course of the narrative, 
the thesis was able to identify and categorize for analytical purposes, a number of inter-connected but 
distinguishable barriers to effective CSR: ideological, practical and political. It argued that these 
barriers, rooted mainly in the Anglo-American neoliberal free market ideology, make it impossible for 
corporations to take CSR seriously and see the concept as anything beyond the business case. The 
thesis was also able to examine the processes through which the Nigerian state became commoditized 
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and offered to the highest bidders – the oil MNCs. Furthermore, it analysed the problem of corruption 
and how it now constitutes a political barrier to effective CSR in the Nigerian context. In the end, it 
suggested that it will be difficult to expect contemporary CSR to be effective as a solution to the 
Niger Delta crisis. 
In the final analysis, corporations desire to transmit „as much risk as possible to others‟, while 
permitting and encouraging those others to be ignorant of the actual character of such risks. 
Flourishing corporations „do not – and cannot – take into account the human victims of the collateral 
damage‟ arising from their activities. This accounts for why corporations are accused of being 
fundamentally immoral, notwithstanding the facade of „benevolent engines of growth‟ which they 
portray.
25
 The suggestion is that expecting contemporary CSR – on its own and in its voluntary form – 
to solve the Niger Delta debacle appears futile and meaningless. In the words of MacIntyre, „teaching 
ethics to traders‟ will be „as pointless as reading Aristotle to your dog. The better the trader, the more 
morally despicable they will be‟.26  
This does not mean that contemporary CSR is entirely without value. Being seriously 
committed to the negative injunction duties of CSR is a factor that can cloak corporate practices with 
a considerable degree of legitimacy and respectability. By engaging more in this duty, corporations 
will show that they are committed to both the spirit and the letters of CSR. Moreover, the Nigeria 
state has to curtail the level of corruption in the country and make efforts to properly regulate the 
activities of oil MNCs. This will encourage and ensure the equitable distribution of the country‟s 
abundant resources. Perhaps, it is only when these are done that effective CSR will be realized in 
Nigeria and the Niger Delta specifically. 
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